Stacy A. Dobson v. Dale C. Cameron, Superintendent, St. Elizabeths Hospital, Ronald Stultz v. Dale C. Cameron, Superintendent, St. Elizabeths Hospital

383 F.2d 519, 127 U.S. App. D.C. 324, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5203

• Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
• Decided: September 1, 1967
• Docket: 20573, 20576
• Status: Published

Opinions

PER CURIAM:

Appellants in these two cases are patients at St. Elizabeths under civil commitment. Each appeals from a dismissal by the District Court, after hearing, of his habeas corpus petition. We reverse and remand in each case for a new hearing before a different judge.

No. 20,573

Appellant Dobson, in addition to claiming eligibility for immediate release^ — a question which was heard and decided adversely to him — raised a variety of other issues. The trial court did not regard any of these as justiciable. Since one of them was an alleged denial of the right to treatment, reversal and remand for a new hearing is required in any event.¹ 21 D.C.Code § 562 (Supp. V., 1966); and see Rouse v. Cameron, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 366, 373 F.2d 451 (1966).

In such new hearing, we regard the issue of eligibility for release as also open for a fresh inquiry and determination, since we are not satisfied that its resolution was founded upon an adequate hearing. We do not address ourselves specifically to the matters referred to in Note 1, supra, since we are content to leave their disposition to the judge presiding at the new trial. We note only that some of them would appear to be intimately related to, and perhaps a part of, the central issue of the adequacy of treatment; and that, to the extent this is so, they are inevitably implicated in the trial of that issue.

It has been urged upon us in this appeal that the habeas corpus petition should not have been entertained at all, much less made the occasion of a hearing, because appellant did not first pursue the administrative remedy which Congress has expressly provided in 21 D.C. Code § 546 (Supp. V., 1966). This court has heretofore indicated its belief that such administrative procedures as are available should normally be exhausted before resort is had to the courts.² We reaffirm that belief most vigorously in this context of a civil commitment in respect of which there can be no question as to the Congressional purpose to afford an administrative avenue of relief as a preface to judicial consideration. The record before us is, however, unclear as to exactly wha.t has happened in respect of the raising of this issue in the District Court or what the considerations are in respect of the withholding of judicial intervention at this advanced date in the history of this ease. We have concluded, therefore, to leave the parties free on remand to take such action and to make such contentions on this point as they deem fit; and the District Court will, as it should be entitled to do, deal with the matter in the first instance.

No. 20,576

In his pro se petition, appellant Stultz asserted only that he was being improperly held in the maximum security ward and should be tranferred to another place within the hospital. This issue, which the trial judge had not regarded as justiciable in Dobson, was nevertheless made the subject of an evidentiary hearing which ended with a ruling by the judge that, even though he had no jurisdiction, he would deny the relief sought on the merits. Being unconvinced that, under these circumstances, there has been a meaningful hearing and resolution of the claim advanced, we reverse and remand for a new hearing.

On appeal it was alleged for the first time that there had been a denial of appellant’s right to treatment. 21 D.C. Code § 546 (Supp. V., 1966); and see Rouse v. Cameron, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 366, 373 F.2d 451 (1966). Our remand contemplates that this issue may be raised in the District Court if appellant so elects. With respect to the exhaustion of administrative remedies, we note that appellee’s return to the writ appears to have raised this question, but that the writ was nonetheless directed to issue. We have suggested above in Dobson the substantiality we attribute to this question ; and, as in our remand in that case, we direct that the parties shall be free upon this remand to take such action as they deem fit with respect to this issue, with the court making such disposition of it as it thinks warranted in the circumstances which obtain here.³

* * *

The judgments are reversed and the eases remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

It is so ordered.

1 . The other issues included, in addition to treatment, alleged failures by appellee to discharge statutory obligations to keep records and to accord appellant proper communication with the outside world by telephone and mail; and they also extended to alleged non-statutory claims of undue restrictions of liberty, such as improper retention in the maximum security ward, arbitrary limitations upon visiting privileges, and unreasonable refusals to permit appellant to work outside the institution during the day.

2 . In Rouse v. Cameron, supra, we said as follows:

This requirement [the right to treatment] also suggests the appropriateness of administrative procedures for considering complaints alleging lack of treatment. These procedures would not only provide the Hospital an opportunity to afford a remedy, but would also provide a record which might assist in the disposition of any resulting litigation. And given “adequate and available” administrative procedures, it might be argued, although we do not decide, that the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of remedies would apply. See, e. g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-52 [58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638] (1938); Sohm v. Fowler, 124 U.S.App. D.C. 382, 365 F.2d 915, decided June 16, 1966.

125 U.S.App.D.C. at 371, 373 F.2d at 456 n. 22.

3 . Because appellant Stultz appears to be complaining only of inadequate treatment (including detention in the maximum security ward) and not of his continuing hospitalization, it has been suggested that the administrative remedy of 21 D.C.Code § 546 is not available to him since it is directed in terms to the alternatives of immediate release and continued commitment. We do not now decide what the precise scope of the statute may be, inasmuch as the District Court should do that in the first instance on the basis of the contentions made to it and in the light of the facts of record before it. We note only that where, as in Dobson, release is sought simultaneously with treatment and other rights which assume continued confinement, these latter become moot if release is administratively forthcoming; and that, accordingly, it would be appropriate for a court at least to stay its consideration of these matters until exhaustion of the administrative remedy. We note also that a person situated as was Stultz might conceivably bring himself within § 546 by claiming entitlement to release unless his other rights are recognized. The objectives which Congress sought to serve by § 546 would ordinarily be farthest advanced by according to that statute a reading consistent in breadth with those objectives.