Southern New England Telephone Co. v. MCI Worldcom Communications, Inc.

353 F. Supp. 2d 287, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1198, 2005 WL 217022
CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedJanuary 28, 2005
DocketCIV.A.3:02 CV 274(SRU)
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 353 F. Supp. 2d 287 (Southern New England Telephone Co. v. MCI Worldcom Communications, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Southern New England Telephone Co. v. MCI Worldcom Communications, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 287, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1198, 2005 WL 217022 (D. Conn. 2005).

Opinion

*289 DECISION AND ORDER

UNDERHILL, District Judge.

On November 21, 2001, the Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control (“the DPUC”) issued a decision setting out the terms it required the Southern New England Telephone Company (“SNET”) and MCI WorldCom Communications, Inc., MCI Metro Access Transmission Services, Inc., and Brooks Fiber Communications of Connecticut (collectively “MCI”) to include in their proposed telecommunications interconnection agreement. SNET and MCI both challenge that decision, each arguing that several of the required terms are inconsistent with the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“the 1996 Act” or “the Act”) and each seeking, by way of summary judgment, a ruling vacating the terms it challenges and upholding the terms its opponent challenges. The DPUC argues that all the challenged terms are permissible and must be left untouched. I conclude that all of the challenged terms are either inconsistent with federal law or arbitrary and capricious, and I remand the case to the DPUC for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

I. The Telecommunications Act of 1996

Discarding the notion that telecommunications services are most efficiently provided by a state-regulated monopoly, the 1996 Act creates a federal regime designed to loosen the grip of incumbent local exchange carriers (“ILECs”) on the telecommunications market and to allow the entry into that market of competitive local exchange carriers (“CLECs”). Towards that end, the Act imposes a number of obligations on local exchange carriers in general and incumbent local exchange carriers in particular; three are relevant to this case.

Reciprocal Compensation. All local exchange carriers are required to “establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunications.” 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5). In general, this requirement means that, for calls originating on one carrier’s network and terminating on another’s, the two carriers involved must arrange for the originating carrier, which typically bills the customer directly, to compensate the terminating carrier, which typically cannot bill the customer, for the use of the terminating carrier’s network.

Dialing Parity. All local exchange carriers must allow their competitors “to have nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers, operator services, directory assistance, and directory listing, with no unreasonable dialing delays.” 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3).

Unbundled Access. An incumbent local exchange carrier must provide requesting competitive local exchange carriers with unbundled access to the elements of the incumbent’s telecommunications network. Unbundled access means “nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiseriminato-ry.” 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).

ILECs and CLECs arrange to satisfy their federal obligations by entering into “interconnection agreements,” which govern all aspects of their relationship, including the issues of reciprocal compensation, dialing parity, and unbundled access. In the first instance, carriers attempt to voluntarily negotiate their interconnection agreement, but, if that fails, either party may seek compulsory arbitration by the relevant state public utility commission. 47 U.S.C. § 252(b). Once an agreement is reached, either voluntarily or through arbi *290 tration, it is submitted to the state public utility commission, where it is reviewed for, among other things, compliance with federal law. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e). Any party aggrieved by the state commission’s decision may bring an action in federal district court. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6).

II. SNET and MCI’s History

SNET is Connecticut’s ILEC. MCI is a CLEC. In January 2000, SNET and MCI began negotiating an interconnection agreement but failed to reach a consensus: MCI petitioned the DPUC for arbitration. The DPUC assigned the arbitration to one of its commissioners who issued a decision on May 15, 2001. Over SNET’s objection, the DPUC adopted the arbitrator’s decision as the commission’s final decision (“the Final Decision”).

On February 14, 2002, SNET brought this suit, in which it challenges four of the determinations made by the DPUC in the Final Decision. MCI defends the DPUC’s actions on those four issues, but claims that two other determinations in the Final Decision are incorrect. SNET denies that the two issues raised by MCI pose any problem. The DPUC maintains that its decision was correct in all material respects.

In August 2002, the DPUC voluntarily reopened proceedings in this case to consider whether the Final Decision required modification in light of changes in federal law. On November 13, 2002, the DPUC issued a ruling concluding that the Final Decision needed no change.

SNET and MCI have both moved for summary judgment on their respective claims and against the other’s claims. The DPUC opposes both motions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The 1996 Act does not explain how district courts are to review the determinations of state public utility commissions. Those courts that have faced the issue have uniformly concluded that a state commission’s interpretations of federal law are reviewed de novo, but its interpretations of state law and its findings of fact are reviewed under an “arbitrary and capricious” standard. See SNET v. DPUC, 285 F.Supp.2d 252, 258 (D.Conn.2003) (collecting cases); Global NAPS, Inc. v. Verizon New England Inc., 327 F.Supp.2d 290, 296 (D.Vt.2004) (collecting cases).

In reviewing an agency’s decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard, a court will uphold the agency’s decision if it can discern a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. SNET v. DPUC, 285 F.Supp.2d at 258. The court may not, however, supply a reason for the agency’s decision that the agency itself has not given. Id.

When reviewing an agency’s interpretation of federal law, the court applies the law in effect at the time it conducts its review, even if that was not the law in effect at the time the agency made its decision. Pacific Bell v. Pac-West Telecomm, Inc., 325 F.3d 1114, 1130 n. 14 (9th Cir.2003) (citing U.S. West v. Jennings, 304 F.3d 950, 956 (9th Cir.2002)).

Though they filed motions for summary judgment, SNET and MCI effectively seek an administrative appeal of the DPUC’s determination under the standards just given.

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353 F. Supp. 2d 287, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1198, 2005 WL 217022, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/southern-new-england-telephone-co-v-mci-worldcom-communications-inc-ctd-2005.