St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Culwell

62 S.W.2d 100
CourtTexas Commission of Appeals
DecidedJune 24, 1933
DocketNo. 1694—6205
StatusPublished
Cited by36 cases

This text of 62 S.W.2d 100 (St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Culwell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Commission of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Culwell, 62 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Super. Ct. 1933).

Opinion

CRITZ, Judge.

The St. Paul Eire & Marine Insurance Company issued to H. E. Culwell two policies of fire insurance, one in part on a stock of goods of a drug store, and in part on certain drug store furniture and fixtures in the town of Avoca, Tex. The other policy is on the stock of goods of the same store. There is no issue of concurrent insurance involved.' The property covered by the two policies was destroy- , ed by fire while they were in force, and the refusal of the insurance companies to pay brought on this litigation.

The suit was instituted in the district court of Jones county, Tex., by Mrs. A. E. Culwell, wife of the named insured, joined pro forma by her said husband, to reform the two policies so as to make them read to “Avoca Drug Company,” and recover the amounts thereof in her own right as her separate property. Trial in the district court without a jury resulted in a judgment for Mrs. Culwell. This ■judgment was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. 45 S.W.(2d) 347. The insurance company brings error.

The facts of this case are undisputed; only law questions being involved. It seems that during the happening of the events here involved, and for many years prior thereto, there was a drug store in Avoca, Tex., run in the trade-name of “Avoca Drug Company.” During such period the above store was owned and operated by various parties. At one time it was owned by the son of these two [101]*101plaintiffs. At the time the two fire insurance policies here sued on were issued, and at the time the property insured burned, the store in question belonged to Mrs. A. E. Culwell, wife of H. E. Culwell, in her separate right. H. E. Culwell acted as general manager for his wife in the operation of the store. Mrs. Culwell seems to have stayed at home and attended to her household duties in the ordinary manner of a housewife. It is shown that all of the property covered by these two policies was destroyed by fire during the life of such policies, except a small amount of goods in a safe. Mrs. Culwell demanded payment of the policies as the sole owner. The company refused payment on the ground that the contract was personal to H. E. Culwell, and did not protect Mrs. Culwell. The suit followed.

As above shown, both of these policies are issued in the name of H. E. Culwell as the owner of the property insured. Both such policies contained the following standard provision: “This entire policy unless otherwise provided, by agreement, endorsed hereon or added hereto, shall be void * * if the interest of the insured in the property be other than unconditional and sole ownership. # * ⅜ 5J

Neither of the above policies contains any agreement indorsed thereon or added thereto which in any way modifies or abrogates the above provision.

As already shown, and as shown by the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, Mrs. Culwell seeks to recover on these two policies in her own name, and in her separate right as the unconditional and sole owner of the properties insured. In this connection Mrs. Culwell seeks to reform the policies so as to make them read to the trade-name of “Avoca Drug Company,” and then seeks to recover as the sole owner of such Avoca Drug Company; in other words, Mrs. A. E. Cul-well seeks to recover on the theory that she and Avoca Drug Company are one and the same person, and that the parties to the contract both intended for Avoca Drug Company to be named therein as the insured, regardless of ownership. The ground relied on by Mrs. Culwell to so reform the policies is mutual mistake in making such policies read in the name of her husband, H. E. Culwell.

It is the settled law of this state that the above ownership clause in a fire insurance policy has no relation to any answer or statement covered by the provisions of article 5043, R. C. S. 1925, but such ownership clause is a contractual warranty. It is also the settled law that fire insurance policies are purely personal contracts available only to the holder or insured. It follows that they are not contracts in rem. National Fire Insurance Co. v. Carter (Tex. Com. App.) 257 S. W. 531.

Since fire insurance contracts are personal to the insured it follows that fire insurance companies have the right to consider the person insured, the moral hazard, as of prime importance in issuing their policies. In fact, the person insured is always a matter of prime consideration in issuing fire insurance policies. National Eire Insurance Co. v. Carter, supra.

In the case at bar it is fairly evident that this company might have been willing to assume this fire risk if the business insured was owned and operated by the husband, when it would not have been willing to assume such risk if ‘the business was owned by the wife, and operated by the husband as her agent. .

Since these policies were issued to H. E. Culwell, and as written are personal to him, Mrs. A. E. Culwell cannot recover in this suit in her own separate right, unless and until such policies are reformed so as to make them in some way legally personal to her. Mrs. Culwell contends that this can be accomplished if the policies are reformed so as to make them read to “Avoca Drug Company.” As already stated, the ground alleged for reformation is mutual mistake.

A mutual mistake is one common to both parties to the contract, each laboring under the same misconception. Harrell v. De Normandie, 26 Tex. 120; May v. San Antonio, etc., Town Site Co., 83 Tex. 502, 18 S. W. 959; 5 Words and Phrases, Third Series, 297; Paine-Eishburn Granite Co. v. Reynoldson, 115 Neb. 520, 213 N. W. 750.

Stated in another form, a mutual mistake is one which is reciprocal and common to both parties to the contract, and one where each alike labors under the same misconception, in respect to the terms of such contract, and sometimes of the agreement itself. Id.; O’Reilly’s Case, 258 Mass. 205, 154 N. E. 851.

Equity has jurisdiction to reform written instruments in cases of mutual mistake, but a written contract will not be reformed in equity because of a mistake, in the absence of fraud, unless it is mutual; that is, common to both parties, and each under the same mistake as to its terms. May v. San Antonio, etc., Town Site Co., supra; Finks v. Hollis, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 23, 85 S. W. 463; 5 Words and Phrases, Third Series, 298; Universal Sec. Co. v. American Pipe & Const, Co., 95 N. J. Eq. 752, 128 A. 618.

Under our blended system of law and equity, an instrument can be reformed, and recovery had on such instrument as reformed in one action.

We shall now proceed to apply the above rules to the facts of this case to ascertain if there are any facts which will justify reformation of these two policies so as to make them personal .to Mrs. A. E. Culwell in [102]*102lier own separate right. It is evident, from the statement we have made and the evidence we shall later quote, that to justify such reformation we must find evidence in the record which will either support a finding that both the insurer and the insured intended the policies should read in favor of “Avoca Drug Company,” regardless of ownership, or that it was intended by both the insurer and the insured that such policies should read to Mrs. A. E. Culwell in her very name.

The transactions involved in the issuance of these policies all took place between II. E. Culwell, the husband, and G. H. Rennels, the local agent of the insurance company. As we understand this record, the testimony of these two witnesses contains all the evidence bearing on the issue of mutual mistake.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

KCCC Properties, Inc. v. Quality Vending, Inc.
312 S.W.3d 231 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2010)
in Re Merchant Derles Jones, Relator
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2009
Gilbane Building Co. v. Keystone Structural Concrete, Ltd.
263 S.W.3d 291 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2007)
Abilene National Bank v. Fina Supply, Inc.
706 S.W.2d 737 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1986)
First National Bank of Andrews v. Jones
635 S.W.2d 950 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1982)
Cambridge Companies, Inc. v. Williams
602 S.W.2d 306 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1980)
Cornish v. Yarbrough
558 S.W.2d 28 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1977)
Ace Drug Marts, Inc. v. Sterling
502 S.W.2d 935 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1973)
Jackson v. Gibraltar Life Insurance Co. of America
435 S.W.2d 618 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1968)
Finger v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.
423 S.W.2d 460 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1968)
Commercial Standard Insurance Co. v. White
423 S.W.2d 427 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1967)
Dugan v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp.
421 S.W.2d 717 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1967)
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Palestine Fashions, Inc.
402 S.W.2d 883 (Texas Supreme Court, 1966)
Old Colony Insurance Company v. Messer
328 S.W.2d 335 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1959)
Allison v. Smith
281 S.W.2d 136 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1955)
Lowe v. Michigan Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
236 S.W.2d 168 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1950)
Hayman v. Dowda
233 S.W.2d 466 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1950)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
62 S.W.2d 100, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/st-paul-fire-marine-ins-co-v-culwell-texcommnapp-1933.