Southern Corporate Packers, Inc. v. American Fruit & Produce Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedApril 2, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-21147
StatusUnknown

This text of Southern Corporate Packers, Inc. v. American Fruit & Produce Corporation (Southern Corporate Packers, Inc. v. American Fruit & Produce Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Southern Corporate Packers, Inc. v. American Fruit & Produce Corporation, (S.D. Fla. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 21-cv-21147-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

SOUTHERN CORPORATE PACKERS, INC. and FLORIDA VEG INVESTMENTS LLC doing business as Mr. Greens Produce,

Plaintiffs,

v.

AMERICAN FRUIT & PRODUCE CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants. ____________________________________/

ORDER ON EX-PARTE MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiffs, Southern Corporate Packers, Inc. (“Southern”) and Florida Veg Investments LLC’s (“Mr. Greens”) (together, “Plaintiffs”), Ex-Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. [11] (“Motion”). The Court has reviewed the Motion, the Memorandum in Support, ECF No. [11-2], the Affidavit of Jorge Pedraza, ECF No. [11-3] (“Pedraza Aff.”), the Affidavit of Brian Arrigo, ECF No. [11-4] (“Arrigo Aff.”), the Attorney Certification Why Notice Should Not Be Required Pursuant to Rule 65(b)(1)(B), ECF No. [11-1], the record in this case and the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs are licensed buyers and sellers of wholesale quantities of perishable agricultural commodities (“produce”) by the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”). See Arrigo Aff. ¶¶ 3-4; Pedraza Aff. ¶¶ 3-4. Defendant, American Fruit & Produce Corp. (“American Fruit”), is also a produce dealer subject to and licensed under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930 (“PACA”), 7 U.S.C. § 499a et seq., by the USDA. See id. ¶ 5. On March 25, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit against American Fruit, Marshall’s Place, Inc. (“Marshall’s Place”), and numerous individual defendants, seeking relief under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930 (“PACA”), 7 U.S.C. § 499a et seq., and state law. ECF No. [1]. Plaintiffs

assert claims against American Fruit for violation of PACA (Count I) and breach of contract (Count III). Id. Plaintiffs also bring claims against the co-defendants for alter ego (Count II) conversion and unlawful retention of PACA trust assets (Count V), fraudulent transfer (Counts VI, IX, XI, XIII, XV, XVII, XIX), and constructive trust (Counts VII, VIII, X, XII, XIV, XVI, XVIII). Id. Plaintiffs represent that between March, 2020, and January, 2021, they sold $78,117.90 in produce to American Fruit. ECF No. [1] ¶ 5; Arrigo Aff. ¶ 7; Pedraza Aff. ¶ 7. Plaintiffs maintain that they issued and transmitted invoices to American Fruit. See id. ¶ 9. The invoices included the required PACA statutory trust language, id. at ¶ 10. American Fruit accepted the produce from

Plaintiff. ECF No. [1] ¶ 6. Since receipt of the invoices, American Fruit has not paid for the produce pursuant to the agreed payment terms. Arrigo Aff. ¶¶ 15-16; Pedraza Aff. ¶¶ 15-16. According to Plaintiffs, in connection with their attempts to secure payment from American Fruit, they discovered that Defendant Marshall’s Place operates from the same business address as American Fruit, and the two entities share common officers and management. Arrigo Aff. ¶¶ 20- 24; Pedraza Aff. ¶¶ 21-23, 25-27. As a result, Plaintiffs assert that Marshall’s Place is paying for produce purchased by American Fruit, leading Plaintiffs to the conclusion that American Fruit has failed to maintain sufficient PACA trust assets, and is transferring those assets to Marshall’s Place and others. Arrigo Aff. ¶¶ 27-28; Pedraza Aff. ¶¶ 28-29. Plaintiffs assert further that unless the Court enjoins American Fruit and Marshall’s Place’s ongoing dissipation of PACA trust assets, those trust asset will continue to be dissipated, resulting in immediate and irreparable harm to Southern and Mr. Greens. Arrigo Aff. ¶¶ 29-30; Pedraza Aff. ¶ 30. Congress enacted PACA in 1930 to encourage fair trading practices in the marketing of produce. Frio Ice, S.A. v. Sunfruit, Inc., 918 F.2d 154, 155 (11th Cir. 1990). Under PACA, the

Secretary of Agriculture must license all merchants, dealers, and brokers of produce placed in interstate or international commerce. 7 U.S.C. § 499c. In 1984, Congress amended PACA in response to a pervasive practice by which produce dealers granted lenders security interest in produce for which the dealers had not fully paid. See Tanimura & Antle, Inc. v. Packed Fresh Produce, Inc., 222 F.3d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2000). The 1984 amendment established a statutory trust over any goods, receivables, or proceeds from perishable agricultural commodities until the buyer makes full payment to the supplier. 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c). Plaintiffs assert that they are each a PACA trust beneficiary of American Fruit. The instant Motion seeks to enjoin American Fruit and Marshall’s Place from transferring PACA trust assets,

except for tendering full payment to Plaintiffs. ECF No. [11] at 2. Plaintiffs represent that the evidence establishes that “PACA trust assets have not been maintained by American Fruit as required by law, that American Fruit is experiencing severe financial problems, that it appears that Marshall’s Place is in receipt or control of PACA trust assets, and that PACA trust assets are being dissipated. ECF No. [11-2] at 7. Plaintiffs further assert that notice of the Motion is not required because “notice will afford Defendants an opportunity to dissipate trust assets that are required by statute to be held for the benefit of Plaintiffs” by giving Defendants the opportunity “to liquidate PACA trust assets and to pay non- trust debts with trust assets” such that recovery of trust assets “is all but impossible after they are dissipated.” ECF No. [11-1] at 1-2; 6-7. II. DISCUSSION The Eleventh Circuit has explained that the four factors to be considered in determining whether to grant a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction are the same. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2005). Namely, a movant must

establish “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that entry of the relief would serve the public interest.” Id. at 1225-26 (citing Ingram v. Ault, 50 F.3d 898, 900 (11th Cir. 1995); Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000)). “The primary difference between the entry of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction is that a temporary restraining order may be entered before the defendant has an adequate opportunity to respond, even if notice has been provided.” Textron Fin. Corp. v. Unique Marine, Inc., No. 08-10082-CIV, 2008 WL 4716965, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2008). Further, a temporary restraining order may be granted without notice to the

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Related

Ingram v. Ault
50 F.3d 898 (Eleventh Circuit, 1995)
Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo v. Michael Schiavo
403 F.3d 1223 (Eleventh Circuit, 2005)

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Southern Corporate Packers, Inc. v. American Fruit & Produce Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/southern-corporate-packers-inc-v-american-fruit-produce-corporation-flsd-2021.