South Boston General Hosp. v. Blue Cross of Va.

409 F. Supp. 1380, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16079
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedMarch 18, 1976
DocketCiv. A. 74-C-68-D
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 409 F. Supp. 1380 (South Boston General Hosp. v. Blue Cross of Va.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
South Boston General Hosp. v. Blue Cross of Va., 409 F. Supp. 1380, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16079 (W.D. Va. 1976).

Opinion

OPINION AND JUDGMENT

DALTON, District Judge.

Petitioner, South Boston General Hospital (hereinafter South Boston), has brought this action seeking review of a final determination by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (hereinafter the Secretary). Jurisdiction was noted in an opinion by this Court on April 24, 1975. South Boston General Hospital v. Weinberger, 397 F.Supp. 360 (D.C.Va.)

The facts of the case are not in dispute. South Boston is a non-profit provider of Medicare benefits under the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq., (hereinafter the Act) and is seeking a review of a determination by Blue Cross as agent for the Secretary which (1) reduced the depreciation expenses incurred by South Boston in a sale to a related organization and (2) denied the interest expense paid to the related organization. South Boston has exhausted its administrative remedies. Both sides have moved for Summary Judgment.

FACTS

Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for costs of services incurred in the efficient delivery of needed health services. 1 This *1382 issue arose when South Boston General Hospital, petitioner herein, purchased the facilities of South Boston General Hospital, Inc., in June, 1968. The acquisition *1383 by petitioner was in exchange for notes totaling $650,010.00, payable in fifteen annual installments and included interest at four per cent (4%). The purchase was effective July 1, 1968. Since both the proprietary hospital and petitioner were and are qualified as providers of Medicare services under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq., they were and are entitled to the reimbursal benefits of direct and indirect costs incurred by them in connection with the delivery of health care, services. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(l)(A). When petitioner filed its 1969, 1970 and 1971 Medicare Costs Reports with Blue Cross of Virginia (the disbursal agent of the Secretary as authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1395h), it claimed as allowable costs the interest expense paid to the prior owner of the facility and depreciation computed on the basis of the cost of the facility to Petitioner. Respondents denied reimbursement on the basis of the related parties doctrine, as expressed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.415, 405.419 and 405.427. This denial has resulted in an alleged loss of $174,000.00 to petitioner.

Petitioner makes the following allegations:

1) The classification of South Boston and the proprietary hospital as related parties was unwarranted and erroneous.
2) Application of 20 C.F.R. § 405.427 to this controversy was erroneous and constitutes reversible error.
3) The regulations applicable to this controversy do not further the purposes for which the Act was enacted, and in this case hinder those purposes.
4) The regulations applicable to this controversy deny petitioner both due process of law and equal protection of the law.

The first allegation is clearly erroneous. The entire administration and staff were carried over to the new hospital, and the management remained essentially the same. The proprietary hospital and petitioner are clearly related parties within the meaning of the regulations. The remaining allegations, however, raise important questions and will be dealt with more fully.

APPLICABILITY OF 20 C.F.R. § 405.427

As indicated by its language the thrust of section 405.427 is to avoid self-dealing between related parties in an ongoing relationship in which one of the parties is supplying services, facilities or supplies to the other. The present tense is used throughout the section, indicating the continuing viability of both organizations. Examples of this intent can be found in sub-section (b)(1) where it is stated that the “provider ... is associated . . . with or has control of or is controlled by the organization furnishing the services, facilities, or supplies.” Subsection (b)(2) reads: “when individuals possess significant ownership or equity in the provider and the institution or organization serving the provider.”

The Secretary contends that inclusion of the term “facilities” clearly encompasses an outright purchase of an entire facility, as in the case at bar. However, sub-section (c)(2) illustrates the proper interpretation to be given the term “facilities.” There the example of a leasing arrangement between related parties of an entire facility is set forth. 2 The dis *1384 tinction between such a continuing transaction and a single transaction involving the sale of an on-going hospital facility is highlighted by the specific reference to the latter transaction in 20 C.F.R. § 405.415(g). The title of sub-section (g) of section 405.415 (Establishment of cost basis on purchase of facility as an ongoing operation.) mandates a finding that, in determining cost basis for depreciation, section 405.415(g) controls. Likewise, treatment of interest is specifically covered in section 405.419, and that section must be deemed controlling when questions regarding reimbursement of interest arise.

The court finds that 20 C.F.R. § 405.-427 is not applicable to this controversy. Plaintiff contends that a determination based on this regulation is reversible error. The court expresses no opinion as to that contention because even if true, denial of reimbursement could be based on the related parties doctrine expressed in sections 405.415(g) and 405.419, if those sections are valid. Therefore, the court will address the validity of those sections, which form the statutory basis for denying reimbursement, regardless of the provisions of section 405.427.

DO THE REGULATIONS FURTHER THE PURPOSES OF SECTION 1395x(v)(l)(A) OF THE ACT?

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1395x

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409 F. Supp. 1380, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16079, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/south-boston-general-hosp-v-blue-cross-of-va-vawd-1976.