Spring Valley Water Co. v. City and County of San Francisco

246 U.S. 391, 38 S. Ct. 356, 62 L. Ed. 790, 1918 U.S. LEXIS 1559

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: April 15, 1918
• Docket: 211
• Status: Published

Opinion

Mb. Chief Justice White,

after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The sole ground urged for reversal is the invalidity of the assessment (a) because it was not authorized by any statute of the State and (b) because it did not contain a sufficient description of the property assessed, and we come to consider these objections under two headings.

(a) That the assessment was authorized by the following section of the Political Code of California we think is clear.

“Section 3647. Property and money in litigation. Money and property in litigation in possession of a county treasurer, of a court, county clerk, or receiver, must be assessed to such treasurer, clerk, or receiver and the taxes be paid thereon under the direction of the court.”

Without following and directly answering the argument advanced to sustain the contrary view, we content ourselves with a summary statement of the reasons for our conclusion. Words cannot make clearer than does the language of the text the purpose of the section to tax property or money in litigation in the hands of a court. . Indeed the Supreme Court of California has so construed the section. Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., 137 California, 699; Bessolo v. City of Los Angeles, 169 Pac. Rep. 372. It is further manifest that the taxation of the money deposited in the injunction suits. was what was sought to be accomplished by the assessment which was made. The money assessed was in litigation, was in the custody of the court and was by its direction placed in the bank in a special account subject to the control of the court. Moreover the assessment to the bank which held the money for the court was a direct compliance with the terms of the section, the description "receiver” being employed in the statute not in a technical sense but as embracing any person acting as' agent or depository of funds for a court. To give to the word the narrower meaning contended for would defeat the obvious and adjudged purpose of the statute.

(b) It is contended that the assessment was invalid for want of sufficient description of the property assessed, first, because the assessment purported to assess moneys impounded in the 1907 injunction suit, No. 14,275, when as we have seen no money was in fact deposited in that suit, and second, because the assessment did not separately assess the moneys impounded in each of the six suits but assessed as a unit all the moneys impounded in all the suits.

As to the first, it is apparent that the inclusion of the 1907 suit, No. 14,275, could not operate to assess moneys which had no existence and hence the reference to that suit is wholly negligible. As to the second, the assessment referred to the cases by number and designated the court in which they were pending as well as the parties. The court in exercising its jurisdiction over the moneys had specifically directed their deposit to special accounts in each suit separately, thus enabling .it at the termination of the litigation to distribute the funds after apportioning the sum of the tax chargeable to each. It is thus clear that not only was there no want o" definiteness in the description of the property but no possible detriment to the Water Company could in any event arise because of the method of assessment which was followed.

Affirmed.