Spanaway Concerned Citizens v. Pierce County; Tacoma Rescue Mission

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: June 2, 2026
• Docket: 60984-3
• Status: Published

Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two

June 2, 2026

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II SPANAWAY CONCERNED CITIZENS, No. 60984-3-II

Appellant,

v.

PIERCE COUNTY; TACOMA RESCUE PUBLISHED OPINION MISSION; AHBL, INC.,

Respondents.

CRUSER, J.—Spanaway Concerned Citizens appeal the superior court’s decision affirming

the Pierce County hearing examiner’s approval of Tacoma Rescue Mission’s planned development

district and conditional use permit application. Spanaway Concerned Citizens contends that

Tacoma Rescue Mission’s application was incomplete and therefore never vested because (1)

Tacoma Rescue Mission did not own the entire property and did not get consent from the other

property owner, the defunct Drainage District No. 15, and (2) the proposal was inconsistent with

the maximum density allowed by the Pierce County Comprehensive Plan at the time the

application was submitted.

We conclude that Spanaway Concerned Citizens has failed to demonstrate that the hearing

examiner erred because (1) it has not shown that the Drainage District has a settled, unquestioned

ownership interest in the land to be developed, and (2) Tacoma Rescue Mission’s proposal, which No. 60984-3-II

used the density calculation provisions for sleeping units provided by the Pierce County Code, was

consistent with the comprehensive plan. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS

I. BACKGROUND

In 2022, the Pierce County Council adopted a comprehensive plan to end homelessness.

One of the goals of the plan was to “Expand the Permanent Housing System to meet the need.”

PIERCE COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO END HOMELESSNESS 3 (Nov. 2021), https://www.pie

rcecountywa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/109977/Comprehensive-Plan-to-End-Homelessness-

with-Appendices-and-Shelter-Action-Plan. The plan repeatedly emphasized the need to

“[d]evelop and support shared housing units for those unable to afford living alone.” Id. 16.

A separate document, the Pierce County Comprehensive Plan, set forth the maximum

density requirements by zone in terms of dwelling units per acre. PIERCE COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE

PLAN 2-31 (July 2023) (PCCP) [https://perma.cc/366G-QEFV]; PIERCE COUNTY CODE (PCC)

18A.15.020.A.1.1 In October 2022, the Pierce County Council adopted ordinance no. 2022-49s

which amended the definition of “Dwelling unit” in PCC 18.25.030 to clarify that “[d]welling unit

does not include sleeping units.” PIERCE COUNTY ORDINANCE (PCO) 2022-49s, Ex. A at 2. The

ordinance defined “[s]leeping unit” as “a private room or suite within shared housing in which

persons sleep, and which lacks permanent, individual provisions for either cooking, eating, or

sanitation.” Id. at 6. The ordinance also defined “Shared Housing Village” as “a type of permanent

community housing where detached, private living accommodations, primarily in the form of

1 PCC 18A.15.020 has been amended multiple times since the events in this case transpired. Because these amendments do not impact our analysis, we cite to the current version. Compare Pierce County Ordinance 2022-49s § 1, with Pierce County Ordinance 2025-516s § 4.

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sleeping units, are arranged on a site and kitchen and/or sanitary facilities are shared. Shared

Housing Village may include some dwelling units.” Id. at 5. The ordinance provided that “[f]or

the Shared Housing Use Type, sleeping units which lack private provisions for cooking, eating, or

sanitation shall be equivalent to 0.25 dwelling units for purposes of calculating density.” PCO

2022-49s, Ex. B at 1.

In March 2023, the Council enacted ordinance no. 2023-5s, which authorized shared

housing villages in the residential resource zone for the Parkland-Spanaway-Midland community

plan area. PCO 2023-5s at 3. Spanaway Concerned Citizens (SCC) appealed the ordinance to the

growth management hearings board and, in a settlement agreement, the Council agreed to repeal

the ordinance. The ordinance would no longer be in effect as of December 1, 2023. See PCO 2023-

42s.

II. TACOMA RESCUE MISSION’S APPLICATION

In May 2023, after ordinance no 2023-5s went into effect, but before it was repealed,

Tacoma Rescue Mission (TRM) applied for a planned development district and conditional use

permit to build a shared housing village. The shared housing village (Village) would serve Pierce

County’s chronic homeless population. The Village would be built on 86.32 acres located in the

Parkland-Spanaway-Midland community plan area. Because 13.61 acres of the subject property

are environmentally constrained, only 72.71 acres are developable. The property is in the

“Residential Resource” zone and has a maximum allowable density of 3 dwelling units per acre,

subject to planned development district approval. PCCP 2-31 (July 2023); PCC tbl. 18A.15.020-

1. Therefore, the maximum number of dwelling units allowed on TRM’s parcel is 218. The Village

would include 189 park model style recreational vehicles, 96 micro sleeping units, and 4 single

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family dwellings. The Village would also provide communal bathrooms, laundry, and cooking

facilities.

TRM’s application included a signed attestation by an agent of TRM that TRM had the

legal right to begin the permitting process for the proposed development project. TRM also

submitted a statutory warranty deed, dated May 8, 2023, conveying the entire parcel, without

exception to TRM and proof of title insurance.

The Pierce County Department of Planning and Public Works deemed TRM’s application

complete on July 6, 2023.

III. CHALLENGE BEFORE THE HEARING EXAMINER

On November 16, 2023, Pierce County issued a mitigated determination of nonsignificance

(MDNS) related to TRM’s planned project. In December 2023, SCC appealed the MDNS for the

project. The hearing on the appeal of the MDNS was consolidated with the hearing on the approval

of the planned development district and conditional use permit application. The MDNS challenge

is not at issue on appeal.

Before the Pierce County hearing examiner, SCC argued that TRM’s planned development

district/conditional use permit application did not vest because (1) TRM did not own the entire

property and did not get consent from the other property owner, the defunct Drainage District No.

15, and (2) the proposal was inconsistent with the maximum density allowed by the comprehensive

plan at the time the application was submitted. SCC alleged that TRM never acquired title to a

720-foot-long, 25-foot-wide strip of land that was conveyed to the now-defunct Drainage District

No. 15 in a 1920 superior court order for the purpose of constructing a drainage ditch. TRM argued

that the Drainage District only ever acquired an easement to construct a ditch on the property.

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TRM further contended that even if the Drainage District retained some ownership of the property,

the strip and areas around it are critical areas that will not be disturbed or developed by the project.

The hearing examiner found that TRM’s application vested to the version of the code in

effect on the day the planned development district and conditional use permit application was filed,

May 23, 2023, and approved TRM’s application. With regard to SCC’s argument that the

application was incomplete because it was missing an attestation by all owners of the subject

property, the hearing examiner concluded that the Drainage District did not have a fee interest in

the land, but merely an easement to build a drainage ditch. The hearing examiner further concluded

that the proposal was compliant with the density requirements of the Pierce County Code and with

the version of the comprehensive plan in effect on the date the proposal vested. In reaching this

conclusion, the hearing examiner reasoned,

[s]leeping units, by definition in PCC 18.25.030, lack provisions for cooking, eating, or sanitation. For that reason, they cannot be called dwelling units, which by definition in PCC 18.25.030, have facilities for living, sleeping, eating, cooking, and sanitation. The 300 square-foot sleeping units the Applicant proposes are not merely scaled-down versions of single-family houses or other, more traditional dwelling units. The sleeping units provide a fundamentally different living experience, in which residents must walk outside to reach a shower building or a kitchen. Of course, sleeping units still do have density impacts and so it would be a mistake to ignore sleeping units altogether when calculating project densities. The Hearing Examiner finds that the 1:4 conversion provided in PCC 18A.45.030.A is a reasonable conversion ratio and is consistent with the Comprehensive Plan and with the underlying zoning density limits in PCC 18A.15.020.

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 38.

The hearing examiner approved TRM’s planned development district and conditional use

permit.

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IV. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND LAND USE PLANNING ACT APPEAL

SCC filed a motion for reconsideration. The hearing examiner denied this request. SCC

appealed the hearing examiner’s decisions to the superior court under the Land Use Planning Act

(LUPA).2 The superior court affirmed the hearing examiner. SCC appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A. LUPA Appeals

We sit in the same position as the superior court when reviewing the superior court’s

decision under LUPA and we review the record before the hearing examiner. Miller v. City of

Sammamish, 9 Wn. App. 2d 861, 870, 447 P.3d 593 (2019); RCW 36.70C.120(1). The party

seeking relief under LUPA has the burden of establishing that one of the standards set forth in

RCW 36.70C.130(1)(a) through (f) has been met. RCW 36.70C.130(1). As relevant to this appeal,

those standards are:

(b) The land use decision is an erroneous interpretation of the law, after allowing for such deference as is due the construction of a law by a local jurisdiction with expertise;

(c) The land use decision is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court;

(d) The land use decision is a clearly erroneous application of the law to the facts.

RCW 36.70C.130(1). We review questions of law de novo. Miller, 9 Wn. App. 2d at 869. Evidence

is substantial where it is sufficient to persuade a reasonable person that the premise is true. Id.

2 Ch. 36.70C RCW.

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B. Vesting Requirements

The Pierce County Code defines “[v]esting” as “the establishment of a date that is used to

determine which development regulations the Department and Hearing Examiner will apply to the

review of a complete application or approved development permit.” PCC 18.25.030.3 An

application vests when it is deemed complete. PCC 18.160.050.D. An application is considered

complete when it contains, among other things, a

[s]igned attestation by applicant or authorized agent with regard to applicant's title, legal interest, or contractual right to any real property that the applicant's application for land use permits proposes to develop ("subject property").

a. If the applicant is the owner of the subject property, the application must attest that the applicant holds title to the subject property.

Former PCC 18.40.020.C. 2 (2021).

Former PCC 18.40.020.B states that “[p]roposals that are inconsistent with the use and/or

density provisions of the Comprehensive Plan and/or development regulations shall not be

accepted.” The PCC does not define the term “accepted.” See PCC 18.25.030.

II. ATTESTATION OF OWNERSHIP VESTING REQUIREMENT

SCC contends that TRM’s application was not complete and therefore did not vest because

the defunct Drainage District No. 15 owned a portion of the land and TRM did not obtain its

consent. TRM argues that SCC’s vesting arguments are untimely, that SCC does not have standing

to challenge TRM’s title to the subject property and the examiner was without jurisdiction to

decide TRM’s ownership rights, and that the hearing examiner correctly concluded that TRM was

3 PCC 18.25.030 has been amended multiple times since the events in this case transpired. Because these amendments do not impact our analysis, we cite to the current version. Compare PCO 2022- 49s § 1, with PCO 2025-571 § 2.

7 No. 60984-3-II

not required to get the Drainage District’s consent because the 1920 decree conveyed only an

easement to the District. We conclude that the hearing examiner did not err because SCC has not

demonstrated that the Drainage District owned the ditch property.

SCC has the burden of demonstrating that the hearing examiner erred. RCW

36.70C.130(1). Here, SCC’s contention that the Drainage District owned the ditch property in fee

simple is only supported by an ambiguous 1920 superior court order allowing the District to

construct the ditch. This order is not a binding, recorded interest in the property. SCC has not

presented evidence that the Drainage District has a continuing, settled, and unquestioned

ownership interest in the land to be developed such that their approval was required for the

application to vest.

Moreover, as TRM notes, the drainage ditch is located within an undevelopable wetland

that is immaterial to TRM’s development project. To vest, TRM needed to provide a “[s]igned

attestation by applicant or authorized agent with regard to applicant's title, legal interest, or

contractual right to any real property that the applicant's application for land use permits proposes

to develop.” Former PCC 18.40.020.C.1 (emphasis added). Here, TRM did not propose to develop

the wetland property, which was undevelopable and not included in the density calculation. PCC

8 No. 60984-3-II

18A.15.020.A.2.a.1, b. Thus, SCC has not met its burden of demonstrating that the hearing

examiner erred by concluding that TRM’s application vested.4

III. CONSISTENCY WITH COMPREHENSIVE PLAN VESTING REQUIREMENT

SCC argues that TRM’s application did not vest because the proposal is inconsistent with

the maximum density allowed by the comprehensive plan. Specifically, SCC contends that the

hearing examiner erred as a matter of law by applying the density calculation for sleeping units

from the Pierce County Code to conclude that TRM’s application was consistent with the

comprehensive plan. We disagree.

Under the Growth Management Act, most counties are required to “adopt a comprehensive

plan . . . and development regulations that are consistent with and implement the comprehensive

plan.” RCW 36.70A.040(3). Our supreme court has recognized that comprehensive plans serve as

a “guide” or “blueprint” for land use decisions, and that land use regulations must generally

4 TRM argues that neither this court nor the hearing examiner has “jurisdiction” to decide TRM’s ownership rights. Br. of Resp’t TRM at 46. TRM similarly argues that SCC lacked standing to challenge TRM’s title. As an initial matter, TRM misuses the term “jurisdiction” when it is plainly referring to the hearing examiner’s authority. TRM concedes that the determination of whether an application is complete is a land use decision, and both the hearing examiner and the superior court, as well as this court, have both jurisdiction and statutory authority to decide LUPA cases. See RCW 36.70C.030, .020(2)(b). To determine whether an application has vested, the hearing examiner must determine whether the county was correct in deeming the application complete. PCC 1.22.080.B, 18.160.050. Accordingly, the hearing examiner has the authority to examine any issues related to vesting, and the challenger of the land use decision has standing to argue any issue that would be determinative of that question, to include examining whether the county was correct in deeming the application complete. TRM inaccurately recharacterizes SCC’s challenge as, essentially, a quiet title action. SCC did not ask the hearing examiner, the superior court, or this court to settle a title dispute between parties claiming an ownership interest in the parcel purchased by TRM, but rather contended that the evidence clearly showed that the Drainage District held title to a portion of the property—an assertion we reject. For this reason, TRM’s argument that SCC lacked standing to challenge TRM’s claim of title likewise fails because that is an inaccurate characterization of what SCC asked the hearing examiner to do.

9 No. 60984-3-II

conform with the comprehensive plan rather than strictly adhere to it. See Fall City Sustainable

Growth v. King County, 34 Wn. App. 2d 383, 393, 568 P.3d 1129 (2025) (discussing Woods v.

Kittitas County, 162 Wn.2d 597, 612-14, 174 P.3d 25 (2007)).

Here, the PCCP states that residential resource zoned areas should develop at densities of

“1 to 3 [dwelling] units per acre.” PCCP 2-31 (July 2023). SCC argues that the Comprehensive

plan defines dwelling unit when it states:

Housing is typically thought of in terms of multifamily apartment developments, duplexes and triplexes, and single-family homes. It includes stick-built homes, modular housing, manufactured housing, and mobile homes. The arrangement of dwelling units includes traditional units, accessory units, and a variety of non- traditional housing techniques designed to provide for people's wants and needs at a wide range of costs.

PCCP 9-2 (July 2023). This language, in the introduction of the housing element of the PCCP,

illustrates the ways in which dwelling units are typically arranged. It does not define “dwelling

unit.” Indeed, no provision of the comprehensive plan defines “dwelling unit.” “Dwelling unit” is

defined in the Pierce County Code to include “permanent provisions for living and sleeping,

kitchen facilities, and sanitation facilities”; sleeping units, by definition, lack these provisions.

PCC 18.25.030. Nothing in the comprehensive plan prevents the council from establishing a

methodology to limit the density implications of housing forms that do not meet the definition of

“dwelling unit.” As the hearing examiner observed, “sleeping units provide a fundamentally

different living experience, . . . Of course, sleeping units still do have density impacts and so it

would be a mistake to ignore sleeping units altogether when calculating project densities.” CP at

38. We agree with the hearing examiner’s finding that “the 1:4 conversion provided in PCC

18A.45.030.A is a reasonable conversion ratio.” Id. This conversion ratio is consistent with the

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PCCP and with the comprehensive plan to end homelessness’ goal of developing and supporting

shared housing units. Thus, TRM’s application vested at the time it was deemed complete.

ATTORNEY FEES

TRM and Pierce County request attorney fees under RCW 4.84.370, which provides for an

award of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party in an appeal of a land use decision. We

hold that TRM and Pierce County are entitled to attorney fees.

RCW 4.84.370(1) provides that a prevailing party on appeal of a land use decision by a

county or city shall be awarded attorney fees and costs if “(a) The prevailing party on appeal was

the prevailing or substantially prevailing party before the county, city, or town . . . ; and (b) The

prevailing party on appeal was the prevailing party or substantially prevailing party in all prior

judicial proceedings.”

Because TRM and Pierce County prevailed before the hearing examiner, the superior court,

and this court, they are entitled to attorney fees under RCW 4.84.370(1) in an amount to be

determined by the court commissioner.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that SCC has failed to demonstrate that the hearing examiner erred because

(1) it has not demonstrated that the Drainage District has a settled, unquestioned ownership interest

in the land to be developed, and (2) TRM’s proposal, which used the density calculation provisions

for sleeping units provided by the Pierce County Code, was consistent with the Comprehensive

Plan. Accordingly, we affirm and award TRM and Pierce County attorney fees under RCW

4.84.370(1).

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CRUSER, J. I concur:

GLASGOW, J.

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VELJACIC, C.J. (concurring) — I agree with my colleagues in the majority that Tacoma

Rescue Mission’s (TRM’s) proposal is consistent with Pierce County’s Comprehensive Plan. I

also agree that TRM’s application should not have been denied for lack of ownership of the entirety

of the subject property.

I write separately because, in my view, TRM satisfied the application’s requirements by

attesting to its ownership. The hearing examiner lacked authority to conduct a title examination

beyond confirming that an attestation was made by the owner.

Pierce County Code (PCC) 18.40.020(C) directs Pierce County Public Works to review a

land use application to determine whether the required components have been included before

deeming the application complete. Among those required components is a signed attestation

regarding the applicant’s title, legal interest, or contractual right to the subject property. As TRM5

points out, PCC 18.40.020(C) directs Pierce County Public Works to “check” a submitted land use

application to confirm that components are included therein before it is determined to be complete.

The provision does not require investigation into the accuracy and truthfulness of the information

provided.

5 TRM couches its argument in terms of standing and jurisdiction, even calling into question this court’s jurisdiction at one point in its brief. We need not address standing or jurisdiction, as an analysis of the hearing examiner’s authority is sufficient to resolve the question here. Moreover, we use the term “authority,” rather than “jurisdiction,” where possible to avoid confusion. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “jurisdiction” is “a word of many, too many, meanings.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998). Likewise, our Supreme Court has observed that the “improvident and inconsistent” use of the term “subject matter jurisdiction” has led courts to conflate true jurisdictional questions with issues concerning the authority to act in a particular manner. Marley v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 125 Wn.2d 533, 539, 886 P.2d 189 (1994).

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TRM provided the necessary attestation. In addition, and not required by the ordinance,

TRM provided a statutory warranty deed. Under the plain language of the ordinance, the

attestation was enough to satisfy that portion of the permit; the deed was more.

The Pierce County Hearing Examiner’s powers are set out in PCC 1.22.080. They are

limited to determining whether a particular application for development is consistent with

applicable law for the type of development at issue. Nowhere in PCC 1.22.080 does it enumerate

that the hearing examiner may litigate claims to title.

Indeed, no authority exists providing that the hearing examiner may litigate title to

property. There would be grave disorder to our system of title ownership and conveyance if a land

use hearing examiner were allowed to deprive an owner of title without due process protections

commensurate with such a deprivation. Moreover, a hearing examiner would lack any ability to

provide a remedy should the examiner declare title is in one other than the purported owner; the

examiner cannot require issuance of a deed. Litigating title outside of a court of law could amount

to a cloud to title. See Robinson v. Khan, 89 Wn. App. 418, 423, 948 P.2d 1347 (1998); RCW

7.28.100. The hearing examiner erred by effectively litigating title; Spanaway Concerned

Citizen’s attempted challenge to TRM’s title in order to prevent vesting should fail on this basis

without an analysis of the merits of the hearing examiner’s decision regarding title.

Veljacic, C.J.