Spurgeon v. Iowa & Missouri Granite Works

196 Iowa 1268
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedJune 22, 1923
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 196 Iowa 1268 (Spurgeon v. Iowa & Missouri Granite Works) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Spurgeon v. Iowa & Missouri Granite Works, 196 Iowa 1268 (iowa 1923).

Opinions

De Graff, J.

[1269]*12691. MAST~1t A~Th SmOVANT: Workmen's Ooinpensation Act: compensation for permanent partial disability. [1268]*1268The appellee-claimant was employed by the Iowa & Missouri Granite Works and received an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The injury occurred [1269]*1269March. 4, 1921. On April 16, 1921 the appellee and his employer entered into an agreement for settlement as authorized by the Iowa Workmen’s Compensation Statute. The written memorandum was • duly signed by the parties and filed with and approved by the state industrial commission. The agreement states that the injury arose out of and in the course of the appellee’s employment, and that the amount of compensation agreed upon is $15 per week “during the period allowed by law,” and acknowledged receipt of the first installment for one week to March 26, 1921.

Subsequently to the execution of this writing the insurer paid the claimant ten weekly installments of $15 each, and on May 19, 1921 tendered him the further sum of $22.50 “in full of all further liability ’ ’ which tender plaintiff refused to accept and thereupon the employer and the insurer refused to make further payment.

On February 14, 1921 the appellants offered-to pay appellee compensation at the rate of $15 for 33% weeks less the sum of $150 previously paid. This offer was also refused by the claimant. On October 14, 1921 plaintiff filed with Hon. A. B. Funk, industrial commissioner, an application setting forth the facts above recited and alleged that the injury for which he was entitled to compensation resulted in a breaking of his arm in three places whereby he suffered a permanent partial disability reducing or. destroying his earning capacity in the same degree as though he had lost the arm. On this basis the plaintiff claimed a recovery at $15 per1 week for the full period of 225 weeks under the provisions of Section 2477-m9 (j) (19), Code Supplement, 1913, and 2477-m9 (j) (13), as amended by Chapter 220 of the Acts of the Thirty-eighth General Assembly. He further prays a determination of the fact whether his injury is temporary or permanent, but does not question the agreed compensation in the sum of $15 per week.

To this application the defendants appeared, admitted making the memorandum of settlement, but deny that plaintiff sustained an injury “partial or total in character and permanent in quality,” on the date named or any injury which incapaci[1270]*1270tated liim from earning wages beyond May 14, 1921 or from earning full wages beyond June 4, 1921.

Plaintiff then filed a reply which in substance is a restatement of the matters recited in his application. By stipulation of the parties the questions so put in issue were tried before the industrial commissioner acting through his deputy. The evidence introduced tended to support the opinion of the medical experts that the injured arm shows a permanent partial disability from 25 to 40 per cent. This testimony was given about one year after the injury. The opinion of the surgeon who made an examination of the plaintiff at the request of the insurer on August 8', 1921 is that “the ultimate disability to the arm should not exceed 15 per cent.” Upon a second examination in February 1922 this doctor “found very little change since” the one previously made. He concludes with the statement: “In my opinion the man should have been at work before this time and the permanent disability sustained by Mr. Spurgeon does not exceed 15 per cent of the full function of the arm.”

We deem it unnecessary to detail in technical terms the character of the injury as testified by the medical men on the hearing before the commission. It appears without dispute that at the time of the injury the claimant had been and was then in the employment of the Granite Works at a weekly wage of $30. His employer testified in reference to the plaintiff’s physical condition: “I think Mr. Spurgeon would be worth as much to me in his present condition as he was before the injury. I would pay him the same salary. If I had employment for Mr. Spurgeon, I would be willing to pay him the same wages as I am paying other hands for the same work. I think, after he was injured, I told him to come down, and he could grind tools. I would give him $20 a week for grinding tools. ’ ’

Upon the showing made the deputy commissioner found and determined that the use of plaintiff’s arm had been permanently impaired as the result of said injury to the extent of 25 per cent and ordered that the compensation therefor be fixed at $15 per week for a period of 56% weeks beginning at the date of the injury and subject to credit for payments made subsequently to the injury. From this decision or rather from that part thereof which limits the time for which compensation is allowed; [1271]*1271to wit, 5614 weeks, the plaintiff appealed to the district court. On the submission of the appeal the order of the commissioner was affirmed in so far as it found the plaintiff’s injury to be a permanent impairment of the use of his arm to the extent of 25 per cent, but modified the order as to the time to be covered by the compensation and fixed the period at 225 weeks. From this decision the defendants have appealed.

2. Master and servant : Workmen’s Compensation Act: finding of fact. We have to consider*, therefore, whether the claimant is entitled to the full period of compensation of 225 weeks. No other question is involved. In determining this question it will be remembered that the parties hereto executed a memorandum of settlement fixing the amount of compensation at $15 per week, but due to the fact that at that time the injury was of recent origin, and the period of disability uncertain and undetermined, it was provided in the agreement that the payment should be continued “• during* the period provided by law.” This period would necessarily be determined by the character of the injury and necessarily depended upon the fact whether the 'disability was temporary or permanent, total or partial- This was the question left open by the parties and it was the primary question submitted to the industrial commission. This question of fact having been determined under a conflict of testimony by the commissioner there remains but one question or conclusion of law on this appeal.

What is the statutory period provided for compensation for the injury of the character determined by the commissioner ?

The Iowa Workmen’s Compensation Law is intended to furnish relief to those who are the unfortunate victims of industrial injuries, and such relief is granted when such injury destroys or impairs the capacity to earn wages. The extent of the relief is based on two factors: (a) the average earnings in wages (b) the character of the disability occasioned by the injury. The first factor is constant with a minimum and maximum limit. The second factor depends entirely on the character of the injury and the effect produced on the earning capacity. The law contains a schedule in accordance with which compensation shall be paid. This schedule embraces as far as practicable all injuries which may be suffered, and fixes for certain specified injuries [1272]*1272the periods during which the weekly compensation benefits or payments are to become due to the beneficiaries.

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Bluebook (online)
196 Iowa 1268, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/spurgeon-v-iowa-missouri-granite-works-iowa-1923.