2013 IL App (2d) 120861 Nos. 2-12-0861 & 2-12-1072 cons. Opinion filed September 25, 2013 ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
CHRISTOPHER SPRINGBORN, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Kane County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 12-MR-73 ) THE VILLAGE OF SUGAR GROVE, ) ) Defendant-Appellant ) ) (Brent Eichelberger, Individually and in His ) Honorable Official Capacity as Village Administrator, ) Thomas E. Mueller, Defendant). ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JOSEPH CECALA, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Kane County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 11-CH-3712 ) THE VILLAGE OF CARPENTERSVILLE, ) ) Defendant-Appellant ) ) Honorable (Mark Rooney and Linda Morgren, ) Thomas E. Mueller, Defendants). ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Burke and Justice McLaren concurred in the judgment and opinion. 2013 IL App (2d) 120861
OPINION
¶1 In these consolidated appeals, the Village of Sugar Grove and the Village of Carpentersville
challenge awards of benefits under section 10 of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (Act) (820
ILCS 320/10 (West 2012)). For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 A. General Background
¶4 Plaintiffs, Christopher Springborn and Joseph Cecala, were police officers with, respectively,
Sugar Grove and Carpentersville. In separate instances, they were injured while clearing roadway
obstructions in the course of their duties. Plaintiffs petitioned their respective employers for
insurance benefits under section 10 of the Act, which provides in relevant part:
“(a) An employer who employs a full-time law enforcement, correctional or
correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who, on or after the effective date of this Act
suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium of the
employer’s health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured employee’s spouse, and
for each dependent child of the injured employee ***.
***
(b) In order for the law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer,
firefighter, spouse, or dependent children to be eligible for insurance coverage under this Act,
the injury or death must have occurred as the result of the officer’s response to fresh pursuit,
the officer or firefighter’s response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency, an
unlawful act perpetrated by another, or during the investigation of a criminal act. Nothing in
this Section shall be construed to limit health insurance coverage or pension benefits for
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which the officer, firefighter, spouse, or dependent children may otherwise be eligible.” 820
ILCS 320/10(a), (b) (West 2012).
The municipalities declined the requests for benefits. Each plaintiff then brought a complaint in the
trial court for a declaratory judgment that he was entitled to the benefits. Each alleged that he cleared
the roadway obstructions in response to what he reasonably believed was an emergency. Springborn
additionally alleged that his injury resulted from “an unlawful act perpetrated by another” (820 ILCS
320/10(b) (West 2012)). Cecala made no allegation of an unlawful act by another.
¶5 In both cases, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In the sections that
follow, we recount the subsequent proceedings in each case.
¶6 B. Background in No. 2-12-0861—Springborn
¶7 Attached to the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment were Springborn’s discovery
deposition and his testimony from two appearances before the Board of Trustees for the Police
Pension Fund of Sugar Grove. From these sources we compile the following account, noting any
significant disparities between the deposition testimony and the hearing testimony.
¶8 Springborn was on patrol on August 27, 2009, when, at 9:30 or 10 a.m., he received a dispatch
that an off-duty police officer was attempting to stop a Meyer Paving truck on Route 47 between Bliss
Road and Kedeka Road. Responding to the dispatch, Springborn proceeded north on Route 47. In
the area of Route 47 and Kedeka Road, Springborn came across chunks of asphalt on Route 47. That
section of Route 47 has two southbound lanes and two northbound lanes. The asphalt chunks covered
the “whole [inside, or west, northbound] lane.” There was a lesser quantity of chunks in the outside,
or east, northbound lane. There were 10 to 15 chunks in all, each weighing “between 20 and 40
pounds.” In his deposition testimony, Springborn stated that the chunks “ranged in size from about
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the size of a softball to about the size of—little bigger than a piece of paper, about three inches thick.”
In his hearing testimony, Springborn described the size of the chunks as “a foot and a half to two feet
long by *** anywhere from three to six inches thick.”
¶9 Springborn testified that Route 47 is “a major highway” in Kane County, with “heavy traffic,”
and that it was “rush hour” when he encountered the asphalt. The speed limit for that section of
Route 47 was 45 or 55 miles per hour. Springborn stated that, upon spotting the asphalt, he asked the
public works department in Sugar Grove for assistance in removing the asphalt. The department
replied that the Illinois Department of Transportation had responsibility for clearing Route 47.
Believing that the asphalt chunks presented an “emergency” and an “immediate safety hazard,”
Springborn activated his emergency lights and parked his squad car in the west northbound lane,
where the majority of the asphalt chunks were located. He then removed the asphalt chunks by hand,
tossing them onto the shoulder or the median. Springborn believed that the police department’s
“police and procedure manual” required officers to remove roadway debris that might endanger
motorists. Springborn suffered no injury or discomfort in removing these pieces of asphalt.
¶ 10 Springborn testified that, as he continued driving on Route 47, he encountered a second mass
of asphalt chunks. In his deposition testimony, Springborn stated that the “numbers were about the
same” as the first debris field but that “there were a few bigger pieces.” In his hearing testimony,
however, Springborn described the second debris field as “much larger” than the first debris field and
opined that it presented an “even greater hazard” than the first because it was “actually protruding into
both lanes.” Most of the pieces, however, were in the west northbound lane. According to
Springborn, the pieces in the second field “ranged in size from softball size to two to three feet
[wide], anywhere from three to six inches thick.” As with the first field, Springborn activated his
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emergency lights and parked behind the pieces in the west northbound lane. Observing that some of
the chunks in the west lane were too large for him to lift, Springborn notified the dispatcher that he
would need assistance. Springborn proceeded to clear the east lane without incident. While clearing
the west lane, however, he slipped and injured his back. Springborn was alone at the scene when he
was injured.
¶ 11 Springborn noted that the driver of the asphalt truck was charged with violating a state statute
by spilling a load.
¶ 12 The trial court granted Springborn’s summary judgment motion and denied Sugar Grove’s
motion. The court provided no rationale for its decision. Sugar Grove filed this timely appeal.
¶ 13 C. Background in No. 2-12-1072—Cecala
¶ 14 The parties filed with their summary judgment motions the discovery deposition of Cecala
and the affidavits of Scott Adams and Michael Kilbourne, both of whom were commanders in the
Carpentersville police department on the evening that Cecala was injured.
¶ 15 Cecala testified that he was on patrol on December 29, 2008, when, at 9 p.m., he was
dispatched to investigate a traffic accident and a possible case of driving under the influence at the
intersection of Route 31 and Spruce Drive in Carpentersville. Cecala believed that the dispatcher
might also have mentioned that a person was injured. Cecala considered the situation an “emergency”
and headed to the scene with his emergency lights and siren activated. Cecala explained that, at their
intersection, Route 31 runs north-south and Spruce east-west. The intersection is controlled in all
four directions by traffic signals. Route 31 and Spruce each have two lanes for straight traffic.
Additionally, southbound Route 31 has west and east turn lanes onto Spruce. The west southbound
turn lane on Route 31, located at the northwest corner of the intersection, is separated from the
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straight lanes by a concrete triangle, on which, normally, a traffic signal stands. On this occasion,
however, Cecala arrived to find the traffic signal felled and lying on Route 31. Cecala also observed
a truck against a tree at the southeast corner of the intersection. Cecala surmised that the truck had
struck the signal pole and proceeded to strike the tree. Cecala estimated that the signal pole was 10
to 15 feet long. The pole was lying across the entire west southbound straight lane of Route 31.
Cecala could not recall whether or how much the pole was protruding into Route 31’s east
southbound straight lane. Cecala did recall, however, that it was “still possible for vehicles traveling
southbound on [Route] 31 to go through the intersection of Spruce.” Cecala also noted that the east
southbound turn lane on Route 31 would have aided vehicles in driving around the pole if indeed it
was protruding into the east straight lane. When he arrived at the scene, Cecala was concerned not
only because the pole posed a roadway obstacle, but also because its wires, which had been pulled
out of the ground, were still live. Cecala described Route 31 as a “major thoroughfare” and a “pretty
busy street all the time.”
¶ 16 Cecala stated that he parked his squad car behind the signal pole in the west southbound
straight lane of Route 31. His purpose was to position his squad car as a barrier between the pole and
the southbound traffic. In addition to his squad car’s emergency lights, Cecala activated its
directional lights to signal traffic to veer left (or east). As in all situations involving roadway
obstructions, Cecala’s “most important” task upon arriving at the scene was to prevent motorists from
hitting the obstruction. There were several other police officers present (Cecala could not recall the
order in which he and the others arrived). Cecala “knew that the pole needed to be moved” and that
it needed to be done “immediately.” His squad car, though blocking the downed signal, was itself
a “hazard” because “it’s very dangerous for a police officer to be in the roadway even with the lights
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on.” Cecala “kn[ew] that squad cars get rear-ended with their lights on,” and he had seen “people get
hit while squad cars are there.” Cecala had “always [been] instructed to remove yourself from that
situation as soon as you can[,] which would mean you would have to eliminate [the hazard].” Thus,
even with his squad car blocking the pole, Cecala still deemed the situation an “emergency.”
¶ 17 Cecala testified that, in his 12 years as a police officer, he had responded to two or three prior
incidents involving downed traffic signals or telephone poles, and in each case police officers moved
them manually. Cecala had also responded to “hundreds” of instances of other objects obstructing
roadways, such as trees and dead deer. Cecala acknowledged that a pole need not be moved manually
by a police officer. Cecala also noted that a tow truck had been called to the scene. While Cecala
knew that a tow truck has the capacity to move a felled pole, he had never seen that done.
¶ 18 According to Cecala, he spoke with Sergeant O’Brien at the scene about “how we were going
to get [the pole] off the roadway.” He and O’Brien “were standing next to the pole discussing,
‘We’ve got to move this pole.’ ” They then manually moved the pole and laid it across the concrete
triangle from which it had fallen. Cecala estimated that the pole weighed 100 pounds. Once moved,
the pole was no longer obstructing Route 31, but now one-third of it was protruding into Spruce
Drive, and hence it was “still a problem.” While O’Brien turned to other business at the scene, Cecala
conferred with Officer Brown about the pole. They agreed that the pole needed to be moved again.
Asked if there was “any emergency situation at that moment that required [them] to move the pole
instead of waiting for somebody else to move it,” Cecala answered:
“Other than the fact that it still presented a hazard in its location, there is nothing else that
would prevent us from waiting for something, somebody else to come. Obviously[,] we could
have sat there and waited for someone else to come, but we chose to move it at that point.”
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¶ 19 Cecala and Brown decided to manually move the pole off the roadway and into a parking lot.
As they made the effort, Cecala was injured. Cecala did not recall ever being ordered to move the
pole. Cecala estimated that he was at the scene between 5 and 10 minutes altogether.
¶ 20 In his affidavit, Kilbourne stated that police department records reflected that two officers had
already been at the scene for about five minutes when Cecala arrived.
¶ 21 In his affidavit, Adams averred that Route 31 was “one of the busiest thoroughfares that runs
[sic] through the Village of Carpentersville.” According to Adams, “the blockage of traffic of any
type on Illinois Route 31 would require an emergency response on behalf of the [police department].”
Adams noted:
“[T]he traffic signals at the intersection of Illinois Route 31 and Spruce Drive, while heavy,
can be lifted and moved out of the roadway if they pose an obstruction, much as I did on
numerous occasions while employed by the Village of Carpentersville Police Department.
*** [I]f a downed traffic signal impeding traffic on Illinois Route 31 could not be
quickly moved by [the police department], an officer would be assigned to provide emergency
traffic direction, complete with a squad car with activated lights, until other village services
could respond to the scene to place lighted barricades and traffic direction signage. The
barricades and signage would remain in place until the traffic signal could be removed by
State of Illinois personnel.
*** [W]hen providing emergency traffic direction for an extended period of time, vital
resources are prevented from responding to other emergency situations.
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*** [Cecala] *** was acting in accordance with law enforcement custom and practices
with respect to his actions taken in regards to the downed traffic signal. [Cecala] was
responding to the emergency needs of the Village of Carpentersville and its citizenry.”
¶ 22 The trial court granted Cecala’s motion for summary judgment and denied Carpentersville’s
motion. The court stated no rationale for its decision. Carpentersville filed this timely appeal.
¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 24 Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West
2012). We review de novo the propriety of a trial court’s grant of summary judgment. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. v. Earth Foods, Inc., 238 Ill. 2d 455, 461 (2010). “When parties file cross-motions
for summary judgment, they agree that only a question of law is involved and invite the court to
decide the issues based on the record.” Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 28. “However, the mere
filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not establish that there is no issue of material fact,
nor does it obligate a court to render summary judgment.” Id. “A triable issue precluding summary
judgment exists where the material facts are disputed, or where, the material facts being undisputed,
reasonable persons might draw different inferences from the undisputed facts.” Adams v. Northern
Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2004). “The use of the summary judgment procedure is to be
encouraged as an aid in the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit.” Id. “However, it is a drastic means
of disposing of litigation and, therefore, should be allowed only when the right of the moving party
is clear and free from doubt.” Id.
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¶ 25 Sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Act impose two preconditions for the award of insurance
benefits to a law enforcement officer. Section 10(a) provides that such benefits are available only
where the officer “suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty.” 820 ILCS 320/10(a)
(West 2012). Section 10(b) further provides that “the injury or death must have occurred as the result
of the officer’s response to fresh pursuit, the officer[’s] *** response to what is reasonably believed
to be an emergency, an unlawful act perpetrated by another, or during the investigation of a criminal
act.” 820 ILCS 320/10(b) (West 2012). Carpentersville and Sugar Grove do not dispute in these
appeals that Springborn and Cecala suffered “catastrophic injuries.” They dispute only that
Springborn and Cecala met the requirements of section 10(b).
¶ 26 The most recent published decision on section 10(b) is Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of the
Orland Fire Protection District, 2012 IL 110012, where the supreme court considered consolidated
appeals of summary judgment rulings on claims for section 10 benefits brought by firefighters
Michael Gaffney and Brian Lemmenes. In neither case was it questioned that the firefighter was
catastrophically injured; the issue was whether the firefighter was injured “as a result of *** [his]
response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency” (820 ILCS 320/10(b) (West 2012)). The
court held that, under the undisputed facts, the “emergency” component was met in Gaffney’s case
but not in Lemmenes’. Id. ¶¶ 69, 79.
¶ 27 To reach these conclusions, the court first had to ascertain section 10(b)’s definition of
“emergency.” The court noted this district’s decision in DeRose v. City of Highland Park, 386 Ill.
App. 3d 658, 661 (2008), where, resorting to dictionary definitions, we held that an “emergency”
under section 10(b) means a situation that “is urgent and calls for immediate action.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Reviewing primary and secondary definitions of “emergency” from
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Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993), the court determined that our concept of
“emergency” lacked the necessary component of unforeseeability. We quote the court’s discussion
at length because one of the definitional illustrations provided by Webster’s, and relied upon by the
court as elucidating the concept of foreseeability, is exactly the factual situation presented in both of
the appeals at hand:
“The primary definition from Webster’s Third New International Dictionary states an
‘emergency’ is ‘an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls
for immediate action .’
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 741 (1993). As our appellate court has held,
an ‘emergency’ clearly requires an urgent and immediate response. The definition also
indicates, however, that the urgency or immediate action must result from an unforeseen
circumstance. The requirement of an unforeseen event is shown by the illustration stating,
‘they were far from help when the [emergency] overtook them.’
The other senses and illustrations also demonstrate that an unforeseen event is integral
to an ‘emergency.’ Those senses and illustrations provide: ‘a: a pressing need: EXIGENCY
b: a sudden bodily
alteration such as is likely to require immediate medical attention (as a ruptured appendix or
surgical shock) c: a usu. distressing event or condition that can often be anticipated or
prepared for but seldom exactly foreseen
down then><[emergency] docking facilities><[emergency]
crews working to clear the roads>.’ Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 741
(1993). While we agree with the appellate court that an ‘emergency’ includes an element of
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urgency and the need for immediate action, we also believe it involves an unforeseen
circumstance or event requiring that immediate action.
Further, section 10(b) covers situations arising in the performance of a public safety
employee’s job. The four factors from section 10(b) involve potentially dangerous situations
occurring in the course of employment. A firefighter’s employment includes responding to
situations involving imminent danger to a person or property. The term ‘emergency’ in
section 10(b), as applied to a firefighter, connotes the sense that either a person or property
is in some form of imminent danger.
We, therefore, conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term ‘emergency’
in section 10(b) is an unforeseen circumstance involving imminent danger to a person or
property requiring an urgent response. To be entitled to continuing health coverage benefits
under section 10(b), the injury must occur in response to what is reasonably believed to be an
unforeseen circumstance involving imminent danger to a person or property requiring an
urgent response.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶¶ 61-64.
Below, we return to the emphasized language. First, we recount the facts and reasoning in Gaffney’s
and Lemmenes’ cases.
¶ 28 Gaffney was injured during a training exercise involving an actual fire on the third floor of
a building. Gaffney wore full fire gear for the exercise, and his battalion chief instructed him to treat
the exercise as an actual emergency. As the crew was moving the fire hose between the second and
third floors, it became stuck. Due to smoke, there was no visibility. Gaffney followed the hose back
down to the second floor and discovered that it was hooked around a chair. In moving the chair,
Gaffney injured his shoulder. Id. ¶¶ 6-8.
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¶ 29 The supreme court held that Gaffney’s training exercise became an emergency when there
arose the unforeseen event of the hose becoming stuck. Id. ¶ 66. This event created imminent danger
and required an urgent response, as “the crew was stranded on the stairwell to the third floor of the
burning building with no visibility and no water to put out the fire.” Id. Moreover, when Gaffney
went to free the hose, he “put himself at risk of becoming lost and disoriented in the smoke-filled
building.” Id. ¶ 67. The court noted that Gaffney had no “option of ending his participation in the
exercise after it became an emergency.” Id.
¶ 30 In Lemmenses’ case, he, too, was injured during a training exercise. The exercise took place
at an abandoned factory. The firefighters were required to wear full fire gear. There was no actual
fire, but the firefighters’ masks were blackened in order to simulate live fire conditions, and they were
told to act as if there was an emergency. The firefighters were instructed that a fellow firefighter was
trapped inside the building, was running out of air, and would die if not found and rescued. The
firefighters were given specific instructions for the exercise, including a predetermined path for
running the fire hose into the building. Fire department supervisors testified that the individual acting
as the trapped firefighter was never in real danger during the exercise, which was performed under
“ ‘controlled conditions.’ ” Id. ¶¶ 21-24.
¶ 31 Lemmenes was injured when he attempted to free the trapped firefighter. Id. ¶ 22. The court
held that Lemmenes could not have reasonably believed that he was responding to an “emergency”
under section 10(b). The court noted that the exercise was conducted under “ ‘controlled
conditions,’ ” no one was in imminent danger at any point during the exercise, and “[n]o unexpected
or unforeseen developments arose during th[e] drill, unlike the situation in Gaffney where the hose
line became entangled in an unknown object.” Id. ¶ 77.
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¶ 32 We note that, though Gaffney modified DeRose’s definition of what is objectively an
emergency, Gaffney did not abrogate DeRose’s holding that section 10(b) requires the claimant to
have subjectively believed that he was facing an emergency. See DeRose, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 661
(section 10(b) requires a determination “(1) whether [the claimant] believed that he was facing an
emergency and (2) whether that belief was reasonable”).
¶ 33 Applying section 10(b) as construed in Gaffney, we note that the affidavits, depositions, and
hearing testimony submitted by the parties do not disclose any issue of material fact in either case
before us. The parties draw conflicting inferences from those facts, but on the material points the only
reasonable inferences are drawn by Springborn and Cecala. That is, the undisputed facts in each case
show that (1) the officer believed that he was responding to an emergency; and (2) his belief was
reasonable.
¶ 34 First, both officers actually believed that they were facing emergencies. Each characterized
the road obstruction as a “hazard” or an “emergency.” Cecala also believed that his squad car,
stopped in a lane of traffic, was itself a hazard justified only by the pressing need to block traffic from
the signal pole.
¶ 35 Carpentersville, however, contends that, if Cecala believed that the signal pole needed to be
moved immediately, he would not have taken time to speak, first with O’Brien and then with Brown,
about moving the pole. Rather, Cecala “would have immediately moved [the pole].” This point lacks
merit. First, the apparent reason Cecala conferred with a colleague in both instances was that he
needed help lifting the pole. Second, the evidence suggests that the conferments about the pole were
not casual and meandering, but focused on the obvious logistical problem of moving the unwieldy
pole.
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¶ 36 The record further establishes that Springborn’s and Cecala’s subjective beliefs about the
presence of an emergency were reasonable. Carpentersville disputes that the felled traffic signal was
an unforeseen circumstance given Cecala’s and Adams’ statements of prior experiences with roadway
obstructions such as traffic signals, light poles, trees, and dead deer. Carpentersville, however,
overlooks a particular sense of foreseeability that the supreme court in Gaffney noted was expressed
in dictionary definitions of “emergency.” An “emergency” includes “ ‘a usu. distressing event or
condition that can often be anticipated or prepared for but seldom exactly foreseen
[emergency] is over, prices will go down then><[emergency] docking
facilities><[emergency] crews working to clear the roads>.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Gaffney, 2012 IL
110012, ¶ 62 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 741 (1993)). Thus, an event
is no less dire if it falls within the kinds of events that police officers ought to anticipate encountering
in their daily duties. Coincidentally, the dictionary entry that the supreme court quoted as illustrative
of the nuances of foreseeability cites the example of roadway obstructions as a type of emergency.
We do not suggest that any roadway debris is per se an emergency under section 10(b); each case
must be decided on its own facts. We are simply rejecting the suggestion that past police experience
with a certain kind of event renders a particular instance of such an event foreseeable for purposes
of section 10(b). Here, as explained below, the roadway obstructions “involv[ed] imminent danger
to a person or property requiring an urgent response” (id. ¶ 64). The additional requirement of
foreseeability was satisfied because the particular circumstances of the events were not foreseeable,
even as much as the police were prepared by their training and experience to address those types of
events.
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¶ 37 Carpentersville and Sugar Grove each argue that there was no “imminent danger” because
the squad car blocked the roadway obstruction and there was an open lane through which traffic could
pass. Here we note that Carpentersville questions not the need to move the pole once it was
protruding into Spruce Drive, but the need to move it in the first instance, after Cecala had parked
behind it. Cecala testified that, in his experience, a squad car stopped on a roadway, while a necessary
immediate precaution, poses its own “hazard” and, therefore, the roadway obstruction should be
quickly removed. Adams averred that it is the policy of the Carpentersville police that roadway
obstructions should be “quickly moved” by officers. Adams explained that the provision of
emergency traffic direction “for an extended period of time” consumes “vital resources.” There were
no similar representations in Springborn’s case, but the safety factor applies there as well. The record
suggests that Route 47, like Route 31, is a major, heavily trafficked roadway. Parking a squad car on
either road would present danger, most obviously from inattentive drivers.
¶ 38 Carpentersville and Sugar Grove also question whether attempted manual removal of the
obstructions was appropriate. We note that, in each case, manual removal was the most readily
available means and so the most suited to the pressing need to clear the roadway of both the
obstruction and the squad car. In Cecala’s case, Adams confirmed in his affidavit that manually
removing a signal pole from the roadway is within the physical capacity of a police officer, and
Adams implied that manual removal ought to be tried before assistance is summoned.
¶ 39 Carpentersville claims that there was circumstantial evidence of the lack of imminent danger
in the fact that the officers who preceded Cecala to the scene “did not immediately move the downed
traffic signal.” The record is silent, however, as to what these officers were doing before Cecala
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arrived. They might well have attempted, unsuccessfully, to move the signal pole. Or, perhaps they
devoted their attention to the driver who crashed.
¶ 40 Carpentersville also finds it telling that (in its words) “[Cecala] conceded that he could have
waited for someone or something to move the downed traffic signal, but he decided not to wait.”
Carpentersville fails to acknowledge the entirety of Cecala’s statement, which was:
“Other than the fact that it [the signal pole] still presented a hazard in its location, there is
nothing else that would prevent us from waiting for something, somebody else to come.
Obviously[,] we could have sat there and waited for someone else to come, but we chose to
move it at that point.” (Emphasis added.)
Cecala’s concession was simply that it would have been possible (in a loose sense) to wait for
assistance. Cecala did not concede that waiting would have been appropriate given the hazards of the
situation.
¶ 41 Sugar Grove contends that, because Springborn had already determined that the second field
of asphalt contained pieces that he could not lift without assistance, and indeed told dispatch as much,
he simply could have waited for assistance before clearing any of the asphalt. By clearing what he
could, however, Springborn reasonably attempted to shorten the time that the hazards would be on
the roadway.
¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that, under the undisputed facts, Springborn and
Cecala each reasonably believed that he faced an emergency.
¶ 43 Carpentersville makes the further contention that Cecala’s injury was not sustained in
“response to *** an emergency” (820 ILCS 320/10(b) (West 2012)) because, at the moment he
attempted to move the signal pole, he “was not reacting or responding to anything,” either “a call for
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help” or “an order to move the traffic control signal.” This reading of section 10(b) finds no support
in Gaffney. Cecala’s decision to move the signal pole was no less a “response” under section 10(b)
than was Gaffney’s decision to free the fire hose by moving the chair. Cecala’s “response” was
initiated when he complied with the dispatch, and that “response” was ongoing when he opted to
move the traffic signal pole.
¶ 44 Lastly, Carpentersville urges us to consider the financial impact an affirmance would have on
municipalities going forward. This is not a proper factor for our decision. We apply section 10(b)
as interpreted by Gaffney, come what may.
¶ 45 We note that Springborn’s complaint sought section 10 benefits on the additional ground that
he was injured “as the result of *** an unlawful act perpetrated by another” (820 ILCS 320/10 (West
2012)). (Cecala alleged no such additional ground.) On appeal, Sugar Grove disputes that
Springborn met this ground. Since our holding under the “emergency” prong of section 10(b) is
adequate to sustain the trial court’s summary judgment ruling, we need not address whether
Springborn met this additional ground under section 10(b).
¶ 46 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 47 Affirmed.
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