St. Mina Auto Sales, Inc. and Victor S. Elgohary v. Najwa Al-Muasher, D/B/A American Auto Sales, D/B/A American Auto Sales 1.1

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided November 23, 2015·No. 01-14-00599-CV·Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED

01-14-00599-CV

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS 11/23/2015 8:44:00 AM CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

FILED IN

No. 01-14-00599-CV 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 11/23/2015 8:44:00 AM FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE HOUSTON, TEXAS Clerk

St. Mina Auto Sales, Inc. and Victor Elgohary, Appellants,

v.

Najwa Al-Muasher d/b/a American Auto Sales and American Auto Sales 1.1, Appellees.

Appeal from the 80th Judicial District Court Harris County, Texas

APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR REHEARING AND EN BANC RECONSIDERATION

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Victor S. Elgohary State Bar No. 24067587 6406 Arcadia Bend Ct Houston, Texas 77041-6222 Phone (281) 858-0014 victor@vselgohary.com Attorneys for Appellants

ISSUE PRESENTED

The Court erred by upholding the sanctions award and allowing the

lower court to modify the judgment.

I. ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS OF FACT

In April 2014 the owners of Mina, AAS, and Cinco met with their

priest and mediated a settlement on their own without the assistance of counsel.

Mina communicated this fact to Elgohary and asked that the case be dismissed

according to the parties’ oral agreement.

As pointed out in the original briefs, counsel for AAS – Omar Misleh

– pointed out to Elgohary that the judgment filed with the court and ultimately

entered did not conform to what Misleh signed. He sent Elgohary an e-mail on

May 16, 2014 to that effect. But before even substantively conferring with

Elgohary regarding the problem – as required by the local rules – Misleh filed his

motion for sanctions just seven days after sending the one e-mail.

The subsequent conversations between Misleh and Elgohary prior to

the sanctions hearing regarding the attempts to resolve the problems with the

judgment have not been disclosed in their entirety. Elgohary made efforts to confer

with Misleh during the last week of May 2014 by telephone regarding Misleh’s

concerns and the oversight. (R.R. 15). That telephone conference between counsel

resulted in Misleh’s e-mail dated June 2, 2014, just 4 days before the scheduled

sanctions hearing. (Exhibit A).

In that e-mail, Misleh proposed that in order to resolve the problem,

Elgohary should obtain a release from Cinco, a client Elgohary would need

authorization to represent in this matter. Misleh also proposed that Cinco continue

to be excluded from any agreed judgment. (Exhibit A). Elgohary responded the

same day by e-mail after reviewing Misleh’s proposed changes. (Exhibit B).

Misleh responded with yet another version of the settlement agreement based on

Elgohary’s comments. (Exhibit C).

After receiving Misleh’s second e-mail reply, Elgohary responded by

telephone regarding Misleh’s proposed revisions. During that telephone

conversation, Elgohary pointed out that there were still errors in the revisions to

the proposed settlement agreement between AAS and Cinco. Elgohary also

expressed concerns that under Misleh’s new proposal, there were still issues with

how all the parties would be properly bound by a final agreed judgment. During

that call, Elgohary also pointed out that Misleh’s proposed order would not be

equitable to the parties since AAS’s claims against Cinco would not be dismissed

with prejudice even if the proposed settlement agreement was signed by Cinco.

Misleh’s proposed solution also left AAS with a problem since Cinco was not

under the jurisdiction of the lower court and could not be bound by an agreed

judgment. At that point, Misleh hung up the telephone and refused to speak with

Elgohary after June 2, 2014 to work out the remaining issues, seeking instead to

obtain his $2,000 sanction against Elgohary. 1

Even after this Court issued its opinion, Elgohary again reached out to

Misleh to try to get to a resolution that would address the outstanding issues and

offered to get this dispute resolved as originally intended by all the parties under

TEX.R.APP.P. 42.1. After almost a month and multiple requests by Elgohary for a

response from Misleh regarding the proposal, Elgohary received no reply by

telephone or e-mail. In order to get a response, Elgohary had to make two trips to

Misleh’s offices to speak with him personally since he disconnected his telephone

from answering, refused to give Elgohary his alternate cell phone contact number,

and did not respond to e-mails. Misleh finally responded – after Elgohary’s second

visit to Misleh’s offices – that AAS declined Elgohary’s proposal. (Exhibit E).

Elgohary attempted to confer with Misleh again regarding any concerns that might

effectuate such an agreement, but Misleh has not responded to Elgohary’s most

recent request to discuss either by telephone or e-mail.

1 Misleh informed Elgohary during one office visit that AAS has never compensated him for the services rendered.

II. ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES

This Court should reverse the sanctions award and the judgment overall

because the trial court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing led to an

improper judgment.

A. The record is absent of any evidence of misconduct or

attorneys’ fees in connection with the misconduct.

Inherent power to sanction exists to the extent necessary to deter,

alleviate, and counteract bad faith abuse of the judicial process. Metzger v. Sebek,

892 S.W.2d 20, 51 (Tex.App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied)(citing Kutch

v. Del Mar College, 831 S.W.2d 506 (Tex.App. – Corpus Christi 1992, no writ). In

a sanctions context, a trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing to make the

necessary factual determinations about a party’s or attorney’s motives and

credibility as they relate to bad faith. R.M. Dudley Const. Co., Inc. v. Dawson, 258

S.W.3d 694, 709 (Tex.App. – Waco 2008, pet denied). Without such an

evidentiary hearing, the trial court has no evidence before it to determine bad faith;

an element that is required to invoke a court’s inherent power to sanction.

Alejandro v. Robstown ISD, 131 S.W.3d 663, 670 (Tex.App. – Corpus Christi

2004, no pet.) (citing Karagounis v. Prop. Co. of Am., 970 S.W.2d 761, 765

(Tex.App. – Amarillo 1998, pet. denied); see also Karlock v. Schattman, 894

S.W.2d 517, 523 (Tex.App. – Fort Worth 1995, orig. proceeding). In the context of

TEX.CIV.PRAC.&REM CODE §10 – which also has a bad faith element – the party

moving for sanctions must prove the offending party’s subjective state of mind.

Brozynski v. Kerney, 2006 WL 2160841, at *4 (Tex.App. – Waco Aug. 2, 2006,

pet. denied) (citing Mattly v. Spiegel, Inc., 19 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex.App. –

Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.)). The same is true under TEX.R.CIV.P. 13.

Karlock v. Schattman, 894 S.W.2d at 523.

Evidence must be admitted under the rules of evidence at an

evidentiary hearing for a trial court to consider it in a sanctions context. Alejandro

v. Bell, 84 S.W.3d 383, 393 (Tex.App. – Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). Arguments

of counsel are not evidence. U.S. Government v. Marks, 949 S.W.2d 320, 326

(Tex. 1997); see also McCain v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 856 S.W.2d 751, 757

(Tex.App. – Dallas 1993, no writ)(citing Delgado v. Kitzman, 793 S.W.2d 332,

333 (Tex.App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ))(stating that arguments of

counsel are not evidence in a sanctions context).

In the lower court, there is no evidence of any bad faith or resultant

attorneys’ fees in the record because there was no evidentiary hearing which would

have afforded an opportunity for oral testimony and e-mail documents to be

properly admitted, authenticated, and cross-examined under oath. The record only

consists of argument, which contains an incomplete narrative of all the relevant

events that transpired between counsel. There is not even an affidavit of attorney’s

fees which could have been challenged. The record only contains argument and the

lower court asking how much time was required for Misleh to attend the hearing

and prepare the motion for sanctions, for which Misleh failed to even confer prior

to its filing. That is improper and is not evidence by any recognized standard.

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St. Mina Auto Sales, Inc. and Victor S. Elgohary v. Najwa Al-Muasher, D/B/A American Auto Sales, D/B/A American Auto Sales 1.1, (Tex. Ct. App. 2015).

St. Mina Auto Sales, Inc. and Victor S. Elgohary v. Najwa Al-Muasher, D/B/A American Auto Sales, D/B/A American Auto Sales 1.1 (St. Mina Auto Sales, Inc. and Victor S. Elgohary v. Najwa Al-Muasher, D/B/A American Auto Sales, D/B/A American Auto Sales 1.1) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Karagounis v. Property Co. of America
970 S.W.2d 761 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1998)
R.M. Dudley Construction Co. v. Dawson
258 S.W.3d 694 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2008)
McCain v. NME Hospitals, Inc.
856 S.W.2d 751 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1993)
Kutch v. Del Mar College
831 S.W.2d 506 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1992)
Alejandro v. Bell
84 S.W.3d 383 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2002)
Karlock v. Schattman
894 S.W.2d 517 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1995)
Mattly v. Spiegel, Inc.
19 S.W.3d 890 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Metzger v. Sebek
892 S.W.2d 20 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1994)
Alejandro v. Robstown Independent School District
131 S.W.3d 663 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2004)
Delgado v. Kitzman
793 S.W.2d 332 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1990)
United States Government v. Marks
949 S.W.2d 320 (Texas Supreme Court, 1997)