Stafford v. Mandalay Bay LLC

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: September 24, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01056
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Michael Stafford, Case No.: 2:24-cv-01056-JAD-DJA 4 Plaintiff 5 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for v. Summary Judgment and Closing Case 6 Mandalay Bay, LLC, [ECF No. 51] 7 Defendant 8

9 Mandalay Bay contends that it fired lifeguard Michael Stafford after he accosted a guest 10 at one of its pools. Stafford alleges his supervisor fabricated that story and that Mandalay Bay 11 really fired him based on his race. So Stafford sues for racial discrimination and requests $2.4 12 million in damages, reinstatement, and for Mandalay Bay’s parent company to provide him with 13 unlimited stays at any MGM resort. Mandalay Bay moves for summary judgment, arguing that 14 Stafford cannot show a history of satisfactory work performance or disparate treatment of 15 similarly situated individuals needed to prove discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 16 Green or that Mandalay Bay’s stated reason for Stafford’s termination was pretextual. Mandalay 17 Bay also contends that Stafford failed to attest to any relevant facts in his response, so no 18 evidence supports his claim. Because Stafford did not include any relevant evidence or sworn 19 statements to support his claim, he has failed to meet his burden to stave off summary judgment. 20 So I grant Mandalay Bay’s motion, enter judgment in its favor, and close this case. 21 22 23 1 Background 2 Mandalay Bay hired Michael Stafford, a Black man, as a part-time lifeguard.1 After an 3 incident at the pool involving a guest, Mandalay Bay suspended Stafford for a month and opened 4 an investigation.2 Mandalay Bay appointed its employees, Kathi Konkel and Wyatt Dent, as

5 investigators.3 Konkel interviewed Stafford’s supervisor, Yaneli Argueta, who stated that the 6 guest complained to her after the incident and said that Stafford was extremely rude to him.4 7 Konkel interviewed two other lifeguards at the scene, each of whom stated that Stafford 8 threatened to fight the guest.5 One of those lifeguards reported that Stafford had told the guest, 9 “we told you 30 f—king seconds ago to get the f— out of the pool,” “you guys are the only ones 10 still in here while everyone else got out,” and “I’ll beat [your] a—, you don’t want it I promise 11 you that.”6 The investigation also discovered Stafford’s criminal history in Utah that he did not 12 report to Mandalay Bay during his background check.7 13 The investigators then interviewed Stafford, who provided a different account.8 He 14 stated that he noticed two guests in the pool: a father and son.9 He and four other lifeguards

15 went over to the father, and Stafford told them to get out of the pool.10 Stafford offered the boy a 16

17 1 ECF No. 51-1 at 3. 18 2 Id. at 34. 3 Id. at 30. 19 4 Id. at 34. 20 5 Id. 21 6 Id. at 16 (cleaned up). 7 Id. at 34, 68. 22 8 Id. 23 9 Id. at 15. 10 Id. 1 life-preserver tube, and the father stated that his son “was fine and not to assist.”11 The father 2 and son eventually left.12 Stafford denied using profanity or threatening to fight.13 Konkel’s 3 interview notes recount that Stafford stated that he did not know what could be considered 4 profanity, he described himself as “very direct,” he claimed that his coworkers are biased

5 because they don’t know him, and he suggested that the guest may have been delusional or 6 drunk.14 Based on witness testimony, Konkel found that the guest’s allegations were 7 substantiated.15 The investigation team then agreed to terminate Stafford for violating the 8 company’s policies.16 9 Stafford sues Mandalay Bay, alleging that it terminated him based on his race in violation 10 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.17 Mandalay Bay moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of 11 Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6), which I initially granted with leave to amend.18 But I denied 12 Mandalay Bay’s second motion to dismiss after Stafford amended his complaint with more 13 specific allegations.19 Mandalay Bay now moves for summary judgment, arguing that Stafford 14

15 11 Id. at 15, 34. 12 Id. at 15. In his amended complaint, Stafford tells a slightly different story. He alleges that he 16 and three other lifeguards of different races saw the son struggling and swam towards him to help him. ECF No. 40 at 3–5. The father yelled “Don’t save him, don’t touch him. Let him 17 swim out.” Id. Stafford and the other lifeguards collectively yelled and waved to the father, forcing him to exit the pool to assist the struggling boy. Id. Over the father’s objections, they 18 rescued and guided the son to safety. Id. Stafford alleges that he told them to get out of the pool but denied using profanity or threatening to fight. Id. 19 13 ECF No. 51-1 at 34. 20 14 Id. 21 15 Id. at 34–35. 16 Id. at 10, 11, 35. 22 17 ECF No. 40 at 4. 23 18 ECF Nos. 17, 38. 19 ECF No. 48. 1 cannot show his work performance was satisfactory, that similarly situated individuals were 2 treated differently, or that Mandalay Bay’s stated reason for terminating him is pretextual.20 It 3 also argues that the discovery of his conviction in Utah bars rehiring under the after-acquired- 4 evidence doctrine, and that his requested relief—unlimited stays, value membership, and

5 punitive damages—are unfounded or relief that cannot be granted.21 Pro se Stafford opposes the 6 motion.22 7 Discussion 8 Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and admissible evidence “show 9 that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment 10 as a matter of law.”23 If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on the dispositive 11 issue at trial, it is not required to produce evidence to negate the opponent’s claim—its burden is 12 merely to point out the evidence showing the absence of a genuine material factual issue.24 The 13 movant need only defeat one element of a claim to garner summary judgment on it because “a 14 complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

15 necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”25 The court must view all facts and draw all 16 inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.26 17 18 19 20 ECF No. 51 at 11–19. 20 21 Id. at 14–19. 21 22 See generally ECF No. 58. 23 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 22 24 Id. at 323. 23 25 Id. at 322. 26 Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986). 1 Given that Stafford is an unrepresented litigant, the court must liberally construe his 2 arguments.27 But Stafford’s unrepresented status does not relieve him of his burden on summary 3 judgment: unrepresented litigants in ordinary civil cases still must strictly comply with the 4 summary judgment rules.28 And the court should not inject itself into the adversarial process on

5 behalf of a party.29 6 Stafford brings a claim for racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.30 7 Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Stafford must first make out a prima facie case of 8 racial discrimination.31 The burden then shifts to Mandalay Bay to show a legitimate, 9 nondiscriminatory reason for terminating him.32 If Mandalay Bay does so, Stafford has the 10 burden of showing that the explanation is pretextual.33 Summary judgment should be granted if 11 Stafford fails to present evidence establishing either the prima facie case or that the explanation 12 is pretextual.34 13 14

16 27 Ortez v. Wash. Cnty., 88 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1996); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (unrepresented litigants “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 17 drafted by lawyers”). 18 28 Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[Unrepresented] litigants in the ordinary civil case should not be treated more favorably than parties with attorneys of record.”); 19 Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). 29 Filler, 790 F.2d at 1365. 20 30 See ECF No. 40 at 4. 21 31 Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). 22 32 Id. at 641. 23 33 Id. 34 Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890–91 (9th Cir. 1994). 1 A. Stafford cannot establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 2 To prevent summary adjudication of a racial-discrimination claim, a plaintiff must first 3 show that (1) he belongs to a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position, (3) he was 4 subjected to an adverse-employment action, and (4) similarly situated individuals of other races

5 were treated more favorably.35 The amount of proof needed to establish these elements on 6 summary judgment is minimal, below even a preponderance of the evidence.36 Nor are the 7 requirements “rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic;” they can vary depending on the context and 8 “differ from case to case.”37 Mandalay Bay concedes that Stafford belongs to a protected class 9 and that he suffered an adverse-employment action.38 But it contests the remaining prongs: 10 Stafford’s qualifications and whether similarly situated individuals were treated better.39 11 1. Qualification for the position can be shown through work history. 12 Stafford can establish that he was qualified for his lifeguard position by showing a 13 satisfactory work history.40 That showing must rise above a subjective personal self- 14 assessment.41 For example, in Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal Inc., Republic Silver

15 State Disposal terminated Mark Aragon, a white male, from his job carrying trash bins to waiting 16 17

18 35 Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 2002). 36 Id. at 659. 19 37 Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303, 311 (2025) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. 20 Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)). 38 ECF No. 51 at 11. 21 39 Id. at 11–13. 22 40 See Aragon, 292 F.3d at 659–60. 41 Id. at 660; Weil v. Citizens Telecom Servs. Co., LLC, 922 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2019) (“An 23 employee’s self-assessment of his performance, though relevant, is not enough on its own to raise a genuine issue of material fact.”). 1 garbage trucks.42 Aragon alleged that his non-white supervisor terminated him based on his 2 race.43 When his employer moved for summary judgment, Aragon provided evidence that he 3 had “no formal write-ups for poor performance or disciplinary notices against him,” “his 4 performance was equal to his coworkers and that his trucks brought in an average amount of

5 garbage by weight,” he had documents explaining any absence, and his supervisor made 6 statements about him being rehired.44 The court found that these facts were sufficient to show 7 that Aragon was qualified for his position.45 8 2. More favorable treatment of similarly situated coworkers requires 9 an evidentiary showing of different treatment under the same circumstances.

10 Likewise, Stafford may support the other prong—that similarly situated individuals were 11 treated more favorably—by showing that a coworker of another race in the same position and 12 accused of the same or similar conduct was less-harshly punished.46 For example, in the Ninth 13 Circuit’s opinion in Ballou v. McElvain, female sergeant Julie Ballou was passed over several 14 times for a promotion, including when she was at the top of the promotion list.47 She sued the 15 police chief for sex discrimination.48 The chief’s stated reason for not promoting Ballou was that 16 she violated a policy by not writing a report when she should have,49 but one of the male 17 18

42 Aragon, 292 F.3d at 657. 19 43 Id. at 657–58. 20 44 Id. at 659–60. 21 45 Id. at 660. 46 See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641. 22 47 Ballou v. McElvain, 29 F.4th 413, 418 (9th Cir. 2022). 23 48 Id. 49 Id. at 419. 1 sergeants promoted over her had been investigated for violating the very same policy.50 2 Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the court found that Ballou had met her initial 3 “minimal” burden of showing that similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were 4 treated more favorably.51

5 But coworkers are typically not similarly situated if they are not accused of the same or 6 similar conduct. For comparison, in Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, a supervisor directed 7 Francisco Vasquez, a Hispanic deputy-probation officer, not to play football with the youth at a 8 youth-detention center after he asked to do so.52 But he disobeyed and played football with the 9 youth and another non-Hispanic probation officer who was unaware of the supervisor’s order.53 10 When Vasquez was reprimanded for disobeying the order—but the other officer was not 11 similarly punished—Vasquez sued for racial discrimination.54 He claimed that similarly situated 12 individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably because the other officer was 13 not similarly punished.55 The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument, finding that the officers were 14 not similarly situated because the other officer was not accused of the same conduct—knowingly

15 disobeying an order.56 16 17 18 19 50 Id. at 422. 20 51 Id. 21 52 Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 638–39. 53 Id. at 638–39. 22 54 See id. at 639, 641. 23 55 See id. 56 Id. at 641. 1 3. Stafford has offered no showing to support either prong. 2 Stafford has not satisfied his burden of showing either his qualifications or that similarly 3 situated individuals were treated more favorably. He has attested to only four facts: that he is 4 unrepresented, he submitted a brief, he filed an evidentiary objection, and he recommends that I

5 investigate whether any surveillance footage exists.57 Even liberally construing his declaration 6 as incorporating his brief, the facts included in it fall short of establishing that he was qualified 7 for the position or that similarly situated individuals of other races were treated more favorably. 8 Unlike Aragon, Stafford does not provide or describe any specific facts showing that he was 9 performing well in his job overall; he only described the incident in question.58 And Stafford’s 10 sole argument in his brief that similarly situated coworkers were treated better is that he was 11 interviewed before the other lifeguards and his supervisor, which according to him, gave them 12 time to conspire.59 But he does not offer, as he must under cases like Vasquez and Ballou, any 13 evidence showing that Mandalay Bay accused a lifeguard of another race of similar conduct but 14 treated that lifeguard more favorably. Nor could he point to any similar incidents during his

15 deposition.60 Stafford has thus not met his initial burden of establishing his prima facie case. 16 B. Stafford has not offered specific and substantial evidence of pretext to rebut 17 Mandalay Bay’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination. 18 Even if Stafford could establish a prima facie case, Mandalay Bay has offered a 19 legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination—that he accosted a guest in violation of 20 21 57 ECF No. 58 at 5. 22 58 Id. at 2. 23 59 See id. 60 ECF No. 51-1 at 84–87 (107:7–110:25). 1 its rules.61 So the burden shifts back to Stafford to show that Mandalay Bay’s stated reason is 2 pretextual.62 Stafford can satisfy this burden with direct evidence that shows that discrimination 3 more likely motivated the employer or with indirect evidence that the employer’s explanation is 4 unworthy of credence.63 Direct evidence consists of evidence that shows discriminatory animus

5 without any inference or presumption.64 Indirect evidence must be specific and substantial 6 evidence challenging the credibility of the employer’s motives.65 7 The crux of Stafford’s argument is that his supervisor had a racial bias against him and 8 that she organized the other lifeguards to lie about him and the incident.66 He also theorizes that 9 the human-resource employees were biased, too, and they decided to terminate him once they 10 learned that he is Black.67 Mandalay Bay calls these arguments “speculation” and 11 “conjecture.”68 12 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc. forecloses both of 13 Stafford’s arguments.69 Reloynne Villiarimo and her subordinate worked as ground personnel 14 for Aloha Island Air.70 Villiarimo claimed that when she left her post at the front of the aircraft

16 61 See, e.g., Earl v. Nielsen Media Rsch., Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding plaintiff’s “multiple violations of company policy could constitute a legitimate reason for 17 terminating her employment”); ECF No. 51-1 at 10, 11, 35. 18 62 Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640. 63 Id. 19 64 Mayes v. WinCo Holdings, Inc., 846 F.3d 1274, 1280 (9th Cir. 2017). 20 65 Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641. 21 66 ECF No. 51-1 at 80 (103:9–23); ECF No. 58 at 2–3. 67 ECF No. 51-1 at 80–82 (103:9–105:7). 22 68 ECF No. 51 at 14. 23 69 Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2002). 70 Id. at 1058. 1 to help her subordinate, the two of them accidentally damaged and disabled one of Aloha’s 2 planes.71 Three witnesses challenged her explanation, stating that she had never left her post and 3 that she lied about it.72 Aloha terminated Villiarimo, and its stated reasons were that she lied 4 during the investigation and likely committed procedural violations.73

5 Villiarimo sued Aloha for sex discrimination.74 She theorized that Aloha’s stated reason 6 for terminating her—that she lied—was pretextual because Aloha based it on the statements of 7 three witnesses who, she asserted, were the real liars.75 The court found that Villiarimo didn’t 8 satisfy her burden to show pretext.76 It noted that judging whether Aloha’s proffered 9 justifications were actually false was irrelevant for discrimination claims.77 Rather, courts “only 10 require that an employer honestly believed its reason for its actions,” even if its reason is 11 ultimately “foolish or trivial or even baseless.”78 Because Villiarimo presented no evidence that 12 Aloha’s belief was insincere, the Ninth Circuit held that granting summary judgment for the 13 company was proper.79 14 Like in Villiarimo, Stafford’s argument boils down to the allegation that all the witnesses

15 in the investigation into his conduct lied. But even if that were true, Stafford has offered nothing 16 to show that the employees who decided to terminate him—Mandalay Bay’s investigation team, 17

18 71 Id. 72 See id. at 1058–59. 19 73 Id. at 1059. 20 74 Id. 21 75 Id. at 1063. 76 Id. 22 77 Id. 23 78 Id. 79 Id. 1 Kathi Konkel and Wyatt Dent—did not honestly believe that Stafford committed the 2 violations.80 And no facts suggest that they terminated him because of his race and not because 3 of what they uncovered during the investigation. In his deposition, Stafford offered his opinion 4 that they decided to fire him when they learned of his race,81 but a bald accusation of bias is not

5 “specific and substantial” evidence of pretext under the law.82 So Stafford cannot prove that 6 Mandalay Bay’s explanation is pretextual.83 7 Conclusion 8 Because the record fails to support Stafford’s prima facie case of racial discrimination or 9 rebut the defense’s reason for termination, IT IS ORDERED that Mandalay Bay, LLC’s motion 10 11 12 13

14 80 Nor is there any evidence suggesting that Stafford’s supervisor organized all the witnesses to lie about him, that she did so out of racial animus, or that the investigation was a mere “rubber 15 stamp” that could justify a cat’s paw theory of liability. Cf. Lui v. DeJoy, 129 F.4th 770, 779–80 (9th Cir. 2025) (finding that a superior’s decision to terminate an employee was improperly 16 influenced by a biased subordinate when the supervisor heard no live testimony, stated that she never met any of the employees who submitted the complaints, and heard that the complaints 17 may have been racially motivated). 18 81 ECF No. 51-1 at 80–82 (103:9–105:7). 82 Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A 19 plaintiff’s belief that a defendant acted from an unlawful motive, without evidence supporting that belief, is no more than speculation or unfounded accusation about whether the defendant 20 really did act from an unlawful motive” and creates “no genuine issue of material fact.”); Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1061 (citing Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477 (9th Cir. 1996)) 21 (“this court has refused to find a ‘genuine issue’ where the only evidence presented is ‘uncorroborated and self-serving’ testimony”). 22 83 Mandalay Bay also argues that Stafford cannot be rehired under the after-acquired-evidence doctrine and that several categories of damages in his prayer for relief cannot be granted. ECF 23 No. 51 at 14–19. Because I find that Stafford has not put forward sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on his prima facie case, I do not reach these arguments. 1} for summary judgment [ECF No. 51] is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff and CLOSE THIS CASE. ran 5 US. Districi Judge Jenn (fer). Dorsey September 24, 2025 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23