Spitzer v. Trans Union LLC

140 F. Supp. 2d 562, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21131, 2000 WL 33281681
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. North Carolina
DecidedAugust 2, 2000
Docket2:99-cv-24
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 140 F. Supp. 2d 562 (Spitzer v. Trans Union LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Spitzer v. Trans Union LLC, 140 F. Supp. 2d 562, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21131, 2000 WL 33281681 (E.D.N.C. 2000).

Opinion

ORDER

BOYLE, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The underlying complaint alleges that Defendant Trans Union violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and North Carolina common law by furnishing inaccurate information respecting two bankruptcies and a derogatory commercial real estate mortgage loan with Security Pacific. For the reasons given below, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

In February of 1997, Plaintiffs Stanley Spitzer and Rose Spitzer applied for a loan to refinance their home. During the application process, Plaintiffs claim to have learned that Defendant Trans Union, a consumer reporting agency, had included incorrect information in their credit report. Plaintiffs state that they contacted Defendant regarding the alleged misinformation, repeatedly requesting that it be removed from their record. Plaintiffs allege that Trans Union replied with “computer generated form letters,” but finally produced the address of Security Pacific to Plaintiffs, claiming that they had verified the entries. Plaintiffs claim that this address was incorrect, as it was four years out of date. Plaintiffs later admitted, in depositions, that the information was technically accurate, but complain that it did not fairly present the unusual circumstances of their story. Plaintiffs further charge that Defendant did not satisfactorily incorporate their explanatory consumer statement into the credit reports.

Plaintiffs, acting pro se, commenced this action in March, 1999 in the General Court of Civil Justice, Superior Court Division, for Perquimans County, North Carolina. Plaintiffs state claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, N.C.G.S. 75-1.1 et seq., and North Carolina common law. Defendant removed the matter to this Court on April 14, 1999 and moved for summary judgment on November 1, 1999. Plaintiffs responded on December 14,1999. Defendant filed its reply on January 5, 1999. Plaintiffs filed a surreply on Janu *564 ary 12, 1999. All issues are fully briefed and ripe for ruling.

ANALYSIS

I. Summary Judgment Standard

A motion for summary judgment cannot be granted unless there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant must demonstrate the lack of a genuine issue of fact for trial, and if that burden is met, the party opposing the motion must “go beyond the pleadings” and come forward with evidence of a genuine factual dispute. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986). The Court must view the facts and the inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Conclu-sory allegations are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

II. Plaintiffs’ § 1681e(b) Fair Credit Reporting Act Claim

Plaintiffs state two causes of action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Plaintiffs’ first FCRA claim arises under Section 1681e(b), which states that “whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” It is well established that a case of “negligent noncompliance with § 1681e(b) consists of four elements:” (1) inaccurate information was included in a consumer’s credit report; (2) the inaccuracy was due to defendant’s failure to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy; (3) the consumer suffered injury; and (4) the consumer’s injury was caused by the inclusion of the inaccurate entry. See, e.g., Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 963 (3rd Cir.1996).

Defendant argues that the § 1681e(b) claim fails because the information reported was accurate and because Plaintiffs were not harmed by the inclusion of the information they allege is inaccurate. In support of this contention, Defendant relies upon Plaintiff Stanley Spitzer’s deposition, in which he acknowledges that he and Plaintiff Rose Spitzer “in [them] negligence” signed a balloon mortgage for the benefit of his brother’s business venture without reading the terms of the note. See Plaintiffs’ Response at 2. Mr. Spitzer reports that his brother’s “house of cards collapsed” and that his brother eventually defaulted on the loan, resulting in Plaintiffs’ being forced to assume the payments. See Stanley Spitzer Affidavit at 14-15.

Plaintiffs make several key admissions regarding the veracity of the items reported on their consumer report. First, Plaintiffs admit throughout their depositions that they made several late payments to Security Pacific. Plaintiffs do not contest the accuracy of Trans Union’s reporting of these late payments, but note that they made double-payments whenever they missed a month’s mortgage payment.

Next, Plaintiffs admit that they filed for bankruptcy to delay foreclosure on the collateral — their home' — but note that they eventually made full payment to Trans Union and that the bankruptcy filing was dismissed. Plaintiffs maintain that the principal was “suddenly” due and that they were “presented with a $250,000 payment to be made in one lump sum.” See Plaintiffs’ Response at 2; Stanley Spitzer Affidavit at 14-15. They claim that they eventually transferred “a $400,000 income- *565 producing waterfront property” to Security Pacific, the value of which exceeded their outstanding balance, and that Security Pacific made payment to them of the difference as a result.

Plaintiffs then admit that they filed for bankruptcy a second time in North Carolina. The record shows that this second bankruptcy arose from Plaintiffs’ change of residence from New York to North Carolina, at which time their New York bankruptcy was dismissed and Plaintiffs re-filed for bankruptcy in North Carolina.

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Bluebook (online)
140 F. Supp. 2d 562, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21131, 2000 WL 33281681, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/spitzer-v-trans-union-llc-nced-2000.