UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________ ) JOSEPH A. STALLARD, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 20-2703 (RBW) ) GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The pro se plaintiff, Joseph A. Stallard, brings this civil action against the defendants,
Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC (collectively “the Goldman
defendants”), and Voodoo SAS (“Voodoo”), alleging violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 18, 1114(1),
1117, 1125(a); 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a)–(b), 506(a); and 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 1952(a), 1956, 1961,
2320(a), as well as common law claims of trademark infringement, unfair competition, fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. See
generally Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1. Currently pending before the Court are (1) the
Goldman defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint, see Motion by Defendants Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc. and Goldman Sachs & Co., LLC to Dismiss the Complaint (“Goldman Defs.’
Mot.”), ECF No. 13; (2) Voodoo’s motion to dismiss the Complaint, see Motion by Defendant
Voodoo SAS to Dismiss the Complaint (“Voodoo’s Mot.”), ECF No. 34; and the plaintiff’s
motion for sanctions against Voodoo, see Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (“Pl.’s Mot. for Sanctions”), ECF No. 39. Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, 1 the Court
concludes for the following reasons that it must grant in part and deny without prejudice in part
the defendants’ motions to dismiss. Specifically, the Court grants in part the Goldman
defendants’ motion to dismiss in regard to the plaintiff’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”) and antitrust claims because the plaintiff lacks Article III standing
to bring RICO and antitrust claims against the Goldman defendants. The Court grants in part
Voodoo’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff lacks statutory standing to bring RICO and
antitrust claims against Voodoo. The Court will deny without prejudice both motions to dismiss
in all other respects. And, because the District of Columbia is not the proper venue for the
plaintiff’s claims that survive the defendants’ motions, the Court will transfer the plaintiff’s
remaining claims to the Eastern District of Virginia and deny without prejudice the plaintiff’s
motion for sanctions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The following allegations are derived from the plaintiff’s Complaint unless otherwise
specified.
1 In addition to the filings already referenced, the Court also considered the following submissions in rendering its decision: (1) the Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion by Defendants Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and Goldman Sachs & Co., LLC to Dismiss the Complaint (“Pl.’s Opp’n to Goldman Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 18; (2) the Reply Brief of Defendants The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (“Goldman Defs.’ Reply”), ECF No. 21; (3) the Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion by Defendant Voodoo SAS to Dismiss the Complaint (“Pl.’s Opp’n to Voodoo’s Mot.”), ECF No. 36; (4) the Reply Memorandum by Defendant Voodoo SAS in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (“Voodoo’s Reply”), ECF No. 37; (5) defendant Voodoo’s Notice of Erratum, Exhibit (“Ex.”) A (Corrected Reply Memorandum by Defendant Voodoo SAS in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (“Corrected Voodoo Reply”)), ECF No. 38-1; (6) the Opposition of Voodoo SAS to Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (“Voodoo’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 40; and (7) the Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No. 41.
2 1. Alleged Racketeering Activity by the Defendants
The plaintiff alleges that on “May 28, 2018[, a] press release issued by [the] Goldman
and Voodoo [defendants] stated, ‘Goldman Sachs – through its West Street Capital Partners VII
fund – becomes Voodoo’s reference shareholder alongside the Founders who remain majority
owners of the company.” Compl. ¶ 149. According to the plaintiff, “[the] Goldman [defendants]
funded Voodoo with at least $200 million,” id. ¶ 4, which was allegedly “laundered . . . through
the Cayman Islands using a $7 billion vehicle called West Street Capital Partners VII[,]” id. The
plaintiff claims that “West Street Capital Partners VII is funded by 867 unknown investors[,]” id.
¶ 147, and is “directed by Maples Fiduciary Services (Delaware), who also has a Cayman Islands
company, Maples Fiduciary Services (Cayman)[,]” id. ¶ 146. The plaintiff also claims that
“[c]ompensation from West Street Capital Partners VII goes to [the] Goldman [defendants.]” Id.
¶ 148.
The plaintiff makes several allegations against the Goldman defendants for alleged
racketeering activity and laundering money to Voodoo. Specifically, the plaintiff points to
previous criminal violations allegedly committed by employees of the Goldman defendants. See
Compl. ¶¶ 115–42. The plaintiff alleges that “Timothy Leissner [(“Leissner”)] pleaded guilty [in
2018] to conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act [] and conspiracy to commit
money laundering.” Id. ¶ 141. The plaintiff claims that “Leissner admitted that [the] Goldman
[defendants] used the U[nited] S[tates] banking system to send money to bribe Malaysian
officials . . . between January [ ] 2009 and October [ ] 2014.” Id. ¶ 142. Furthermore, the
plaintiff alleges the commission of “[b]ribery of U[nited] S[tates] [p]ublic [o]fficials[,]” id. at 26,
by “Hank Paulson[, the former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Goldman Sachs and the
former United States Secretary of the Department of the Treasury,]” see id. ¶¶ 123–39. More
specifically, he contends that Paulson “ran the show as Treasury Secretary” and “caus[ed]
3 A[merican] I[nternational] G[roup] [(“AIG”)] to fail and trigger[] highly leveraged payouts by
AIG to [the] Goldman [defendants].” Id. ¶ 136.
The plaintiff also alleges that “[the] Goldman[] [defendants’] racketeering activity funded
Voodoo’s racketeering activity. [Specifically, he contends that t]he influx of funds from [the]
Goldman [defendants] caused Voodoo to dominate the mobile video game market in a way that
violates [federal] antitrust laws[,]” id. ¶ 4, and “infring[es] the [trademark and] copyrights of [the
p]laintiff[’s] [ ] Knocky Balls video game,” id. ¶ 2.
2. The plaintiff’s intellectual property
The plaintiff states that “[o]n November 5, 2019, [he] obtained a trademark
registration[, Registration No. 5,900,923,] with the U[nited] S[tates] P[atent and] T[rademark]
O[ffice] [(“USPTO”)] for the mark, Knocky Balls, for use on video games.” Id. ¶ 25. Further,
the plaintiff states that “[o]n June 24, 2019, [he] filed with the [United States Patent and
Trademark Office or] [(‘]USPTO[’)] an application for International Registration with the World
Intellectual Property Organization ([“]WIPO[”]) under the Madrid Protocol, with France as the
designated country.” Id. ¶ 31. The plaintiff states that “[o]n August 29, 2019, the International
Bureau of the WIPO registered the Knocky Balls mark[, ]Registration No. 1,484,378[], and on
January 16, 2020, the Institut national de la propriété industrielle [ ] in France issued a statement
of grant of protection for the Knocky Balls mark in accordance with Rule 18ter(1) of the Hague
Agreement.” Id. ¶ 36.
The plaintiff claims that “[t]he Knocky Balls mark was first used in [domestic] commerce
when Knocky Balls was published by [the plaintiff] on the Microsoft Store on December 28,
2016, where it remains to this day. Knocky Balls was published by [the plaintiff] to Google Play
on or before March 27, 2018.” Id. ¶ 27. Further, the plaintiff states that “[o]n August 10, 2018,
4 Voodoo published a video game to the App Store (iOS) called Knock Balls, and on September
19, 2018, [Voodoo] published Knock Balls on Google Play.” Id. ¶ 28.
According to the plaintiff, “[t]he logo for Knock Balls [is] remarkably similar to [the
plaintiff’s] Knocky Balls with a ball hitting blocks with a splat icon.” Id. ¶ 28. The plaintiff
claims that “[s]hortly after [ ] [his] application [for Knocky Balls] was approved for publication
and forwarded to the I[nternational] B[ureau], Voodoo reported Knocky Balls to Google Play for
violation of the impersonation policy. [And, o]n July 13, 2019, Knocky Balls was removed from
Google Play.” Id. ¶ 33. Additionally, the plaintiff claims that “Voodoo’s ads, for [its] games,
infringed on, at least, the following trademarks registered with the [USPTO]: Aniosgel[,
]Registration No. 2,924,386[], Disneyland[, ]Registration No. 4,866,683[], and Cleveland
Cavaliers[, ]Registration No. 3,028,591[]; and the unregistered trademarks of Lebron James and
a deceased YouTuber named Etika.” Id. ¶ 38.
B. Procedural Background
On January 20, 2021, the Goldman defendants filed their motion to dismiss the
complaint, see Goldman Defs.’ Mot. at 1, on February 17, 2021, the plaintiff filed his opposition
to the Goldman defendants’ motion to dismiss, see Pl.’s Opp’n to Goldman Defs.’ Mot. at 1, and
on March 10, 2021, the Goldman defendants filed a reply in support of their motion, see
Goldman Defs.’ Reply at 1.
On January 20, 2021, Voodoo filed its motion to dismiss for improper service of process.
See Voodoo SAS’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Improper Service of Process Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) (“Voodoo’s 1st Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 14. On January 6, 2022, the
Court denied Voodoo’s motion to dismiss for improper service of process and ordered the
plaintiff to effect proper service by April 6, 2022. See Order (Jan. 6, 2022) at 1, ECF No. 33.
5 Then, on January 14, 2022, Voodoo filed its currently pending motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim, see Voodoo’s Mot. at 1, and on February 14, 2022, the plaintiff filed a
memorandum in opposition to Voodoo’s motion, see Pl.’s Opp’n to Voodoo’s Mot. at 1.
Additionally, the plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions on March 24, 2022, against
Voodoo for the alleged falsification of evidence, see Pl.’s Mot. for Sanctions at 1, after which
Voodoo filed its memorandum in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion on April 7, 2022, see
Voodoo’s Opp’n at 1, and to which the plaintiff filed his reply, see Pl’s Reply, on April 13, 2022.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“Federal [district] courts are courts of limited jurisdiction[,]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), and “[a] motion for dismissal under [Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1) ‘presents a threshold challenge to the [C]ourt’s jurisdiction[,]’”
Morrow v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 2d 71, 75 (D.D.C. 2010) (Walton, J.) (quoting Haase v.
Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Thus, the Court is obligated to dismiss a claim if
it “lack[s] . . . subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Because “[i]t is to be
presumed that a cause lies outside [the Court’s] limited jurisdiction,” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377,
the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction, see
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
“In deciding a [Rule] 12(b)(1) motion, the [C]ourt need not limit itself to the allegations
of the complaint.” Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp.
2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2001). Rather, the “[C]ourt may consider such materials outside the pleadings
as it deems appropriate to resolve the question [of] whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.”
6 Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 104 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000); see Jerome
Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Additionally, the Court must “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint
and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can
be derived from the facts alleged[.]’” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 642
F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir.
2005)). However, “the [p]laintiff’s factual allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer
scrutiny in resolving a [Rule] 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a [Rule] 12(b)(6) motion for
failure to state a claim.” Grand Lodge, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 13–14 (first and second alterations in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether a complaint “state[s] a claim upon which relief can
be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “the Court must construe the
complaint in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be
derived from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted). While the Court must “assume [the] veracity” of any “well-
pleaded factual allegations” in a complaint, conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the
7 assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Also, the Court need not accept “legal conclusions cast as factual
allegations,” or “inferences drawn by [the] plaintiff if those inferences are not supported by the
facts set out in the complaint.” Hettinga, 677 F.3d at 476. Finally, the Court “may consider only
the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the
complaint[,] and matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice.” Equal Emp.
Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
C. Pro Se Complaints
“A pro se complaint,” such as the plaintiff’s, “must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Furthermore, all factual allegations by a pro se
litigant, whether contained in the complaint or other filings in the matter, should be read together
in considering whether to grant a dispositive motion. See Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d
545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding that the district court abused its discretion in failing to read all
of the pro se litigant’s filings together prior to dismissing the case). Nonetheless, “[a] pro se
plaintiff[] must still adequately plead [his or her] complaint consistent with the edicts of Iqbal
and Twombly.” Yellen v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 301 F. Supp. 3d 43, 47 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing
Atherton v. D.C. Office of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 682 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
III. ANALYSIS
The plaintiff asserts a total of twenty counts in his Complaint against the defendants. See
generally Compl. He names the defendants jointly in some counts, and separately in others. See
Compl. at 2–4 (identifying the claims and the defendants to which each applies). However,
8 because the plaintiff is proceeding in this case pro se, the Court will liberally construe each
allegation as to all of the defendants together. See Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
787 F.3d 524, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, [and
thus,] a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The plaintiff’s allegations can be divided into five different categories of claims: (1) civil
RICO claims, see Compl. ¶¶ 233–48; (2) antitrust claims, id. ¶¶ 249–59; (3) copyright
infringement claims, id. ¶¶ 191–94, 195–206, 207–10; (4) trademark infringement claims, id. ¶¶
176–90, and (5) common law claims including negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference,
unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy, see Compl. at 2–4. Both of the defendants argue that the
plaintiff lacks standing as to the RICO and antitrust claims. See Goldman Defs.’ Mot. at 10, 21;
Voodoo’s Mot. at 26, 29. The Court will therefore first address Article III standing before
turning to statutory standing as to the civil RICO and antitrust claims. 2 The Court will then
address whether this district is the proper venue for the remaining claims as to all of the
defendants that survive the defendants’ motions.
A. Article III Standing, Generally
“Article III of the Constitution confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual ‘cases’
and ‘controversies.’” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). “In an attempt to give
meaning to Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, the courts have developed a series of
2 As an initial matter, the Goldman defendants also seek to “[s]trike [the p]laintiff’s [i]mmaterial [a]llegations[,]” Goldman Defs.’ Mot. at 7; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), that they believe “will inevitably lead to wildly improper discovery requests and disputes unnecessarily consuming the resources of the parties and the Court[,]” id. at 9. However, the Goldman defendants concede that “given their impertinence[ to the case], the Complaint fails to state a claim with or without the [allegations.]” Id. Because the Court ultimately agrees that the plaintiff lacks standing to pursue the RICO and antitrust claims against them, the Court need not consider the merits of the Goldman defendants’ motion to strike the portions of the Complaint referenced in their motion to dismiss. Cf. Dentons US LLP v. Republic of Guinea, 208 F. Supp. 3d 330, 338 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[F]ederal courts retain the discretion to strike [or not strike] immaterial allegations even in the absence of prejudice to the moving party[.]”).
9 principles termed ‘justiciability doctrines,’ among which are standing[,] ripeness, mootness, and
the political question doctrine.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 101
F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996). If a plaintiff lacks Article III standing, a district court
need not delve into [a plaintiff's] myriad constitutional and statutory claims . . . because a court may not resolve contested questions of law when its jurisdiction is in doubt, as [h]ypothetical jurisdiction produces nothing more than a hypothetical judgment—which comes to the same thing as an advisory opinion, disapproved by [the Supreme] Court from the beginning.
Am. Freedom L. Ctr. v. Obama, 106 F. Supp. 3d 104, 108 (D.D.C. 2015) (alterations in original)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical[.]’” Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (citations omitted).
“The absence of any one of these three elements defeats standing.” Newdow v. Roberts, 603
F.3d 1002, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
1. Whether the Plaintiff Has Standing to Pursue His Claims Against the Goldman Defendants
The Court first exercises its “affirmative obligation . . . to ensure it is acting within its
jurisdictional authority[,]” Morrow, 723 F. Supp. 2d at 76 (citing Grand Lodge, 185 F. Supp. 2d
at 13), and concludes that the plaintiff does not have Article III standing to bring RICO and
antitrust claims against the Goldman defendants. This is because none of the plaintiff’s RICO
and antitrust claims are “fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant[s.]” See
10 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016); Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (same).
In regard to the plaintiff’s RICO claims, he alleges “massive funding by [the] Goldman
[defendants that] gave Voodoo the ad funding to push Knock Balls to the top of the charts on
Google Play and the App Store[,]” Compl. ¶ 236, “remove[] Knocky Balls from Google Play,
[cause Knocky Balls to receive] a fake bad review, and fraudulently [attempt] to purchase
[Knocky Balls] through a fake company[,]” id. ¶¶ 241, 244. However, an injury under civil
RICO “must be concrete and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lopez v.
Council on Am.-Islamic Rels. Action Network, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 104, 110, 114 (D.D.C.
2009) (citing Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 483 (3d Cir. 2000)). Here, the plaintiff fails to
allege any facts that demonstrate how the “massive funding [allegedly provided] by [the]
Goldman [defendants,]” Compl. ¶ 236, was a proximate cause of “[the removal of the plaintiff’s]
Knocky Balls from Google Play,” id. ¶¶ 241, 244. Moreover, the racketeering activity allegedly
engaged in by the Goldman defendants would have occurred significantly earlier than when the
plaintiff alleges the infringement of his video game occurred. See Compl. ¶¶ 123–40
(contending that the alleged bribery of public officials by the Goldman defendants began in 2006
with the appointment of former Treasury Secretary Paulson); see also id. ¶¶ 86–87 (listing the
dates of alleged infringement by Voodoo beginning on August 10, 2018). The significant time
lapse and lack of a causal connection between the alleged racketeering activity and the alleged
infringement does not support the conclusion that there is a “direct relationship[,]” see Solomon
v. Dechert LLP, No. 22-cv-3137 (JEB), 2023 WL 6065025, at *9 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2023),
between the conduct engaged in by the Goldman defendants and the injuries alleged by the
plaintiff.
11 Next, as to the plaintiff’s antitrust claims, his allegations against the Goldman defendants
are even more attenuated. According to the plaintiff, “[t]he acquisition of Voodoo stock by [the]
Goldman [defendants] may substantially lessen competition in the market in violation of 15
U.S.C. § 18[, and t]he acquisition also provided the funding to Voodoo to do the activities listed
in this [C]omplaint that damaged [him.]” Id. ¶ 259 (emphasis in original). However, there are
no allegations in the Complaint that the Goldman defendants’ investment interest in Voodoo
facilitated the alleged anticompetitive actions that Voodoo undertook against the plaintiff, see
generally Compl., nor would ownership and investment alone be sufficient to establish that the
Goldman defendants facilitated any anticompetitive actions by Voodoo. See, e.g., Copperweld
Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 772 (1984) (“A corporation has complete power to
maintain a wholly owned subsidiary . . . . The economic, legal, or other considerations that lead
corporate management to choose one structure [of ownership] over the other are not relevant to
whether the enterprise’s conduct seriously threatens competition.”). And, as the Goldman
defendants correctly indicate, at least two of the competitors in the purported market are owned
by companies with market capitalizations “in excess of $10 billion and $70 billion, respectively,
dwarfing the $200 million Goldman fund investment that supposedly . . . conferred market
dominance on Voodoo.” Goldman Defs.’ Mot. at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
Compl. ¶ 166 (“Activision Blizzard is the largest titan in the [video game] industry[.]”); id. (“The
largest [mobile video game company] is Zynga.”). Thus, even assuming arguendo that the
plaintiff sustained any antitrust injury from anticompetitive conduct, it is not “fairly traceable” to
the Goldman defendants.
Accordingly, for the above reasons, the Court concludes that the plaintiff lacks Article III
standing to bring RICO and antitrust claims against the Goldman defendants, and it must
12 therefore dismiss Counts IX, X, XI and XII, against them. However, at this stage of the case, the
Court notes that the plaintiff appears to have Article III standing against Voodoo because, taking
his allegations as true, he could have “suffered an injury in fact, [ ] that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of [ ] [Voodoo], and [ ] [it] [could be] redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338. Therefore, the Court will proceed to assess whether the
plaintiff possesses statutory standing to pursue his RICO and antitrust claims against Voodoo.
B. Whether the Plaintiff’s RICO Claims Should be Dismissed
Incorporating the Goldman defendants’ arguments, see Voodoo’s Mot. at 8, Voodoo
argues that the plaintiff has not “establish standing to bring a civil RICO claim[ against it,]”
Goldman Defs.’ Mot. at 10. Specifically, Voodoo “challenges [ ] [the p]laintiff’s standing to sue
under [the civil RICO] statute[], as [the plaintiff] lacks . . . the injury to ‘business or property’
required to sue under civil RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)[.]” Voodoo’s Mot. at 8. As proof that he
has alleged injury to his business or property, the plaintiff contends in his opposition that “the
Complaint properly alleged the fake negative review of his game[ from the Google Play
Store, ]Compl. ¶¶ 271–72[], the false removal of his game[, ]Compl. ¶¶ 273–74[], and the
facilitation, funding, and concealment of these frauds by the defendants through the Cayman
Islands[, ]Compl. ¶¶ 231, 286[]. Certainly, those activities damaged the plaintiff.” Pl.’s Opp’n
to Goldman Defs.’ Mot. at 11. The Court will address each argument in turn.
1. Standing to Pursue the Civil RICO Claims 3
“To adequately allege a civil RICO claim, [a p]laintiff must allege ‘(1) conduct (2) of an
enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.’” Roe v. Bernabei & Wachtel PLLC,
85 F. Supp. 3d 89, 99 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Pyramid Secs. Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc., 924
3 Statutory standing under RICO is properly analyzed under Federal Rule 12(b)(6)—separate and distinct from Article III standing, which is analyzed under 12(b)(1).
13 F.2d 1114, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). “‘Racketeering activity,’ also known as ‘predicate acts’ or
‘predicate offenses,’ is defined in a lengthy statutory provision which enumerates various
criminal acts under both state and federal law.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 216 F. Supp.
3d 146, 153 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)). “Thus, [a] plaintiff[] must allege that
the defendants committed predicate acts to state a civil RICO claim.” Id. And, the plaintiff must
establish that the predicate acts “were directed at him, as opposed to others.” Scheck v. Gen.
Elec. Corp., No. 91-cv-1594 (SS), 1992 WL 13219, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 7, 1992); see also 18
U.S.C. § 1964.
A civil RICO plaintiff “only has [statutory] standing if, and can only recover to the extent
that, he has been injured in his business or property by the [predicate acts—i.e., the] conduct
constituting the [RICO] violation[.]” Hourani v. Mirtchev, 796 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (first
alteration in original) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496–97 (1985)).
“[T]he injury [ ] is the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a
pattern[.]” Id. A civil RICO plaintiff must also show that (1) “the defendant’s [RICO] violation
was a ‘but for’ cause of [the] plaintiff’s injury[,]” Holmes v. Sec. Invest. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S.
258, 265–66 (1992), and (2) that the “RICO predicate act proximately caused [the plaintiff’s]
alleged injuries[,]” Solomon, 2023 WL 6065025, at *9 (citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495). “When
a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is
whether the alleged violation[s] led directly to the plaintiff’s injuries.” Anza v. Ideal Steel
Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 461 (2006). Indeed, “[t]here must be ‘some direct relation between
the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged. A link that is too remote, purely
contingent, or indirect[] is insufficient.’” Cheeks, 216 F. Supp. 3d at 153 (quoting Hemi Grp.,
LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010)).
14 Before addressing whether the plaintiff has adequately alleged injury to his business or
property, the Court first notes the alleged predicate acts the plaintiff attributes to the defendants.
See Pl.’s Opp’n to Goldman Defs.’ Mot. at 11 (“The plaintiff . . . allege[s] the fake negative
review of his game (Compl. ¶¶ 271–72), the false removal of his game [from Google Play]
(Compl. ¶¶ 273–74), and the facilitation, funding, and concealment of [alleged] frauds by the
defendants through the Cayman Islands (Compl. ¶¶ 231, 286).”). The plaintiff is correct that the
defendants do not appear to address whether “there were [ ] patterns of racketeering activity[,]”
id. at 10, and instead, focus their arguments on whether the plaintiff has properly connected the
predicate acts to his own alleged injuries, see Goldman Defs.’ Reply at 4–5 (“The fatal problem
for [the p]laintiff is that RICO requires a nexus among the predicate acts that form the requisite
pattern of racketeering, the purported enterprise, and the plaintiff’s injury.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Corrected Voodoo Reply at 21 (incorporating by reference the Goldman
defendants’ RICO arguments). Accordingly, the Court assumes arguendo that the plaintiff has
pled the requisite predicate acts, see, e.g., Ambellu v. Re’ese Adbarat Debre Selam Kidist
Mariam, 387 F. Supp. 3d 71, 85 (D.D.C. 2019) (“Under [Federal] Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must
construe the [civil RICO plaintiff]’s allegations in the light most favorable to them and accept as
true all reasonable factual inferences drawn from well-pleaded allegations.”), and must
determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a connection between those acts and an injury
sustained by his business or property sufficient to establish civil RICO standing.
2. Whether the Plaintiff Has Statutory Standing to Proceed Against Voodoo
The plaintiff argues that he incurred “injur[ies] to [his] business or property[,]” Quick v.
EduCap, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 3d 121, 138 (D.D.C. 2018), claiming that Voodoo “clone[d the
plaintiff’s] Knocky Balls[ game,]” which “push[ed Voodoo’s] Knock Balls [game] to the top of
the charts on Google Play and the App Store[,]” Compl. ¶ 236; see id. ¶ 241. However, the
15 plaintiff does not allege a “concrete financial loss” as the basis for any of his civil RICO claims
against Voodoo for its alleged conduct. See Lopez, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 110, 114 (citing Maio,
221 F.3d at 483). The plaintiff further alleges that Voodoo “damaged [him] by infringing his
copyrights and trademark.” Compl. ¶ 244. While the “misuse of intellectual property can suffice
to confer standing for a RICO claim,” the plaintiff must provide a “concrete example” of the
harm that was caused. Roe, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 99–100 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). The Court cannot identify, nor does the plaintiff provide concrete examples of any
harm he has suffered as a result of Voodoo’s alleged conduct. See Compl. ¶¶ 236, 241, 244.
Rather, the plaintiff alleges that “[Voodoo] removed Knocky Balls from Google Play, gave it a
fake bad review, and fraudulently tried to purchase it through a fake company[,]” id. ¶ 244,
which, without more, does not appear to have resulted in an injury that “flow[ed] from the
commission of the [alleged] predicate acts[—i.e., the alleged copyright and trademark
infringement,]” see Lopez, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 110.
Additionally, the plaintiff does not allege any facts to show that Voodoo’s purported
“clon[ing of the plaintiff’s] Knocky Balls[ game,]” was a “[b]ut for” and proximate cause of
Voodoo’s Knock Balls game being elevated “to the top of the charts on Google Play and the App
Store.” Compl. ¶ 236. The reasons for Voodoo’s Knock Balls game topping the charts on
Google Play and the App Store are speculative at best, see Lopez, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 110,
including the plaintiff’s own representation that Voodoo received considerable “ad[vertising]
funding[,]” Compl. ¶ 236, which could explain the elevated ranking of Voodoo’s Knock Balls
game on Google Play and the App Store. But “[b]ecause the plaintiff[’s] alleged injury is
speculative at best, the plaintiff[ did] not ma[k]e the requisite showing that [his] injuries w[ere]
the proximate cause of . . . [Voodoo’s] acts.” Lopez, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 114; see Maio, 221 F.3d
16 at 483 (noting that a showing of injury requires proof of a concrete financial loss and not mere
injury to an intangible property interest). The harm that the plaintiff alleges must be “direct[ly]
connect[ed] [to] the predicate criminal act and the injury[,]” Greenpeace, Inc. v. Dow Chemical
Co., 808 F. Supp. 2d 262, 270 (D.D.C. 2011), but, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that
connection. Accordingly, the plaintiff has not alleged any facts to show he was “injured in his
business or property by [Voodoo’s] conduct[,] constituting the [civil RICO] violation[.]” See
Hourani, 796 F.3d at 11.
For these reasons, the Court must dismiss the civil RICO claims against Voodoo, i.e.,
Counts IX, X, XI, and XII, for lack of statutory standing.
C. Whether the Plaintiff Has Standing to Pursue Antitrust Claims Against Voodoo
The Court next considers whether the plaintiff has antitrust standing to bring antitrust
claims against Voodoo. The plaintiff’s two counts alleging antitrust violations are based on § 1
of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act. See Compl. ¶¶ 249–59. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act declares illegal “[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nation[s,]” 15 U.S.C. § 1, and the
Supreme Court has recognized that this provision was intended to prohibit only unreasonable
restraints, see, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988). Section 7
of the Clayton Act prohibits any acquisition of the stock or assets of another company where “the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 18. The
Court will analyze whether the plaintiff has adequately pleaded an antitrust injury with respect to
all of the defendants collectively. 4
4 Although the Court has dismissed the plaintiff’s antitrust claims against the Goldman defendants, the Court must assess their conduct as it relates to Voodoo for purposes of determining whether the plaintiff has antitrust standing to pursue claims under Sherman and Clayton Acts against Voodoo.
17 Generally, to demonstrate antitrust standing, the plaintiff must allege an injury that
“affect[s] [his] business or property” and is “the kind of injury the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent[.]” Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
More specifically, to establish antitrust standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) an injury that
the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and that flows from that which makes [the]
defendants’ acts unlawful; (2) direct and non-speculative damages to [the] plaintiff[’]s[] business
or property; and (3) proper-plaintiff status, which ensures that other parties are not better situated
to sue.” Mulvey v. Am. Airlines Inc., 18-cv-3119 (CKK), 2019 WL 1060877, at *3 (D.D.C.
Mar. 6, 2019). “To understand the scope of antitrust standing, [courts must] focus on the
bedrock principle of this field: antitrust laws protect market (i.e.[,] economic) competition.”
Johnson v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 869 F.3d 976, 983 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (emphasis
omitted); see Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977). But
“[u]nlike constitutional standing, . . . jurisdiction does not turn on antitrust standing.” In re
Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 108 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Associated
Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535 n.31
(1983)). Because antitrust standing is not jurisdictional, “[i]t is properly considered under
[Federal] Rule 12(b)(6).” Pierce v. Yale Univ., 17-cv-2508 (CRC), 2019 WL 162029, at *3
(D.D.C. Jan. 10, 2019).
Here, the plaintiff lacks antitrust standing because he has not properly alleged how
Voodoo harmed the competitive mobile video game market. See, e.g., Sprint Nextel Corp. v.
AT&T Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 308, 313 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[E]ven if a threatened injury is ‘causally
related to an antitrust violation,’ it ‘will not qualify as “antitrust injury” unless it is attributable to
an anticompetitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny.’” (quoting Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA
18 Petrol. Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990))). Nor has the plaintiff shown that his alleged injury is
“the kind of injury the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.” Andrx Pharms., Inc., 256 F.3d at
806. In regard to the relevant market, the plaintiff makes limited allegations against Voodoo.
Specifically, the plaintiff implicates Voodoo by arguing that he was “damaged because [the]
Goldman [defendants] funded Voodoo and made them the size that they are. But for [the]
Goldman [defendants], Voodoo would not have infringed [the plaintiff’s] game[.]” Compl.
¶ 255. However, as the Court indicated, supra, Section III.A.1, there is no allegation in the
Complaint that Goldman’s interest in Voodoo facilitated alleged anticompetitive actions by
either company. See generally Compl.; see, e.g., Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 772 (“A
corporation has complete power to maintain a wholly owned subsidiary . . . . The economic,
legal, or other considerations that lead corporate management to choose one structure [of
ownership] over the other are not relevant to whether the enterprise’s conduct seriously threatens
competition.”). Without a causal link between Goldman’s purchase of a minority share in
Voodoo and Voodoo’s allegedly anticompetitive conduct, the plaintiff cannot demonstrate
antitrust standing. See Ass’n of Retail Travel Agents, Ltd. v. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., 635 F.
Supp. 534, 536 (D.D.C. 1986) (“[§] 1 of the Sherman Act requires a party to show concerted
activity in restraint of trade.” (emphasis added)); see Nat’l ATM Council, Inc. v. Visa Inc., 922
F. Supp. 2d 73, 82 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[P]laintiffs [alleging misconduct in violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act] must allege not only the antitrust injury, but also the existence of an agreement or
conspiracy, or facts sufficient to support the inference of an agreement or conspiracy.” (emphasis
added)).
Even assuming arguendo that the plaintiff could establish sufficient causation to
implicate the Goldman defendants in Voodoo’s conduct, his own briefing calls that conclusion
19 into question. The plaintiff argues that the Goldman defendants’ purchasing portions of Voodoo
is akin to “a deep[-]pocket parent in[] a market of pygmies.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Goldman Defs.’
Mot. at 20 (quoting Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 478) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Implicitly, the plaintiff alleges that due to Goldman’s financial might, Voodoo has been able to
engage in anticompetitive business practices that would have otherwise been impossible.
However, first, there is no factual allegation as to how the Goldman defendants’ size facilitated
Voodoo’s actions any differently than would have been the case had they been purchased by a
smaller company. See generally Compl. Thus, without an allegation that the injury to the
market would not have occurred had Voodoo not been purchased by a deep-pocketed parent, the
plaintiff likewise fails to demonstrate an injury sufficient to establish antitrust standing.
Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487 (holding that, under § 7 of the Clayton Act, a plaintiff must prove
“more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market”); see WAKA LLC v. DC
Kickball, 517 F. Supp. 2d 245, 250 (D.D.C. 2007) (“To state a claim based on a [§] 1 violation, a
plaintiff must allege that defendants entered into some contract, combination, conspiracy, or
other concerted activity that unreasonably restricts trade in the relevant market.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Second, and importantly, the plaintiff’s allegation about the power of the Goldman
defendants’ financial assets in the market fails due to the greater size of other competitors also in
the market. The Goldman defendants deny the plaintiff’s assertion that they have over one
trillion dollars in assets, claiming the true number is less than one-tenth of that amount. See
Goldman Defs.’ Reply at 15 n.5. The Goldman defendants also note that several of the
competitors in the market are owned by at least two companies with market capitalizations “in
excess of $10 billion and $70 billion, respectively, dwarfing the $200 million Goldman fund
20 investment[.]” Goldman Defs.’ Mot. at 25. Thus, the Goldman defendants are correct that they
are not a giant in a pygmy market, but rather a giant in a market of giants, which undermines the
plaintiff’s claim that their size contributes to anticompetitive effects. 5
Finally, the plaintiff’s claim that that “[b]ut for [the] Goldman [defendants], Voodoo
would not have infringed [the plaintiff’s] game,” Compl. ¶ 255, is “speculative at best . . . [and
therefore] the [plaintiff] lack[s] [ ] standing[ based on this theory,]” Transmission Agency of N.
Cal. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 495 F.3d 663, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Furthermore, the
“Sherman Act does not penalize harm to individual competitors, but to competition itself.”
Southgate v. Facebook, Inc., No. 17-cv-648 (AJT), 2017 WL 6759867, at *4 (E.D. Va. Nov. 14,
2017) (citing NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 139 (1998). Indeed, “this [Circuit]
has clearly held that injury to a single competitor does not suffice to constitute an injury to
competition.” Johnson, 869 F.3d at 983; Dial A Car, Inc. v. Transp., Inc., 82 F.3d 484, 486–87
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (“While [the plaintiff] alleges injury to itself, that injury involves only one
specific competitor and is insufficient to support a finding that the market as a whole is or will be
injured.”). Therefore, the plaintiff’s infringement claims do not survive under an antitrust theory
of liability because, as alleged, they are not “the kind[s] of injur[ies that] the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent.” Andrx Pharms., Inc., 256 F.3d at 806. Accordingly, the Court must
5 In regard to Voodoo, the plaintiff concedes that it does not have market power in the hyper-casual game market. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Goldman Defs.’ Mot. at 20 (“[the Goldman defendants] [have] the market power, not [d]efendant Voodoo.”). Both parties agree that central to any antitrust claim is an allegation that “defendants have market power in that market[.]” In re McCormick & Co., 217 F. Supp. 3d 124, 137 (D.D.C. 2016). The plaintiff attempts to backpedal from this concession by claiming that Voodoo has market power “through the market power of its deep pocket parent.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Voodoo’s Mot. at 40. However, this argument also falls victim to the same defects it has in the context of the Goldman defendants, namely, that many of Voodoo’s competitors have similarly deep- pocketed investors. Accordingly, the plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state an antitrust claim against Voodoo. Fotobom Media, Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 22-cv-712 (APM), 2024 WL 1603968, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2024) (“An antitrust plaintiff must allege sufficient ‘fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [conduct].’” (alterations in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)).
21 dismiss Counts XIII and XIV of the plaintiff’s Complaint as to Voodoo because he lacks
antitrust standing to pursue them.
D. Whether This Court is the Proper Venue for the Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims
The Court, having dismissed the civil RICO and antitrust claims against all of the
defendants, now considers whether the remaining claims should be transferred to another venue.
The defendants argue that “[w]ithout the RICO and antitrust claims, this Court lacks jurisdiction
over the remaining claims.” Goldman Defs.’ Mot. at 26; Voodoo’s Mot at 8. In response, the
plaintiff argues that “[t]he defendants did not dispute that the plaintiff served them on their
registered agent in [the District of Columbia], and they did not dispute that service gives the
Court personal jurisdiction over them for the RICO and antitrust claims through the [respective]
nationwide service of process statutes.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Goldman Defs.’ Mot. at 26; see 18
U.S.C. § 1965 (RICO); 15 U.S.C. § 22 (antitrust). The plaintiff therefore argues that “[t]he
service gives the Court general personal jurisdiction over the defendants for all claims.” Pl.’s
Opp’n to Goldman Defs.’ Mot. at 27.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides that a civil action may be brought in
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
In evaluating a jurisdictional challenge under this statute, a Court may either dismiss a case, “or
if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district . . . in which it could have been
22 brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). “The decision whether a transfer or a dismissal is in the interest
of justice[ ] rests within the sound discretion of the district court” where the suit was improperly
filed, see Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Courts in this
Circuit favor transfer in a case when “procedural obstacles—such as lack of personal
jurisdiction[ or] improper venue . . . impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication [ ] on the
merits.” Coltrane v. Lappin, 885 F. Supp. 2d 228, 235 (D.D.C. 2012) (Walton, J.) (internal
quotation marks omitted). When the issue of whether to transfer or dismiss arises where the
plaintiff is pro se, there is a “presumption in favor of transfer[ing]” a complaint that “dovetails
with the normal application of liberal standards to pro se pleadings.” Sanchez-Mercedes v.
Bureau of Prisons, 453 F. Supp. 3d 404, 418 (D.D.C. 2020). However, there are no “fixed
general rules on when cases should be transferred[.]” Starnes v. McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 929
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
The defendants are correct that without the RICO and antitrust claims, this Court no
longer has general or specific jurisdiction over the remaining claims because none of the
defendants are “at home” in this district, nor do the remaining claims “arise out of or relate to the
defendant[]s’ contacts with th[is] forum.” Goldman Defs.’ Mot. at 26 n.17; see Cockrum v.
Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 158, 174 (D.D.C. 2018) (“For corporations,
[general jurisdiction can be exercised in] a[] [district] . . . in which the corporation is fairly
regarded as at home[.]”) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 924 (2011)); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. at 919 (“[S]pecific
jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very
controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). None of the
defendants resides in the District of Columbia, as the Goldman defendants reside in the state of
23 New York, see Goldman Defs.’ Mot. at 26 n.17; Compl. ¶¶ 6–7, and Voodoo is headquartered in
Paris, France, see Voodoo’s Mot. at 3; Compl. ¶ 8. Moreover, the plaintiff, a resident of
Herndon, Virginia, see Compl. ¶ 5, does not allege that any of the remaining claims are related to
or arise out of the defendants’ ties to the District of Columbia, see generally Compl. Thus,
because this Court has neither general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction over the remaining
claims, the Court is divested of a basis upon which to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
defendants in regard to these claims.
Exercising its “sound discretion[,]” Naartex Consulting Corp., 722 F.2d at 789, the Court,
“in the interest of justice[,]” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), transfers this case to what is now the proper
venue, rather than dismissing it. Accordingly, the Court transfers the plaintiff’s copyright,
trademark, and state law claims to a “district in which a substantial part of the events . . . giving
rise to the claim[s] occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is
situated[,]” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), that being the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia. 6
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses the plaintiff’s RICO and antitrust claims
for lack of Article III standing as to the Goldman defendants, statutory standing as to Voodoo,
denies without prejudice the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, and transfers the remaining claims
to the Eastern District of Virginia.
6 For all of the same reasons, the Court will also deny without prejudice the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions. In the event the plaintiff desires to renew his motion for sanctions, he may do so upon the transfer of this case to the Eastern District of Virginia.
24 SO ORDERED this 27th day of November, 2024. 7
REGGIE B. WALTON United States District Judge
7 The Court will contemporaneously issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.