(SS) Gonzales v. Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, E.D. California·Decided September 3, 2020·No. 1:19-cv-01128·Unknown

Opinion

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8

9 JASMINE MONIQUE GONZALES, Case No. 1:19-cv-01128-SAB

10 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL SECURITY APPEAL AND ENTERING 11 v. JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 12 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, (ECF Nos. 17, 18, 19) 13 Defendant. 14 15 I. 16 INTRODUCTION 17 Plaintiff Jasmine Monique Gonzales (“Plaintiff”) through her guardian ad litem, Paul 18 Gonzales, seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 19 (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) finding she no longer qualifies for disability benefits pursuant 20 to the Social Security Act. The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which 21 were submitted, without oral argument, to Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone.1 22 Plaintiff suffers from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”). For the 23 reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Social Security appeal shall be denied. 24 II. 25 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 26 Plaintiff, a minor, was found to be disabled in a determination dated December 10, 2010. 27 On May 4, 2015, it was determined that Plaintiff was no longer disabled as of April 1, 2015. 1 (AR 83-88.) The determination was upheld upon reconsideration following a disability hearing 2 before the state hearing officer. (AR 142-144.) Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing before 3 Administrative Law Judge Ruxana Meyer (“the ALJ”). Plaintiff’s father waived the right to 4 appear and testify at the hearing. (AR 231.) On September 6, 2018, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 5 was not disabled. (AR 19-40.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on 6 April 24, 2019. (AR 8-10.) 7 A. Hearing Testimony 8 Plaintiff and her father, Mr. Gonzales, appeared for hearing on November 13, 2017. (AR 9 60-78.) Mr. Gonzales did not want to waive his right to representation so the hearing was 10 postponed for Plaintiff to obtain counsel. (AR 69, 180.) 11 Plaintiff’s attorney appeared, but neither Plaintiff nor Mr. Gonzales appeared, for the 12 hearing set on February 14, 2018. (50-59.) At the hearing, the ALJ noted that there was a 13 document stating that Mr. Gonzales had knee surgery the day prior to the hearing. (AR 53.) 14 When asked, Plaintiff’s attorney stated that Plaintiff was not waiving her right to appear at the 15 hearing. (AR 53.) He argued that good cause existed as to why they missed the hearing and he 16 was willing to move forward with any expert testimony that was available. (AR 53.) The ALJ 17 stated that knee surgery is generally an outpatient procedure so she was not sure that good cause 18 had been shown for the failure to appear. (AR 53.) The ALJ also stated that there was no 19 medical expert present. (AR 53.) Counsel requested that Mr. Gonzales’s testimony be 20 presented in a document fashion and the ALJ agreed. (AR 54.) A waiver of appearance for the 21 hearing was executed. (AR 231.) 22 B. ALJ Findings 23 The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 24 • The most recent favorable medical decision finding that Plaintiff was disabled is 25 the determination dated December 17, 2010. This is known as the “comparison 26 point decision” or CPD. 27 • At the time of the CPD, Plaintiff had the following medically determinable 1 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 2 • Medical improvement occurred as of April 1, 2015. 3 • Since April 1, 2015, the impairment that Plaintiff had at the time of the CPD has 4 not met or medically equaled the listing. 5 • Plaintiff was born on March 29, 2004. Therefore, she was a school-age child, as of 6 April 1, 2015. Plaintiff is currently an adolescent. 7 • Since April 1, 2015, the impairment that Plaintiff had at the time of the CPD has 8 not functionally equaled the Listings of Impairments. 9 o Since April 1, 2015, Plaintiff has had no limitation in acquiring and using 10 information as a result of the impairment present at the CPD. 11 o Since April 1, 2015, Plaintiff has had less than marked limitation in 12 attending and completing tasks as a result of the impairment present at the 13 CPD. 14 o Since April 1, 2015, Plaintiff has had less than marked limitation in 15 interacting and relating with others as a result of the impairment present at 16 the CPD. 17 o Since April 1, 2015, Plaintiff has had no limitation in moving about and 18 manipulating objects as a result of the impairment present at the CPD. 19 o Since April 1, 2015, Plaintiff has had no limitation in the ability to care for 20 herself as a result of the impairment present at the CPD. 21 o Since April 1, 2015, Plaintiff has had no limitation in health and physical 22 well-being as a result of the impairment present at the CPD. 23 • The medical and other evidence establish that Plaintiff: did not have an impairment 24 at the CPD that was not considered at that time; and has not developed any 25 additional impairments subsequent to the CPD. 26 • Since April 1, 2015, Plaintiff has not had an impairment or combination of 27 impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments. 1 impairments that functionally equals the listings. 2 • Plaintiff’s disability ended as of April 1, 2015, and the claimant has not become 3 disabled again since that date. 4 (AR 25-40.) 5 III. 6 LEGAL STANDARD 7 To be eligible for disabled child’s insurance benefits, the claimant must meet the Social 8 Security Act’s definition of “child,” be unmarried, be below specified age limits (18 or 19) or be 9 under a disability which began prior to age 22, and was dependent on the insured at the time of 10 the insured’s death. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541, 547 (2012) (quoting 42 11 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1), see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279–80 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting 12 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(B)(ii)) (“To be eligible for disabled child’s insurance benefits, the 13 claimant must, ‘at the time [her] application is filed,’ be ‘under a disability . . . which began 14 before [s]he attained the age of 22.’ ”). A child is disabled for the purposes of the Social 15 Security Act if she suffers from “a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which 16 results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death 17 or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 18 months.” Merrill ex rel. Merrill v. Apfel, 224 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 42 19 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i)). 20 The Social Security regulations establish a three-step sequential evaluation process to be 21 followed in a child disability case. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924. At the First Step, the Commissioner 22 must determine whether the claimant is working and whether the work is substantial gainful 23 activity; if so, a finding of nondisability is made and the claim is denied. 20 C.F.R. § 24 416.924(b).

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