Southern Mutual Insurance v. Pike

32 La. Ann. 483
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedMarch 15, 1880
DocketNo. 7051
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 32 La. Ann. 483 (Southern Mutual Insurance v. Pike) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Southern Mutual Insurance v. Pike, 32 La. Ann. 483 (La. 1880).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

DeBlanc, J.

The marked ability with which this important-cause has been prosecuted and defended, has enlarged its real proportion.

The Southern Mutual Insurance Company was organized by an act of the Legislature of this State, approved on the 12th of March 1855, and' — according to the first section of said act — was to continue for and during the term of twenty-five years.

The officers of the company were to be elected on the third Thursday of January of each and every year, and — as such — were to serve until the next general election, and until their successors had qualified.

The powers delegated to the corporation by the statute of 1855, were — by its directors — transferred to its first president and treasurer, William S. Pike, Senior, who died on the 17th of January 1875, more than five years before the term fixed by the act of 1855 for the expiration of the company’s charter.

As president, the entire business of the corporation was conducted by him — as treasurer, the whole of its assets were entrusted to his care. In those capacities, lie had in his possession — from the date when the company was organized and until his death — the books, papers, bills receivable, cash, and — without exception — all that belonged to it.

He was a trustee invested with almost unlimited authority, and in whom his associates had reposed an unlimited confidence. He died owing and promising an account of his trust. That account, which he was compelled and willing to render, is now asked of one who — as his legal representative — has unreservedly accepted his succession, and who — by the effect of that pure and simple acceptance — is bound to discharge those of his parent’s obligations which are still in force.

What is then asked of defendant? Not exclusively the payment of a debt which may exist, but the existence of which is not yet ascertained — not merely the satisfaction of an obligation for which' — primarily — his parent may have been individually liable, but the execution of his parent’s obligation as president and treasurer of the corporation, an account of the trust confided to his integrity, the delivery of notes, cash and effects, which — as an agent and a depositary — he held exclusively for and as the absolute property of the insurance company.

[485]*485As against that part of the otherwise too broad and too collective demand of the company, the only prescription, if any, which might be invoked by defendant, is — beyond a doubt — the prescription acqui-rendi causa; and — in this instance — to effectually oppose it to plaintiff’s action, he would have to accomplish the more than difficult task of maintaining that one who — as the deceased — combined the responsible functions of president and treasurer of a corporation — could—while acting and holding as such and for others, acquire — by the lapse of time and a prolonged neglect, a valid title to the property left in his charge as an agent.

That pretension is untenable. The deposit must be restored to the depositor as soon as he demands it, oven though the contract may havo specified when it is to be restored: no surrender can relieve an unfaithful agent from that obligation ; and one, or the heir of one, who possesses for another and not in his own name cannot prescribe, whatever may be the length of his possession, unless he evinces — by an external act, or a declaration inconsistent with or adverse to his precarious tenure — an undisguised and open intention of changing the origin, the cause and the character of his anterior possession.

C. C. 2955 (2926); 3510 (3476) ; 3511 (3477); 3512 (3478).

“ Mais il faut — said DeLaporte — que les actes de contradiction soient forméis et positifs ; en sorte qu’il soit constant extórieurement qu’on a eu dessein de possóder ce que Ton pretend avoir preserit, particulierement á 1’égard des dioses que Ton ne possede pas sans quelque fait. II ne suffirait pas, par exomple, qu’un fermier prétendit jouir comme propriótaire, s’il ne l’avait pas manifestó par quelqu’acte, quand máme il demeurait cent ans sans payer le prix de la ferme, parcequ’il parait toujours sous la qualité de fermier.”

Traite des Prescriptions, pp. 67 and 68.

Tile company’s charter which was “ to continue for and during the term of twenty-five years,” does not appear to havo been forfeited. From March 1861 up to January 1875, Pike alone acted, or at least could have acted as its president and treasurer: he did not officially resign those functions, nor did he ever express to any one of the interested parties, the intention of renouncing the important mandate which he had received from the board of directors. He drew his salary as president up to January 1865 ; declared — in 1863 — that he had never taken, any thing for insurance that was not equivalent to gold and silver, and— in 1861 — removed a considerable quantity of gold and silver from the vault of the old bank in Baton Rouge. In 1871 — said his confidential clerk — from entries which he made in Mr. Pike’s private books, and under his direction, Mr. Pike still held possession of the papers and assets of the insurance company. In and before the month of August [486]*4861874, he remarked in conversations with other parties, that he could and would settle with every one connected with the company, but that he could not do it at that time, for the reason that he could not then withdraw so much money from his business in New Orleans.

The entries made on the books of the corporation, by the deceased himself, and either as president or as treasurer, or by any one under his direction, constitute — as against his succession, and legal representatives — a standing acknowledgment of his liabilities in his two recited capacities; and though that acknowledgment may be explained,, corrected or varied, though the apparent liabilities may be increased, reduced or shown to have been satisfied or extinguished, those entries— such as they are — must necessarily form the basis of the account to be rendered by his representative.'

Call Mr. Pike by whatever name the ingenuity of counsel may suggest, he held and possessed — not in his own name — but for others, whose rights he never denied or contested. Ear from openly resisting the exercise of their rights, he — on at least two different occasions — promised to account to the company. He could not alone and secretly, without any verbal or written notice to any one, without an overt act which might have been construed as amounting to a notice of his intention, change the character of his limited and qualified possession. His refusal would not have lessened, his promise did not add to, his obligation to account.

Marcadé, de la Prescription, p. 113.

If — as stated — Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
32 La. Ann. 483, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/southern-mutual-insurance-v-pike-la-1880.