(SS) Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KATHERINE LUCILLE MARTIN, Case No. 1:21-cv-00292-DAD-BAM 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 v. REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 14 LELAND DUDEK, Acting Commissioner 15 of Social Security,1 (Docs. 15, 17) 16 Defendant.

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19 INTRODUCTION 20 Plaintiff Katherine Lucille Martin (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the 21 Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for Disability Insurance 22 Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The parties’ briefing on the motion was submitted, 23 without oral argument, to Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe for findings and recommendations. 24 (Docs. 15, 17.) Having considered the parties’ briefs, along with the entire record in this case, the 25 Court finds that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) was not supported by 26

27 1 Leland Dudek became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security in February 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Leland Dudek is substituted for Kilolo Kijakazi as 28 Defendant in this suit. 1 substantial evidence in the record and was not based upon proper legal standards. Accordingly, this 2 Court will recommend reversing the agency’s determination to deny benefits. 3 FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 4 Plaintiff applied for Title II Disability Insurance Benefits on September 12, 2016, alleging that 5 she became disabled on August 23, 2016. AR 375-76.2 The claim was denied initially on November 6 15, 2016, and on reconsideration on April 7, 2017. AR 274-85, 286-300. Plaintiff requested a hearing 7 before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) and ALJ Shiva Bozarth. held a hearing on January 9, 8 2019. AR 224-273. ALJ Bozarth issued an order denying benefits on the basis that Plaintiff was not 9 disabled on May 1, 2019. AR 34-55. Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ’s decision, which the 10 Appeals Council denied. AR 9-14. This appeal followed. 11 Medical Record 12 The relevant medical record was reviewed by the Court and will be referenced below as 13 necessary to this Court’s decision. 14 The ALJ’s Decision 15 Using the Social Security Administration’s five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ 16 determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. AR 34-55. Specifically, the 17 ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of 18 August 23, 2016. AR 39. The ALJ identified the following severe impairments: osteoarthritis; 19 degenerative changes to the shoulders; mild degenerative disc disease; borderline personality disorder; 20 bipolar disorder; attention deficit disorder; and depression. AR 40. The ALJ also noted the nonsevere 21 impairment of renal cysts. Id. The ALJ further determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment 22 or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled any of the listed impairments. AR 40- 23 41. 24 Based on a review of the entire record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual 25 functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work except that Plaintiff could lift and carry 20 pounds 26 27 2 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate 28 page number. 1 occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; could stand and/or walk at least six hours; could sit for at least 2 six hours total in an eight-hour workday; could frequently balance, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb 3 ramps or stairs; could occasionally stoop and climb ladders or scaffolds; could frequently push and 4 pull; could frequently reach overhead with the dominant right upper extremity; could occasionally 5 reach and handle with the non-dominant left upper extremity; could only simple routine tasks; and was 6 limited to only routine work related decision making. AR 41. The ALJ considered “all symptoms and 7 the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective 8 medical evidence and other evidence,” as well as “opinion evidence.” Id. 9 The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform past relevant work, was defined as a 10 younger individual on the alleged disability onset date, had at least a high school education and could 11 communicate in English, and that transferability of job skills was not material to the disability 12 determination. AR 48. Given Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found 13 that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could 14 perform. AR 48-49. The ALJ noted that examples of jobs consistent with Plaintiff’s age, education, 15 work experience, and RFC included: Advertising Material Distributor (DOT No. 230.687-010, Light, 16 Unskilled (2), 46,000 jobs nationally); Can Filling and Closing Machine Tender (DOT No. 529.685- 17 282, Light, Unskilled (2), with 25,000 jobs nationally); and Parking Lot Attendant (DOT No. 915.473- 18 010, Light, Unskilled (2), with 26,000 jobs nationally). AR 49. The ALJ therefore concluded that 19 Plaintiff had not been disabled from August 23, 2016, through the date of the decision. Id. 20 SCOPE OF REVIEW 21 Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision to 22 deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations, this 23 Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence. 24 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” Richardson v. Perales, 25 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 26 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 27 adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The record as a whole must be 28 considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 1 Commissioner’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the 2 evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must apply the proper legal standards. E.g., 3 Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s 4 determination that the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards, 5 and if the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of 6 Health and Human Servs., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987). 7 REVIEW 8 In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he or she is unable to engage in 9 substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which has 10 lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 11 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he or she has a physical or mental impairment of such 12 severity that he or she is not only unable to do his or her previous work, but cannot, considering his or 13 her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which 14 exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The 15 burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 16 1990). 17 DISCUSSION3 18 Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by properly weighing the Medical Source Statements 19 and MRFC limitations of Plaintiff’s long-term, treating psychiatrist, Dr. Dwight W. Sievert. (Doc. 15 20 at 9-13.) Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for 21 discounting Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms. (Id. at 14-18.) 22 A. Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints 23 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed harmful error by failing to provide clear and 24 convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony as inconsistent with the evidence, and argues 25 that the ALJ’s summary of the medical evidence does not constitute clear and convincing reasons for 26

27 3 The parties are advised that this Court has carefully reviewed and considered all of the briefs, including arguments, points and authorities, declarations, and/or exhibits. Any omission of a reference to any specific 28 argument or brief is not to be construed that the Court did not consider the argument or brief. 1 discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. (Id.) In deciding whether to admit a claimant’s subjective 2 complaints, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th 3 Cir. 2014); Batson v. Comm’r, 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). First, the claimant must produce 4 objective medical evidence of her impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce some 5 degree of the symptom or pain alleged. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014. If the claimant satisfies the first 6 step and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony regarding 7 the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Id. 8 at 1015. 9 Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 10 expected to cause the alleged symptoms. AR 47. However, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s statements 11 concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms, noting that the 12 statements were not consistent with medical evidence and other evidence in the record. Id. The ALJ 13 was therefore required to provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s 14 subjective complaints. 15 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations were not fully consistent with the medical and other 16 evidence, noting that Plaintiff’s “statements and allegations are not fully consistent with the medical 17 and other evidence.” AR 47. Although lack of supporting medical evidence cannot form the sole 18 basis for discounting testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 681 19 (9th Cir. 2005). 20 Here, the ALJ contrasted Plaintiff’s allegations with the objective findings as follows: 21 In this case, the claimant's statements and allegations are not fully consistent with the medical and other evidence. For example, she alleged 22 her ability to stand and walk is "affected" (see Exhibit 4E, p. 6), but the record, which routinely showed she was able to heel and toe walk and 23 she ambulated without problems or an assistive device (see Exhibits 3F, 24 pp. 4, 10, 19; 4F, p. 19) does not support this. The claimant further alleged her ability to get along with others is "affected" (see Exhibits 4E, 25 p. 6), but that is internally inconsistent with her own report that she spends time with others and is very respectful toward authority figures 26 (see Exhibit 4E, pp. 5-7). Overall, the claimant alleges suffering from 27 significant limitations, which prohibit her from working (see Exhibits 2E, p. 2; 4E; hearing testimony), but that is inconsistent with a 28 December 2018 examination showing a full range of motion with good 1 strength and only minimal discomfort in the extremities (see Exhibit l0F, p. 5). It is also inconsistent with a report showing the claimant exhibited 2 a goal directed thought process with intact judgment and insight and she appeared capable of doing simple math calculations (Exhibit 20F, p. 5). 3 In addition, an alleged inability to work is inconsistent with the findings 4 and opinions of Drs. Michiel (see Exhibit 20F), Wagner (see Exhibit l0F), Nasrabadi (see Exhibit lA), and Herman (see Exhibit 3A). 5 In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is supported 6 by the overall medical evidence of record for the reasons discussed 7 above. The medical evidence of record does not support the extent of the claimant's subjective complaints and her statements and allegations are 8 not fully consistent with the medical and other evidence.

9 AR 47. 10 The ALJ contrasts Plaintiff’s allegations that her physical and mental impairments prevented 11 her from working with evidence from medical reports that demonstrated relatively normal findings. 12 See AR 879-80 (December 2018 report noting “Strength is 5/5 in the bilateral upper and lower 13 extremities including grip strength bilaterally” and generally normal range of motion findings); AR 14 1532 (December 15, 2018 report noting that Plaintiff’s “thought process was goal-directed,” she 15 “appeared able to do simple math calculations,” and she had normal findings for judgment and 16 insight). The ALJ therefore appropriately used the lack of medical evidence as one factor to discount 17 Plaintiff’s symptoms testimony. 18 However, the ALJ solely points to the medical evidence and does not discuss any other reasons 19 in discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. The Ninth Circuit has held that while lack of medical evidence 20 may be a factor in discounting pain testimony, it “cannot form the sole basis.” Burch, 400 F. 3d at 21 681. As the ALJ only uses the lack of medical evidence to discount Plaintiff’s symptoms testimony, 22 the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s symptoms testimony. 23 Defendant argues that testimony that contradicts the medical record is a sufficient basis for 24 rejecting the claimant’s subjective testimony, citing Carmickle v. Comm’r. (Doc. 17 at 14). In 25 Carmickle v. Comm’r, the Ninth Circuit examined the ALJ’s rejection of a claimant’s testimony, 26 noting that the “ALJ also rejected [claimant’s] testimony that he can lift only 10 pounds occasionally 27 in favor of Dr. Patton’s contradictory opinion that he can lift up to 10 pounds frequently” and holding 28 1 that “Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant's subjective 2 testimony.” Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008). However, 3 the Ninth Circuit in that case also noted that the “ALJ rejected [claimant’s] assertion that he has to 4 ‘change positions constantly’ when sitting, finding it inconsistent with [claimant’s] full-time college 5 attendance.” Id. Rather than holding that a lack of medical evidence may be the sole basis for 6 discounting symptoms testimony, the Ninth Circuit noted it as one basis among others for discounting 7 symptoms testimony. Defendant’s argument that the ALJ appropriately discounted Plaintiff’s 8 symptoms testimony based solely upon the medical evidence is therefore incorrect. 9 Defendant argues that the Court should defer to the ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence in 10 place of Plaintiff’s interpretation of the evidence. (Doc. 17 at 14.) The Ninth Circuit has held that 11 when “the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational interpretation, we must defer 12 to the ALJ's conclusion.” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1198 (citing Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 13 (9th Cir. 1995)). However, the issue here is not whether the ALJ improperly interpreted evidence, but 14 instead whether the ALJ had another reason beyond the lack of medical evidence for discounting 15 Plaintiff’s symptoms testimony. Defendant’s argument is therefore unavailing. 16 Accordingly, the ALJ erred in discounting Plaintiff’s symptoms testimony. 17 B. Remedy 18 The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or order an immediate award of 19 benefits is within the Court's discretion. See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 20 2000). Unless “the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would 21 serve no useful purpose,” remand for further proceedings is warranted. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 22 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). As it is not clear that “further administrative proceedings would serve no 23 useful purpose,” remand for further proceedings is appropriate. Id.; see also Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 24 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court may reverse the decision of the Commissioner of 25 Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing, but the proper course, except in 26 rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.”) (internal 27 quotes and citations omitted). On remand, the ALJ should specifically address Plaintiff’s symptoms 28 testimony. 1 Having found that remand is warranted, the Court declines to address Plaintiff’s remaining 2 argument that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist. See 3 Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because we remand the case to the ALJ for the 4 reasons stated, we decline to reach [plaintiff's] alternative ground for remand.”); see also Augustine ex 5 rel. Ramirez v. Astrue, 536 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1153 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“[The] Court need not address 6 the other claims plaintiff raises, none of which would provide plaintiff with any further relief than 7 granted, and all of which can be addressed on remand.”); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 177 n.6 8 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Because we remand for reconsideration of step three, we do not reach the other 9 arguments raised.”). 10 /// 11 /// 12 /// 13 /// 14 /// 15 /// 16 /// 17 /// 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial 3 evidence in the record as a whole and is not based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, IT IS 4 HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows: 5 1. Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social 6 Security be GRANTED; 7 2. The agency’s determination to deny benefits be REVERSED; and 8 3. The Clerk of this Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff Katherine 9 Lucille Martin and against Defendant Leland Dudek, Acting Commissioner of Social 10 Security. 11 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 12 assigned to the case, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days after being 13 served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file written objections with the 14 Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 15 Recommendations.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages or include exhibits. 16 Exhibits may be referenced by document and page number if already in the record before the 17 Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limit may not be considered. The parties are 18 advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to 19 challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 20 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 21 22 IT IS SO ORDERED.

23 Dated: April 15, 2025 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ 24 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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