Squier v. Commissioner

Board of Tax Appeals

Squier v. Commissioner

26 B.T.A. 1407, 1932 BTA LEXIS 1146

CourtUnited States Board of Tax Appeals

DecidedOctober 31, 1932

DocketDocket No. 39529.

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 26 B.T.A. 1407 (Squier v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Squier v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 1407, 1932 BTA LEXIS 1146 (bta 1932).

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Opinion

[1409]*1409OPINION.

Steenhagen:

The petitioners have in effect stipulated, and unequivocally adopt as a premise for their argument, the fact that the death of decedent was the occasion of worthlessness of the shares and the debts. They assert that if the decedent had attempted to establish a fiscal period ending prior to his death and to take these deductions on the return for such period, he would have failed because the worthlessness could not have been demonstrated. Cf. Patrick J. Shouvlin, 3 B. T. A. 499; Henry W. Cushman, 13 B. T. A. 41; Simon Sherman, 18 B. T. A. 969; J. Harvey Ladew, 22 B. T. A. 443. The respondent agrees with this both in the stipulation and his argument. Upon such an uncontested factual basis there seems to be no room for doubt that the worthlessness did not occur until after the decedent’s death, and hence whatever deductions there may be in respect thereof are assignable to the later period of the estate and not to the period of the individual before his death. This is the only period which we are permitted in this proceeding to consider. For such period, therefore, the respondent’s determination must be sustained.

Judgment will be entered under Rule 50.

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[1409]*1409OPINION.

Steenhagen:

The petitioners have in effect stipulated, and unequivocally adopt as a premise for their argument, the fact that the death of decedent was the occasion of worthlessness of the shares and the debts. They assert that if the decedent had attempted to establish a fiscal period ending prior to his death and to take these deductions on the return for such period, he would have failed because the worthlessness could not have been demonstrated. Cf. Patrick J. Shouvlin, 3 B. T. A. 499; Henry W. Cushman, 13 B. T. A. 41; Simon Sherman, 18 B. T. A. 969; J. Harvey Ladew, 22 B. T. A. 443. The respondent agrees with this both in the stipulation and his argument. Upon such an uncontested factual basis there seems to be no room for doubt that the worthlessness did not occur until after the decedent’s death, and hence whatever deductions there may be in respect thereof are assignable to the later period of the estate and not to the period of the individual before his death. This is the only period which we are permitted in this proceeding to consider. For such period, therefore, the respondent’s determination must be sustained.

Judgment will be entered under Rule 50.

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Bluebook (online)

26 B.T.A. 1407, 1932 BTA LEXIS 1146, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/squier-v-commissioner-bta-1932.

Opinion

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