Southern Pacific Co. v. Fisher

274 P. 779, 35 Ariz. 87, 1929 Ariz. LEXIS 120
CourtArizona Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 18, 1929
DocketCivil No. 2790.
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 274 P. 779 (Southern Pacific Co. v. Fisher) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Arizona Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Southern Pacific Co. v. Fisher, 274 P. 779, 35 Ariz. 87, 1929 Ariz. LEXIS 120 (Ark. 1929).

Opinion

ROSS, J

The widow and administratrix of Harry L. Fisher brought this action against the Southern Pacific Company, its engineer, Claude J. Maben, and its fireman, Fred E. Woodworth, charging them with negligently causing the death of said Harry L. Fisher in a collision at a railroad crossing in the town of Casa Grande, Pinal county, Arizona.

The specific acts of negligence are set out in her complaint as follows:

“ . . . Said defendant sounded no whistle, nor any bell for eighty rods and more, nor at all, on the immediate approach and immediately back of said crossing; . . . that said train was . . . traveling at a very high rate of speed, to-wit: thirty-five miles an hour or more; that by reason of said rate of speed, and by reason of the fact that the said engineer or train sounded no whistle nor rang any bell, nor gave any warning of its approach, the said Harry L. Fisher, though using due care and caution . . . was by said locomotive and train run into and the automobile in which he was then riding .... collided with and was demolished,” and injured said Harry L. Fisher so that he died; “that the direct, immediate *89 and proximate canse of the injury to, and the death of, said Harry L. Fisher, was the negligent omissions of said defendant to sound any whistle or ring any bell or give any warning of the approach of said engine, or train, as above specifically set forth.”

The defendants answered separately by general denials, and the railroad company in addition alleged that the accident and death were caused solely by the gross negligence and fault of the deceased.

The plaintiff had a verdict and judgment against the defendants for $10,000. They have appealed from the order overruling their motion for a new trial, and from the judgment.

There are sixteen assignments of error. Under the one that the court erred in denying defendants’ motion for a directed verdict at the close of defendants’ case, we shall examine the transcript of the testimony with a view of determining if there is any substantial evidence to support the allegations of negligence. If not, or if it shall appear therefrom that the decedent’s death was due to his sole negligence, it will not be necessary to consider the other assignments.

We first direct attention to the allegation of negligence chargud in the complaint and the issues therein tendered. There is no general allegation of negligence and the specific negligence relied on is, to say the least, rather peculiarly phrased. Omissions to warn, and the speed of the train, are in one place stated to have been the cause of the death of plaintiff’s intestate, and in another it is stated that the omission to warn was the “direct, immediate and proximate cause of the injury and the death.” The exact language in the first allegation is “that, by reason of said rate of speed, and by reason of the fact that the said engineer or train sounded no whistle nor rang any bell, nor gave any warning of its approach,” the deceased was run into. The com *90 bination of these two delicts is assigned as the canse of the injury and death.

The failure to give warning of the approach of a train to a public crossing’ by blowing the whistle or ringing the bell is, under the statutes of this state, negligence per se (White v. Arizona Eastern Ry. Co., 30 Ariz. 151, 245 Pac. 270), regardless of the speed of the train. But the converse is not true. We have no statute, and the town of Casa Grande had no ordinance regulating the speed of trains. In the absence of such regulation, speed alone is not negligence. Larrabee v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 173 Cal. 743, 161 Pac. 750; 22 R. C. L. 1011, § 242. Evidence supporting the allegation of speed is not enough to make out the case alleged. It must go further and show that the omission to warn by signals, and the rate of speed, combined to cause the injury and death. Such is the allegation. But that the theory of the complaint was the omission to give warning by proper and adequate signals is manifest by the following allegation thereof:

“That the direct, immediate and proximate cause of the injury to, and the death of, said Harry L. Fisher, was the negligent omissions of said defendant to sound any whistle or ring any bell or give any warning of the approach of said engine, or train, as above specifically set forth. ’ ’

Bearing in mind the particular kind of negligence that is alleged, we state the pertinent evidence upon that issue.

The accident occurred on August 18, 1925, at about 8:40 A. M., at what is known as the Florence Street crossing in the town of Casa Grande. The defendant company’s track runs through the town in an easterly and westerly direction, and crosses Florence Street at right" angles. The train was headed west, while the deceased approached the crossing from the north, *91 on Florence Street, driving a Ford truck. One thousand three hundred fifty feet east of Florence Street crossing there is another crossing known as the Williams crossing. One thousand fifty feet east of the Florence Street crossing, on the north side of the track, are the section, bunk, and pump houses, and the depot is about 300 feet west of Florence Street. North Main Street is north, and South Main Street south, of the track and intersect Florence Street at the same angle as the railroad track. On these two main streets are located business houses and residences facing the track.

The deceased and his wife, the plaintiff, lived about 350 feet southwesterly from the Florence Street crossing, south of the depot on South Main Street. The American Express office is in the same yard. The deceased had lived in Casa Grande six years, and at the time of the accident, and for three or four years prior thereto, was the agent of the express company. He was familiar with the Florence Street crossing; had passed over it many times every day in looking after the express business. He was an experienced driver of automobiles, in good health, and in the possession of all his faculties. The morning of the accident he went from his home and the express office to meet an eight o ’clock passenger train. After meeting the train he made some calls on the north side of the track, and was on his way back to his home or the express office when he was killed. The evidence is that the atmospheric conditions were favorable to seeing and hearing.

That the deceased could have heard the approaching train, had he stopped and listened, and that, had he looked, he would have seen the train in ample time to have avoided the accident, seems certain. He was seen from the engine when he was 30 to 40 feet from the crossing. Conversely, he should have seen *92 the engine. He and the train were both within the vision of onlookers standing near the track, when he was from 35 to 40 feet from the railroad crossing, and the engine 600 feet. Of the twenty-one witnesses who testified in the ease, only four said they did not hear the train’s warning, and, as we shall see from their testimony, these were paying no attention to the train or deceased until after the accident.

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Bluebook (online)
274 P. 779, 35 Ariz. 87, 1929 Ariz. LEXIS 120, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/southern-pacific-co-v-fisher-ariz-1929.