Speedy Key Lock and Tow Service and Douglas Couden v.

CourtDelaware Court of Common Pleas
DecidedMarch 27, 2015
DocketCPU4-14-002869
StatusPublished

This text of Speedy Key Lock and Tow Service and Douglas Couden v. (Speedy Key Lock and Tow Service and Douglas Couden v.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Delaware Court of Common Pleas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Speedy Key Lock and Tow Service and Douglas Couden v., (Del. Super. Ct. 2015).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

SPEEDY KEY LOCK & TOW SERVICE and DOUGLAS COUDEN,

Defendants—Below/Appellants, CA. No. CPU4—l4—002869

V.

AMERICAN SPIRIT FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,

Plaintiff-Beiow/Appeliee.

Submitted: February 25, 2015 Decided: March 27, 2015

R. Joseph Hrubiec, Esquire L. John Bird, Esquire Law Office of R. Joseph Hrubiec Fox Rothschild, LLP 715 North Tatnall Street 919 N. Market Street, Suite 300 Wilmington, DE 1980] Wilmington, DE 19801 Attorney.be Appellant Allomeyfor Appellee ORDER

In this appeal, DefendantsBelow/Appellants Speedy Key Lock & Tow Service (“Speedy Key”) and Douglas Couden (“‘Mr. Couden”) (coliectiveiy, “Appeliants”) seek review of the Justice of the Peace Court’s denial of its motion to vacate default judgment entered for Plaintiff— Below/Appellee American Spirit Federal Credit Union (“Appellee”). On July 28, 2014, Appellants moved in the Justice of the Peace Court to vacate the default judgment entered

against them on July 22, 2014. On September 24, 2014, the Justice of the Peace Court entered an

order denying the motion. Appellants filed a notice of appeal in this Court on October 9, 2014.1 This is the Court’s decision, following a review of the parties’ written submissions, on whether the .Justice 01‘” the Peace Court abused its discretion in denying Appellants” motion to vacate.2 PROCEDURAL POSTURE

On April 29, 2014, Appellee filed suit against Appellants in the Justice of the Peace Court seeking replevin of two recreational vehicles. On June 9, 2014, the parties appeared for trial; however, the Justice of the Peace Court centinued trial after realizing that Speedy Key was not properly served. On June 10, 2014, the Justice of the Peace Court ordered: (1) Appellee to file an alias complaint with the proper address for Speedy Key; (2) Mr. Couden to obtain an attorney, or a Civil Form 50,3 and; (3) Appellants to file a counterclaim within 15 days of being served with the alias complaint. The couit sent a blank Civil Form 50 with its order.

On June 10, 2014, Appellee filed an alias complaint, and served Appellants on June 24, 2014. On July 8, 2014, Appellants filed an answer and counterclaim, as well as a Civil Form 50. Upon receiving Appellants” filings, the Justice of the Peace Court sent Appellant a deficient filing form, indicating that Appellants’ Civil Form 50 was incomplete as it neither appointed a legal representative nor was validated by the Chief Magistrate”s office. Appellants” filing was also defective because their answer and counterclaim were not signed. Appellants did not

cerrect their deficiencies.

' The notice of appeal was incomplete upon its initial filing however, on October 20, 2014, Appellants filed the transcript of the proceedings below, and thus perfected the notice of appeal.

2 in response to the notice of appeal, Appellee filed a complaint on appeal, and Appellants filed an answer and counterclaim. On November 21, 2014, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Appellants had proceeded in accordance with an appeal seeking a trial de novo, instead of proceeding in accordance with an appeal for abuse of discretion. On November 25, 2014, Appellants responded to the motion, arguing that it complied with the statutory requirements to perfect the appeal, but agreed that their appeal seeks review of the Justice of the Peace Court’s denial of their motion to vacate. On December l2, 2014, the Court ordered the parties to brief the issue of whether the Justice of the Peace Court abused its discretion in denying the motion to vacate.

3 Under 10 Del. C. § 9525, a corporation that is a party to an action in the Justice of the Peace Couit “may be prosecuted by an officer or employee of the corporation who need not be a duly licensed attorney—at-law provided, however, that officer or employee is duly qualified under Delaware Supreme Court Rule 57.” Delaware Supreme Court Rule 57 requires a corporation to file a “certificate of representation” (Civil Form 50) when proceeding pro se.

On July 22, 2014, the parties appeared in. Justice of the Peace Court for trial. Appellee was represented by a member of the Delaware Bar, and Appellants appeared pro se. The Justice of the Peace Court entered default judgment against Speedy Key since Appellants never corrected their filing deficiencies, and dismissed the case with prejudice as to Mr. Couden.4

On July 28, 2014, Mr. Couden properly filed a validated Civil Form 50 as well as the motion to vacate default judgment. Mr. Couden argued that the Justice of the Peace Court should vacate the default judgment because he thought that the Chief Magistrate would provide the validated Civil Form 50 to the court. Mr. Couden claimed that he originally sent the Civil Form 50 to the Chief Magistrate and was unaware that he needed to supply the court with a validated copy.

On August 12, 2014, the Justice of the Peace Court held a hearing on the motion and determined that Appellants’ failure to properly complete the Civil Form 50 did not constitute excusable neglect under Justice of the Peace Civil Rule 60. The couit noted that Mr. Couden did not present any evidence to show that he filed the Civil Form 50 with the Chief Magistrate’s office prior to July 22, 2014, and denied Mr. Couden’s motion to vacate the default judgment.

On October 9, 2014, Appellants appealed the Justice of the Peace Court’s decision to this Court. Appellants argue that the Justice of the Peace Court erred in denying their motion to vacate because Appellants” actions constitute excusable neglect. Appellants claim that they attempted to comply with the court’s order and rules when submitting its Civil Form 50, and did in fact cure their deficiency when they submitted a fully executed and validated Civil Form 50

with its motion to vacate. Appellee argues that the Justice of the Peace Court properly denied

4 Mr. Couden’s dismissal from the case is not on appeal and is therefore not subject to this opinion.

Appellants” motion to vacate because Appellants failed to timely and properly file any pleadings or the Civil Form 50.5 STANDARD OF REVIEW In an appeal from a motion to vacate defaultjudgment, the standard of review is abuse of discretion.6 “An appeal from denial of a motion to vacate a default judgment does not bring the matter to this court for a trial de novo but only brings for review the Justice of the Peace’s Order denying the motion to vacate”? The abuse of discretion standard is set forth in Pitts v. White:

The essence of judicial discretion is the existence of judgment by conscience and reason, as opposed to capriciOus arbitrary action and where a Court has not exceeded the bounds of reason in View of the circumstances, and has not so ignored recognized rules of law of practice, so as to produce injustice, its legal discretion has not been abused; for the question is not whether the reviewing Court agrees with the Court below, but rather whether it believes that the judicial mind in view of the relevant rules of law and upon due consideration of the facts of the case could have reasonably reached the conclusion of which complaint is made.8

In reviewing an appeal under an abuse of discretion standard, “the reviewing court may not

substitute its own View of what is right for those of the trial judge. The inquiry is whether the

judgment was based upon conscience and reason, as opposed to capriciousness or arbitrariness.”

DISCUSSION Under the Justice of the Peace Civil Rule 60(b), “On motion and upon such terms as are just the Court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order 01'

proceeding for . . . (l) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect . . . or (6) any other

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