Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Metro-Link Telecom, Inc.

919 S.W.2d 687, 1996 WL 41880
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedApril 4, 1996
Docket14-93-00987-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by43 cases

This text of 919 S.W.2d 687 (Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Metro-Link Telecom, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Metro-Link Telecom, Inc., 919 S.W.2d 687, 1996 WL 41880 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

*689 OPINION

FOWLER, Justice.

Metro-Link Telecom, Inc. (Metro-Link) sued Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (Bell) for: (1) attempting to compel Metro-Link to pay higher rates than Bell had initially agreed to charge; (2) for taking away some services Bell agreed to give; and (8) for threatening to take away other services Bell agreed to give Metro-Link. Bell claims among other things that it is immune from suit because it is required to provide services and charge rates in accordance with its tariffs filed with the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), and that the rates and services Metro-Link was using violated its filed tariffs. The case went to trial before a jury who awarded Metro-Link $5 million. Bell brings twenty-eight points of error attacking not only the jury’s findings, but also the trial court’s refusal to find Bell immune as a matter of law. Metro-Link brings three cross-points complaining about certain rulings of the court.

We reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment that Metro-Link take nothing in its suit against Bell because we conclude that the filed rate doctrine applies to this case and shields Bell from suit for its actions.

I. A ROADMAP

This case revolves around a service arrangement between Bell and Metro-Link in which Bell provided products and services to Metro-Link at local rates and Metro-Link used the products and services to provide long distance service to its customers. As noted above, Metro-Link sued because Bell: (1) attempted to make Metro-Link pay the normal rates for long distance service; (2) took some services away from Metro-Link after telling Metro-Link that the services were reserved for local, not long distance, customers; and (3) threatened to take other services away from Metro-Link. At the outset, Bell raises as a defense to the suit a legal doctrine, called the filed rate doctrine, which, if applicable, makes Bell immune from suit. Because of its importance, we must discuss at length that doctrine and its applicability. However, before we can even consider the filed rate doctrine, we must first review and explain: (1) the applicable regulatory background; (2) certain technical terms pertinent to this decision; (3) the nature of the tariff structure in Texas; (4) the configuration of Metro-Link’s system; and finally, (5) the differences between local telephone providers and long distance providers and the rates they must pay. This last topic, the differences between local telephone providers and long distance providers, pervades the entire opinion because it provides the basis for understanding why we ultimately conclude that Bell is immune from suit.

II. TECHNICAL AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND

Bell is a public utility providing local and long distance telephone service. Metro-Link provides long distance telephone service, but not as a public utility. It is a private business. It provides some of its own equipment and then uses Bell’s system to provide its customers with service. Metro-Link purchases services directly from Bell and then resells the services to its customers.

As indicated in the preceding paragraph, this case necessarily involves many technical and legal issues unique to the telephone industry and public utilities. In addition, the ease turns on events that occurred in the telephone industry nationwide and in Texas in the early 1980s. These events and issues comprise the backdrop for understanding the conclusion that we reach, and ultimately, dictate that conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph, 552 F.Supp. 131 (D.D.C.1982), aff'd, 460 U.S. 1001, 103 S.Ct. 1240, 75 L.Ed.2d 472 (1983), modf'd, United States v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 569 F.Supp. 990 (D.C.Cir.1983); Public Utility Comm’n v. AT & T Communications, 111 S.W.2d 363 (Tex.1989) (“AT & T Communications”).

In 1982, the telephone giant AT & T was found to be a monopoly and ordered to reorganize under the divestiture decree entered in American Telephone & Telegraph and Western Electric. This reorganization not only split up AT & T’s corporate components, but also impacted the provision of telephone *690 service nationwide. The divestiture drastically changed the landscape of the telephone industry. It divested AT & T of its regional operating companies, which previously were responsible for local telephone service. The divestiture also created 161 distinct geographic areas within the United States. Each of the regional operating companies provide telephone service in these areas called local access transport areas or “LA-TAs.” See Western Electric, 569 F.Supp. at 993-95. Each Bell operating company, including Southwestern Bell, is allowed to provide long distance services within a LATA (intraLATA), but not between LATAs (inter-LATA). As the court in Western Electric put it: “Most simply, a LATA marks the boundaries beyond which a Bell Operating Company may not carry telephone calls.” Id. at 994. Service between LATAs is left to long distance companies unrelated to the Bell operating companies, companies such as AT & T, MCI, and Sprint. Id.

The LATA involved in this suit is the Houston LATA, which includes the Houston area (the “718” calling area) and the Galveston-Texas City area (part of the “409” calling area). Although the divestiture decree specifically prohibits Bell operating companies from providing interLATA service, it does not state who could provide long distance service intraLATA This decision is left to each of the States.

Prior to the divestiture, Texas regulated the telephone industry, recognizing that the provision of telephone service is a monopolistic venture. In 1975, the Texas Legislature enacted the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) to regulate the telephone industry in the State. The PURA operates as a substitute for “the normal forces of competition which operate to regulate prices in a free enterprise society” and prohibits any public utility from charging rates or providing services that are “unreasonably preferential, prejudicial or discriminatory.” Tex.Rev.Civ. StatAnn. art. 1446, §§ 2, 38, 45 (Vernon Supp.1995). The Legislature also created the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to oversee the regulation of public utilities in Texas. Id. § 32.

After the divestiture, the PUC recognized that it needed to create a new rate structure for telephone service in Texas. Consequently, the PUC began proceedings in Texas to determine a rate structure for intraLATA and interLATA telephone service. The proceedings involved not only the Bell operating companies, but also long distance companies, such as Sprint, MCI, and AT & T. These companies are called interexchange carriers (“IXCs”), a label created by the divestiture decree. See Western Electric Co., 569 F.Supp. at 994; AT & T Communications, 111 S.W.2d at 368 (Mauzy, J., concurring). Although IXCs are long distance carriers, they must access the local telephone system to provide long distance service to their customers.

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Bluebook (online)
919 S.W.2d 687, 1996 WL 41880, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/southwestern-bell-telephone-co-v-metro-link-telecom-inc-texapp-1996.