OPINION
SAM BASS, Justice.
This is an appeal from a conviction for burglary of a habitation. After a jury found appellant guilty as charged, the court found an enhancement allegation to be true and assessed punishment at 15 years.
We reverse and remand.
In September 1985, Officer Carl Turner of the Galveston Police' Department stopped a car because its taillights were flickering. The car had a television on the top of the car, and another television and other items in the back seat.
The appellant was driving the car, and Michael Goodlow was sitting in the front passenger seat. Officer Turner asked both men for their names and identification, and then called headquarters to check on any outstanding warrants, to seek additional help, and to see if any burglaries had been reported. While waiting for a report, Turner asked appellant where the property [488]*488came from, and appellant replied that he “got it from his sister’s house.” Turner received a report that no burglaries had been reported, but that appellant had an outstanding warrant for assault. Turner arrested the appellant.
Craig Pos, an identification officer, told appellant that his fingerprints were being taken to be compared with those lifted from a burglary. Appellant told Fos that he was not “stupid enough to leave prints” and that “it would be quite confusing because four other men had gone into the house.” Fos testified that appellant told him that the only thing they had on him was possession of stolen property. The burglary was not reported by the owner until the next morning.
A jury trial commenced on April 15,1986, rendering a verdict of guilty. A punishment hearing before the court was held on May 29, 1986, at which appellant pled “not true” to the enhancement paragraph. The court found the enhancement charge to be “true,” and assessed punishment at 15 years confinement. On June 5, 1986, a hearing on appellant’s motion for new trial was held, at which appellant complained that he did not receive a fair and impartial trial because of the composition of the petit jury. Specifically, he contended that there was a conscious design of the prosecutor to remove members of the black race from his jury.
In point of error one, appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial. This motion was based on alleged violations of his rights to due process, equal protection of law, and a fair trial by a jury composed without reference to racial prejudice.
On April 29, 1986, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), was handed down. The Supreme Court determined that a defendant could make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the ve-nire by relying solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s trial. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-23. To establish such a prima facie case, a defendant:
1) first must show that he is a member of a recognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s race;
2) is entitled to rely on the fact that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate; and,
3) must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.
Id. Once a prima facie case has been made by the defendant, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors that is related to the particular case to be tried. Id.
In the case at bar, the panel contained 10 individuals who were black. The prosecutor used nine of its strikes to remove every black person from the jury. The tenth black venireman was struck by defense counsel.
Defense counsel did not object to the impaneling of the jury on the grounds of racial discrimination.
The State claims that appellant waived his point of error because appellant failed to timely object before the jury was impaneled, as occurred in Batson. We hold that appellant preserved his claim of error when he filed his motion for new trial. Because Batson had not yet been decided, when this case was tried, there were no prerequisites established for this type of complaint. In Griffith v. Kentucky, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 708, 709, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), the Supreme Court held that Batson is to be applied retroactively to all convictions that were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered. Thus, Batson applies retroactively because a decision in this case was not final at the time Batson was decided. See DeBlanc v. State, 732 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).
[489]*489At the hearing on the motion for new trial, the State conceded that a prima facie case of discrimination had been established. The State then had the burden to rebut the appellant’s prima facie case by articulating neutral explanations for the peremptory strikes of the eight black veniremen. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.
Whether “purposeful discrimination” has been shown is a question that a trial court must determine in the light of all the “circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” Id. at 1721. If the State makes an explanation that is facially adequate, the trial court then has the duty to determine if the defendant has proven a case of purposeful discrimination. Id. at 1723-24. This requires the court to make a factual finding, which usually will involve the credibility of the witnesses. On appeal, the reviewing court must give great deference to the trial court’s findings on this issue. Id. at 1724 n. 21.
In this case, the trial court never reached the point of a factual determination of whether purposeful discrimination had been proven because the prosecutor’s explanation of his peremptory strikes was facially inadequate as a matter of law. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, the prosecutor admitted:
Although race is a factor I do consider, it is not an overriding factor and it was not an overriding factor in Mr. Speaker’s trial in the selection of these jurors.
While the prosecutor’s candor is commendable, his statement clearly shows that he considered race a factor while selecting the jurors in the appellant’s trial. This basis for juror selection has traditionally been condemned. See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 287, 70 S.Ct. 629, 632, 94 L.Ed. 839 (1950) ([a]n accused is entitled to have charges against him considered by a jury in the selection of which there has been neither inclusion nor exclusion because of race). While we realize that it may be unrealistic to expect the prosecutor to put aside every improper influence when selecting a juror, we conclude that that is exactly what the law requires. Thus, a prosecutor’s admission that race was an influencing factor in the selection process vitiates the legitimacy of the entire procedure.
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OPINION
SAM BASS, Justice.
This is an appeal from a conviction for burglary of a habitation. After a jury found appellant guilty as charged, the court found an enhancement allegation to be true and assessed punishment at 15 years.
We reverse and remand.
In September 1985, Officer Carl Turner of the Galveston Police' Department stopped a car because its taillights were flickering. The car had a television on the top of the car, and another television and other items in the back seat.
The appellant was driving the car, and Michael Goodlow was sitting in the front passenger seat. Officer Turner asked both men for their names and identification, and then called headquarters to check on any outstanding warrants, to seek additional help, and to see if any burglaries had been reported. While waiting for a report, Turner asked appellant where the property [488]*488came from, and appellant replied that he “got it from his sister’s house.” Turner received a report that no burglaries had been reported, but that appellant had an outstanding warrant for assault. Turner arrested the appellant.
Craig Pos, an identification officer, told appellant that his fingerprints were being taken to be compared with those lifted from a burglary. Appellant told Fos that he was not “stupid enough to leave prints” and that “it would be quite confusing because four other men had gone into the house.” Fos testified that appellant told him that the only thing they had on him was possession of stolen property. The burglary was not reported by the owner until the next morning.
A jury trial commenced on April 15,1986, rendering a verdict of guilty. A punishment hearing before the court was held on May 29, 1986, at which appellant pled “not true” to the enhancement paragraph. The court found the enhancement charge to be “true,” and assessed punishment at 15 years confinement. On June 5, 1986, a hearing on appellant’s motion for new trial was held, at which appellant complained that he did not receive a fair and impartial trial because of the composition of the petit jury. Specifically, he contended that there was a conscious design of the prosecutor to remove members of the black race from his jury.
In point of error one, appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial. This motion was based on alleged violations of his rights to due process, equal protection of law, and a fair trial by a jury composed without reference to racial prejudice.
On April 29, 1986, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), was handed down. The Supreme Court determined that a defendant could make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the ve-nire by relying solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s trial. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-23. To establish such a prima facie case, a defendant:
1) first must show that he is a member of a recognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s race;
2) is entitled to rely on the fact that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate; and,
3) must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.
Id. Once a prima facie case has been made by the defendant, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors that is related to the particular case to be tried. Id.
In the case at bar, the panel contained 10 individuals who were black. The prosecutor used nine of its strikes to remove every black person from the jury. The tenth black venireman was struck by defense counsel.
Defense counsel did not object to the impaneling of the jury on the grounds of racial discrimination.
The State claims that appellant waived his point of error because appellant failed to timely object before the jury was impaneled, as occurred in Batson. We hold that appellant preserved his claim of error when he filed his motion for new trial. Because Batson had not yet been decided, when this case was tried, there were no prerequisites established for this type of complaint. In Griffith v. Kentucky, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 708, 709, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), the Supreme Court held that Batson is to be applied retroactively to all convictions that were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered. Thus, Batson applies retroactively because a decision in this case was not final at the time Batson was decided. See DeBlanc v. State, 732 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).
[489]*489At the hearing on the motion for new trial, the State conceded that a prima facie case of discrimination had been established. The State then had the burden to rebut the appellant’s prima facie case by articulating neutral explanations for the peremptory strikes of the eight black veniremen. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.
Whether “purposeful discrimination” has been shown is a question that a trial court must determine in the light of all the “circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” Id. at 1721. If the State makes an explanation that is facially adequate, the trial court then has the duty to determine if the defendant has proven a case of purposeful discrimination. Id. at 1723-24. This requires the court to make a factual finding, which usually will involve the credibility of the witnesses. On appeal, the reviewing court must give great deference to the trial court’s findings on this issue. Id. at 1724 n. 21.
In this case, the trial court never reached the point of a factual determination of whether purposeful discrimination had been proven because the prosecutor’s explanation of his peremptory strikes was facially inadequate as a matter of law. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, the prosecutor admitted:
Although race is a factor I do consider, it is not an overriding factor and it was not an overriding factor in Mr. Speaker’s trial in the selection of these jurors.
While the prosecutor’s candor is commendable, his statement clearly shows that he considered race a factor while selecting the jurors in the appellant’s trial. This basis for juror selection has traditionally been condemned. See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 287, 70 S.Ct. 629, 632, 94 L.Ed. 839 (1950) ([a]n accused is entitled to have charges against him considered by a jury in the selection of which there has been neither inclusion nor exclusion because of race). While we realize that it may be unrealistic to expect the prosecutor to put aside every improper influence when selecting a juror, we conclude that that is exactly what the law requires. Thus, a prosecutor’s admission that race was an influencing factor in the selection process vitiates the legitimacy of the entire procedure. See Batson 106 S.Ct. at 1719; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. (Otto) 370, 397, 26 L.Ed. 567 (1881).
We accordingly sustain the appellant’s first point of error.
In his second and third points of error, the appellant urges that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charges because there is insufficient evidence to convict him, and also erred by refusing to submit a requested charge on circumstantial evidence.
The test applied on an insufficient evidence claim is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the indictment. Tisdale v. State, 686 S.W.2d 110, 114 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). Further, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. See Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). It is not required that the circumstances should, to a moral certainty, actually exclude every hypothesis that the act may have been committed by another person, but only those that are reasonable and consistent with the circumstances and the facts proved. Id. Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the accused, as the cumulative effect of all the incriminating facts may be sufficient to support the evidence. Id. Proof that amounts only to a strong suspicion or mere probability, however, is insufficient. Id.
Officer Turner testified that he had stopped appellant, who was driving a car that contained stolen property. Turner stated that appellant told him that the property belonged to his sister. It was later determined that the property belonged to a third party. The burglary occurred about the time Turner apprehended appellant, and it was reported by the owner after he had returned home from work later that night.
[490]*490The record further shows that appellant told Officer Fos that he would not have been stupid enough to leave his fingerprints; that four people had been inside the house; and that he could be charged only with possession of stolen property.
A jury is entitled to accept one version of facts and reject another, or reject any or all of a witness’ testimony. See Penagraph v. State, 623 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that any rational trier of fact could have found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant asserts that an instruction on circumstantial evidence should have been given in the charge. Where a jury is properly instructed on the State’s burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and the requirement that an acquittal be entered if there existed reasonable doubt about defendant’s guilt, the trial court can properly refuse to give an instruction on circumstantial evidence. See Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 199 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). Because the charge given properly stated the State’s burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and the requirement that acquittal be entered if there existed reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt, the trial court did not err in refusing to include the circumstantial evidence instruction.
Points of error two and three are overruled.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.