Hunstein, Justice.
Lakiesha Bartley was arrested and detained in April 1997 by Chatham County Sheriff Al St. Lawrence pursuant to a fugitive warrant issued on the basis of arrest warrants from South Carolina for Bartley’s alleged commission in that state of five counts of the criminal offense of deposit account fraud. In July 1997 Bartley filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that no formal demand or extradition warrant had been received from South Carolina and that she was not a “fugitive from justice.” Because the problem with the absent war[95]*95rant was resolved minutes before the hearing, the habeas court addressed only Bartley’s claim that she was not a fugitive from justice. The court heard testimony by Bartley that she is a Florida resident who was in Savannah attending college; that other than as a toddler, she had never set foot in South Carolina; that several months before any of the bad checks in issue were written, Bartley’s car had been broken into and her identification, a checkbook, and other items were stolen; that shortly thereafter Bartley lost her purse and all of its contents while on campus; that the break-in and loss were reported to police and campus security, respectively; and that because of these matters Bartley notified the Savannah police of her new address when she moved to Atlanta. Bartley’s mother testified that her daughter was with her in Florida in December (when some of the bad checks were written), but could not give the precise dates. The State adduced only the extradition warrant. The habeas court granted Bartley’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, finding that Bartley was not in South Carolina at the time of the commission of the alleged crimes and thus could not have “fled from justice” from that State. See OCGA § 17-13-23. We affirm.
1. The State contends the habeas court erred by ruling that Bart-ley was not a fugitive from justice. The habeas court correctly recognized that it was not appropriate for it to look behind the probable cause finding of the demanding state, see Rhodes v. State, 255 Ga. 391 (338 SE2d 676) (1986), and that, as the habeas court in the asylum state, it was limited to determining the four “readily verifiable” facts discussed in Michigan v. Doran, 439 U. S. 282, 289 (99 SC 530, 58 LE2d 521) (1978) (upholding the constitutionality of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, codified in Georgia as OCGA § 17-13-20 et seq.). See Marini v. Gibson, 267 Ga. 398 (1) (478 SE2d 767) (1996). See also OCGA § 17-13-23. The only one of those four facts in issue here is whether Bartley was a fugitive from justice,1 i.e., whether she committed or was charged with a crime in one state, left its jurisdiction, and was found within the territory of another state when it was sought to subject her to the criminal process of the former state. Anderson v. Roth, 231 Ga. 369, 370 (202 SE2d 91) (1973).
Pursuant to OCGA § 17-13-23, the demand for extradition recognized by the Governor alleged, inter alia, that Bartley was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime and that she thereafter fled from the state. The State argues that where these allegations are properly presented by the demand[96]*96ing state and accepted by the Governor, an accused like Bartley cannot challenge the factual basis of these allegations in any extradition habeas corpus proceeding in Georgia. The State relies on several opinions issued by this Court which “have led some to conclude that whether the accused was in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime is not recognized . . . as a viable issue.” Jenkins v. Garrison, 265 Ga. 42, n. 6 (453 SE2d 698) (1995). However, those cases are distinguishable from this case for the reasons set forth in Jenkins, namely, that they either involved warrants issued pursuant to OCGA § 17-13-25 and its predecessor statute, whereby the surrender of the accused to the demanding state is authorized even though the accused was not within the demanding state at the time the crime was committed, or else involved situations wherein the petitioner was challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to establish probable cause to believe he was in the demanding state at the time of the crime, a challenge foreclosed by Michigan v. Doran, supra, 439 U. S. at 289. Jenkins v. Garrison, supra. Likewise, the State’s reliance on Marini v. Gibson, supra, is misplaced as that case is distinguishable because it decided only that an accused, who is present in Georgia after having been mistakenly released from incarceration in the demanding state, qualifies as a “fugitive from justice” for extradition purposes.
Contrary to the State’s position, the law is well established that
[a] person who is held on the governor’s warrant issued in response to a request for extradition is entitled to habeas corpus relief upon establishing that he is not a “fugitive from justice.” [Cit.]
Marini v. Gibson, supra, 267 Ga. at 399 (1). Accord Jenkins v. Garrison, supra, 265 Ga. at 44.
If [the petitioner] can show that he was not in the demanding State on the day of the commission of the alleged crime, it would be the duty of the court in a habeas corpus proceeding to discharge him. [Cits.]
Sellers v. Griffin, 226 Ga. 565, 566 (176 SE2d 75) (1970). A habeas court is not improperly questioning the demanding state’s determination of probable cause, weighing an accused’s defenses to the charged crime, or deciding the accused’s guilt or innocence when it follows the fourth requirement in Michigan v. Doran, supra, by deciding whether the petitioner was a fugitive from justice, an inquiry which necessarily entails addressing whether the petitioner was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, thereafter left its jurisdiction, and was found in the [97]*97territory of this State. See Anderson v. Roth, supra, 231 Ga. at 370. See also OCGA § 17-13-23. As has been recognized,
“[t]here is a distinction, though often subtle, between proof of absence from the state for purposes of negativing the condition of extradition and proof of an alibi as such for purposes of establishing innocence.”
State Ex Rel. Wagner v. Hedman, 195 NW2d 420, 422 (Minn. 1972). Because the habeas court here carefully limited its review to a determination whether the requirements in Michigan v. Doran, supra, had been met and did not improperly expand the scope of the proceedings by inquiring into the legal sufficiency of Bartley’s statutory or constitutional defenses, we find no error in the habeas court’s inquiry into the limited issue whether Bartley was a fugitive from justice.
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Hunstein, Justice.
Lakiesha Bartley was arrested and detained in April 1997 by Chatham County Sheriff Al St. Lawrence pursuant to a fugitive warrant issued on the basis of arrest warrants from South Carolina for Bartley’s alleged commission in that state of five counts of the criminal offense of deposit account fraud. In July 1997 Bartley filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that no formal demand or extradition warrant had been received from South Carolina and that she was not a “fugitive from justice.” Because the problem with the absent war[95]*95rant was resolved minutes before the hearing, the habeas court addressed only Bartley’s claim that she was not a fugitive from justice. The court heard testimony by Bartley that she is a Florida resident who was in Savannah attending college; that other than as a toddler, she had never set foot in South Carolina; that several months before any of the bad checks in issue were written, Bartley’s car had been broken into and her identification, a checkbook, and other items were stolen; that shortly thereafter Bartley lost her purse and all of its contents while on campus; that the break-in and loss were reported to police and campus security, respectively; and that because of these matters Bartley notified the Savannah police of her new address when she moved to Atlanta. Bartley’s mother testified that her daughter was with her in Florida in December (when some of the bad checks were written), but could not give the precise dates. The State adduced only the extradition warrant. The habeas court granted Bartley’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, finding that Bartley was not in South Carolina at the time of the commission of the alleged crimes and thus could not have “fled from justice” from that State. See OCGA § 17-13-23. We affirm.
1. The State contends the habeas court erred by ruling that Bart-ley was not a fugitive from justice. The habeas court correctly recognized that it was not appropriate for it to look behind the probable cause finding of the demanding state, see Rhodes v. State, 255 Ga. 391 (338 SE2d 676) (1986), and that, as the habeas court in the asylum state, it was limited to determining the four “readily verifiable” facts discussed in Michigan v. Doran, 439 U. S. 282, 289 (99 SC 530, 58 LE2d 521) (1978) (upholding the constitutionality of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, codified in Georgia as OCGA § 17-13-20 et seq.). See Marini v. Gibson, 267 Ga. 398 (1) (478 SE2d 767) (1996). See also OCGA § 17-13-23. The only one of those four facts in issue here is whether Bartley was a fugitive from justice,1 i.e., whether she committed or was charged with a crime in one state, left its jurisdiction, and was found within the territory of another state when it was sought to subject her to the criminal process of the former state. Anderson v. Roth, 231 Ga. 369, 370 (202 SE2d 91) (1973).
Pursuant to OCGA § 17-13-23, the demand for extradition recognized by the Governor alleged, inter alia, that Bartley was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime and that she thereafter fled from the state. The State argues that where these allegations are properly presented by the demand[96]*96ing state and accepted by the Governor, an accused like Bartley cannot challenge the factual basis of these allegations in any extradition habeas corpus proceeding in Georgia. The State relies on several opinions issued by this Court which “have led some to conclude that whether the accused was in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime is not recognized . . . as a viable issue.” Jenkins v. Garrison, 265 Ga. 42, n. 6 (453 SE2d 698) (1995). However, those cases are distinguishable from this case for the reasons set forth in Jenkins, namely, that they either involved warrants issued pursuant to OCGA § 17-13-25 and its predecessor statute, whereby the surrender of the accused to the demanding state is authorized even though the accused was not within the demanding state at the time the crime was committed, or else involved situations wherein the petitioner was challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to establish probable cause to believe he was in the demanding state at the time of the crime, a challenge foreclosed by Michigan v. Doran, supra, 439 U. S. at 289. Jenkins v. Garrison, supra. Likewise, the State’s reliance on Marini v. Gibson, supra, is misplaced as that case is distinguishable because it decided only that an accused, who is present in Georgia after having been mistakenly released from incarceration in the demanding state, qualifies as a “fugitive from justice” for extradition purposes.
Contrary to the State’s position, the law is well established that
[a] person who is held on the governor’s warrant issued in response to a request for extradition is entitled to habeas corpus relief upon establishing that he is not a “fugitive from justice.” [Cit.]
Marini v. Gibson, supra, 267 Ga. at 399 (1). Accord Jenkins v. Garrison, supra, 265 Ga. at 44.
If [the petitioner] can show that he was not in the demanding State on the day of the commission of the alleged crime, it would be the duty of the court in a habeas corpus proceeding to discharge him. [Cits.]
Sellers v. Griffin, 226 Ga. 565, 566 (176 SE2d 75) (1970). A habeas court is not improperly questioning the demanding state’s determination of probable cause, weighing an accused’s defenses to the charged crime, or deciding the accused’s guilt or innocence when it follows the fourth requirement in Michigan v. Doran, supra, by deciding whether the petitioner was a fugitive from justice, an inquiry which necessarily entails addressing whether the petitioner was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, thereafter left its jurisdiction, and was found in the [97]*97territory of this State. See Anderson v. Roth, supra, 231 Ga. at 370. See also OCGA § 17-13-23. As has been recognized,
“[t]here is a distinction, though often subtle, between proof of absence from the state for purposes of negativing the condition of extradition and proof of an alibi as such for purposes of establishing innocence.”
State Ex Rel. Wagner v. Hedman, 195 NW2d 420, 422 (Minn. 1972). Because the habeas court here carefully limited its review to a determination whether the requirements in Michigan v. Doran, supra, had been met and did not improperly expand the scope of the proceedings by inquiring into the legal sufficiency of Bartley’s statutory or constitutional defenses, we find no error in the habeas court’s inquiry into the limited issue whether Bartley was a fugitive from justice.
In that regard, it is well established that the duly-executed warrant is prima facie evidence that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime. See generally Sellers v. Griffin, supra, 226 Ga. at 566; Broyles v. Mount, 197 Ga. 659 (1) (30 SE2d 48) (1944). It was thus
incumbent upon the petitioner in this habeas corpus proceeding to persuade the trial judge, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the petitioner was not in the demanding state at the time [of the commission of the crime]. [Cit.]
Ward v. Jarvis, 240 Ga. 668-669 (2) (242 SE2d 134) (1978). See Stynchcombe v. Rhodes, 238 Ga. 74 (231 SE2d 63) (1976) (petitioner carries burden of proving absence in demanding state by a preponderance of the evidence); see also Sellers v. Griffin, supra, 226 Ga. at 566 (person held upon a governor’s warrant in extradition habeas proceeding must introduce evidence “sufficient to overcome the prima facie case on the issue”). These cases, applying a preponderance of the evidence standard of review, are consistent with our holdings that the general rules of evidence controlling the weight and sufficiency thereof apply in habeas corpus proceedings, including the burden on the petitioner to prove his case to the satisfaction of the habeas corpus judge by a preponderance of the evidence. Crawford v. Linahan, 243 Ga. 161 (1) (253 SE2d 171) (1979).
In the instant case, the habeas court did not clearly err when it found that Bartley was not in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the crimes and thus was not a “fugitive from justice” as our review of the evidence adduced by Bartley shows that she carried her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, the habeas court’s ruling is affirmed.
[98]*982. We find no error in the habeas court’s refusal to dismiss Bart-ley’s habeas petition as moot.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Carley and Thompson, JJ, who concur specially.