(SS) Carlson v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 29, 2024
• Docket: 1:23-cv-00451
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MELANIE PAIGE CARLSON, Case No. 1:23-cv-00451-BAM 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 13 v. FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 14 MARTIN O’MALLEY, Commissioner of (Docs. 16, 20) 15 Social Security,1 16 Defendant. 17

18 INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiff Melanie Paige Carlson (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the 20 Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her applications for disability insurance 21 benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and for supplemental security income under Title 22 XVI of the Social Security Act. The matter is currently before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for 23 summary judgment and the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to Magistrate 24 Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe.2 25

26 1 Martin O’Malley became the Commissioner of Social Security on December 20, 2023. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Martin O’Malley is substituted as the defendant in this suit. 27 2 The parties consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct all proceedings in this case, including 28 entry of final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Docs. 7, 9, 10.) 1 Having considered the briefing and record in this matter, the Court finds that the decision of 2 the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole 3 and based upon proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion for 4 summary judgment and affirm the agency’s determination to deny benefits. 5 FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 6 Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income 7 on March 27, 2020. AR 10, 194-203, 204-05.3 Plaintiff alleged that she became disabled on July 26, 8 2014, due to traumatic brain injury, back injury, bipolar disorder type 2, OCD, and degenerative 9 arthritis. AR 217. Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. AR 130-34, 10 136-39, 143-47, 149-53. Subsequently, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. On January 7, 11 2022, ALJ Anthony J. Johnson, Jr. held a telephonic hearing. Plaintiff appeared at the hearing with 12 her attorney, Amanda Foss. AR 35. Following the hearing, ALJ Johnson issued an order denying 13 benefits on March 1, 2022. AR 7-22, 33-73. Thereafter, Plaintiff sought review of the decision, 14 which the Appeals Counsel denied, making ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. AR 1- 15 5. This appeal followed. 16 Relevant Hearing Testimony and Medical Record 17 The relevant hearing testimony and medical record were reviewed by the Court and will be 18 referenced below as necessary to this Court’s decision. 19 The ALJ’s Decision 20 Using the Social Security Administration’s five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ 21 determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. AR 10-22. Specifically, the 22 ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial activity since July 26, 2014, her alleged 23 onset date. AR 12-13. The ALJ identified the following severe impairments: asthma, obesity, 24 degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, and a depressive disorder. AR 13. The ALJ determined that 25 26 27 3 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page 28 number. 1 Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled any 2 of the listed impairments. AR 13-16. 3 Based on a review of the entire record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual 4 functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, except that she could occasionally climb ramps 5 and stairs, but could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She could occasionally balance, stoop, 6 kneel, crouch, or crawl. She could not tolerate exposure to concentrated vibration, heat, cold, 7 humidity, or wetness. She also could not tolerate exposure to concentrated hazards such as 8 unprotected heights or moving machinery. She was limited to understanding, remembering, and 9 carrying out simple and routine work-related instructions. She could concentrate for period of two 10 hours on work-related tasks and could occasionally work with the general public, coworkers, and 11 supervisors. She could perform non-production pace, non-assembly line pace jobs with occasional 12 workplace changes introduced gradually over time. She could tolerate occasional decision-making 13 with no responsibility for the safety of others. She also occasionally would require the use of a cane to 14 ambulate to and from, and move about the workspace, but could stand without assistance. AR 16-19. 15 With this RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work, but there were 16 other jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, such as sorter, laundry folder, and 17 garment tagger. AR 19-21. The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability 18 from July 26, 2014, through the date of the decision. AR 21. 19 SCOPE OF REVIEW 20 Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision to 21 deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations, this 22 Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence. 23 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” Richardson v. Perales, 24 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 25 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 26 adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The record as a whole must be 27 considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 28 Commissioner’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the 1 evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must apply the proper legal standards. E.g., 2 Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s 3 determination that the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards, 4 and if the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of 5 Health and Human Servs., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987). 6 REVIEW 7 In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he or she is unable to engage in 8 substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which has 9 lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 10 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he or she has a physical or mental impairment of such 11 severity that he or she is not only unable to do his or her previous work, but cannot, considering his or 12 her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which 13 exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The 14 burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 15 1990). 16 DISCUSSION4 17 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s mental RFC determination is not supported by substantial 18 evidence because the ALJ failed in his duty to further develop the record and obtain a consultative 19 psychiatric evaluation. (Doc. 16 at pp. 13-17.) Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred by failing to 20 evaluate Plaintiff’s anxiety disorder at step two of the sequential evaluation. (Id. at pp. 17-19.) 21 A. Duty to Develop the Record and Obtain Consultative Examination 22 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed his duty to further develop the record, which rendered the 23 RFC determination legally insufficient. 24 “In Social Security cases, the ALJ has a special duty to develop the record fully and fairly and 25 to ensure that the claimant’s interests are considered, even when the claimant is represented by 26

27 4 The parties are advised that this Court has carefully reviewed and considered all of the briefs, including arguments, points and authorities, declarations, and/or exhibits. Any omission of a reference to any specific 28 argument or brief is not to be construed that the Court did not consider the argument or brief. 1 counsel.” Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ’s duty to “conduct an 2 appropriate inquiry” is triggered only where evidence is ambiguous or the record is inadequate to 3 allow for proper evaluation of the evidence. Id.; Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 4 2001). 5 Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ’s duty to develop the record was triggered because the 6 state agency psychiatric consultants determined that “there was insufficient evidence of Plaintiff’s 7 mental impairments” and, therefore, “no medical opinions were offered as to the impact of Plaintiff’s 8 mental impairments on her functionality.” (Doc. 16 at p. 14.) Plaintiff’s argument is not wholly 9 persuasive. The record demonstrates that the state agency consultants evaluated Plaintiff’s mental 10 impairments for purposes of both disability insurance benefits (with a date last insured of June 30, 11 2016), and supplemental security income. AR 74-85, 86-97, 100-12, 113-25. With respect to 12 disability insurance benefits, in July and October 2020, the state agency consultants determined that 13 there were no available mental health records prior to Plaintiff’s date last insured and, therefore, there 14 was insufficient evidence to substantiate the presence of a depressive, bipolar or related disorders or 15 for anxiety or obsessive-compulsive disorders.5 AR 79-80, 91-92, 106, 119. With respect to 16 supplemental security income, the state agency consultants did not conclude that there was insufficient 17 evidence to substantiate a disorder. Rather, they determined that Plaintiff had medically determinable 18 mental impairments and they thus considered the paragraph B areas of mental functioning, identifying 19 only mild limitations and opining that Plaintiff’s impairments were non-severe. AR 80, 92, 106-07, 20 119-20. 21 Contrary to Plaintiff’s suggestion, the state agency psychiatric consultants evaluated the impact 22 of Plaintiff’s mental impairments on her functionality for purposes of supplemental security income, 23 but found her not particularly limited. Although the ALJ found those opinions “not persuasive,” (AR 24 19), and determined that Plaintiff had a severe mental impairment warranting nonexertional limitations 25 (AR 13, 16-19), it is not accurate to say that no mental health professional provided a basis for the 26

27 5 To be entitled to disability insurance benefits, Plaintiff had to establish disability while still insured for benefits, i.e., before June 30, 2016 (AR 12). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(a); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 28 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (DIB claimant must prove she is disabled before her insured status expired). 1 RFC determination. See, e.g., James N. v. Saul, ED CV 18-1199-KS, 2019 WL 3500332, at *7 (C.D. 2 Cal. Jul. 31, 2019) (rejecting argument that ALJ was required to obtain evidence from additional 3 medical sources to support the RFC determination where ALJ found the state agency psychiatrists’ 4 opinions to be insufficiently restrictive, noting “[i]t is inaccurate to say under these circumstances that 5 no mental health professional provided a basis for the ALJ’s RFC determination or that the ALJ made 6 such a determination out of whole cloth”). 7 Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred by failing to obtain a medical opinion for the purpose 8 of reviewing additional medical records submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel shortly before the 9 administrative level hearing (and presumptively after the state agency medical consultants rendered 10 their opinions in July and October 2020). (Doc. 16 at pp. 14-15.) Generally, an ALJ’s duty to develop 11 the record is not triggered merely because additional medical evidence is received after the state 12 agency physicians complete their review. See Rocha v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-cv-00613-CDB 13 (SS), 2023 WL 4747689, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2023) (“An updated opinion is not required simply 14 because additional medical evidence is received after the State agency physicians had already 15 reviewed Plaintiff’s records.”); Smith v. Saul, No. 1:19-cv-01085-SKO, 2020 WL 6305830, at *8 16 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2020) (same). “ALJs need not seek the opinion of a medical expert every time they 17 review new medical evidence and make a RFC determination.” Keyes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 18 1:21-cv-01779-EPG, 2023 WL 2166917, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2023) (quoting Bufkin v. Saul, 836 19 F. App’x 578, 579 (9th Cir. 2021) (unpublished)). 20 Plaintiff suggests that the duty to develop the record was triggered by subsequent medical 21 records because they reflected a change, i.e., “exacerbations of Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder and anxiety 22 disorder.” (Doc. 16 at pp. 14-15.) It is not evident to the Court that records cited by Plaintiff in her 23 briefing support her position of a worsening condition such that it required an updated medical 24 opinion. For example, Plaintiff cites to records of her August 2017 hospitalization due to a suicide 25 attempt and involuntary psychiatric hold. (Doc. 16 at p. 15, citing AR 1180, 1191-96.) However, 26 medical records available and considered by the state agency psychiatric consultant on reconsideration 27 included information identifying Plaintiff’s August 2017 hospitalization. See, e.g., AR 104, 117 28 (“2017 hospital for SI”); see also AR 307 (“Bakersfield Hospital in Aug 2017 for SI”). The ALJ also 1 considered records of Plaintiff’s August 2017 hospitalization, acknowledging that Plaintiff engaged in 2 self-harm in response to stressful situations like social conflict. AR 17, citing AR 1194 (Ex. 9F at p. 3 18). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s attempts at self-harm supported mental accommodations in 4 the RFC. AR 18. 5 Plaintiff also cites to certain treatment records from Dr. Nirmal Brar reflecting increasing 6 depression and anxiety with corresponding increases in the dosage of her medications in 2020 and 7 2021. (Doc. 16 at pp. 14-15, citing AR 1273 [5/30/20 increased depression, including waking up 8 depressed and spending a lot of days in bed, for which Cymbalta dosage was increased], 1252 (Ex. 9 10F, p. 35) [5/6/21 increase in anxiety and depression], 1249 (Ex. 10F, p. 32) [6/8/21 increase in 10 depression and anxiety with a panic attack two days prior, for which Vraylar dosage was increased], 11 1246-1248 (Ex. 10F, pp. 29-31) [6/23/21 treatment note reflecting second increase of Vraylar 12 medication that month due to Plaintiff’s feelings of being overwhelmed]). To the extent Plaintiff 13 relies on records from May 2020 (AR 1273), those records do not support her position of a worsening 14 condition subsequent to the time the state agency psychiatric consultants rendered their opinions. As 15 previously indicated, the state agency psychiatric consultants rendered an initial opinion in July 2020 16 and a reconsideration opinion in October 2020. 17 With respect to the remaining records from May and June 2021, Plaintiff appears to overstate 18 their contents. Though Plaintiff claims the records illustrate two medication increases, the cited 19 records appear to identify only one quantitative increase in her medication dosage. Compare AR 1247 20 (6/23/21 treatment note stating “INCREASE Vraylar 4.5 mg 1 po qhs”) with AR 1250 (6/8/21 21 treatment note stating “INCREASE Vraylar 4.5 mg 1 po qhs”). Plaintiff does not point to later 22 treatment records reflecting additional issues or increases. There also is no suggestion that the ALJ 23 failed to consider the cited records. Indeed, the ALJ expressly referenced treatment records from both 24 May 6, 2021, and June 8, 2021, including records identifying the increase in Plaintiff’s medication 25 dosage. AR 17, citing Ex. 10F at pp. 33, 36, 39. Importantly, there is no indication that any of these 26 later records required a physician to interpret the data or were not “self-evident.” See Escudero v. 27 Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:18-cv-01136-EPG, 2019 WL 4917634, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2019) 28 (finding the ALJ improperly failed to develop the record where some of the medical evidence post- 1 dating the opining physicians’ assessments “appear[ed] to be very medical in nature and not 2 susceptible to a lay understanding.”). 3 Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination was flawed. (Doc. 16 at pp. 15-16.) In 4 so arguing, Plaintiff faults the ALJ for failing to obtain a psychiatric consultative examination. (Id. at 5 p. 16 [“There was no psychiatric consultative examination ordered by the Agency or the ALJ. It 6 appears that the ALJ defined her own limitations for Ms. Carlson . . . .”].) However, it is Plaintiff’s 7 burden to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990); 42 U.S.C. § 8 423(d)(5)(A) (“An individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such 9 medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social Security may 10 require.”); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a) (“[Y]ou have to prove to us that you are ... disabled ....”), 11 416.912(a) (same); Harrison v. Saul, No. 1:19-cv-01683-BAM, 2021 WL 1173024, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 12 Mar. 29, 2021). Plaintiff failed to submit any medical opinions from a treating or examining physician 13 as to her ability to work or her functional limitations. Because it is Plaintiff's burden to present 14 evidence of disability, the mere absence of an opinion from an examining physician does not give rise 15 to a duty to develop the record; rather, that duty is triggered only where there is an inadequacy or 16 ambiguity. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 17 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001) (“An ALJ’s duty to develop the record further is triggered only when there 18 is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the 19 evidence.”); see also Hogan v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-01787-SKO, 2022 WL 317031, at *10 (E.D. Cal. 20 Feb. 2, 2022) (noting no “rule of general applicability that an ALJ must obtain an examining opinion 21 in every case before rendering an RFC determination”); Harrison, 2021 WL 1173024, at *5-6. 22 (concluding absence of report from treating or examining source did not give rise to duty to develop 23 the record where record contained opinions of state agency physicians and plaintiff’s complete 24 treatment records). 25 In this instance, there is no indication that the record was ambiguous or inadequate to allow for 26 proper evaluation. The record included Plaintiff’s testimony and the prior administrative findings of 27 the state agency psychiatric consultants, both of which were summarized by the ALJ. AR 17, 19 And, 28 the ALJ left the record open after to the hearing for the receipt of podiatry records. AR 38. Upon 1 submission of those records, Plaintiff’s counsel confirmed that there were “no more records left 2 outstanding.” AR 1277. Absent any inadequacy or ambiguity in the record, the ALJ had no duty to 3 further develop the record. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Kijakazi, No. 1:21-cv-01676-SKO, 2023 WL 4 6164086, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2023) (finding ALJ had no duty to develop the record further 5 where counsel conceded at the hearing that record contained plaintiff’s complete treatment records and 6 no gaps or inconsistencies were noted); accord Findley v. Saul, No. 1:18-cv-00341-BAM, 2019 WL 7 4072364, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2019) (finding ALJ not obligated to further develop the record 8 where counsel stated at the hearing that the record was complete). 9 Plaintiff also suggests that the ALJ impermissibly defined his own limitations for Plaintiff in 10 the RFC without the support of a medical opinion. (Doc. 16 at pp. 16-17.) An RFC “is the most [one] 11 can still do despite [his or her] limitations” and it is “based on all the relevant evidence in [one’s] case 12 record,” rather than a single medical opinion or piece of evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 13 416.945(a)(1) (“We will assess your residual functional capacity based on all of the relevant medical 14 in your case record.”). Indeed, “[t]he RFC need not mirror a particular opinion; it is an assessment 15 formulated by the ALJ based on all relevant evidence.” Ashlock v. Kijakazi, No. 1:21-cv-01687-GSA, 16 2022 WL 2307594, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2022); Gonzalez, 2023 WL 6164086, at *6 (citing 17 Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995), (“The nature of the ALJ’s responsibility is to 18 interpret the evidence of record, including medical evidence.”); Mills v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 19 2:13-cv-0899-KJN, 2014 WL 4195012, at *4 n.8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2014) (“[B]ecause it is the ALJ’s 20 responsibility to formulate an RFC that is based on the record as a whole, ... the RFC need not exactly 21 match the opinion or findings of any particular medical source.”). Here, the ALJ did not improperly 22 substitute his own opinion for a medical opinion. Rather, the ALJ considered the opinions of the state 23 agency psychiatric consultants, Plaintiff’s allegations concerning her disability, and Plaintiff’s 24 complete treatment records. AR 16-19. The ALJ found that the state agency physicians’ opinions 25 were unpersuasive based on Plaintiff’s attempts at self-harm and her allegations of memory problems, 26 variable concentration, not tending to her personal hygiene, and engaging in self-harm in response to 27 stressful situations. AR 17, 19. 28 For these reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ did not fail in his duty to develop the record. 1 B. Plaintiff’s Anxiety Disorder 2 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to evaluate her anxiety disorder at step two of the sequential 3 evaluation. (Doc. 16 at p. 19.) 4 At step two of the five-step sequential evaluation, the ALJ is required to determine whether a 5 plaintiff has a “severe” medical impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 6 416.920(c). An impairment, or combination of impairments, can be found to be non-severe if the 7 evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s 8 ability to work. See SSR 85–28, 1985 WL 56856 (Jan. 1, 1985); see also Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 9 303, 306 (9th Cir.1988) (adopting SSR 85–28). “The mere existence of an impairment is insufficient 10 proof of a disability.” Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir.1993). A claimant bears the 11 burden of proving that an impairment is disabling. Id. (citation omitted). 12 “Step two is merely a threshold determination meant to screen out weak claims.” Buck v. 13 Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017), citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146–47 (1987). 14 “It is not meant to identify the impairments that should be taken into account when determining the 15 RFC . . . . The RFC . . . should be exactly the same regardless of whether certain impairments are 16 considered ‘severe’ or not.” Id. (emphasis in original). Any error in failing to include an impairment 17 at step two is harmless if the ALJ considered any limitations imposed by the impairment in subsequent 18 steps of the analysis. See Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The decision reflects 19 that the ALJ considered any limitations posed by the bursitis at Step 4. As such, any error that the ALJ 20 made in failing to include the bursitis at Step 2 was harmless.”); Morrison v. O’Malley, No. 1:22-CV- 21 01559-SKO, 2024 WL 21558, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2024) (explaining failure to include an 22 impairment in the step two analysis is harmless if the ALJ considers the functional limitations that 23 flow from said impairment in subsequent steps of sequential evaluation). 24 At step two of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ identified Plaintiff’s depressive disorder, but 25 not an anxiety disorder, as a severe impairment. AR 13. Nevertheless, in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, 26 the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s functional limitations flowing from her mental impairments, including 27 Plaintiff’s allegations of memory problems, variable concentration, not tending to her personal 28 hygiene, and engaging in self-harm in response to stressful situations. AR 17. Further, the relevant 1 treatment records reviewed by the ALJ in assessing the RFC included Plaintiff’s reports of anxiety. 2 AR 17, citing, e.g., AR 1095, 1101, 1106 (Ex. 8F at pp. 26, 32, 37), 1194 (Ex. 9F at p. 18), 1250, 1253 3 (Ex 10F at pp. 33, 36). The Court therefore finds that any error in failing to include anxiety as a 4 severe impairment at step two is harmless because the ALJ considered any limitations posed by her 5 anxiety at subsequent steps of the sequential evaluation. 6 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 7 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 8 evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, IT IS 9 HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 10 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 16) is DENIED; 11 2. Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 12 is DENIED; and 13 3. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Martin 14 O’Malley, Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff Melanie Paige Carlson. 15 16 IT IS SO ORDERED.

17 Dated: February 29, 2024 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ 18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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