CARDINE, Justice.
Gerry Spence, appellant, undertook to represent Andrea Dworkin in her litigation against Hustler Magazine (Hustler). Because he undertook to represent this client, he was personally attacked by Hustler by being named “Asshole of the Month.” Spence is a lawyer. Lawyers named “Asshole of the Month,” such as Spence, are “vermin-infested turd dispensers,” “parasitic scum-suckers,” “shameless shitholes (whose main allegiance is to money) [who] are eager to sell out their personal values, truth, justice .and our hard-won freedoms for a chance to fatten their wallets.” Spence, a “hemorrhoidal type,” was “Asshole of the Month for July” in 1985. Hustler claimed members of Spence’s firm were potential witnesses and moved to disqualify them from representing him in this litigation. The district court denied Hustler’s motion to disqualify Spence’s counsel and then granted Hustler’s motion for summary judgment against Spence upon his defamation claim for damages.
We reverse the summary judgment and affirm the order denying the motion to disqualify Spence’s counsel.
Spence presents us with this statement of issues in his defamation action:
“1. Whether this Court will give full force and effect to Wyoming’s Constitutional issue provision that ‘the jury [has] the right to determine the facts and the law, under the direction of the court’ in a libel case.
“2. Whether the publication about Spence was false and defamatory, and was published ‘with good intent and [for] justifiable ends?’
“3. Whether the publication was protected ‘opinion’ and whether that question ought to have been presented to the jury for determination.”
In response, Hustler asserts:
“1. Whether summary judgment was improper under Article I, Section 20 of the Wyoming Constitution.
“a. Whether Article I, Section 20 forbids summary judgment in a libel action.
“b. Whether the court’s responsibility under the First Amendment to grant [773]*773summary judgment on constitutional issues can be superseded by a provision of the state constitution.
“2. Whether the statements about plaintiff Gerry Spence were constitutionally protected statements of opinion.
“3. Whether Spence met his burden of proving the statements about him were false.
“4. Whether Spence, a public figure, met his burden of coming forward with clear and convincing proof that defendants published falsehoods about him with knowledge that they were false or with a subjective awareness of probable falsity.
“5. Whether Spence’s admission that he suffered no reputational harm required dismissal of his libel suit.”
Spence’s lawsuit against Hustler seeking damages for defamation was precipitated by an article which appeared in the July 1985 issue of Hustler magazine. Shortly before the article was printed, Spence had filed a number of legal actions against Hustler on behalf of clients including Andrea Dworkin. The article or “column,” however it might best be characterized, was this:
“Many of the vermin-infested turd dispensers we name Asshole of the Month are members of that group of parasitic scum-suckers often referred to as lawyers. These shameless shitholes (whose main allegiance is to money) are eager to sell out their personal values, truth, justice and our hard-won freedoms for a chance to fatten their wallets. The latest of these hemorrhoidal types to make this page is Jackson, Wyoming, attorney Gerry Spence, our Asshole of the Month for July.
“Spence dudes himself up in western duds and calls himself a ‘country lawyer,’ but the log-cabin image is as phony as a cum-dripping whore’s claim of virginity: This reeking rectum is worth millions and owns a 35,000 acre ranch. Spence’s claim to fame is that in the name of ‘the little guy’ he’s won some mighty big judgments * *'*. He’d like to add HUSTLER to the list ... for a whopping $150 million. His client is ‘little guy’ militant lesbian feminist Andrea Dwor-kin, a shit-squeezing sphincter in her own right. In her latest publicity-grab, Dworkin has decided to sue HUSTLER for invasion of privacy among other things.
“Dworkin seems to be an odd bedfellow for ‘just folks,’ ‘family values’ Spence. After all, Dworkin is one of the most foul-mouthed, abrasive manhaters on Earth. In fact, when Indianapolis contemplated an antiporn ordinance co-authored by Dworkin, she was asked by its supporters to stay away for fear her repulsive presence would kill the statute. Spence, however, can demand as much as 50% of the take from his cases. And a possible $75 million would buy a lot of country for this lawyer. Considering that Dworkin advocates bestiality, incest and sex with children, it appears Gerry ‘This Tongue for Hire’ Spence is more interested in promoting his bank account than the traditional values he’d like us to believe he cherishes.
“This case is nuisance suit initiated by Dworkin, a cry-baby who can dish out criticism but clearly can’t take it. The real issue is freedom of speech, something we believe even Dworkin is entitled to, but which she would deny to anyone who doesn’t share her views. Any attack on First Amendment freedoms is harmful to all ... Spence’s foaming-at-the-mouth client especially. You’d think someone of Spence’s stature would know better than to team up with a censor like Dworkin. Obviously, the putrid amber spray of diarrhea known as greed has clouded this Asshole’s senses.” (emphasis in original)
At the outset we must agree with Hustler that Article 1, § 20 of the Wyoming Constitution does not provide an avenue of relief that supersedes well-established First Amendment law in cases such as this. The United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, is the supreme law of the land. This is recognized in our own state constitution. Wyo. Const., Art. 1, § 37. We do not agree that Art. 1, § 20 absolutely guar[774]*774antees a plaintiff a trial to a jury in a defamation case. Spriggs v. Cheyenne Newspapers, 63 Wyo. 416, 182 P.2d 801, 804-09 (1947); see Tschirgi v. Lander Wyoming State Journal, 706 P.2d 1116 (Wyo.1985).
The district court relied heavily upon the case Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) in granting summary judgment in favor of Hustler in this case. The United States Supreme Court said in that case:
“We conclude that public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue [which was similar in gutter language to that in this case] without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice,’ i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. This is not merely a ‘blind application’ of the New York Times standard, see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390, 87 S.Ct. 534, 543, 17 L.Ed.2d 456 (1967), it reflects our considered judgment that such a standard is necessary to give adequate ‘breathing space’ to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.
“Here it is clear that respondent Falwell is a ‘public figure’ for purposes of First Amendment law. The jury found against respondent on his libel claim when it decided that the Hustler ad parody could not ‘reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [respondent] or actual events in which [he] participated.’ * * * The Court of Appeals interpreted the jury’s finding to be that the ad parody ‘was not reasonably believable,' * * * and in accordance with our custom we accept this finding. Respondent is thus relegated to his claim for damages awarded by the jury for the intentional infliction of emotional distress by ‘outrageous’ conduct. But for reasons heretofore stated this claim cannot, consistently with the First Amendment, form a basis for the award of damages when the conduct in question is the publication of a caricature such as the ad parody involved here.” Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57, 108 S.Ct. at 882-83 (emphasis added).
We first observe that development of the law of defamation has moved along a strange path to a place where we now say that the more outrageous, vile, vulgar, humiliating and ridiculous the publication, the more it is protected. It may subject another to enormous ridicule and be more personal and hurtful than much recognized defamation, but if it is outrageous enough, it is “all right.” Thus, it is “all right” to publish that Falwell had sex in an outhouse with his mother, but not “all right” to publish that Falwell had sex with a church member. Both publications state facts, both are defamatory; one would cause ridicule, perhaps contempt, the other hatred and contempt. It is said that one publication is believable, the other not; and so no matter what the ridicule, hurt and damage, the court held Falwell without a remedy. It is said that this is “imaginative expression” — “rhetorical hyperbole.” The Falwell case states the law, and we accept it as such. But the Spence case is different. Spence is acting on behalf of another, arguably without personal involvement. As applied to Spence, there ought to be, and there is, a limit. It is fair comment on matters of public concern.
We do not perceive the holding enunciated in the Falwell case to be dispositive of the issue raised by Spence in his complaint, and we are convinced that, as Falwell was allowed to present his case to a jury, so is Spence entitled to have his theories of recovery presented to a jury for consideration. In the Falwell decision, the Supreme Court noted that the First Amendment freedoms that were discussed throughout that opinion are subject to limitations. In the case Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942), the United States Supreme Court noted that:
“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitu[775]*775tional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words— those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. ‘Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.’ ” (emphasis added and footnotes omitted)
Although not directly in point, the quoted language in Chaplinsky intimates that an individual is entitled to maintain an action for redress of the kind of grossly defamatory statements as those at issue here. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) furthers development of that stated in Chaplinsky, tracing the law of defamation in a concise, easily read and understood fashion. It is the most important decision in this area of law since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964) and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967). First, the Court directly confronted the question whether there is “a constitutionally-required ‘opinion’ exception to the application of defamation laws.” It laid to rest the absurd notion that anything published that is couched in opinion language cannot be defamation for which damages are recoverable when it said:
“[W]e think the ‘ “breathing space” ’ which ‘ “freedoms of expression require in order to survive,” ’ [Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.] Hepps, 475 U.S. [767], at 772, 106 S.Ct. [1558], at 1561 [89 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986) ] (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S., at 272, 84 S.Ct., at 721), is adequately secured by existing constitutional doctrine without the creation of an artificial dichotomy between ‘opinion’ and fact.” Milkovich, — U.S. at-, 110 S.Ct. at 2706.
Supporting this conclusion, the Court cites Restatement, Second, Torts § 566, comment (a) (1977):
“Under the law of defamation, an expression of opinion could be defamatory if the expression was sufficiently derogatory of another as to cause harm to his reputation, so as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. * * * The expression of opinion was also actionable in a suit for defamation, despite the normal requirement that the communication be false as well as defamatory. * * * This position was maintained even though the truth or falsity of an opinion — as distinguished from a statement of fact — is not a matter that can be objectively determined and truth is a complete defense to a suit for defamation.”
To lessen the burden of defamatory expression of opinion,
“ ‘[t]he principle of “fair comment” afforded] legal immunity for the honest expression of opinion on matters of legitimate public interest when based upon a true or privileged statement of fact.’ 1 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts § 5.28, p. 456 (1956) (footnote omitted). As this statement implies, comment was generally privileged when it concerned a matter of public concern, was upon true or privileged facts, represented the actual opinion of the speaker, and was not made solely for the purpose of causing harm.” Milkovich, — U.S. at-, 110 S.Ct. at 2703.
Was Hustler exercising a privilege of “fair comment” for an honest expression of opinion, on a matter of public concern, when Hustler stated that Spence was a “vermin-infested turd dispenser,” a “parasitic scum-sucker,” a “shameless shithole,” a “reeking rectum,” a “hemorrhoidal type” and “Asshole of the Month for July?” Was that publication made solely for the purpose of causing harm? It is at least questionable whether that was fair comment on a matter of public concern not [776]*776made solely for the purpose of causing harm. And the claim that Spence sold out his personal values for a chance to “fatten his wallet” with a “possible $75 million” may be a false statement of fact, for it appears that Spence may be able to prove that he stands personally to gain nothing monetarily from this litigation since it appears that Spence may have assigned all of his recovery to a charitable organization to provide pro bono legal services to the poor and disadvantaged.
The statements by Hustler about Spence are clearly defamatory, for they are such as would hold him up to hatred, contempt or ridicule. Unless they are protected defamatory criticism of a public figure, they are actionable, and Spence should be allowed to pursue his claim.
A public figure is not subject to defamatory attack and criticism just because he is a public figure. In other words, Larry Flynt is not free to arise each morning and select a public figure to attack and defame for no reason at all. The public figure subject to defamatory criticism is one who is involved in the resolution of important public questions or who by reason of fame shapes events in areas of concern to society, Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 1996 (Warren, C.J., concurring), and who injects himself into the vortex of a controversy. The controversy here involved is Dwórkin’s fight against pornography. Hustler’s argument is structured upon the proposition that Spence has taken up the fight against pornography, thrust himself into the controversy as a public figure, and is therefore subject to response by persons taking the other side. Spence may or may not, in fact, be personally opposed to pornography. That fact is not disclosed by the record in this case. What is disclosed by the record is that, under the circumstances presented here, he appears only to be representing a client who is fighting pornography and is on her side only in the sense that he is providing professional services to her. Thus, if Spence engaged in this controversy beyond the confines of the litigation, he may be subject to appropriate defamatory criticism — fair comment upon a matter of public concern. If, however, he did no more than represent his client in her litigation against Hustler, there is no constitutional opinion privilege for these defamatory publications. At least that is a subject of dispute between the parties and cannot be decided at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings.
It seems reasonable also that Spence might be a public figure in some situations and a private person in others. While it is admitted by all that Spence is a public figure, at least for some purposes, it may develop in trial that Spence was not a “public figure” for his role as a lawyer representing Dworkin which led to the allegedly defamatory publication. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757-63, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 2944-47, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3012-13, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974); and see generally 35 Words and Phrases, “Public Figure” (1963). To be the public figure whom publishers are privileged to defame, absent malice, the party must at least have been involved in the public controversy before the defamatory statement was published. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134-35, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 2688, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979); Vern Sims Ford, Inc. v. Hagel, 42 Wash.App. 675, 713 P.2d 736, 739 (1986). Hustler relies in part for its characterization of Spence as a “public figure” upon the publication of Spence’s books, especially Trial by Fire (concerning a case of his against Penthouse magazine) which was not published until 1986 and a second book And Justice for None which was not published until 1989. Thus, in 1985, at the time the Hustler article was published, Spence may not have been a “public figure” for First Amendment purposes who had entered the fight against pornography as Hustler claims.
A professional person, who may be a “public figure” for some purposes, should be free to offer his services to a client as a private professional without being subjected to public figure defamation. To hold [777]*777otherwise would have a chilling effect upon attorneys who undertake to represent clients in difficult, unpopular, high profile, or sensational types of cases. We can foresee also detriment to these potential clients being unable to employ skilled, capable, specialist lawyers who have achieved some fame and reputation because of their legal and trial abilities and are claimed to have achieved public figure status. Under these circumstances, we hold that a person situated, as Spence is here, is not subject to defamation without recourse. We see no threat to the principles of the First Amendment which we, as a court of last resort, have upheld with great vigor; but there must, as the United States Supreme Court has itself held, be some balance between Freedom of Speech and Press and other interests of constitutional proportions which are of equal importance. Free speech cannot equate with the freedom to intimidate, destroy and defame an advocate seeking to represent a client.
In summary, our review of the propriety of summary judgment is well-established. Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d. 188, 190-91 (Wyo.1989). In this ease the district court granted summary judgment on the basis of the pleadings alone. See, Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d. 625 (Wyo.1986). Spence agreed that he was a public figure, and he may be for some purposes. He is not, however, a public figure if his involvement in the controversy is only as a lawyer representing a client. Although we decide this case on grounds not fully briefed or argued to the court, we have held on several occasions that we may decide a case on any ground that justice requires. White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102, 105 (Wyo.1984). On remand, the parties will have ample opportunity to establish whether Spence is a public or private figure. Thus, our holding is that a lawyer who is merely advocating for a famous or controversial client is not a public figure merely because he has taken on the cause as advocate. We hold that there is not a special opinion privilege, and, under the circumstances of this case and the principles enunciated in Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, and Milkovich, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2695, Spence may have his day in court.
We next address Hustler’s cross-appeal in which these issues concerning disqualification of Spence’s counsel are presented:
“1. Whether an attorney’s filing of a lawsuit for libel and related torts based upon an alleged charge of unprofessional and unethical conduct renders that lawyer’s partners and associates likely witnesses as to the truth or falsity of the challenged statement.
“2. Whether an attorney’s filing of a lawsuit for libel and related torts based upon an alleged charge of unprofessional and unethical conduct renders that lawyer’s partners and associates likely witnesses as to the existence of any reputa-tional harm allegedly suffered by the lawyer.
“3. Whether an attorney’s filing of a lawsuit for intentional infliction of emotional distress renders that lawyer’s partners and associates likely witnesses as to the nature and severity of the alleged emotional distress.
“4. Whether a lawyer’s partners and associates must be disqualified from representation of the lawyer, pursuant to Rule 3.7 of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct, when those partners and associates are likely to be called as witnesses in the case.”
Spence’s response to these arguments is this:
“1. Whether Gary L. Shockey, partner of Gerry L. Spence, may act as Mr. Spence’s counsel, pursuant to the authority in Rule 3.7, Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law, which provides, in part, that ‘A lawyer may act as an advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as a witness [unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9].’
“2. Whether other members of Mr. Spence’s firm may be witnesses.
“3. Whether [Hustler has] utterly failed to make necessary evidentiary showings with respect to issues 1 and 2.”
[778]*778Hustler contends that Spence needs to call as witnesses members of the firm, including Shockey. The areas in which Hustler contends that the firm members’ testimony is needed include the truth or falsity of challenged published statements, whether Spence suffered any reputational harm, and the nature and severity of any emotional distress. Because of this alleged need, Hustler contends that Shockey cannot continue as Spence’s trial counsel.
Determination of this issue is governed by Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law, Rule 3.7, which became effective on January 12, 1987. Rule 3.7 provides:
“(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where:
“(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
“(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or
“(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.
“(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.”
Rules 1.7 and 1.9 pertain to conflict of interest between lawyers and their clients and between lawyers and their former clients. Hustler concedes that no conflicts of interest under those rules exist here. One function of Rule 3.7(b) is to make clear that 3.7(a) is personal to the client’s trial advocate and will not be imputed to other members of the firm. 1 G. Hazard & . W. Hodes, Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 684 (1990). Without a conflict of interest, Rule 3.7(b) does not enter into the issue of whether Shockey may continue as counsel regardless of whether other members of the firm will testify. Therefore, we conclude that Rule 3.7(b) has no application to the facts of this case.
Rule 3.7 superseded Disciplinary Rules 5-101(B) and 5-102 when this court adopted the Rules of Professional Conduct, replacing the Code of Professional Responsibility. DR 5-101(B) stated:
“A lawyer shall not accept employment in contemplated or pending litigation if he knows or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness, except that he may undertake the employment and he or a lawyer in his firm may testify:
“(1) If the testimony will relate solely to an uncontested matter.
“(2) If the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is no reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the testimony.
“(3) If the testimony will relate solely to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case by the lawyer or his firm to the client.
“(4) As to any matter, if refusal would work a substantial hardship on the client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the particular case.”
DR 5-102 stated:
“(A) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his client, he shall withdraw from the conduct of the trial and his firm, if any, shall not continue representation in the trial, except that he may continue the representation and he or a lawyer in his firm may testify in the circumstances enumerated in DR 5-101(B)(1) through (4).
“(B) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm may be called as a witness other than on behalf of his client, he may continue the representation until it is apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client.”
The Code of Professional Responsibility might have mandated disqualification, but that is an issue we need not consider here. The new Rules of Professional Conduct, which govern this case, are less restrictive than the code in this area. [779]*779ABA/BNA Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Conduct 61:501 (1989). See Wydick, Trial Counsel as Witness: The Code and The Model Rules, 15 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 651 (1982). Although Rule 3.7 recognizes the threat of prejudice against the opposing party when the roles of trial advocate and witness are combined, one of the goals of the rule is to minimize the use of the rule as a tactical weapon by adversary counsel. Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.7, comments 1, 2; Wydick, 15 U.C.Davis L.Rev. at 677. Rule 3.7 protects the right of a party to counsel of his choice. Security General Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Ariz. 332, 718 P.2d 985, 988 (1986). Disqualification motions are “ ‘often simply common tools of the ligation process * * * used * * * for purely strategic purposes.’ ” McElroy v. Gaffney, 129 N.H. 382, 529 A.2d 889, 894 (1987) (quoting Van Graafeiland, Lawyer’s Conflict of Interest — A Judge’s View (Part II), N.Y.L.J. July 20, 1977 at 1, col. 2). Such motions to disqualify chosen counsel are disfavored, especially when the motion is based on what another party ought to do in choosing its witnesses for trial. Mitts & Merrill, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 112 F.R.D. 349, 353-54 (N.D.Ill.1986). Hustler’s motion to disqualify Shockey and other members of the Spence, Moriarity & Schuster law firm is for all appearances just such a diversionary motion.
Furthermore, Hustler has made no showing that Shockey is “likely to be a necessary witness” as Rule 3.7(a) requires. Simply to assert that the attorney will be called as a witness is not enough. Humphrey on behalf of State v. McLaren, 402 N.W.2d 535, 541 (Minn.1987). If the evidence can be produced in some other effective way, the attorney is not a necessary witness. Id. Thus, Hustler’s own argument that other members of the firm can be called to testify to the matters to which Shockey can testify defeats the contention that Shockey is a necessary witness. For these reasons, we affirm the order of the district court denying Hustler’s motion to disqualify Shockey, as well as other members of the Spence firm.
The order of the district court granting summary judgment to Hustler is reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The order of the district court refusing to disqualify members of the Spence firm from representing Spence in the prosecution of this action is affirmed.
THOMAS, J., files a specially concurring opinion.
MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., file separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part.