Spinella v. Town of Paris Zoning Board of Appeals

191 Misc. 2d 807, 744 N.Y.S.2d 310, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 711
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJune 18, 2002
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 191 Misc. 2d 807 (Spinella v. Town of Paris Zoning Board of Appeals) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Spinella v. Town of Paris Zoning Board of Appeals, 191 Misc. 2d 807, 744 N.Y.S.2d 310, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 711 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2002).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Robert F. Julian, J.

Question Presented: Petitioners, by a CPLR article 78 proceeding, contend that the regular use of two-, three- and four-wheel recreational vehicles on property zoned rural-residential is a customary use permitted under the town zoning ordinance; and that the Town’s order prohibiting use of these vehicles on worn tracks on the petitioners’ property is arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.

Holding: Use of these vehicles by the petitioners is permitted and the Town did abuse its discretion. Petition granted. [808]*808Discussion: This case highlights a growing source of discord in rural/suburban America, the conflict between users of recreational all-terrain vehicles and those who believe such vehicles breach their individual rights to peace and quiet. This matter arises out of the use of recreational all-terrain two-, three- and four-wheel vehicles by the petitioners on their multi-acre property in the Town of Paris. Motivated by certain neighbor complaints, the respondent Town of Paris intervened, attempting to use its zoning ordinance, which defines a rural-residential use consistent with other communities in the state similarly situated, as a basis to prohibit such use. The Town contends that the petitioners’ use of the aforementioned vehicles is not a customary use and that they have created a “race track,” which is not a permitted use. The respondent issued an “Order to Remedy Violation” dated September 7, 2001, and after public comment required the petitioners to remedy a zoning violation at petitioners’ property at 1952 Green Crossing Road, Cassville, New York. The alleged violation was “non permitted use of premises (motorcycle or three or four wheel vehicle track),” and cited article V, § 7 of the Town of Paris Zoning Ordinance as the source of authority for the order. The cited section in turn refers to a table of acceptable uses under the ordinance. The petitioners’ property is within a rural-residential (R-R) zone. The applicable table, “Schedule A” of the ordinance states that permitted principal uses include one- or two-family dwelling, farm, nursery, truck garden and “Customary Accessory Building or use.”

The petitioners timely brought this article 78 proceeding to challenge the Town’s order. The court issued a decision on April 9, 2002, ordering a hearing pursuant to Town Law § 267-c. The court held a hearing commencing on May 13, 2002. The court has found the following facts and made the following determinations:

The petitioners’ property consists of approximately 135 acres, including a one-family residence. The petitioners use their property, among other things, for the operation of various recreational vehicles by friends, neighbors, and family members.

The Town raised, as a threshold bar to relief to the petitioners, the claim that the identical issue had been resolved by Honorable John Murad, Justice of the Supreme Court, in Matter of Cole v Paris (Index No. 99-1993), in a decision dated March 28, 2000. Justice Murad there found that a “motorcycle racing track” is not a customary accessory use of property in an [809]*809R-R district in the Town of Paris. The respondents, invoking stare decisis, assert that the Cole decision should be followed herein. The court was provided with, and makes part of the record herein, all papers and proofs before Justice Murad in Cole. The court, having heard from witnesses called by both parties, and having reviewed all the papers and proceedings in Cole, concludes that the proof is clear and undisputed that the worn paths located on the Spinella property have none of the indices of a “motorcycle race track.” The facts here and in Cole are decidedly different, and the court is therefore not bound by the prior decision of Justice Murad, which is simply inapplicable.

The factual issue before the court was, therefore, whether or not the use of recreational vehicles, such as motorcycles, three-wheelers, four-wheelers and other like vehicles, and the concomitant worn paths left by their use, constitutes a customary accessory use in R-R residential districts in the Town of Paris. The court, having heard from witnesses called by both parties on this issue, concludes that the Spinellas’ use of recreational vehicles, such as motorcycles, three-wheelers, four-wheelers and other like vehicles, including the creation of worn paths and trails associated therewith, is a customary accessory use of such property in the Town of Paris.

It is undisputed that, in addition to recreational vehicles, Mr. and Mrs. Spinella utilize vehicles for the purpose of maintaining their acreage and travel on paths, some of which were preexisting their ownership, for the purpose of obtaining fire wood and otherwise maintaining their acreage. Mr. Spinella drew on an exhibit his specific uses of worn paths by truck and other vehicles for the purpose of maintaining the property. This use constitutes a substantial portion of the worn path footage located on the property.

It is undisputed that over and above this use there are other worn paths that are utilized exclusively for recreational vehicles, although in virtually all circumstances those paths connect to the worn paths that are also utilized for maintenance purposes. It is also acknowledged that the paths used for maintenance purposes are coincidentally also ridden on by recreational vehicles.

The Spinellas have described the use of their property for recreational vehicles. There was no proof of “racing,” but rather recreational, leisure time riding by themselves, their children and certain of their friends. The Spinellas testified that the worn paths have been created both by design and use and that [810]*810they have endeavored to maintain the paths to the extent of making them free of rocks, leveling them, and doing other routine maintenance for the safety of users of the property.

The Town takes the position that the use of recreational vehicles of this type is allowed but not to the extent that repetitive use creates a race track. The Town contends that the Spinellas’ use of the property is as a race track and thus prohibited under the zoning ordinance. The Town argues that this is not a customary use envisioned by the zoning ordinance. The Town indeed endeavored to argue that under article V, § 7 of the zoning ordinance “customary accessory buildings or use” is simply defined as outbuildings and swimming pools, and that no other use is permitted as a customary use under the zoning ordinance and thus a hearing was not indicated as a matter of law. The Town Zoning Officer acknowledged however that section 7 did not encompass customary accessory use, that customary accessory use was not defined in that section, and that section 7 was really directed toward a definition of customary accessory outbuildings. Indeed section 7 solely defines customary accessory outbuildings. Therefore, the court rejects the Town’s argument that the zoning ordinance defines “customary accessory use” in section 7 and concludes that the definition and scope of “customary accessory use” is a question of fact, and cannot be determined by definitions within the four corners of the zoning ordinance. A hearing was properly ordered for the purpose of determining whether or not petitioners’ use was a “customary accessory use” of their property.

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Bluebook (online)
191 Misc. 2d 807, 744 N.Y.S.2d 310, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 711, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/spinella-v-town-of-paris-zoning-board-of-appeals-nysupct-2002.