Springsteen v. Denver Cnty Assessor

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 13, 2025
• Docket: 24CA1803
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA1803 Springsteen v Denver Cnty Assessor 11-13-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1803 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV33609 Honorable David H. Goldberg, Judge

Robert C. Springsteen and Mary Elisa Springsteen,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Denver County Assessor Keith Erffmeyer, and City and County of Denver Board of Equalization,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Pawar and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 13, 2025

Springsteen Law Firm LLC, Anita M. Springsteen, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Miko Brown, City Attorney, Michele A. Horn, Assistant City Attorney, Charles T. Solomon, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants- Appellees ¶1 Plaintiffs, Robert Springsteen and Mary Springsteen, appeal

the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of

defendants, the Denver County Assessor, Keith Erffmeyer, and the

City and County of Denver Board of Equalization. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 This case concerns a 2023 tax valuation of a residential

fourplex located in Denver, Colorado, conducted by the City and

County of Denver Assessor’s Office (Assessor’s Office). The

undisputed facts show that in May 2023, the Springsteens received

a “Notice of Valuation” for their property from the Assessor’s Office

that assigned their residential property an actual value of

$1,636,400 for the 2023 tax year (valuation 1). The Assessor

Office’s computer-generated valuation attributed $1,007,500 to the

land and $628,900 to improvements made to the land.

¶3 The Springsteens filed a written objection with the Assessor’s

Office challenging the value assigned to their property. They

contended that the actual value of their property was $374,500,

based their valuation on the average land values of the comparables

provided by the Assessor’s Office, plus a de minimus improvement

value.

1 ¶4 After receiving the Springsteens’ objection, the Assessor’s

Office reviewed the Notice of Valuation and determined that, while

the land value was appropriate, the improvements to the land were

overvalued because it had previously determined that the

improvements had outlived their functional lifespan. The

Assessor’s Office reduced the valuation and assigned the

improvements a de minimis value of $1,000, resulting in a total

actual value of $1,008,500 (valuation 2).

¶5 The Springsteens disagreed with valuation 2 and appealed the

valuation to the Denver County Board of Equalization (Board). The

Board held a hearing to determine whether the Assessor’s Office

erred in its valuation. In preparation for the hearing, Erffmeyer

reviewed the sales of comparable properties within the

Springsteens’ neighborhood and determined that their second

valuation of $1,008,500 was appropriate. At the October 2023

Board hearing, both parties presented their valuations. The hearing

officer determined that the Assessor’s Office was correct in its

valuation and denied the Springsteens’ petition.

¶6 The Springsteens then filed a “Petition to Appeal Property

Valuation Assessment Pursuant to Section 39-8-108, C.R.S.” 2025,

2 in the district court. The Springsteens alleged, among other things,

that the Assessor’s Office’s valuation was too high and should be

reduced due to the property’s unusual conditions, as allowed under

section 39-1-104, C.R.S. 2025. Specifically, they cited new

regulations, new zoning, and city policy changes within the past five

years that negatively affected the property’s value.

¶7 After the Springsteens filed their petition in district court, the

Assessor’s Office assigned a certified general appraiser from its

office to conduct an independent site-specific appraisal of the

property. Following Colorado law, the appraiser employed the

market approach to appraise the Springsteens’ property, using

comparable properties with similar zoning to the Springsteens’

property and located within one mile of the property. The appraiser

determined that the actual value of the property for the 2023 tax

year was $1,180,000 (valuation 3).

¶8 In February 2024, defendants filed a motion to partially

dismiss the petition, arguing that the unusual conditions statute

applied only biennially and was inapplicable to the Springsteens’

alleged unusual conditions. After receiving the Springsteens’

response, the district court granted the motion, agreeing that the

3 unusual conditions statute did not apply for the 2023 property tax

year. See § 39-1-104(11)(b)(I).

¶9 Defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment on the

only remaining claim — the property’s assessed value. The

Springsteens filed a response to the motion that focused on their

due process right to a de novo trial and challenged the

independence and credibility of the Assessor’s Office’s certified

appraiser. They also argued that defendants’ varying valuations

submitted during different stages of the proceedings were

unsupported by the record, done in bad faith, and contrary to

public policy allowing the elderly to age in place. The Springsteens

did not attach any supporting documents in their response, instead

relying on the handwritten valuation Mr. Springsteen provided in

defendants’ Exhibit 4 to the motion for summary judgment.

¶ 10 The district court found no genuine issue of material fact,

reasoning that the Springsteens offered no additional evidence

challenging the certified assessor’s independence or the validity of

the property valuations. The court also reasoned that “[m]erely

disagreeing with [defendants’ valuation] d[id] not create a material

4 issue of fact.” Consequently, the court found no genuine issue of

material fact and granted summary judgment.

II. Summary Judgment

¶ 11 The Springsteens contend the district court erroneously

granted summary judgment despite the existence of a genuine issue

of material fact. Specifically, they argue that section 39-8-108(1)

guarantees them a de novo trial, and the court’s order denied them

their due process right to such a trial. They further argue that the

record contains three separate valuations, creating a genuine issue

of material fact concerning which value the statutory presumption

should apply to. We address and reject each contention.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 12 We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary

judgment. Westin Operator, LLC v. Groh, 2015 CO 25, ¶ 19.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and

supporting documents demonstrate there is “no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” C.R.C.P. 56(c); see Nat. Energy Res.

Co. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 142 P.3d

1265, 1276 (Colo. 2006). A material fact is one that affects the

5 outcome of the case. Han Ye Lee v. Colo. Times, Inc., 222 P.3d 957,

960 (Colo. App. 2009). “In determining the existence of an issue of

material fact, a court must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.

¶ 13 “The moving party bears the initial burden of showing no

genuine issue of material fact exists; the burden then shifts to the

nonmoving party to establish a triable issue of fact.” Groh, ¶ 20. A

party against whom summary judgment is sought is entitled to the

benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the facts.

Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Colo. v. Sharp, 741 P.2d 714, 718

(Colo. 1987).

¶ 14 While a nonmoving party is not required to file responsive

affidavits or evidence, see C.R.C.P. 56(e), their decision not to do so

does not relieve the moving party of its burden to establish that

summary judgment is appropriate. Ellerman v. Kite, 625 P.2d 1006,

1010 (Colo. 1981). However, as relevant here, C.R.C.P. 56(e)

requires that all papers supporting or opposing summary judgment

must be “[s]worn or certified.” Therefore, “[a] district court must

disregard documents referred to in a motion for summary judgment

that are not sworn or certified.” Cody Park Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v.

6 Harder, 251 P.3d 1, 4 (Colo. App. 2009). This includes expert

reports. See McDaniels v. Laub, 186 P.3d 86, 87 (Colo. App. 2008)

(“Unsworn expert witness reports are not admissible to support or

oppose a motion for summary judgment.”). Summary judgment is a

“drastic” remedy and may be granted only when there is a “clear

showing that the controlling standards have been met.” Groh, ¶ 21

(citation omitted).

¶ 15 All taxable real property located in Colorado must be “listed,

appraised, and valued for assessment.” § 39-1-105, C.R.S. 2025;

see Colo. Const. art. X, § 3(1)(a). Taxable real property includes all

property that is not expressly exempted by law from taxation. § 39-

1-102(16), C.R.S. 2025. The county assessor is charged with

conducting this assessment. § 39-1-103(5)(a), C.R.S. 2025; see

Colo. Const. art. X, § 3(1)(a); Gilpin Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v.

Russell, 941 P.2d 257, 261 (Colo. 1997). The assessor uses the

taxation scheme outlined in title 39 of the Colorado Revised

Statutes, in addition to the appraisal procedures and instructions

published in the Assessors’ Reference Library, to ensure the fair

and uniform taxation of all taxable real property in Colorado. See

El Paso Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Craddock, 850 P.2d 702, 704

7 (Colo. 1993); Colo. Const. art. X, § 3(1)(a); § 39-1-101.5, C.R.S.

2025. See generally 3 Div. of Prop. Tax’n, Dep’t of Loc. Affs.,

Assessors’ Reference Library (rev. Dec. 2024). The assessment

occurs in two phases: (1) valuation and (2) classification. In the

valuation phase, the assessor calculates the actual value of the

property. See § 39-1-103(5)(a). This calculation is guided by three

theories of appraisal — the cost, market, and income approaches —

that are designed to estimate the actual value of the property. Id.;

Xerox Corp. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 87 P.3d 189, 191 (Colo. App.

2003) (market value is synonymous with actual value). In the

classification phase, “[t]he actual value of residential real-property

shall be determined solely by consideration of the market approach

to appraisal.” § 39–1–103(5)(a). The market approach (also known

as the sales comparison approach) involves an analysis of sales of

comparable properties in the market. Bd. of Assessment Appeals v.

E.E. Sonnenberg & Sons, Inc., 797 P.2d 27, 30 nn.8-9, 31 n.12

(Colo. 1990).

B. No Due Process Violation

¶ 16 We begin with the Springsteens’ due process argument that

permitting courts to enter summary judgment orders without

8 holding a de novo trial renders section 39-8-108(1) meaningless,

because if they are correct, we must remand for a de novo trial. See

§ 39-8-108(1).

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 17 The district court’s determination regarding the scope of the

trial authorized by section 39-8-108(1), involves a question of

statutory interpretation that we review de novo. Jefferson Cnty. Bd.

of Equalization v. Gerganoff, 241 P.3d 932, 935 (Colo. 2010); see

also Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 CO 13M, ¶ 21.

¶ 18 “In construing a statute, we aim to effectuate the legislature’s

intent.” Elder, ¶ 21. We therefore “consider the entire statutory

scheme to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of

its parts, and we construe words and phrases in accordance with

their plain and ordinary meanings.” Id. (quoting Ryser v. Shelter

Mut. Ins. Co., 2021 CO 11, ¶ 14). And we avoid statutory

interpretations that lead to an absurd or illogical result. Tucker v.

Volunteers of Am. Colo. Branch, 211 P.3d 708, 711 (Colo. App.

2008), aff’d sub nom., Volunteers of Am. Colo. Branch v.

Gardenswartz, 242 P.3d 1080 (Colo. 2010).

9 ¶ 19 Article X, section 3, of the Colorado Constitution establishes a

framework for the uniform taxation of real and personal property.

Douglas County Bd. of Equalization v. Fid. Castle Pines, Ltd., 890

P.2d 119, 122 (Colo. 1995). The determination of the actual value

of property is the essential component of that framework. Id.; see

Craddock, 850 P.2d at 704.

¶ 20 Section 39-8-108(1) permits a taxpayer to “appeal the

valuation set by the assessor,” or the “adjusted valuation” if the

county board of equalization makes an adjustment. The statute

provides the taxpayer three options to appeal a valuation: (1) appeal

to the board of assessment appeals; (2) appeal to the district court

for a “trial de novo”; or (3) submit the case to arbitration under

section 39-8-108.5, C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 21 In a trial de novo under section 39-8-108(1), the taxpayer

bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence

that the assessor’s valuation is incorrect. Arapahoe Cnty. Bd. of

Equalization v. Podoll, 935 P.2d 14, 18 (Colo. 1997). “A trial de novo

is commonly understood as a trial anew of the entire controversy,

including the hearing of evidence as though no previous action had

been taken.” Turner v. Rossmiller, 532 P.2d 751, 754 (Colo. App.

10 1975); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 548 (12th ed. 2024) (defining

“de novo” as “[a]new”). This is consistent with the meaning of “trial

de novo” in section 39-8-108(1) as interpreted by a division of this

court in Arapahoe Partnership v. Board of County Commissioners,

813 P.2d 766, 768 (Colo. App. 1990). There, the division explained

that the district court trial “lose[s] its character as a review” of a

lower proceeding and instead becomes “an original proceeding, with

the reviewing court making an entirely independent determination.”

Id.

2. Analysis

¶ 22 We discern no error in the court’s consideration of defendants’

motion for summary judgment. Although the appeal statute allows

for a trial de novo in the district court, nothing in its plain language

requires that a trial occur in every case. See § 39-8-108(1). The

General Assembly was aware of C.R.C.P. 56 when it enacted the

statute and could have expressly barred summary judgment in tax

assessment appeals. See People in Interest of O.C., 2012 COA 161,

¶ 27 (“The General Assembly is presumed to be aware of existing

law when it enacts legislation.” (citing Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d

322, 327 (Colo. 2004)), aff’d, 2013 CO 56. The fact that it did not is

11 evidence of its intent to treat this civil trial like all other civil cases

and to apply the rules of civil procedure, which provide for the

resolution of cases by summary judgment. See Gates Rubber Co. v.

State Bd. of Equalization, 770 P.2d 1189, 1195 (Colo. 1989)

(“[B]ecause the 1902 General Assembly created distinct procedures

for appealing tax assessment errors, ‘it could not have been the

intent of the Legislature to provide two methods of procedure for the

same wrong, growing out of the same facts’” (citation omitted)). The

Springsteens provided no authority, nor are we aware of any, that

precludes summary judgment in a section 39-8-108(1) appeal.

Accordingly, we reject their argument.

3. No Issue of Material Fact

¶ 23 Next, we determine whether any genuine issue of material fact

exists. Upon our de novo review of the record, we note that only

one document attached to the motion for summary judgment

satisfies the “sworn or certified” requirement of C.R.C.P. 56 — the

sworn declaration of Joshua Bushner, a licensed real property

appraiser and the Commercial Assessment Manager for the

Department of Finance in the Assessor’s Office. The declaration

sets forth the facts and procedural posture of the case and endorses

12 valuation 2. The other exhibits attached to the summary judgment

motion included the varying comparables used in valuations 1 and

2, the Springsteens’ land value calculation, and the certified

appraiser’s report endorsing valuation 3 (highest and best use).

But none of these documents are sworn or certified and, as a result,

cannot be considered in determining whether a genuine issue of

material fact exists. See Harder, 251 P.3d at 4.

¶ 24 The Springsteens agree that they did not submit any

documents with their response to summary judgment and

confirmed at oral argument that they relied on defendants’

attachments to the summary judgment motion, including the

different comparables and valuations, to support the existence of a

material issue of fact. A nonmoving party who provides no

affidavits or other attachments does so at their peril. See Ellerman,

625 P.2d at 1010; Jules v. Embassy Props., Inc., 905 P.2d 13, 15

(Colo. App. 1995) (“Although it may be risky for a party not to

respond, the absence of a response does not affect the burden of the

party moving for summary judgment to demonstrate that it is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). Here, because C.R.C.P.

56(e) precludes us from considering the unsworn comparables and

13 valuations, we conclude that the only evidence properly before us

for consideration is the sworn declaration. That declaration

endorses valuation 2 as the correct valuation of the property, and

therefore, it is the valuation that is presumed to be correct for

taxation purposes. See Podoll, 935 P.2d at 18. Absent any other

sworn or certified document in the record endorsing a different

valuation, we must affirm the court’s order granting defendants

summary judgment.

III. Disposition

¶ 25 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE YUN concur.