(SS) Igasan v. Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, E.D. California·Decided March 15, 2024·No. 1:23-cv-00031·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CYNTHIA MARIE IGASAN, Case No. 1:23-cv-00031-SAB

Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DIRECTING v. CLERK OF THE COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY0 SECURITY, AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF CYNTHIA MARIE IGASAN AND TO CLOSE THIS Defendant. ACTION (ECF Nos. 15, 16, 18) I. Cynthia Marie Igasan (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying her application for disability benefits pursuant to the Social Security Act. The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone.1 Plaintiff requests the decision of the Commissioner be vacated and the case be remanded for further proceedings, arguing the Administrative Law Judge improperly discounted the opinion of Dr. Nooshin Maolemi, and the decision is not supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. 1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge and this action has been assigned For the reasons explained herein, Plaintiff’s Social Security appeal shall be denied. II. A. Procedural History Plaintiff protectively filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits on September 21, 2017. (AR 128.) Plaintiff’s application was initially denied on January 17, 2018, and denied upon reconsideration on April 16, 2018. (AR 109-127, 129-146.) Plaintiff requested and received a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Erin Justice (“the ALJ”). Plaintiff appeared for a telephonic hearing on January 29, 2020. (AR 82-108.) On February 12, 2020, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 148-64.) On September 29, 2020, the appeals counsel sent this matter back to the ALJ to evaluate Plaintiff’s claim from October 19, 2016 through September 30, 2019, the date last insured; evaluate Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome at Step 2; give further consideration to Plaintiff’s maximum residual functional capacity and provide appropriate rational with specific references to evidence in the record in support of the assessed limitations; and obtain supplemental evidence from a vocational expert to clarify the effect of the assessed limitations on Plaintiff’s occupational base. (AR 171- 75.) Following remand, Plaintiff appeared for a telephonic hearing on July 8, 2021, before ALJ Shiva Bozarth. (AR 40-81.) On September 15, 2021, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 16-31.) On September 19, 2022, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 5-7.) B. The ALJ’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law as of the date of the decision, September 5, 2021: 1. Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on September 30, 2019. 2. Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from her alleged 3. Through the date last insured, Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the cervical, lumbar, and thoracic spines; degenerative joint disease; essential tremor; rheumatoid arthritis; carpal tunnel syndrome; small fiber neuropathy; fibromyalgia; and obesity. 4. Through the date last insured, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. 5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the ALJ found that through the date last insured, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a reduced range of light work as defined in 20 CFR § 404.1567(b). Specifically, Plaintiff can lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. She can sit, stand, and walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour day. Plaintiff can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; but can occasionally climb ramps and stairs. She can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. In addition, she can never work at unprotected heights or around fast-moving machinery. Plaintiff can never reach with the non-dominant upper extremity; but can frequently reach with the dominant upper extremity. Further, Plaintiff can frequently handle, finger, or feel with the bilateral upper extremity. 6. Through the date last insured, Plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant work as an eligibility worker, caseworker, salesclerk, furniture salesperson, and jewelry salesperson. This work did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by Plaintiffs residual functional capacity. 7. Plaintiff was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from October 19, 2016, the alleged onset date, through September 30, 2019, the date last insured. (AR 21-30.) A. The Disability Standard show she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment2 which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential evaluation process to be used in determining if a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520;3 Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). The five steps in the sequential evaluation in assessing whether the claimant is disabled are: Step one: Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. Step two: Is the claimant’s alleged impairment sufficiently severe to limit his or her ability to work? If so, proceed to step three. If not, the claimant is not disabled. Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment, or combination of impairments, meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1? If so, the claimant is disabled. If not, proceed to step four. Step four: Does the claimant possess the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his or her past relevant work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. Step five: Does the claimant’s RFC, when considered with the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, allow him or her to adjust to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006). The burden of proof is on the claimant at steps one through four. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2020). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of qualifying disability once she has carried the burden of proof from step one through step four. Before making the step four determination, the ALJ first must determine the claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e); Nowden v. Berryhill, No. EDCV 17-00584-JEM, 2018 WL 1155971,

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