(SS) Warren v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: August 28, 2025
• Docket: 1:24-cv-00751
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 JOHNATHAN WARREN, Case No. 1:24-cv-00751-SAB 11 Plaintiff, ORDER REVERSING DECISION OF THE 12 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY v. AND REMANDING FOR FURTHER 13 PROCEEDINGS COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 14 SECURITY, (ECF Nos. 14, 18) 15 Defendant.

16 17 I. 18 INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiff Johnathan Warren (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the 20 Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for disability benefits 21 pursuant to the Social Security Act. The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ 22 briefs, which were submitted without oral argument. 23 Plaintiff requests the decision of Commissioner be vacated and the case be remanded for 24 further proceedings, arguing that the decision below was not supported by substantial evidence. 25 Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) failed to develop the 26 record by leaving the record open and failed to obtain a medical opinion of Plaintiff's mental and 27 physical limitations, improperly relying upon his own lay interpretation of the medical data to incorporate work limitations based upon his review of Plaintiff's impairments. 1 For the reasons explained herein, the Court will reverse the decision of the Commissioner 2 and remand to the agency for further proceedings. 42 U.S.C. 405(g). 3 II. 4 BACKGROUND 5 A. Procedural History 6 On August 22, 2019, Plaintiff protectively filed a Title XVI application for supplemental 7 security income. (ECF No. 11-10, Administrative Record (“AR”), 259-66.) Plaintiff alleged 8 disability beginning on October 1, 2006. (Id.) At the hearing, Plaintiff, through counsel, 9 amended the alleged onset date to August 22, 2019, to match the protective filing date. (AR 45.) 10 Plaintiff’s application was initially denied on November 19, 2019, and denied upon 11 reconsideration on April 20, 2020. (AR 110-15, 121-26.) On April 23, 2020, Plaintiff requested 12 a hearing before an ALJ. (See AR 127.) On May 20, 2022, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, 13 appeared for a telephonic hearing in front of an ALJ. (Id.) On May 31, 2022, the ALJ issued a 14 decision concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 21-32.) On April 25, 2023, the Appeals 15 Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 11-15.) 16 B. The ALJ’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 17 In the decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 18 since August 22, 2019, the application date. (AR 24.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the 19 following severe impairments: chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”), hernia, hearing 20 loss, cervical disc disease, obesity, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, and posttraumatic 21 stress disorder (“PTSD”). (Id.) However, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 22 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed in 23 impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR 25.) 24 After considering the entire record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional 25 capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b)1 except he can

26 1 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good 27 deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do 1 occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. He must avoid work that requires 2 absolute binaural hearing. He must avoid concentrated exposure to respiratory irritants. He cannot 3 have exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights and dangerous moving machinery. He can 4 tolerate simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. He can tolerate frequent interaction with coworkers 5 and supervisors. He can tolerate occasional interaction with the public. He can tolerate occasional 6 changes in work routine. (AR 27.) 7 The ALJ then found that that Plaintiff has no past relevant work, was 48 years old on the 8 date the application was filed and has at least a high school education. (AR 30.) The ALJ 9 determined that transferability of job skills was not an issue to the determination of disability 10 because Plaintiff does not have past relevant work. (Id.) Considering Plaintiff’s age, education, 11 work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in 12 the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (AR 30.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that 13 Plaintiff had not been under disability, as defined by the Social Security Act, from August 22, 14 2019, through the date of the decision, May 31, 2022. (AR 31.) 15 Plaintiff sought timely review of the Commissioner’s decision in federal court. (ECF No. 16 1.) The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. (See ECF 17 Nos. 7, 9.) Thereafter, the parties filed their briefs on the matter.2 18 III. 19 LEGAL STANDARD 20 A. The Disability Standard 21 To qualify for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must 22 work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of 23 time.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b). 2 On December 1, 2022, the Supplemental Rules for Social Security became effective. Rule 5 states, “[t]he action is 24 presented for decision by the parties’ briefs.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Appx. Rule 5. The 2022 Advisory Committee noted that “Rule 5 states the procedure for presenting for decision on the merits a [42 U.S.C.] § 405(g) review action that 25 is governed by the Supplemental Rules.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Appx. Rule 5 advisory committee note 2022. Like an appeal, “the briefs present the action for decision on the merits. This procedure displaces summary judgment or such devices as a joint statement of facts as the means of review on the administrative record.” Id. The 2022 26 Advisory Committee unambiguously clarified that “Rule 5 also displaces local rules or practices that are inconsistent with the simplified procedure established by these Supplemental Rules for treating the action as one for review on 27 the administrative record.” Id. Here, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and Defendant filed a response, which the Court construes as briefs in support of each party’s position on whether the Court should affirm, modify, 1 show she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 2 determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has 3 lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 4 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential evaluation process to 5 be used in determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520;3 Batson v. Comm’r 6 of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). The five steps in the sequential 7 evaluation in assessing whether the claimant is disabled are: 8 Step one: Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. 9 Step two: Is the claimant’s alleged impairment sufficiently severe to limit his or her 10 ability to work? If so, proceed to step three. If not, the claimant is not disabled. 11 Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment, or combination of impairments, meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so, the 12 claimant is disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 13 Step four: Does the claimant possess the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his or her past relevant work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, 14 proceed to step five. 15 Step five: Does the claimant’s RFC, when considered with the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, allow him or her to adjust to other work that exists in 16 significant numbers in the national economy? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 17 18 Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006). The burden of proof is 19 on the claimant at steps one through four. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2020). A 20 claimant establishes a prima facie case of qualifying disability once she has carried the burden of 21 proof from step one through step four. 22 Before making the step four determination, the ALJ first must determine the claimant’s 23 RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The RFC is “the most [one] can still do despite [his or her] 24 limitations” and represents an assessment “based on all the relevant evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 25 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). The RFC must consider all the claimant’s impairments, including 26 3 The regulations which apply to disability insurance benefits, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501 et seq., and the regulations 27 which apply to SSI benefits, 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.901 et seq., are generally the same for both types of benefits. Accordingly, to the extent cases cited herein may reference one or both sets of regulations, the Court notes these 1 those that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e); 416.945(a)(2); Social Security Ruling 2 (“SSR”) 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996).4 “[I]t is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the 3 claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 4 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 404.1546(c). 5 At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show that there are a 6 significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given her RFC, 7 age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(g); Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 8 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). To do this, the ALJ can use either the Medical Vocational Guidelines 9 (“grids”) or rely upon the testimony of a VE. See 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpart P, Appendix 2; 10 Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1114; Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). 11 “Throughout the five-step evaluation, the ALJ ‘is responsible for determining credibility, 12 resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.’” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1149 13 (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). 14 B. Standard of Review 15 Congress has provided that an individual may obtain judicial review of any final decision 16 of the Commissioner of Social Security regarding entitlement to benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In 17 determining whether to affirm, modify, or reverse an ALJ’s decision, the Court reviews only 18 those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 19 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, the Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one; 20 the Court may not disturb the Commissioner’s final decision unless it is based on legal error or 21 the findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Reddick v. 22 Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). “[T]he threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is 23 not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019). Rather, “[s]ubstantial evidence is more 24 than a mere scintilla, and means only such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 25 adequate to support a conclusion.” Stiffler v. O’Malley, 102 F.4th 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2024) 26 4 SSRs are “final opinions and orders and statements of policy and interpretations” issued by the Commissioner. 20 27 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1). While SSRs do not carry the force of law, the Court gives the rulings deference “unless they are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the Act or regulations.” Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1 (quoting Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154). In other words, “[s]ubstantial evidence is relevant evidence 2 which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support 3 a conclusion.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Flaten v. Sec’y of 4 Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)). 5 Should the ALJ err, the Court will not reverse where the error was harmless. Stout, 454 6 F.3d at 1055-56. “An error is harmless only if it is ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 7 determination.’” Leach v. Kijakazi, 70 F.4th 1251, 1255 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Lambert v. 8 Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1278 (9th Cir. 2020)). The burden of showing that an error is not harmless 9 “normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 10 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009)). 11 Finally, “a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 12 simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 13 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). 14 Nor may the Court affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he or she did not rely; rather, the 15 Court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in his decision. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 16 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). It is 17 not this Court’s function to second guess the ALJ’s conclusions and substitute the Court’s 18 judgment for the ALJ’s; rather, if the evidence “is susceptible to more than one rational 19 interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154 (quoting 20 Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)). 21 IV. 22 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 23 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence 24 because the ALJ failed to fully develop the record by (1) failing to leave the record open for 25 updated evidence and (2) the ALJ failed to obtain a medical opinion of Plaintiff's mental and 26 physical limitations. 27 A. The ALJ Did Not Err By Failing to Leave the Record Open 1 updated medical evidence following the May 20, 2022 hearing. (ECF No. 14 at 13-14.) The Court 2 is unpersuaded that the ALJ’s duty to further develop the record was triggered under these specific 3 circumstances. At the hearing, the ALJ asked Plaintiff’s attorney if counsel had any objections to 4 the exhibits in the file, and she responded in the negative. (AR 45.) The ALJ then asked counsel if 5 the record was complete, and she confirmed it was. (Id.) However, during the ALJ’s examination 6 of Plaintiff, Plaintiff intimated he was continuing treatment and additional records were 7 forthcoming. For example, Plaintiff told the ALJ that he recently had an initial consultation (AR 8 50) and he “think[s he] got diagnosed with heart disease, [but he] won’t know until next week….” 9 (AR 49.) Plaintiff explained that he “ha[s] to see a pulmonologist for [his] lungs” and the doctor 10 who performed the initial consultation “said it’s possibly it could be heart disease. And I have an 11 ultrasound next week, so.” (AR 50-51 (unedited).) Plaintiff’s counsel asked Plaintiff if he was 12 experiencing neck pain. (AR 54.) Plaintiff confirmed he was and stated he “just had x-rays done so 13 I will know like in a week. But yeah, it’s probably like two slipped discs is what the x-ray 14 technician said that’s possibly.” (AR 54.) 15 At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ and counsel had the following discussion: 16 ALJ: All right. Okay now, Counsel, I was not aware of the most recent medical evidence that your client mentioned. How difficult 17 is it going to be – ATTY: The X-rays? 18 ALJ: – to get those – well, yeah, he said that they're looking at potential heart problems and – 19 ATTY: Well, I saw that, Your Honor, in the parole records but it looked like quite honestly it was in the mental health that they 20 were talking about it which was really confusing. But it didn't – ALJ: Right. 21 ATTY: – look like they were really doing anything about it now. So, I did see that they noted in the corrections and rehabilitation 22 records that the social worker and the psychologist were talking about it. I think because the Amitriptyline caused some irregular 23 heartbeats, but I don't know that – ALJ: Okay. 24 ATTY: -–they're doing anything to treat. 25 (AR 65.) The ALJ then re-examined Plaintiff to ask about “very recent[]” records that discuss 26 concerns with Plaintiff’s oxygen levels. (AR 65.) Plaintiff responded that his psychological 27 medications may have been causing his heart problems, his medications were cut in half within the 1 asked Plaintiff’s counsel if they were waiting on any results. (Id.) Plaintiff’s counsel re-examined 2 Plaintiff, who clarified that he went to the ER and a cardiologist. (Id.) Plaintiff reiterated that he 3 was having an ultrasound and getting a referral to a pulmonologist. (Id.) 4 Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s counsel, and the ALJ then had the following discussion on the record: 5 ATTY: So, it sounds like there aren't any tests to get at this point, Your Honor. I don't know if we – 6 ALJ: Okay. ATTY: – want to wait till the 23rd – 7 ALJ: Okay. ATTY: – because it will probably take us a couple weeks to get 8 them if they haven't happened yet obviously. ALJ: All right. Counsel, I'm going to follow your lead. If you say 9 that – ATTY: Okay. 10 ALJ: –you don't need to wait on any additional records then I will close the record now and then I'll be able to deliberate and make a 11 decision on the case. Is that what you would like for me to do – ATTY: Yeah – 12 ALJ:-- Counsel? ATTY: – I think that's better, Your Honor. I'm just afraid, I don't 13 want to hold up his claim. And – ALJ: Got you. 14 ATTY: –by law they're given 30 days so it would be – we would be out another 30 days, and that's if the tests show anything. 15 ALJ: Okay. ATTY: –if we get them back in the next - when he goes if he gets 16 news that's very outside of the box, I'll definitely have my office write an immediate letter and see – 17 ALJ: Okay. ATTY: if we get those submitted and – 18 CLMT: I have an issue with time because of my MediCal– ATTY: Yeah. 19 CLMT: – I have to get – everything has to be approved, so I'm getting three ultrasounds and then the heart monitor, but it could 20 take up to two to six weeks just for the heart monitor. ATTY: Yeah, that's what I was worried about – 21 CLMT: Yeah. ATTY: –yeah. 22 ALJ: Got you, okay. CLMT: I agree with her. 23 ALJ: All right, sounds good. Well, you two are on accord and that means I will honor your wishes, I will close the record. 24 (AR 67-69.) 25 In his opening brief, Plaintiff concedes that his counsel declined the ALJ’s offer to hold 26 the record open to submit additional evidence at the May 20, 2022 hearing. (ECF No. 14 at 14.) 27 Plaintiff, however, argues that the ALJ still erred because the discussion at the hearing did not 1 (Id. (citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996) (“In Social Security cases the 2 ALJ has a special duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant's 3 interests are considered. This duty exists even when the claimant is represented by counsel.”). 4 The Court is unpersuaded. It is Plaintiff’s burden to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 5 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). (“An individual shall not be 6 considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the 7 existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social Security may require.”); 20 C.F.R. §§ 8 404.1512(a), 416.912(a) (“[Y]ou have to prove to us that you are ... disabled ....”). The ALJ 9 certainly has a special duty to fully and fairly develop the record. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288. 10 However, the ALJ does not have a special duty to carry Plaintiff’s burden, particularly where 11 Plaintiff’s counsel, knowing additional testing and records were occurring, affirmatively 12 advocated that the ALJ close the record. Specifically, Plaintiff’s counsel (1) confirmed the record 13 was complete; (2) declined the ALJ’s offer to hold the record open by confirming it would be 14 “better” if the ALJ closed the record; (3) offered instead that if the upcoming results were “very 15 outside the box,” she would “definitely have [her] office write an immediate letter” to request to 16 submit those records; and, uniquely, (4) had a conversation with her client on the record whereby 17 she and Plaintiff agreed to decline the ALJ’s offer to hold the record open to avoid “hold[ing] up 18 [Plaintiff’s] claim.” (AR 45, 67-69.) Accepting that counsel and Plaintiff were “on accord,” the 19 ALJ “honor[ed] [counsel and Plaintiff’s] wishes.” (AR 69.) 20 Under these circumstances, Plaintiff effectively asks the Court to impose a new extra 21 special duty on an ALJ by requiring that he or she function as the plaintiff’s advocate and, in this 22 case, act as Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel’s adversary. Plaintiff provides no authority to support 23 imposing such a duty on an ALJ. This Court declines to establish the requested burden-shifting 24 duty. See Collingswood-Bonse v. Colvin, No. 6:13-CV-01646-AA, 2015 WL 853063, at *3 (D. 25 Or. Feb. 24, 2015) (finding the ALJ’s duty to more fully develop the record was not triggered 26 under the circumstances, which included the fact that the plaintiff was represented by counsel 27 who declined the ALJ’s offer to hold the record open for further development); see also Maes v. 1 record, such a duty does not permit a claimant, through counsel, to rest on the record—indeed, to 2 exhort the ALJ that the case is ready for decision—and later fault the ALJ for not performing a 3 more exhaustive investigation.... To do so would contravene the principle that the ALJ is not 4 required to act as the claimant's advocate in order to meet his duty to develop the record.”). 5 Here, Plaintiff’s counsel confirmed the record was complete. (AR 45); see Giddings v. 6 Colvin, No. 1:13-CV-01477-SKO, 2015 WL 1020871, at *6 n.9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2015) 7 (“Plaintiff's counsel's agreement to close the record at the time of the ALJ's hearing without 8 seeking to hold the record open to obtain treating physician opinions or requesting that a 9 consultative examination be obtained...diminishes the persuasiveness of Plaintiff's 10 argument...that the record was not fully developed.”). Although the ALJ expressed his intent to 11 leave the record open for additional records, counsel and Plaintiff affirmatively declined the 12 ALJ’s offer. (AR 68.) The Court does not find the ALJ erred in this case for the independent 13 premise that he failed to leave the record open.

14 B. The ALJ Erred by Independently Interpreting Medical Records and Failing 15 to Fully Develop the Record

16 While this Court declines to create Plaintiff’s requested new duty for ALJs, the ALJ has 17 an existing duty to ensure there is substantial evidence supporting his decision. Although 18 Plaintiff may have been better served if counsel did not confirm the record was complete, 19 affirmatively state it would be “better” not to wait on any additional records, and, with Plaintiff’s 20 agreement, decline the ALJ’s offer to leave the record open, any such oversight by Plaintiff’s 21 counsel at the administrative level does not foreclose Plaintiff's primary challenge to the lack of 22 substantial evidence supporting the crafted MRFC and RFC. 23 With this in mind, the Court disagrees with Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff’s 24 argument that the ALJ erred by failing to develop the record in ways other than failing to leave 25 the record open was not preserved for appeal and is waived. (ECF No. 19 at 5 (citing Meanel v. 26 Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999); Howard v. Astrue, 330 F. App’x 128, 130 (9th Cir. 27 2009)).) As previously stated, “[t]he claimant has the burden of proving that she is disabled.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288. However, “[t]he ALJ always has a ‘special duty to fully and fairly 1 develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s interests are considered . . . even when the 2 claimant is represented by counsel.’” Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003) 3 (quoting Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983)). “[I]t is incumbent upon the ALJ 4 to scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts. 5 [The ALJ] must be especially diligent in ensuring that favorable as well as unfavorable facts and 6 circumstances are elicited.” Id. (quoting Higbee v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1992)). 7 Further, the ALJ’s duty to develop the record fully is heightened where the claimant may be 8 mentally ill and thus unable to protect his own interests. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 9 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Higbee, 975 F.2d at 562). 10 The Ninth Circuit has explained that ambiguous evidence, or the ALJ’s own finding that 11 the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence, triggers the ALJ’s duty to 12 “conduct an appropriate inquiry.” Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150 (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 13 1288). “The ALJ may discharge this duty in several ways, including: subpoenaing the claimant’s 14 physicians, submitting questions to the claimant’s physicians, continuing the hearing, or keeping 15 the record open after the hearing to allow supplementation of the record.” Id. (citations omitted). 16 Similarly, the regulations provide that the ALJ may order further consultative examination to 17 “resolve an inconsistency in the evidence or when the evidence as a whole is insufficient to 18 support a determination or decision.” See 20 C.F.R. § 416.919a. Examples of situations under 19 which further developing the record may be required include when the additional evidence needed 20 is not contained in the records of the claimant’s medical sources, and when highly technical or 21 specialized medical evidence not available from the claimant’s medical sources is needed. 20 22 C.F.R. § 416.919a(b). Once the duty to further develop the record is triggered, failure to do so 23 constitutes reversible error. See Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150-51. 24 This Court recently held that a claimant need not talismanically preserve the issue of the 25 ALJ’s duty to develop the record at the administrative hearing in order for judicial review. Labuga 26 v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:24-cv-00890-SAB, 2025 WL 1911690, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 27 2025). “[A]n ALJ is to be expected, without issue-specific prompting by the parties, to make the 1 support the conclusions that the ALJ makes.” Obrien v. Bisignano, 142 F.4th 687, 699 (9th Cir. 2 2025) (emphasis in original). The Court applies the same logic here. 3 With this in mind, the Court observes that regardless of Plaintiff’s counsel’s exhortation 4 that the ALJ close the record, the record may nonetheless be incomplete or ambiguous. In this 5 vein, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by basing the RFC and MRFC on his own lay review of the 6 raw objective medical evidence of record after rejecting each of the medical opinions in the 7 record as unpersuasive. (ECF No. 14 at 9-13.) Plaintiff contends that, rather than sending 8 Plaintiff to a consultative examiner, calling a medical expert testify, or contacting Plaintiff’s 9 treating physicians, the ALJ erred by “playing doctor” and taking it upon himself to use his lay 10 knowledge to review the entire raw medical record and formulate function-by-function RFC and 11 MRFC limitations. (Id.) In reply, Defendant argues that the RFC finding is not a medical finding 12 and the ALJ need not wholesale adopt all limitations found in a medical opinion. (ECF No. 19 at 13 8.) Defendant thus contends the ALJ fulfilled his role in determining the RFC by considering the 14 record as a whole and his conclusion therefore must be upheld. 15 The RFC is an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical 16 and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis, which means eight 17 hours a day, for five days a week, or an equivalent work schedule. Titles II & XVI: Assessing 18 Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims, SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (S.S.A. July 19 2, 1996). “The RFC assessment must first identify the individual’s functional limitations or 20 restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis, including 21 the functions in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of 20 C.F.R. 404.1545 and 416.945.” Id. An “RFC 22 is not the least an individual can do despite his or her limitations or restrictions, but the most.” 23 Id. (emphasis in original). As Defendant here argues, it is true that a determination of RFC is not 24 a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the 25 Commissioner. See (ECF No. 19 at 8); 20 C.F.R. §§ 414.927(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical 26 opinion), 414.946(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC). “In determining 27 a claimant's RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record such as medical 1 to a medically determinable impairment.” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883; see also 20 C.F.R. § 2 414.945(a)(3) (RFC determined based on all relevant medical and other evidence). 3 Further, when formulating an RFC, ALJ's have some discretion to perform independent 4 review of medical evidence and translate that evidence into functional terms. See Rounds v. 5 Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he ALJ is responsible for 6 translating and incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC.”). For example, claimants 7 routinely receive continued care between the state agency physician's review at the 8 initial/reconsideration levels and the ALJ's subsequent hearing decision, thereby generating new 9 medical records. However, this Court has previously rejected the proposition that an ALJ must 10 obtain a comprehensive consultative opinion in every case before rendering an RFC. Scott T. C. 11 v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:23-cv-01776-SAB, 2025 WL 227288 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2025); 12 see also Meadows v. Saul, 807 F. App'x 643, 647 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting there “is always some 13 time lapse between a consultant's report and the ALJ hearing and decision, and the Social 14 Security regulations impose no limit on such a gap in time.”). With this in mind, an ALJ 15 cannot “substitute his own interpretations of medical records and data for medical 16 opinions” when determining a claimant's RFC. Mack v. Saul, No. 18-cv-01287-DAD-BAM, 17 2020 WL 2731032, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2020). 18 1. Mental RFC 19 The ALJ found both opinions of the state agency medical consultants unpersuasive and 20 thus relied on no medical opinions in assessing the MRFC. (AR 30.) At the initial level, Dr. 21 Ben G. Kessler, Psy.D. found on November 18, 2019, that “based on overall objective and 22 subjective evidence…with continuous adherence to psych [treatment] and meds,” Plaintiff 23 retains the ability to perform unskilled work. (AR 87-88.) At the reconsideration level, Karen 24 Ying, M.D. found on March 4, 2022 that Plaintiff had fairly stable symptoms and would 25 continue to be stable with medications. (AR 99-102) In finding both these opinions 26 unpersuasive, the ALJ stated that Drs. Kessler and Ying “suggested that the claimant’s mental 27 impairments were nonsevere and cause no more than mild restrictions [AR 87-88; 99-102]. This 1 exams; however, it is not consistent with his need for regular ongoing treatment and management 2 with high doses of medications.” (AR 30.) The ALJ then went on to find Plaintiff can tolerate 3 simple, routine, and repetitive tasks; frequent interaction with coworkers and supervisors; 4 occasional interaction with the public; and occasional changes in work routine. (AR 27.) 5 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by conceding that he crafted the MRFC by taking it upon 6 himself to use lay knowledge to determine function-by-function psychiatric limitations based on 7 his independent review of the record absent any specificity of what evidence the ALJ considered 8 and how he opined such evidence affected Plaintiff’s psychiatric functionality. (ECF No. 14 at 9 10.) As stated above, the ALJ has a duty to develop the record where the evidence is ambiguous 10 or the ALJ finds that the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence. 11 Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150. The ALJ did not find that the record was inadequate, nor has 12 Plaintiff pointed to any ambiguous evidence to support his argument that the duty to further 13 develop the record arose. Rather, Plaintiff argues that there is no medical opinion that found 14 Plaintiff to have moderate limitations or how those limitations would affect her ability to work 15 which leaves a gap in the record. 16 Plaintiff argues the bevy of post-state agency consultant records included diagnoses and 17 non-conservative prescription treatment that were not reviewed by any medical source.5 (ECF 18 No. 14 at 11.) Although Plaintiff argues that the ALJ requires some type of guidance from a 19 healthcare professional, the RFC determination is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that 20 is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a 21

22 5 The Court notes that Plaintiff details a January 16, 2020 psychiatric treatment note from Xavier Lara, M.D., documenting Plaintiff as experiencing moderate depression, that he continued to experience cycles of hypomania 23 followed by depression possibly linked to taking two different antidepressants, requiring consideration of adjusting his dose of Elavil with his primary care physician and including raising the dosages of his anti-psychotic medication, 24 Olanzapine. (ECF No. 14 at 12.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, however, this January 16, 2020 record was evaluated at the reconsideration level by state agency consultants. (AR 100 (citing AR 913).) The consultants 25 specifically noted that on this day, despite the above reporting, the consultant noted the following objective findings from the examination: “good [eye contact], cooperative, polite, fair hygiene, mood ‘happy’ affect full. [Thinking process] linear...reports a little bit of [auditory hallucinations] daily, psychosis good…” (AR 100.) Critically, this 26 January 16, 2020 record also detailed Plaintiff’s non-conservative prescription treatment of Elavil, Zyprexa, Remeron, and Vistaril, among others. (AR 912.) Plaintiff remained on these medications until they reduced them 27 approximately three weeks before the May 2022 hearing before the ALJ. (AR 66.) In consideration of the January 16, 2020 record detailed at length by Plaintiff, the consultants—who were ultimately deemed unpersuasive— 1 medical opinion), 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC). “[I]t is 2 the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional 3 capacity.” Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049. In making this determination, the ALJ must determine 4 credibility, resolve conflicts in medical testimony and resolve evidentiary ambiguities. Andrews, 5 53 F.3d at 1039–40. 6 The Court disagrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ improperly formulated the function-by- 7 function MRFC using his lay knowledge. (ECF No. 14 at 11.) Rather, the ALJ considered the 8 lack of objective mental findings in the mental health records and Plaintiff's regular ongoing 9 treatment to find him more limited than the state agency physicians opined: “While [Plaintiff] 10 has significant mental health treatment, the records generally describe him as doing well with a 11 high level of function and only minimal reported symptoms. The vast majority of his mental 12 status exams are essentially normal including good or euthymic moods, cooperative and polite 13 behavior, normal speech, intact memory, average intellectual function, and no apparent psychotic 14 symptoms or hallucinations (e.g.., [AR 598; 646; 649; 651; 866; 868-72; 875-77; 884; 890-91; 15 898; 901-02; 905; 911; 924]).” (AR 29.) Based on these records spanning from September 24, 16 2019 through May 10, 2022, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had severe mental impairments 17 causing no more than moderate limitations. (AR 26-27.) Plaintiff’s self-reports that his 18 symptoms have been “manageable” (AR 905) and that he is “good” (AR 901), and Plaintiff’s 19 physicians’ objective observations that Plaintiff, for example, has normal memory (AR 898), 20 normal thought process (AR 901) and is cooperative (AR 905) is not evidence that is medical in 21 nature and not susceptible to a lay understanding. See Saetern v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:24- 22 CV-01174-EPG, 2025 WL 1180160, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2025) (finding the ALJ’s 23 assessment of Plaintiff’s mental health conditions did not require medical expertise to 24 understand). The Court finds that the ALJ did not interpret the raw medical records and “play[] 25 doctor” as alleged by Plaintiff, but the ALJ considered Plaintiff's subjective complaints, the 26 findings of a depressed mood, minimizing of anger issues, and auditory hallucinations (AR 29), 27 and largely normal mental status examination findings to determine that Plaintiff was more 1 378, 378–80 (9th Cir. 2017) (The ALJ's inclusion of additional RFC limitations benefits, rather 2 than prejudices, the claimant). Moreover, the ALJ relied on evidence other than the medical 3 records, which did not require a medical opinion. For example, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s 4 daily activities, including Plaintiff’s report that he was attending truck driving school. (AR 29 5 (citing AR 872).) 6 Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the record was ambiguous or inadequate to allow for 7 proper evaluation of his MRFC. The ALJ summarized the medical evidence in the record, 8 including evidence related to Plaintiff's mental impairments, and determined Plaintiff's MRFC 9 with the support of that record. The ALJ therefore fulfilled his responsibility to interpret the 10 evidence of record. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. Plaintiff does not specify what additional 11 functional limitations in the relatively benign objective findings were not accounted for in the 12 ALJ's MRFC assessment. Plaintiff does not point to any new evidence in the record after the 13 state agency physicians issued their opinions that would require further evaluation by a 14 psychologist. Nor does he otherwise show any inconsistency between the evidence and his 15 MRFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.919a. Indeed, as discussed above, the ALJ asked Plaintiff's 16 attorney at the hearing if the record was complete, and she responded that it was. (AR 45.) 17 Under these circumstances, the Court finds there was no duty to develop the record by obtaining 18 a medical opinion as to Plaintiff’s MRFC, as it was supported by substantial evidence. 19 2. Physical RFC 20 The ALJ also found the opinions of state agency medical consultants, M. Yee M.D. and 21 E. Steinsapir, M.D. unpersuasive and thus relied on no medical opinions in assessing the physical 22 RFC. (AR 30.) At the initial level, Dr. Yee determined on November 8, 2019 that Plaintiff had 23 exertional limitations including lifting and carrying 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds 24 frequently; sitting, standing and walking for a total of 6 hours in an 8 hour workday; occasionally 25 climbing ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; should never 26 climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; limited reaching but no overhead reaching; should not have a 27 job that requires good hearing; and should avoid concentrated exposure to vibration and hazards. 1 capable of light work. (AR 91-92.) The ALJ found Dr. Yee unpersuasive because Dr. Yee 2 “provided no analysis to support their decision opinion[].” (AR 10.) 3 At the reconsideration level, Dr. Steinsapir found on April 17, 2020, that Plaintiff had no 4 postural, manipulative, or visual limitations; had limitations in hearing in both ears and found 5 Plaintiff was not capable of work requiring absolute acuity of binaural hearing; should avoid 6 concentrated exposure to noise, hazards (specifically no unprotected heights), fumes, odors, 7 dusts, gases, and poor ventilation. (AR 103-07.) Based on his analysis of the physical RFC 8 factors, Dr. Steinsapir found Plaintiff was capable of work with environmental limitations only. 9 (AR 101.) In other words, Dr. Steinsapir found Plaintiff had no exertional limitations. The ALJ 10 found Dr. Steinsapir’s findings unpersuasive because, although he found Dr. Steinsapir 11 supported his opinion with a reasonable analysis, “it was not fully consistent with additional 12 evidence that was received at the hearing level,” including, “[f]or example, the new records” that 13 “showed some degree of cervical disc disease and hernia repair surgery, which would reasonably 14 contribute to cause exertional limitations.” (AR 30.) 15 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by failing to cite to the particular “new records” and to 16 what degree the unspecified new records showed “some degree” of cervical disc disease and 17 hernia repair surgery. (ECF No. 14 at 10.) The Court finds the “new records” related to 18 Plaintiff’s hernia and cervical spine that the ALJ is referring to are not as vague as Plaintiff 19 contends. Rather, in his summary of the records, the ALJ describes an April 27, 2020 ultrasound 20 of Plaintiff’s abdomen finding “a right inguinal hernia with bowel content” (AR 836) and an 21 October 15, 2020 surgical note indicating that Plaintiff “underwent surgical hernia repair.” (AR 22 29 (citing 839)). The ALJ also summarizes a February 9, 2021 x-ray of Plaintiff’s cervical spine. 23 (AR 29 (citing 844)). At the May 20, 2022 hearing, the ALJ confirmed that each of these 24 described records were among those that were “loaded…into the system” on the day of the 25 hearing. (AR 45-46 (citing 834-861).). 26 Plaintiff’s April 27, 2020 ultrasound, October 15, 2020 surgical note, and February 9, 27 2021 x-ray of Plaintiff’s cervical spine took place after Dr. Yee’s November 8, 2018 unreasoned 1 no physical exertional limitations. Accordingly, no medical expert reviewed such evidence, or 2 any other evidence dated after April 17, 2020. Instead, the ALJ, based on an independent 3 interpretation of the evidence, rejected (1) Dr. Yee’s opinion entirely as unsupported and (2) Dr. 4 Steinsapir ’s opinion that Plaintiff had no exertional limitations (but limitations related to hearing 5 and concentrated hazards) because of the new records. In place of a medical opinion regarding 6 what work-related restrictions would be appropriate, the ALJ interpreted the new records himself 7 and formulated an RFC that provided for the performance of less than a full range of light work. 8 (AR 27.) In doing so, the Court finds the ALJ erred. 9 The ALJ specifically rejected Dr. Steinsapir’s no exertional limitation opinion in favor of 10 the ALJ’s own modified light work RFC because Dr. Steinsapir did not have the benefit of the 11 new records showing “some degree of cervical disc disease.” (AR 30.) However, when 12 summarizing the records, the ALJ found the weight of the medical evidence does not support 13 greater restrictions than his assessed RFC finding because Plaintiff “has cervical disc disease, but 14 this was described as only mild.” (AR 29 (citing 844).) In support of both rejecting Dr. 15 Steinsapir’s no limitation opinion and assessing the RFC, the ALJ referenced raw data in the 16 medical record: the radiologist’s interpretation of Plaintiff’s cervical spine. Le MacKay v. 17 O'Malley, No. 1:22-CV-01633-SKO, 2024 WL 169175, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2024) (noting 18 an ALJ errs in independently reviewing medical evidence when the evidence concerns “raw 19 medical data such as complex imaging findings or laboratory testing results.”). While the 20 February 9, 2021 imaging studies of Plaintiff’s cervical spine yielded findings such as “mild 21 spondylosis at C3-4 and C4-5” and “[s]mall anterior endplate osteophytes noted at C4 and C5” 22 (AR 844), there is no indication from the radiologist’s interpretations what functional limitations 23 result from the diagnostic findings. See Heskett v. Bisignano, No. 1:25-CV-00274-SKO, 2025 24 WL 1993698, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2025) (noting that although imaging studies yielded 25 predominately mild findings, “it is not clear what functional limitations result from those clinical 26 findings” and thus the imaging records are the kinds of raw and ambiguous evidence that itself 27 does not provide sufficient indications of Plaintiff’s physical functional limitations); Howell v. 1 radiological studies, and X-rays “generally reflect only the findings, impressions, and medical 2 diagnoses, which are difficult for a lay person to interpret.”). In other words, there is no medical 3 finding that “mild spondylosis at C3-4 and C4-5” and “[s]mall anterior endplate osteophytes 4 noted at C4 and C5,” in consideration of Plaintiff’s other assessed physical limitations, translates 5 to modified light work. (AR 844.) 6 The Court disagrees with Defendant’s argument that because the ALJ was relying on a 7 radiologist’s interpretation of the findings, it was not unreasonable for the ALJ to conclude that 8 the “mild” findings were not disabling enough to preclude all work. (ECF No. 19 at 10.) While 9 this may be the ultimate determination, the ALJ is precluded from interpreting raw medical data 10 and ambiguous evidence into a physical functional limitation. See Heskett, 2025 WL 1993698, at 11 *6. Critically, the radiologist’s interpretation of Plaintiff’s cervical spine x-ray provided no 12 indication of the impact that mild spondylosis or small osteophytes had on Plaintiff's ability to 13 work on a function-by-function basis. See Mack, 2020 WL 2731032, at *2 (finding the ALJ 14 improperly determined RFC after considering MRIs and radiological studies absent a doctor's 15 opinion regarding the effect on plaintiff's ability to work on a function-by-function basis). 16 The ALJ rejected Dr. Steinsapir’s finding of no physical limitations specifically because 17 Dr. Steinsapir did not address Plaintiff’s new cervical spine x-ray that showed “some degree” of 18 cervical disc disease. Yet, using the same piece of evidence, the ALJ then determined that the 19 RFC for modified light work accommodates Plaintiff’s “cervical disc disease” because such 20 impairment was “described as only mild.” (AR 29.) The ALJ did not reference any functional 21 assessment or medical opinion for such conclusion; rather he only cited the cervical spine x-ray 22 report. Clearly, the ALJ’s interpretation of Plaintiff’s cervical spine x-ray report was a critical 23 piece of evidence in the ALJ’s RFC assessment; however, the ALJ personally interpreted the 24 results and attempted to incorporate them into his RFC. The Court finds the ALJ erred in relying 25 on his own lay interpretation of the cervical spine x-ray report, not a medical doctor’s evaluation 26 of the diagnosed impairments on Plaintiff’s ability to work on a function-by-function basis. 27 The second proffered example supporting the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Steinsapir’s no 1 his October 15, 2020 hernia repair surgery. (AR 30.) However, when summarizing the records, 2 the ALJ found the weight of the medical evidence does not support greater restrictions than his 3 assessed RFC finding because “while [Plaintiff] had a hernia, this was successfully treated with 4 surgery.” (AR 29 (citing AR 839).) Notably, the October 15, 2020 operative report does not 5 indicate that Plaintiff’s hernia was “successfully treated”; rather, the report details the operative 6 procedure and notes the operation was complete without any complications. (AR 839.) The ALJ 7 found Dr. Steinsapir’s opinion unpersuasive because that Plaintiff had hernia repair surgery 8 “would reasonably contribute to cause exertional limitations.” (AR 30.) Logic then follows that, 9 despite noting the assessed RFC was supported because the hernia was “successfully treated,” 10 the ALJ ascribed some unknown exertional limitation to the fact Plaintiff had hernia repair 11 surgery. Notably, however, it does not appear from the record that Plaintiff received any further 12 treatment or made any related complaints post-surgery. Nor does Plaintiff argue the record is 13 incomplete or ambiguous specifically related to the hernia repair surgery. 14 Plaintiff does argue, however, that the ALJ substituted his own interpretation of 15 Plaintiff’s post-PAMF December 2, 2021 chest x-ray, which documented “hypoinflated but 16 clear” lungs and impressed “low lung volumes.” (AR 846.) The ALJ discounted this raw data, 17 noting that “[o]ne chest x-ray noted low lung volumes, but other chest x-rays have been 18 unremarkable, showing clear lungs.” (AR 29; compare AR 846 with AR 838 (an October 15, 19 2020 chest x-ray finding no acute cardiopulmonary process) and AR 850 (an April 25, 2022 20 chest x-ray noted no acute cardiopulmonary pathology); see also AR 85 (noting a January 8, 21 2019 chest x-ray showed “no acute disease.”)). In explaining his RFC, the ALJ also noted that 22 “[t]here are no spirometry tests or other tests to clinically assess [Plaintiff’s] pulmonary 23 function.” (AR 29.) However, Plaintiff testified at the hearing that he had been referred to a 24 cardiologist, was having an ultrasound, and was getting a referral to a pulmonologist. (AR 65- 25 66.) Plaintiff confirmed as much in a May 2, 2022 psychiatric treatment progress report that he 26 was experiencing “heart problems” and that he would soon see a cardiologist. (AR 867.) None 27 of the records nor the three post-PAMF chest x-rays indicate the functional limitations caused by 1 allow for proper evaluation of Plaintiff’s functional limitations caused by COPD. See 2 Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150. Similar to Plaintiff’s cervical spine x-rays, the ALJ used his lay 3 interpretation of Plaintiff’s chest x-rays to support his assessed physical RFC that Plaintiff could 4 do modified light work and “must avoid concentrated exposure to respiratory irritants.” (AR 27.) 5 Defendant’s argument that an ALJ may continue to rely on expert opinions even though 6 time elapsed and subsequent evidence entered the record misses the point of Plaintiff’s motion. 7 (ECF No. 19 at 8-9.) Here, Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to rely on any medical opinion as he 8 found the only opinions related to Plaintiff’s physical impairments unpersuasive. Defendant also 9 contends that although the ALJ labeled Drs. Yee and Steinsapir ’s findings “unpersuasive,” each 10 of the ALJ’s RFC findings regarding physical limitations included their most restrictive findings. 11 (ECF No. 19 at 7.) Defendant therefore requests that the Court find that the ALJ inferentially 12 concluded that Drs. Yee and Steinsapir’s opinions were partially persuasive. The Court declines 13 to identify reasons that could have been advanced by the ALJ for assessing the RFC but were 14 not. The ALJ labeled both opinions unpersuasive without qualification and, most importantly, 15 did state any portion of the opinions that supported his RFC. See Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. 16 Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014) (the court “cannot substitute our conclusions 17 for the ALJ's, or speculate as to the grounds for the ALJ's conclusions.”). 18 Without a persuasive medical opinion to support the ALJ’s assessed RFC, the Court finds 19 the ALJ’s RFC lacks the support of substantial evidence. The ALJ summarized the relevant 20 medical evidence and specifically noted there was a lack of evidence related to pulmonary 21 testing (AR 29); however, it is unclear how the ALJ translated that evidence into the assessed 22 modified light RFC. Notably missing from the ALJ's analysis is reference to any medical 23 findings indicating that, given the impairments identified in “new records,” Plaintiff could indeed 24 perform work with a modified light level of exertional demand. The Court finds the lack of a 25 medical opinion that included consideration of the new raw medical data, coupled with the fact 26 that the ALJ knew Plaintiff was receiving additional studies and testing related to Plaintiff’s 27 pulmonary functioning, triggered the ALJ’s duty to further develop the record. Tonapetyan, 242 een ne eee nnn nn nn nn nn ON IE I

1 | case is not supported by substantial evidence. 2 Even if the ALJ has erred, the Court may not reverse the ALJ's decision where the error is 3 | harmless. Stout, 454 F.3d at 1055-56. An error is harmless where it is “inconsequential to the 4 | [ALJ's] ultimate nondisability determinations.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th 5 | Cir. 2008) (quotation and citation omitted); Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150-51 (once the duty to 6 | further develop the record is triggered, failure to do so constitutes reversible error). While the ALJ 7 | assigned physical limitations restricting Plaintiff to modified light work with additional limitations, 8 | the RFC is still without supporting evidence. Had the ALJ included different limitations in the 9 | REC based upon a proper review of the evidence and an adequate, fully developed record, the 10 | ultimate disability determination may have been different.© Heskett, 2025 WL 1993698, at *7. 11 | Thus, the Court cannot find the ALJ’s error is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 12 | determinations. Accordingly, the Court finds that remand for further proceedings is warranted. 13 V. 14 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 15 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the 16 | Commissioner of Social Security is REVERSED and that this matter shall be REMANDED to the 17 | Social Security Agency for further proceedings. 42 U.S.C. 405(g). It is FURTHER ORDERED 18 | that judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff Johnathan Warren and against Defendant 19 | Commissioner of Social Security. The Clerk of the Court is directed to CLOSE this action. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. OF. nf ee 22 | Dated: _ August 27, 2025 _ ef STANLEY A. BOONE 23 United States Magistrate Judge 24 25 26 ® This Court offers no opinion whether the disability determination will or should be different. It may be that a 27 | physician will review the post-PAME medical records and agree that Plaintiff is capable of performing modified light work, as the ALJ determined. However, because the ALJ chose not to develop the record by obtaining a 28 | medical opinion, this Court is unable to determine how the ALJ formulated Plaintiff's RFC determination.