Spicer v. U.S. Marshals of District of Columbia

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: April 11, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-2106
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

___________________________________ ) DEONTE V. SPICER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-2106 (RC) ) U.S. MARSHALS OF DISTRICT ) OF COLUMBIA, ) ) Defendant. ) ___________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 14. For the

reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations

On various dates in early 2024, plaintiff found himself in the holding area at the Superior

Court of the District of Columbia subjected to physical searches by unidentified Deputy United

States Marshals. See Compl. (ECF No. 1-1) at 9 (page numbers designated by CM/ECF).

According to plaintiff, he “was pat searched then told to pull [his] pants down to [his] knees and

ankles,” at which time he “was touched . . . all over [his] testicles and both sides of [his] inner

thighs touching both sides of [his] testicles.” Id. Plaintiff deemed these searches sexual abuse.

See id. at 9-10. He alleged that the Deputy Marshals “received pleasure from sexually abusing

[him],” as “they all were laughing and joking,” and making “sexual noises . . . while the . . .

Marshal had his hands inside [plaintiff’s] pants.” Id. at 10. Female Deputy Marshals allegedly

were present “during a few of [these] sexual assaults.” Id. These incidents “[a]ffected

1 [plaintiff’s] mental state of mind extremely . . . and it has become hard for [him] to focus . . . on

[a] day to day basis.” Id. at 10. Plaintiff allegedly filed “a police complaint” on April 4, 2024,

and a complaint with the Justice Department’s Office of the Inspector General on an unspecified

date. Id.

In his amended pleading, plaintiff purports to make this a class action on behalf of other

detainees, including juveniles, who had been sexually assaulted by Deputy United States

Marshals at the Superior Court. See generally Am. Compl. (ECF No. 5) at 37-40. While the

original complaint includes a demand for $1,500,000 and mental health treatment, see Compl. at

9, plaintiff doubles his demand for damages, to include an award of $1,500,000 for himself and

an additional $1,500,000 to be shared among the class members. See Am. Compl. at 37.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his original complaint in the Superior Court on June 10, 2024. See Case

Summary (ECF No. 5) at 3. Defendant removed the case on July 18, 2024, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1446. See Notice of Removal (ECF No. 1) at 1. The Clerk

of Court issued summonses on October 3, 2024 (ECF No. 9) which were served on October 7,

2024 (ECF Nos. 10-11).

On January 22, 2025, defendant filed its motion to dismiss (ECF No. 14) under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) with a supporting memorandum (“Def.’s Mem.”), arguing that

this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim. On that same day, the Court

issued an Order (ECF No. 15) directing plaintiff to file his opposition or other response to the

motion by February 24, 2025. The Order warned plaintiff that, if he failed to respond to the

motion, the Court would resolve the matter without the benefit of his position. To date, plaintiff

neither has filed an opposition nor has he requested additional time to do so.

2 II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . . [and it] is to be presumed that a

cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.

375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that this Court

has jurisdiction over his claims. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).

“If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a claim, it must dismiss that claim.”

Cofield v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 3d 206, 211 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1),

12(h)(3)).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court construes the complaint as bringing assault and battery claims arising from the

unidentified Deputy United States Marshals’ physical searches of plaintiff’s person in the

Superior Court holding area. These are tort claims brought against employees of the federal

government committed in the course of their official duties, and they proceed, if at all, under the

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80.

The proper defendant to an FTCA action is the United States of America. See, e.g.,

Goddard v. D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency, 287 F.2d 343, 345–46 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (“Suits

based on torts allegedly committed by the Agency or by its employees acting in an official

capacity are maintainable, if at all, under the provisions of the Tort Claims Act, and must name

the United States as defendant.”). Ordinarily, a plaintiff’s failure to name the United States as

the defendant calls for dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See,

e.g., Johnson v. Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr., 133 F. Supp. 3d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2015). That said,

given plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court declines to dismiss the complaint because plaintiff

named the wrong defendant. See Stedman v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, No. 22-cv-3191 (BAH),

3 2023 WL 3600141, at *3 n.3 (D.D.C. May 23, 2023) (“Even though this pro se plaintiff has not

named the United States as a party defendant, this pleading defect is overlooked and plaintiff’s

claims are treated as if he brought them against the United States directly.”). Given the inherent

defects of the complaint, the Court also declines to substitute the United States as the party

defendant. See Binns v. Cent. Intel. Agency, No. 1:20-cv-01896 (UNA), 2020 WL 4335536, at

*2 (D.D.C. July 27, 2020).

A. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s FTCA Claim

1. Sovereign Immunity and the FTCA

“It is elementary that the United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it

consents to be sued . . . , and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's

jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting

United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (internal quotation marks and brackets

omitted)). “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its

agencies from suit.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).

“The FTCA waives sovereign immunity ‘under circumstances where the United States, if

a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where

the act or omission occurred.’” Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC v. United States, 569 F.3d 506,

508 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)). It renders the United States subject to

suit for certain – but not all – tort claims. See, e.g., Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6

(1962). There are limitations under and exceptions to the FTCA which warrant dismissal of the

plaintiff's complaint.

4 2. The Court Lacks Derivative Jurisdiction

Defendant first moves to dismiss because this Court lacks jurisdiction, or more

particularly, derivative jurisdiction, over plaintiff’s FTCA claims. See Def.’s Mem. at 5-6 (page

numbers designated by CM/ECF).

“The derivative-jurisdiction doctrine arises from the theory that a federal court’s

jurisdiction over a removed case derives from the jurisdiction of the state court from which the

case originated.” Palmer v. City Nat’l Bank of W. Va., 498 F.3d 236, 244 (4th Cir. 2007). The

Supreme Court instructs:

The jurisdiction of the federal court on removal is, in a limited sense, a derivative jurisdiction. If the state court lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter or of the parties, the federal court acquires none, although it might in a like suit originally brought there have had jurisdiction.

Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).1 For these

purposes, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia is considered a state court. 28 U.S.C. §

1442(d)(6).

This Court’s “threshold determination is whether, prior to removal, the Superior Court . .

. had jurisdiction of the subject matter” of a plaintiff’s lawsuit. McKoy-Shields v. First

1 Courts have observed “that the derivative jurisdiction doctrine . . . creates something of a paradox.” James v. U.S. Postal Serv., 484 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2020). Defendant removed this case from Superior Court because the federal district court has jurisdiction over an FTCA claim, and promptly moved to dismiss the very same FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “Although Congress has chosen to abrogate the derivative jurisdiction doctrine for removals effectuated under 28 U.S.C § 1441, application of the derivative jurisdiction doctrine remains valid where, like here, cases are removed under 28 U.S.C § 1442.” McKoy-Shields v. First Washington Realty, Inc., No. 11-cv-01419 (RLW), 2012 WL 1076195, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2012) (footnote omitted). Defendant removed the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), and the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction applies. See Williams v. Pretrial Servs. Agency for District of Columbia, No. 23-cv-1859 (RDM), 2024 WL 4103708, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2024). 5 Washington Realty, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-1419, 2012 WL 1076195, at *2 (D.D.C. March 30, 2012).

It did not.

Federal district courts “have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the

United States, for money damages . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of

any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment[.]”

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); see Merkulov v. U.S. Park Police, 75 F. Supp. 3d 126, 130 (D.D.C.

2014). Given the FTCA’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts, “the D.C. Superior

Court could not have had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.” James v. U.S.

Postal Serv., 484 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2020). This federal district court “cannot ‘acquire’

jurisdiction after removal, even if [p]laintiff could have filed his complaint in federal court in the

first instance.” Cofield v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 3d 206, 214 (D.D.C. 2014); see Johnson v.

D.C. Metro Transit Auth., 239 F. Supp. 3d 293, 296 (D.D.C. 2017) (“Because Congress has not

consented to the United States being sued in state court for negligence, the Superior Court never

acquired jurisdiction over either the subject matter or the Smithsonian as a United States

agency.”).

3. Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Even if this Court could have acquired jurisdiction upon removal, there is an alternative

basis for dismissal. Defendant argues that the complaint fails to allege exhaustion of

administrative remedies. See Def.’s Mem. at 6-7.

As stated above, the waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity sets the conditions

under which the United States is subject to suit. Relevant here is a claimant’s obligation to

present his claim to the appropriate federal agency prior to filing a civil action in a federal

district court. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Hall v. Admin. Off. of U.S.

6 Courts, 496 F. Supp. 2d 203, 206 (D.D.C. 2007) (“A condition of this waiver of sovereign

immunity is the timely presentation of a claim to the appropriate federal government agency.”

(citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979)).

The FTCA in relevant part provides:

An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.

28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). “In reviewing this presentment requirement, the Supreme Court has ruled

that pro se litigants should be held to the same standard as litigants with counsel.” Youmans v.

Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., No. 21-cv-1381 (RC), 2022 WL 2982453, at *3 (D.D.C. July

28, 2022) (citing McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113).

“Section 2675(a) requires a claimant to file (1) a written statement sufficiently describing

the injury to enable the agency to begin its own investigation, and (2) a sum-certain damages

claim.” GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1987). To this end, a claimant

may submit to the appropriate agency a written statement of his claim using a Standard Form 95.

See, e.g., Tookes v. United States, 811 F. Supp. 2d 322, 331 (D.D.C. 2011). Whatever form the

claimant’s statement takes, it must provide sufficient “[n]otice of an injury” so that the agency

can conduct its own investigation and evaluate the claim, and a “sum-certain statement of

damages [to] enable it to determine whether settlement or negotiations to that end are desirable.”

GAF Corp., 818 F.3d at 919.

For purposes of this Memorandum Opinion, the Court accepts as true plaintiff’s

allegation of having filed a police report and a complaint to the Office of Inspector General. See

7 Compl. at 10. Missing, however, are any factual allegations demonstrating that these complaints

included both a written statement sufficiently describing his injury and a sum certain demand for

damages. Therefore, plaintiff fails to demonstrate compliance with the FTCA’s presentment

requirement. See Grant v. Sec. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. 03-5260, 2004 WL 287125, at *2

(D.C. Cir. Feb. 4, 2004) (affirming dismissal when plaintiff did not include “sum-certain

damages”); Ali v. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, No. 23-cv-1126 (DLF), 2024

WL 1513475, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2024) (finding that plaintiff had not exhausted administrative

remedies by “complain[ing] to several government entities,” including the Chief of the State

Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, its Inspector General, and the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, but not “to the appropriate government agency:

the State Department itself”); Davis v. United States, 944 F. Supp. 2d 36, 39 (D.D.C. 2013)

(finding that letters to Director of the Bureau of Prisons and Residential Reentry Manager did not

satisfy FTCA’s presentment requirement).

“The FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted

their administrative remedies,” and a claimant’s “fail[ure] to heed that clear statutory command”

warrants dismissal of his claim. McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113. Because plaintiff has not exhausted

his administrative remedies under the FTCA, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction. See Henderson v. Ratner, No. 10-5035, 2010 WL 2574175, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 7,

2010) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of FTCA claim where “[a]ppellant failed to demonstrate

that he exhausted his administrative remedies before filing suit in the district court”); Hammond

v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 740 F. Supp. 2d 105, 111 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing FTCA claim for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiff had not “established by a preponderance of the

8 evidence that he administratively exhausted his FTCA claim with the BOP before commencing

this action”).

B. Plaintiff May Not Represent the Interests of a Class

According to plaintiff, there are at least 19 other detainees who have been subjected to

the same treatment at the hands of unidentified Deputy United States Marshals at the Superior

Court holding area, see Am. Compl. at 39-40, and who, among others, could become members of

a class, see id. Even if plaintiff had established a basis for this Court’s subject matter

jurisdiction, plaintiff could prosecute only his own claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Georgiades v.

Martin–Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that individual who is “not a

member of the bar of any court . . . may appear pro se but is not qualified to appear in the

District Court . . . as counsel for others”). “As a general rule applicable here, a pro se litigant

can represent only himself in federal court.” Cannady v. State of Missouri, No. 1:15-cv-0073

(CRC), 2015 WL 358236, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2015).

This case is not currently a class action, and the Court may not designate it as such, given that

plaintiff is proceeding pro se. See Heard v. Caruso, 351 F. App’x 1, 15 (6th Cir. 2009) (denying

class certification and appointment of plaintiff as class representative where plaintiff was “an

incarcerated pro se litigant without legal training who is . . . not able adequately to represent the

proposed class”); Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (“[It]

it is plain error to permit this imprisoned litigant who is unassisted by counsel to represent his

fellow inmates in a class action.”); Paulson v. Apple Inc., No. 1:15-cv-0556 (RWR), 2015 WL

1825283, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2015) (dismissing ‘“Class Action Complaint’ . . . because a pro

se party, such as plaintiff, cannot represent a class or any other individual in federal court”).

9 IV. CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s tort claims

and, accordingly, GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss. An Order is issued separately.

DATE: April 11, 2025 /s/ RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge