Southern Ry. Co. v. Alabama Public Service Commission

91 F. Supp. 980, 1950 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2869
District Court, M.D. Alabama·Decided July 20, 1950·No. Civ. A. 681·Published·Cited by 8 cases

Opinion

LYNNE, District Judge.

Resting the jurisdiction of the district court upon the Federal question and amount in controversy provisions of Title 28, § 1331, U.S.C.A., or upon the diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy provisions of Title 28, § 1332, U.S.C.A., and that of a district court of three judges upon the provisions of Title 28, § 2281, U. S.C.A., plaintiff, a Virginia corporation, complained of the Alabama defendants and prayed for both temporary and permanent injunctive relief against them.

Plaintiff’s basic insistence is that the revenue derived from the operation of its passenger trains Nos. 7 and 8 between Tuscumbia, Alabama, and 'Chattanooga, Tennessee, is grossly disproportionate to the direct expenses and that the continuation of such train service is not demanded or required by the public necessities.

*983 Alleging the exhaustion of administrative remedies, plaintiff exhibits its petition for a permit allowing abandonment of such service, filed with defendant, Alabama Public Service Commission, September 13, 1948, pursuant to the requirements of Title 48, §§ 35 and 106, Code of Alabama 1940. There follow averments calculated to show undue delay in the hearing and consideration of the petition culminating in an adverse order entered by defendant Commission on April 3, 1950.

Emphasizing the impact of the Commission’s order within the framework of the statutory scheme of regulating transportation companies, Title 48, Code of Alabama 1940, plaintiff makes clear that it is impaled on the horns of a dilemma. If it continues the operation of such trains, it will lose substantial sums of money. If it ignores the Commission’s order and abandons such services, it will face the imposition of severe sanctions under pertinent statutes. Either course, it complains, will result in irreparable damage unless this court grants injunctive relief.

Following the constitution of a three-judge district court in conformity with the provisions of Title 28, § 2281, U.S.C.A., this action was, on May 8, 1950, set down for a hearing on plaintiff’s prayer for a temporary injunction at Montgomery, Alabama, on May 22, 1950.

Upon its convocation, this court was met at the threshold with three several motions, in which all defendants joined, raising certain adjective problems relating to the jurisdiction of the court, the propriety of exercising such jurisdiction as it might be found to have, and the right of plaintiff to injunctive relief in any event.

At the conclusion of oral arguments, the court, after consultation, announced its opinion that each of such motions was due to be overruled for reasons thereafter to be stated. Whereupon, it was stipulated by counsel for the parties that evidence should be adduced and the case submitted upon plaintiff’s prayer for a permanent injunction.

I. Adopting a literal construction of the following language of Title 28, § 2281, U.S.C.A.: “An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title. [June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 968.]” defendants challenge the jurisdiction of this District Court of three judges because no attack is leveled at the constitutionality of the State statutes under which the defendant Commission acted. Since, it is argued, plaintiff does not seek an adjudication of unconstitutionality of such statutes, but relies squarely upon the assertion that the order of the defendant Commission denying plaintiff the right to abandon the passenger train service concerned is confiscatory in effect and therefore violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the quoted statute is manifestly inapplicable.

Dispositive of this contention is Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 1923, 261 U.S. 290, 43 S.Ct. 353, 67 L.Ed. 659, in which Mr. Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion for a unanimous court, stated: “A doubt has been suggested whether these cases are within Sec. 266 of the Judicial Code, Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, 1162; as amended by the Act of March 4, 1913, c. 160, 37 Stat. 1013. The section originally forbade interlocutory injunctions restraining the action of state officers in the enforcement or execution of any statute of a State, upon the ground of its unconstitutionality, without a hearing by three judges. The amendment inserted after the words ‘enforcement or execution of such statute’ the words ‘or in the enforcement or execution of an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under and pursuant to the statutes of such State’ but did not change the statement of the ground, which *984 still reads .‘the unconstitutionality of such statute.’ So if the section is construed with narrow precision it may be argued that the unconstitutionality of the order is not enough. But this Court has assumed repeatedly that the section was to be taken more broadly. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Finn, 235 U.S. 601, 604, 35 S.Ct. 146, 59 L.Ed. 379; Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Geary, 239 U.S. 277, 280, 281, 36 S.Ct. 45, 60 L.Ed. 287; Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 260 U.S. 212, 43 S.Ct. 75, 67 L.Ed. 217; Western & Atlantic R.R. v. Railroad Commission of Georgia, 261 U.S. 264, 43 S.Ct. 252, 67 L.Ed. 645. The amendment seems to have been introduced to prevent any question that such orders were within the section. It was superfluous, as the original statute covered them. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298, 301, 318, 34 S.Ct. 48, 58 L.Ed. 229; Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Golds-boro, 232 U.S. 548, 555, 34 S.Ct. 364, 58 L.Ed. 721; Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Indiana, 221 U. S. 400, 403, 31 S.Ct. 537, 55 L.Ed. 786. But it plainly was intended to enlarge not to restrict the law. We mention the matter simply to put doubts to rest.”

We hold that a Federal three-judge district court has jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging the unconstitutionality of an order of an administrative board or commission, acting under a State statute and praying for injunctive relief against the enforcement, operation or execution of such order, although no attack is made upon the validity of the statute itself. 1

II.

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Southern Ry. Co. v. Alabama Public Service Commission, 91 F. Supp. 980, 1950 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2869 (M.D. Ala. 1950).

91 F. Supp. 980 (Southern Ry. Co. v. Alabama Public Service Commission) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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