(SS) Caglia v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: October 4, 2021
• Docket: 1:19-cv-01376
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 ANTHONY CAGLIA, ) Case No.: 1:19-cv-1376 JLT ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL ) (DOC. 25) AND DENYING THE 13 ) COMMISSIONER’S REQUEST TO AFFIRM THE ) ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION (DOC. 27) 14 v. ) ) ORDER REMANDING THE ACTION PURSUANT 15 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, ) TO SENTENCE FOUR OF 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ) 16 Defendant. ) ORDER DIRECTING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN ) FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF ANTHONY CAGLIA 17 ) AND AGAINST DEFENDANT, THE ) COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 18

19 Anthony Caglia asserts he is entitled to disability insurance benefits and a period of disability 20 under Title II of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff argues the administrative law judge erred in 21 evaluating the record and seeks judicial review of the decision denying his application for benefits. 22 (See generally Doc. 25.) the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four 23 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 24 BACKGROUND 25 In March 2015, Plaintiff applied for benefits, alleging disability due to blindness, “no feeling in 26 [his] hands,” severe shoulder pain, and pain in his teeth. (Doc. 15-2 at 70.) The Social Security 27 Administration denied the application at the initial level and upon reconsideration. (See id. at 24.) 28 Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing regarding his applications and testified before an ALJ on 1 March 21, 2018. (Id. at 24, 41.) The ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled and issued an order 2 denying benefits on June 19, 2018. (Id. at 21-33.) Plaintiff requested review of the decision by the 3 Appeals Council, which denied the request on May 22, 2019. (Id. at 10-12.) Therefore, the ALJ’s 4 determination became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. 5 STANDARD OF REVIEW 6 District courts have a limited scope of judicial review for disability claims after a decision by 7 the Commissioner to deny benefits under the Social Security Act. When reviewing findings of fact, 8 such as whether a claimant was disabled, the Court must determine whether the Commissioner’s 9 decision is supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 10 ALJ’s determination that the claimant is not disabled must be upheld by the Court if the proper legal 11 standards were applied and the findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of 12 Health & Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987). 13 Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a 14 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 15 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938)). The record as a whole 16 must be considered, because “[t]he court must consider both evidence that supports and evidence that 17 detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion.” Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). 18 DISABILITY BENEFITS 19 To qualify for benefits under the Social Security Act, Plaintiff must establish she is unable to 20 engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 21 that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. 22 § 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual shall be considered to have a disability only if: 23 his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and 24 work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in 25 which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. 26

27 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). The burden of proof is on a claimant to establish disability. Terry v. 28 Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990). If a claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability, 1 the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove the claimant is able to engage in other substantial 2 gainful employment. Maounis v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1984). 3 ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION 4 To achieve uniform decisions, the Commissioner established a sequential five-step process for 5 evaluating a claimant’s alleged disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The process 6 requires the ALJ to determine whether Plaintiff (1) is engaged substantial gainful activity, (2) had 7 medically determinable severe impairments (3) that met or equaled one of the listed impairments set 8 forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; and whether Plaintiff (4) had the residual functional 9 capacity to perform to past relevant work or (5) the ability to perform other work existing in significant 10 numbers at the state and national level. Id. The ALJ must consider testimonial and objective medical 11 evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927. 12 Pursuant to this five-step process, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not engage in substantial 13 gainful activity after the alleged onset date of September 2, 2014. (Doc. 15-2 at 26.) Second, the ALJ 14 found Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: “exogenic obesity, left eye blindness since age 15 11, amblyopia of the right eye, neuropathy in the bilateral hands, diabetes mellitus, hypertension, mild 16 degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, and right knee bursitis.” (Id.) The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s 17 friend also reported he had been depressed, but not find “medically determinable mental impairments 18 evidenced in the record.” (Id. at 27.) At step three, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s impairments did not 19 meet or medically equal a Listing. (Id.) Next, the ALJ found: 20 [T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except he can lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 30 21 pounds frequently, stand and walk four hours and sit four hours in an eight hour workday [and] the claimant requires the ability to sit or stand at will. The claimant 22 can occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. In addition, the claimant must wear corrective glasses at work for the right eye and he cannot do work 23 requiring binocular vision because he is blind in the left eye.

24 (Id. at 28.) With this residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined at step four that Plaintiff was 25 “unable to perform any past relevant work.” (Id. at 31.) However, ALJ found Plaintiff could perform 26 “jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.” (Id.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded 27 Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act from September 2, 2014, through the 28 date of the decision. (Id. at 32.) 1 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 2 Plaintiff argues that given the loss of his left eye and poor vision in his right eye, the ALJ erred 3 in finding Plaintiff was not disabled. (Doc. 25 at 3, 7-8.) Plaintiff also reports he has depression, for 4 which he is receiving treatment. (Id. at 5, 7-8.) On the other hand, the Commissioner asserts the 5 “decision is supported by substantial evidence and is in accordance with the law.” (Doc. 27 at 9.) 6 A. Plaintiff’s Mental Impairment(s) 7 As an initial matter, Plaintiff reports he is now receiving “services weekly with Mental Health 8 in Sanger, CA.” (Doc. 25 at 5.) He asserts that he is suffering from depression, which he attributes to 9 a lack of “hope for help.” (Id. at 5, 7-8.) Thus, it appears Plaintiff believes the ALJ erred at step two 10 of the sequential evaluation in finding Plaintiff’s depression was not a severe impairment. (See id.) 11 At step two of the sequential evaluation, a claimant must make a “threshold showing” (1) he 12 has a medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments and (2) the impairment or 13 combination of impairments is severe. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-47 (1987); see also 20 14 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). Thus, the burden of proof is on the claimant to establish a 15 medically determinable severe impairment that significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do 16 basic work activities, or the “abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 17 404.1521(a), 416.921(a). 18 1. Medically determinable impairment 19 The ALJ observed that Plaintiff’s friend, Shannon Miller, “reported the claimant had been 20 depressed.” (Doc. 15-2 at 27; see also id. at 29.) The ALJ noted Ms. Miller also believed Plaintiff 21 “had been isolated and did not want to do much.” (Id. at 29.) The ALJ found “allegations of 22 depressive symptoms on November 20, 2017.” (Doc. 15-2 at 27, citing Exh. 7F, pp. 17, 33 [Doc. 15-2 23 at 324, 340].) However, the ALJ determined there did “not appear to be any mental diagnoses or 24 treatment in the record.” (Id.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded “there are no medically determinable 25 mental impairments evidenced in the record.” (Id.) 26 At an intake appointment to establish care with a new physician in November 2017, Plaintiff 27 reported symptoms in the past two months that included little interest or pleasure in doing things; 28 feeling down, depressed, or hopeless; and feeling tired or having little energy. (Doc. 15-2 at 339-341.) 1 Dr. Pedram Pirsaraei indicated he would “Consider Major Depressive Disorder,” but did not prescribe 2 any medication or treatment for Plaintiff. (Id. at 341-342.) As the ALJ observed, the following 3 treatment note from Dr. Pirsaraei stated Plaintiff “was diagnosed with hypertension, pre-diabetes, and 4 hyperlipidemia.” (Id. at 29, citing Exh. 7F, pp. 30-21 [Doc. 15-2 at 337-338]; see also id. at 335.). 5 Depression was not listed as either a diagnosed condition or in Plaintiff’s “problem list.” (See, e.g., id. 6 at 317, 335.) The ALJ found Plaintiff’s “[e]xaminations were normal.” (Id. at 29.) Dr. Pirsaraei 7 indicated Plaintiff did not report feeling down or hopeless, and Dr. Pirsaraei opined Plaintiff did not 8 exhibit psychological symptoms at subsequent examinations in December 2017, January 2018, and 9 February 2018. (Id. at 312-313, 317, 319, 336-337.) 10 The Ninth Circuit determined that a diagnosis from an acceptable medical source is a 11 prerequisite to a finding that a medically determinable impairment exists, and symptoms by themselves 12 are not sufficient to establish such an impairment. Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1005-06 (9th 13 Cir. 2005). Because Plaintiff has not identified any evidence in the record that he was diagnosed with 14 depression or received treatment for the condition, he fails to meet the burden of showing depression 15 was a medically determinable impairment during the adjudicated period. See id. 16 2. Severity of Plaintiff’s depression 17 Assuming Plaintiff met the burden of show his depression was a medically determinable 18 impairment during the adjudicated period, he must next show the impairment was severe. Bowen, 482 19 U.S. at 153 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). The Ninth Circuit determined that “[t]he mere existence 20 of an impairment is insufficient proof of a disability.” Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678 (9th Cir. 21 1993). In other words, even a medical diagnosis does not make an impairment “severe.” 22 For an impairment to be “severe,” it must “significantly limit[]” the claimant’s “ability to do 23 basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). Basic work activities are “the abilities 24 and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” Id., §§ 404.1522(b), 416.922(b). These activities include 25 “[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions;” “[u]se of judgment;” 26 “[r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations;” and “[d]ealing with 27 changes in a routine work setting.” Id. An impairment is “not severe” if the evidence establishes the 28 impairment has “no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to do work.” Smolen v. 1 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff does not identify any functional 2 limitations—such as difficulties with memory or concentration— that may be attributed to depression, 3 he fails to carry the burden at step two. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 153; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). 4 B. The Physical Residual Functional Capacity 5 A claimant’s RFC is “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 6 404.1545(a), 416.945(a); see also 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(c) (defining an 7 RFC as the “maximum degree to which the individual retains the capacity for sustained performance 8 of the physical-mental requirements of jobs”). In formulating an RFC, the ALJ weighs medical and 9 other source opinions. See, e.g., Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 10 2009). Further, the ALJ must consider “all of [a claimant's] medically determinable impairments,” 11 whether severe or not, when assessing a RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2). 12 1. Waiver 13 As an initial matter, the Court notes Plaintiff’s severe physical impairments included obesity, 14 neuropathy, diabetes, hypertension, degenerative disc disease, and right knee bursitis. (See Doc. 15-2 15 at 26.) The ALJ identified a physical RFC that limited Plaintiff to light work with additional postural 16 limitations. (See Doc. 15-2 at 28.) Plaintiff does not challenge these exertional and postural 17 restrictions in the RFC, and instead focuses on the findings related to his vision. (See generally Doc. 18 25 at 3, 7-10.) 19 The Ninth Circuit has indicated that it cannot “manufacture arguments for an appellant.” 20 Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Greenwood v. Fed. 21 Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994)). Rather, the Court will “review only issues with 22 are argued specifically and distinctly.” Id. Therefore, when a claim of error is not argued and 23 explained, the argument is waived. See id. at 929-30 (holding a party’s argument was waived because 24 the party made only a “bold assertion” of error, with “little if any analysis to assist the court in 25 evaluating its legal challenge”); see also Hibbs v. Dep’t of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 873 n.34 (9th 26 Cir. 2001) (finding the assertion of error was “too undeveloped to be capable of assessment”). 27 Because Plaintiff failed to discuss or otherwise dispute the exertional and functional limitations 28 identified in the RFC, Plaintiff has waived any challenge to these findings of the ALJ. 1 2. Visual limitations and the RFC 2 The ALJ determined as part of the RFC that Plaintiff “must wear corrective glasses at work for 3 the right eye and he cannot do work requiring binocular vision...” (Doc. 15-2 at 28.) In support of this 4 determination, the ALJ indicated he gave “significant weight” to the opinions of physicians who 5 examined and treated Plaintiff. (Id. at 29-30.) In addition, “some weight” was given to the opinions 6 of physicians who reviewed the record and determined Plaintiff could perform work. (Id. at 31.) 7 Under the regulations, “licensed physicians and certain qualified specialists” are considered 8 acceptable medical sources, and their opinions may be substantial evidence in support of an RFC. 20 9 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a); see also Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). Where the 10 acceptable medical source opinion is based on an examination, the “physician’s opinion alone 11 constitutes substantial evidence, because it rests on his own independent examination of the claimant.” 12 Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). In general, the opinion of a treating 13 physician is afforded the greatest weight, but it is not binding on the ultimate issue of a disability. Id.; 14 see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). An 15 examining physician’s opinion is given more weight than the opinion of non-examining physician. 16 Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). 17 However, the opinions of non-examining professionals may also constitute substantial evidence when 18 the opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record. See 19 Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). 20 The ALJ observed that in 2014, Dr. Stewart found “the claimant’s right eye achieved visual 21 acuity of 20/15” with prescription glasses. (Doc. 15-2 at 29, citing Exh. 2F, p. 3 [id. at 283].) 22 However, Dr. Stewart indicated that he was “mak[ing] no judgments about disability, but if [Plaintiff] 23 wears his glasses as prescribed, his right eye sees very well, and is protected.” (Id. at 283.) The ALJ 24 appears to adopt the recommendation that Plaintiff wear glasses in the RFC. However, the record is 25 clear that Plaintiff’s visual acuity worsened in the following years, and the findings of Dr. Stewart 26 offer little support to the ALJ’s conclusions. 27 The ALJ also noted that Dr. Lakshmanaraju Raju performed a consultative examination in July 28 2015. (Doc. 15-2 at 29-30, citing Exh. 3F [id. at 284-292].) At the examination, Plaintiff told Dr. Raju 1 that he had been “developing some visual difficulties with his right eye as well,” and his optometrist 2 said he was “legally blind.” (Id. at 287.) Dr. Raju determined Plaintiff’s visual acuity in his right eye 3 was 20/70 without glasses and 20/50 with glasses. (Id. at 288.) Dr. Raju indicated Plaintiff had 4 “visual limitations” in identifying Plaintiff’s functional assessment but did not identify specific 5 limitations. (See id. at 291-92.) Thus, though the ALJ indicated he gave the opinion of Dr. Raju 6 “significant weight” (id. at 30), Dr. Raju did not identify any limitations such that the Court may find 7 the opinion of Dr. Raju supports the ALJ’s conclusion that if he wears corrective glasses, Plaintiff may 8 work in positions that do not require binocular vision. 9 The ALJ also considered vision findings from Drs. Evans and Kebo, which he gave 10 “significant weight.” (Doc. 15-2 at 30.) The ALJ noted that in February 2016, Drs. Evans determined 11 Plaintiff’s uncorrected distance visual acuity was 20/150 uncorrected and 20/50 with correction. (Id., 12 citing Exh. 6E, p. 2 [id. at 231].) The ALJ also observed that the same month, Dr. Kebo found 13 Plaintiff’s “right eye vision was 20/80 without correction and 20/50 with correction” in the right eye. 14 (Id., citing Exh. 8E, p. 3 [id. at 243].) Further, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s “corrected visual acuity 15 was 20/50 in October and 20/40 in November [2017].” (Id., citing Exh. 6F, pp. 4, 6 [id. at 301, 303].) 16 These opinions related to Plaintiff’s vision from his optometrists were based upon independent 17 examinations, and they may constitute substantial evidence supporting the decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 18 404.1527; Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining the opinion of a treating 19 physician will be given “controlling weight” where supported by clinical findings and examinations). 20 Importantly, however, the physicians did not offer any findings related to Plaintiff’s functional 21 limitations—if any—with either the uncorrected vision or corrected vision levels. 22 Finally, the ALJ indicated he gave “some weight” to the opinions of the State Agency 23 physicians, Drs. Frye and Christian, who reviewed the available record at the initial and 24 reconsideration levels and concluded Plaintiff could perform medium work with vision limitations. 25 (Doc. 15-2 at 31, citing Exh. 1A, pp. 7-8, Exh. 3A, pp. 7-8 [id. at 76-77, 87-88]; see also id. at 79, 86.) 26 Notably, however, Drs. Frye and Christian both cited the visual acuity of 20/15 in support of their 27 findings related to Plaintiff’s visual limitations. (Id. at 76-77, 87-88.) It does not appear that either 28 physician reviewed records that reflected Plaintiff’s worsening vision, such as the findings of 20/80 1 and 20/150 uncorrected vision. Likewise, neither physician reviewed records that indicated Plaintiff’s 2 corrected vision had worsened to 20/40 and 20/50 in 2017. Indeed, the ALJ acknowledged his belief 3 that “the overall record supports additional restrictions” from those identified by Drs. Frye and 4 Christian. (See id. at 31.) 5 The ALJ must have rendered his own medical conclusions to determine Plaintiff could perform 6 work if he wore a corrected lens for his right eye, because no physician reviewed the visual findings 7 from the examinations in 2016 and 2017. However, it is well-settled law that an ALJ may not do so 8 and is not empowered to independently assess clinical findings. See, e.g., Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 9 1094, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding an ALJ erred in rendering his own medical opinion); Banks v. 10 Barnhart, 434 F. Supp. 2d 800, 805 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“An ALJ cannot arbitrarily substitute his own 11 judgment for competent medical opinion, and he must not succumb to the temptation to play doctor 12 and make his own independent medical findings); Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999) 13 (as a lay person, the ALJ is “simply not qualified to interpret raw medical data in functional terms”). 14 Because no physician addressed the worsening visual acuity or assessed visual functional limitations, 15 the Court is unable to find the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical record was proper. Thus, the visual 16 RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence. See Perez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2018 17 WL 721399 at *7-8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2018) (finding an RFC lacked the support of substantial 18 evidence without the support of a physician’s opinion); Perez v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 958 19 F.2d 445, 446 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding “the ALJ’s conclusions are not supported by substantial 20 evidence” when an RFC is formulated without the findings of a physician). 21 C. Remand is Appropriate 22 The decision whether to remand a matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) or to 23 order immediate payment of benefits is within the discretion of the district court. Harman v. Apfel, 24 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). Except in rare instances, when a court reverses an administrative 25 agency determination, the proper course is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or 26 explanation. Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 27 12, 16 (2002)). Generally, an award of benefits is directed when: 28 (1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting such evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of 1 disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited. 2

3 Smolen v, 80 F.3d at 1292. In addition, an award of benefits is directed where no useful purpose would 4 be served by further administrative proceedings, or where the record is fully developed. Varney v. 5 Sec’y of Health & Human Serv., 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1988). 6 The RFC articulated by the ALJ lacks the support of substantial evidence in the record, and the 7 matter should be remanded for further consideration. See Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1102-03 (remanding the 8 matter to the Social Security Administration for reconsideration after finding the ALJ erred by offering 9 conclusions not supported by any medical evidence); Perez, 958 F.2d at 446 (finding that where the 10 ALJ offered an opinion the support of an “assessment of residual functional capacity by a physician, ... 11 it is necessary to remand for the taking of further functional evidence”). 12 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 13 For the reasons set for above, the Court finds the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical record 14 related to Plaintiff’s visual acuity and limitations, and the ALJ’s decision cannot be upheld. See 15 Sanchez, 812 F.2d at 510. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS: 16 1. Plaintiff’s appeal of the ALJ’s decision (Doc. 25) is GRANTED; 17 2. The Commissioner’s request that the administrative decision be affirmed (Doc. 27) is 18 DENIED; 19 3. The matter is REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further 20 proceedings consistent with this decision; and 21 4. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff Anthony 22 Caglia and against Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security. 23 24 IT IS SO ORDERED.

25 Dated: October 4, 2021 _ /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 26 CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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