Stagwell Technologies, Inc. v. Oh

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 22, 2024
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2022-3495
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STAGWELL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Plaintiff, Case No. 22-cv-3495 (JMC)

v.

RICHARD OH, Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Stagwell Technologies, Inc. (Stagwell) filed this suit against

pro se Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff Richard Oh in 2022. See ECF 1.1 Stagwell alleged that Oh

“defrauded [Stagwell] into assuming a multimillion-dollar liability” by falsely inducing the

company to pay rent on a lease that Oh was in fact liable for. See id. ¶¶ 5–30. Since then, Oh has

filed several motions—including a motion to dismiss, ECF 24—which the Court denied on the

record. See May 28, 2024 Minute Entry; Sept. 18, 2024 Minute Entry. Oh filed an answer and

asserted three counterclaims against Stagwell: malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). ECF 35 at 6–10. Stagwell moves to dismiss

Oh’s counterclaims. ECF 43-1. For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Stagwell’s

motion. The Court’s resolution of this motion has no bearing on the merits of Stagwell’s

allegations against Oh or Oh’s defenses to those allegations.

In resolving Stagwell’s motion to dismiss, the Court assumes that Oh’s factual allegations

are true, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and construes his filings liberally in light

1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page.

1 of his pro se status, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

First, Oh claims that Stagwell engaged in malicious prosecution by filing this civil suit

against him. ECF 35 ¶¶ 46–47. “One of the prima facie elements of the claim under D.C. law,

however, is that the underlying suit must have been first terminated in favor of the claimant.” U.S.

ex rel. Head v. Kane Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d 146, 156 (D.D.C. 2009); see Shulman v. Miskell, 626

F.2d 173, 174–75 (D.C. Cir. 1980).2 Here, the underlying suit (the allegedly malicious

prosecution) is the instant civil suit filed by Stagwell. Because this lawsuit has not yet been

resolved on the merits, Oh’s claim is premature. The Court will therefore dismiss Oh’s

counterclaim for malicious prosecution. Oh is free to refile his suit at the appropriate time.

Oh’s IIED claim turns on his malicious prosecution claim. He alleges that, “[a]s a direct

consequence of Stagwell’s malicious prosecution of civil case by abusing the legal process,

Defendant has incurred both economic and non-economic expenses in challenging the underlying

action,” including “pain and suffering [and] emotional distress.” ECF 35 ¶¶ 52–53. The Court

therefore dismisses Oh’s IIED counterclaim as premature because it is premised entirely on his

malicious prosecution claim.

Even if Oh’s IIED claim were properly before the Court, he has failed to state a claim. “To

establish a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show

‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendants, which (2) intentionally or

recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress.’” Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Mann,

150 A.3d 1213, 1260 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Williams v. District of Columbia, 9 A.3d 484, 493–94

2 Neither of the parties has raised a choice-of-law question: Stagwell assumes that District of Columbia law applies, see ECF 43-1 at 7–10, and Oh does not argue otherwise, see generally ECF 46. The Court need not challenge the parties’ assumption that D.C. law applies. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Com. Union Ins. Co., 82 F.3d 478, 482–83 (D.C. Cir. 1996); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Unlike jurisdictional issues, courts need not address choice of law questions sua sponte.”).

2 (D.C. 2010)). Severe emotional distress “requires a showing beyond mere mental anguish and

stress and must be of so acute a nature that harmful physical consequences are likely to result.” Id.

at 1261. Oh alleges only that he seeks compensation for “pain and suffering including emotional

distress.” ECF 35 ¶ 53. This is not sufficient to plausibly allege the severe emotional distress

necessary to sustain an IIED claim. See, e.g., Kurd v. Republic of Turkey, 374 F. Supp. 3d 37, 55

(D.D.C. 2019) (applying D.C. law, and concluding plaintiff did not plausibly allege severe

emotional distress where he “made only the conclusory allegation that he ‘has also experienced

emotional distress’”); Brown v. Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., 773 F. Supp. 2d 125, 138

(D.D.C. 2011) (applying D.C. law, and explaining “[t]hat plaintiff ‘was under a great deal of

intentional pressure,’ . . . does not adequately allege that she suffered severe emotional distress.”);

Thompson v. Trump, 590 F. Supp. 3d 46, 122 (D.D.C. 2022), aff’d on other grounds sub nom.

Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F.4th 1 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (under D.C. law, plaintiff’s “largely

conclusory” allegations that “Defendants’ actions caused severe emotional distress” and “plaintiff

suffered severe emotional distress” did not “meet the high bar for . . . an IIED claim”).

Finally, Oh alleges that Stagwell engaged in abuse of process by filing this suit against

him. ECF 35 ¶¶ 49–50; see id. ¶ 45 (alleging that Stagwell is “attempting to use . . . ridiculous,

knowingly false statements in another attempt to escape payment with a different court to rehash

claims.”). But “simply filing a lawsuit is not actionable, regardless of the motive that may have

prompted the suit.” Kopff v. World Rsch. Grp., LLC, 519 F. Supp. 2d 97, 100 (D.D.C. 2007); see

Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196, 198 (D.C. 1980). The Court will therefore dismiss Oh’s

counterclaim for abuse of process for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

* * *

3 For the foregoing reasons, Stagwell’s motion to dismiss Oh’s counterclaims, ECF 43-1, is

GRANTED. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________ JIA M. COBB United States District Judge

Date: November 22, 2024