Spivey v. Latchana

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedJanuary 6, 2022
Docket2:21-cv-13053
StatusUnknown

This text of Spivey v. Latchana (Spivey v. Latchana) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Spivey v. Latchana, (E.D. Mich. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

JULIANO DAMON SPIVEY,

Plaintiff, Case Number 2:21-CV-13053 v. HONORABLE VICTORIA A. ROBERTS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE JUDGE LATCHANA,

Defendant, __________________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT

I. INTRODUCTION Juliano Damon Spivey, (Plaintiff), incarcerated at the Genesee County Jail in Flint, Michigan, filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons that follow, the civil rights complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Plaintiff has been allowed to proceed without prepayment of fees. See 28 § U.S.C. 1915(a); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F. 3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997). However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) states: Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that: (B) the action or appeal: (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Sua sponte dismissal is appropriate if the complaint lacks an arguable basis when filed. McGore, 114 F. 3d at 612. While a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(footnote and

citations omitted). Stated differently, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To establish a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a civil rights

plaintiff must establish that: (1) the defendant acted under color of state law; and (2) the offending conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by federal law. Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F. 3d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1998)(citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)). “If a plaintiff fails to make a showing on any essential element of a § 1983 claim, it must fail.” Redding v. St. Eward, 241 F. 3d 530, 532

(6th Cir. 2001). III. COMPLAINT Plaintiff alleges that he has criminal charges which are pending in front of

Judge Mark W. Latchana of the Genesee County Circuit Court. Plaintiff alleges that he has been incarcerated on these charges for almost a year. Plaintiff asked his defense counsel to file a motion to assert Plaintiff’s right to a speedy trial. When counsel failed to do so, Plaintiff filed his own pro se motion before the trial judge,

which was denied. Plaintiff seeks dismissal of the pending criminal charges on the ground that his right to a speedy trial is being violated. IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff requests injunctive relief from pending criminal charges; the Court abstains from enjoining a pending state court prosecution. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal proceedings

except in a “very unusual circumstance” where an injunction is necessary to prevent “both great and immediate” irreparable injury. The cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of a defendant having to defend against a single criminal

prosecution cannot be considered by themselves to constitute irreparable injury. Instead, the threat to a state criminal defendant’s federally protected rights must be one that “cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal

prosecution.” Id. at 46. Moreover, “[t]he existence of a ‘chilling effect’, even in the area of First Amendment rights, had never been considered a sufficient basis, in and of itself, for prohibiting state action.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 46. The holding in

Younger was based on principles of equity and upon the “more vital consideration” of the principles of comity and federalism. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. Thus, in cases in which a criminal defendant is seeking to enjoin ongoing state court proceedings, whether they be criminal, civil, or administrative, federal courts should not

exercise jurisdiction, but should normally dismiss the case in its entirety. Kish v. Michigan State Bd. of Law Examiners, 999 F. Supp. 958, 965 (E.D. Mich. 1998)(internal citations omitted).

A federal court should employ three factors to determine whether the Younger abstention doctrine should apply: 1. there must be pending or ongoing state judicial proceedings; 2. these proceedings must implicate important state interests; and, 3. there must be an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.

Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); GTE Mobilnet of Ohio v. Johnson, 111 F.3d 469, 481 (6th Cir. 1997).

Applying the above test, the Court concludes that it would be appropriate to abstain from issuing injunctive relief with respect to the criminal charges pending against Plaintiff. Moreover, if Plaintiff were to be convicted, Plaintiff would still be required to exhaust his available state court appellate remedies with the

Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court prior to seeking federal relief. For purposes of Younger, a state’s trial and appeals process is “treated as a unitary system” and a party may not obtain federal intervention “by

terminating the state judicial process prematurely” by foregoing state appeals to attack the trial court’s judgment in federal court. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 369 (1989). A necessary prerequisite of the Younger doctrine is that a party [prior to contesting the

judgment of a state judicial tribunal in federal court] must exhaust his or her state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the district court. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975). For purposes of the first requirement of the

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Younger v. Harris
401 U.S. 37 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.
420 U.S. 592 (Supreme Court, 1975)
Parratt v. Taylor
451 U.S. 527 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Russell A. Kelm v. C. Hyatt
44 F.3d 415 (Sixth Circuit, 1995)
Gte Mobilnet of Ohio v. Johnson
111 F.3d 469 (Sixth Circuit, 1997)
Mounkes v. Conklin
922 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Kansas, 1996)
Kish v. Michigan State Board of Law Examiners
999 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Michigan, 1998)
Tesmer v. Granholm
114 F. Supp. 2d 603 (E.D. Michigan, 2000)
Coles v. Granville
448 F.3d 853 (Sixth Circuit, 2006)

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