Southwest Research Institute and Mark E. Van Dyke v. Keraplast Technologies, Ltd.
This text of Southwest Research Institute and Mark E. Van Dyke v. Keraplast Technologies, Ltd. (Southwest Research Institute and Mark E. Van Dyke v. Keraplast Technologies, Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
No. 04-02-00589-CV
SOUTHWEST RESEARCH INSTITUTE & Mark E. Van Dyke,
Appellants
v.
KERAPLAST TECHNOLOGIES, LTD.,
Appellee
From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2002-CI-09879
Honorable John J. Specia, Jr., Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Paul W. Green, Justice
Sitting: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice (1)
Paul W. Green, Justice
Sarah B. Duncan, Justice
Delivered and Filed: January 8, 2003
VACATED; APPEAL DISMISSED
Appellants Southwest Research Institute (SWRI) and Dr. Mark E. Van Dyke bring this accelerated appeal challenging two temporary injunctions broadly prohibiting SWRI and Dr. Van Dyke from researching, publishing, or disseminating information related to the entire field of keratin-based technology. We vacate the temporary injunctions and dismiss the appeal.
Background
SWRI is a nonprofit research and development organization providing research, engineering, and testing resources for businesses and government agencies. Over a period of approximately ten years, Keraplast Technologies, Ltd. contracted with SWRI for SWRI to undertake several keratin-based research projects. (2) From the results of these projects, Keraplast hoped to obtain a number of patents for keratin and keratin-based products and processes on which Keraplast could build its business. Each research project was detailed by a separate contract describing the terms of the relationship and the scope of the research to be performed.
In 2000, Keraplast and SWRI experienced a difference of opinion regarding the scope of information that Keraplast claimed as its confidential and proprietary property. This dispute was compromised when SWRI assigned two of its keratin-based patent applications to Keraplast. However, SWRI thereafter declined to perform any further research projects for Keraplast, and the contractual relationship was formally terminated on March 30, 2001.
SWRI then began its own program of keratin-based research projects headed by Dr. Van Dyke, who had previously performed much of the Keraplast research. SWRI and Dr. Van Dyke claim they took extraordinary measures to ensure that SWRI's current projects are not based on any confidential or proprietary information belonging to Keraplast. Keraplast contends that Dr. Van Dyke's published and pending papers and speeches and SWRI's patent applications and advertisements show SWRI is using for its own gain, and disseminating to the public, trade secrets that belong to Keraplast.
Keraplast filed suit to prevent SWRI's conduct and obtained two temporary injunctions, prohibiting SWRI and Dr. Van Dyke, respectively, from "publishing, disseminating, or communicating . . . any information regarding or relating to Keratin-based technology . . ., including without limitation, presentations, interviews, papers, advertisements, electronic or written communication or business inquiries. Keratin-based technology is broadly defined as:
any technology based on, or associated with technology based on, processed keratinous material or tissue wherein during the processing of the keratinous material the keratin is chemically modified
The temporary injunction against SWRI also prohibits the following acts with respect to keratin-based technology:
(1) "file any patent application" in the United States or under the patent law of any foreign country;
(2) "initiate any tests or other research to be performed by third parties;" and
(3) "make application for funding of research grants from or submit contract research proposals to any private enterprise or government or public agency."
The injunction order allows SWRI to pursue currently pending patent applications, to continue current in-house research or projects already under contract with third parties, and to continue pursuit of certain research grants and contract proposals already in progress. SWRI and Dr. Van Dyke challenge the temporary injunctions as unwarranted, overbroad, and a prior restraint on free speech.
Standard of Review
We review the grant or denial of a temporary injunction for clear abuse of discretion without addressing the merits of the underlying case. Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993); Ireland v. Franklin, 950 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ). At the hearing for the temporary injunction, the applicant is not required to prove that he will prevail at trial but must establish the right to preserve the status quo pending trial on the merits by showing: (1) a probable right of recovery, (2) imminent, irreparable harm in the interim, and (3) lack of an adequate remedy at law. Sun Oil Whittaker, 424 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. 1968); Ireland, 950 S.W.2d at 157. We will draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in a manner most favorable to the trial court's judgment. Ireland, 950 S.W.2d at 157. The trial court does not abuse its discretion when it bases its decision regarding the existence of a probable right and injury on conflicting evidence in the record. Id. (citing Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. 1978)).
The improper use of trade secrets provides a proper basis for an injunction. Gonzales v. Zamora, 791 S.W.2d 258, 268 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ). However, every order granting an injunction must be specific in its terms and describe in reasonable detail the act or acts to be restrained. Tex. R. Civ. P. 683; Gonzales, 791 S.W.2d at 267. In a case involving trade secrets, the injunction must also be narrowly tailored to address the improper use of confidential or proprietary information only. Id. at 268. Further, the injunction must not be "framed so broadly as to prohibit the enjoyment of lawful rights." Kulkarni v. Braeburn Valley West Civil Ass'n, 880 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ); see also Ex parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Tex. 1993) (free speech "may not be restricted solely on the grounds that its exercise will have the effect of producing imminent and irreparable harm").
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