St. Louis & South-Eastern Railway Co. v. Mathias

50 Ind. 65
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 15, 1874
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 50 Ind. 65 (St. Louis & South-Eastern Railway Co. v. Mathias) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
St. Louis & South-Eastern Railway Co. v. Mathias, 50 Ind. 65 (Ind. 1874).

Opinions

Downey, J.

This was an action by the appellee against the appellant. The complaint, in substance, charges, that the defendant, before and at the time of the committing of the grievances hereinafter mentioned, to wit, on the 17th day of January, 1873, was the owner and occupier of a certain railroad leading from Evansville, in the State of Indiana, to St. Louis, in the State of Missouri, and of certain cars and locomotives running thereon; that the said railroad, so operated, etc., ran upon and occupied a certain track belonging to and used by the said defendant, said track being on Third street [67]*67in said city of Evansville, below Pigeon Creek. And the plaintiff avers, that on said day he was in the employ of one William Eriedrick, and engaged in hauling coal with a team of horses and wagon, then belonging to said Friedrick; that while he was driving said team along Eleventh avenue, in said city, which avenue crosses.the railroad track of the defendant at right angles, the plaintiff, together with said horses and wagon, without the fault or negligence of the said plaintiff, were run into by a certain train of cars and locomotive belonging to and operated by the said defendant,' her agents, servants, and employes, by reason whereof the plaintiff was violently thrown from his wagon, his right shoulder dislocated, and otherwise severely injured; that the defendant so carelessly, negligently, wantonly, and unlawfully ran and managed said train of cars and locomotive, that the same ran into, over, against, and upon the plaintiff, and thereby violently threw him from the wagon then being driven by him, dislocated his shoulder, and otherwise hurt and injured said plaintiff, by which he has been permanently injured and lamed in his arm, and never will recover from said injury, to his damage five thousand dollars, for which he demands judgment.

The defendant answered by a general denial of each and every allegation of the complaint.

A trial by jury resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff, assessing his damages at twenty-five hundred dollars.

A motion by the defendant for a new trial was overruled, and final judgment was rendered for the amount of the verdict.

■ The errors assigned bring before us for decision the questions as to the sufficiency of the complaint and the correctness or incorrectness of the ruling of the court in refusing to grant a new trial. '

The insufficiency of the complaint is not much relied upon in the brief of counsel. It was presented in the court below by a motion in arrest of judgment. The question is made and [68]*68disposed of in the brief of counsel for appellant, in the following language:

“ But, finally, the judgment should have been arrested, because of the uncertainty of the allegations in the complaint. It is impossible to tell from the complaint what acts of negligence were relied upon.”

The question is decided against the appellant in The Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Keeley’s Adm’r, 23 Ind. 133. It was there held, that «the general averment, that the defendant, by her agents and servants, did carelessly and negligently run over,” etc., was sufficient, without stating the particular acts constituting .such negligence. And see The Ohio & Miss. R. W. Co. v. Selby, 47 Ind. 471.

The first question, arising under the second assignment of error, to which we will refer, relates to the admission in evidence of an ordinance of the city regulating the running of trains in the city, the speed of the trains, the ringing of the bell of the engine, etc. Counsel for appellant urge this as an error. We do not think it an error. The admissibility of such an ordinance and evidence of its violation, as a circumstance to be considered by the jury in deciding the question of negligence, must be regarded as settled. The Madison; etc., R. R. Co. v. Taffe, 37 Ind. 361.

Special objection is made to the eighth section of the ordinance, on the ground that it “ had not the slightest bearing upon the case.” Counsel say, where immaterial testimony is admitted, the presumption is that it injured the party against whom the error is committed,” and in support of the assertion refer to The Bellefontaine R. W. Co. v. Hunter, 33 Ind. 335. That case states the rule thus : “ Where improper evidence, material to the issue, has been admitted, the presumption is that it worked injury,” etc. This does not sustain the position of counsel, as the court speaks of material evidence.

The rule as to the admission of immaterial evidence was applied in Van Vacter v. M’Killip, 7 Blackf. 578, and in Sparks v. Heritage, 45 Ind. 66. There was no available error in admitting the whole ordinance in evidence.

[69]*69The bill of exceptions shows that one of the counsel for the plaintiff, in the commencement of his closing argument, made use of this language :

Gentlemen of the jury, the question for you to determine in this case is, whether or not this railroad company shall be permitted to run their track in the streets, and when the city council requires them by ordinance not to run their trains at a greater speed than five miles an hour, and that they shall ring their bell all the time while running along the streets, and that they shall post at the crossings sign-boards warning passengers of the approach of their trains, whether they shall be permitted to disregard all these requisitions and run their trains from twelve to fifteen miles an hour, in utter disregard of the lives of the people, along the streets, and of all these requisitions made by the city for their protection. Gentlemen, it is for you to determine, by your verdict in this case, whether this country shall be governed by railroad companies or by the people.”

It is a matter peculiarly within the province of the court, before which a trial is had, to regulate and control the arguments of counsel. If in any case this court would reverse a judgment for an error in the exercise of its authority in such a matter, it would have to be a very clear case of abuse of such discretion. - In this case, there was no objection made, nor any request to the court to correct, the statement or to limit counsel to a more pertinent discussion of the questions involved. This irregularity was first urged in the motion for a new trial. Ho doubt counsel frequently, .jn the heat of discussion, prompted by a zeal for their clients, waste the time of the court and use language and arguments not pertinent to the question at issue. But, as a general rule, the correction of these matters must be left to the nisi prius courts.

We will next consider the case with reference to the sufficiency of the evidence. In order to its proper understanding, we here insert a map of that part of the city where the occurrence t took place:

[70]

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Bluebook (online)
50 Ind. 65, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/st-louis-south-eastern-railway-co-v-mathias-ind-1874.