Stallings v. Santander Consumer USA

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 14, 2026
• Docket: 1-25-0554
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 250554-U

FIRST DISTRICT SECOND DIVISION April 14, 2026

No. 1-25-0554

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). __________________________________________________________________________

LENORA STALLINGS, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County, Illinois vs. ) ) No. 23 M1 112308 SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC., ) RECOVERY SERVICES LLC, and ROSE ) Hon. Maria M. Barlow, TOWING-SKOKIE, ) Judge Presiding ) Defendants-Appellees. ) __________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Van Tine and Justice D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Affirmed. Appellant failed to establish any error in dismissal of fifth amendment complaint.

¶2 Plaintiff Lenora Stallings, acting pro se, filed this lawsuit over the repossession of her

automobile for nonpayment. The lienholder of the car was defendant Santander Consumer USA,

Inc., while the other two defendants—Recovery Services, LLC and Rose Towing-Skokie—were

the parties that repossessed the vehicle.

¶3 Plaintiff’s original complaint and the four amended complaints that followed did not

identify a cause of action. But her fifth amended complaint alleged seven. The complaint gave a

title to each count: (1) a due-process violation; (2) breach of contract; (3) harassment; (4) No. 1-25-0554

defamation; (5) a violation of the Fair and Accurate Credit Reporting Act; (6) a violation of the

Fair Debt Collection Act; and (7) conversion. In addition to these titles, each of the seven counts

also purports to allege violations of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act. Plaintiff

seeks damages in the amount of $30,000.

¶4 The circuit court dismissed the fifth amended complaint with prejudice under section 2-

615 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2024). Plaintiff appeals.

Unfortunately, there are severe deficiencies with her appellate brief that make our review

impossible.

¶5 The most glaring problem is that plaintiff never claims that the circuit court erred in

dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Her brief does not ever address the complaint’s alleged

pleading deficiencies. Nor does she argue that the court abused its discretion by not allowing her

to replead the complaint for a sixth time.

¶6 Her statement of jurisdiction, though checking the correct box for the appropriate

supreme court rule providing jurisdiction, complains that “[e]vidence was excluded in the final

judgment. Exhibits & Motions filed w/case was not discussed.” Her statement of facts, which

never once cites the fifth amended complaint or anything else in the record on appeal, is a nearly

eight-page narrative of the evidence plaintiff presumably intends to prove.

¶7 Her argument section similarly contains a list of grievances against defendants with the

occasional sprinkle of legal conclusions. For example, she writes in her brief that, in

repossessing her vehicle, defendants “violated cease & desist letter” or “[d]eprived plaintiff of

due process being no computer-generated order was filed.” Her brief accuses defendants of

“miscommunicating ‘false’ ‘belief’ of inaccuracies to 3rd parties, the character of the plaintiff of

‘refusing’ to make payments on her personal business account and contract agreement with

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Santander within her community.”

¶8 We credit plaintiff, acting pro se, with attempting to supply this court with information.

But unfortunately, there is no escaping the fact that plaintiff misses the point of this appeal.

¶9 When reviewing a motion to dismiss under section 2-615, our only question is whether

the complaint states a viable cause of action. Village of Kirkland v. Kirkland Properties Holdings

Co., LLC I, 2023 IL 128612, ¶ 44. We review the factual allegations of the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff and ask whether any set of facts would entitle the plaintiff to

relief. Id. At this juncture, we do not consider evidence or any other information beyond the four

corners of the complaint itself. Arora v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 2025 IL App (2d)

240522, ¶ 31; Neppl v. Murphy, 316 Ill. App. 3d 581, 585 (2000); Elson v. State Farm Fire &

Casualty Co., 295 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6 (1998). And we will only consider well-pleaded facts, not

legal conclusions. Kirkland, 2023 IL 128612, ¶ 44.

¶ 10 Every cause of action has elements, and the complaint must make factual allegations that

satisfy each of those elements. To give but one example, to plead a claim for breach of contract,

the complaint must allege that (1) the parties had a valid and enforceable contract; (2) the

plaintiff substantially performed her obligations of the contract; (3) the defendant breached the

contract; and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of that breach. Id. ¶ 46.

¶ 11 When the trial court here dismissed the complaint with prejudice, the court was ruling

that the complaint failed to properly allege the elements of any stated cause of action. To

convince us that the trial court was wrong, it was thus incumbent on plaintiff to explain to us that

the complaint did, in fact, properly allege the elements of at least one cause of action.

¶ 12 Plaintiff has not done so. Not once in her brief does she discuss the elements of any of the

seven causes of action, much less how her fifth amended complaint pleaded those elements. Nor

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does plaintiff even state that the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint. She has thus

forfeited any argument that the trial court erred in doing so. See Alms v. Peoria County Election

Comm’n, 2022 IL App (4th) 220976, ¶ 28 (“Where an appellant fails to present a cogent

argument, that argument is forfeited.”); Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

¶ 13 We are sympathetic to a pro se litigant unschooled in the practice of law, and we are

willing to go the extra mile to forgive imperfections or inartful legal discussion in a brief. But we

cannot wholly create plaintiff’s argument for her. We must remain neutral; we cannot be an

advocate for one side or the other. See People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 328 (2010); Tuna v.

Wisner, 2023 IL App (1st) 211327, ¶ 56. Ours is an “ ‘adversary system’ ” that depends on

“ ‘party presentation.’ ” Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 323, 324 (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554

U.S. 237, 243 (2008)).

¶ 14 In other words, “ ‘we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to

courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.’ ” Id. (quoting Greenlaw, 554 U.S.

at 243). If we conducted the necessary research to determine the elements of these various causes

of action and then searched the fairly lengthy complaint for allegations satisfying those elements,

we would be abandoning our role as neutral arbiter and advocating for one side over the other.

¶ 15 Because plaintiff has made no argument that the trial court erred in dismissing the fifth

amended complaint with prejudice, we have no basis to overturn the trial court’s judgment. We

thus affirm it.

¶ 16 Affirmed.