Sotheby's International Realty, Inc. v. Deutsch

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Sotheby's International Realty, Inc. v. Deutsch

137 A.D.3d 640, 28 N.Y.S.3d 364

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 24, 2016

Docket650078/11 593 592

StatusPublished

This text of 137 A.D.3d 640 (Sotheby's International Realty, Inc. v. Deutsch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sotheby's International Realty, Inc. v. Deutsch, 137 A.D.3d 640, 28 N.Y.S.3d 364 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2016).

Pincite

Opinion

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles E. Ramos, J.), entered November 24, 2014, after a nonjury trial, in favor of plaintiff in the total sum of $1,657,319.45, unanimously affirmed, with costs. Appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered October 23, 2014, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the judgment.

In this action for damages arising from a claimed breach of contract relating to the sale of two of defendants’ properties in East Hampton, New York, we find no basis to disturb the trial court’s findings, based largely on credibility determinations, that there was an express agreement or at least an implied agreement to pay plaintiff a commission of 4% (see Joseph P. Day Realty Corp. v Chera, 308 AD2d 148, 149, 153 [1st Dept 2003]).

Plaintiff’s broker (1) told defendant Deutsch that the buyer was interested in the property; (2) personally showed the buyer, *641 his wife, and his decorator the property; (3) discussed the potential purchase price with the buyer at the property; (4) continued to keep Deutsch abreast of the buyer’s interest; (5) sent the buyer, at his and Deutsch’s request, information on comparable properties; and (6) sought Deutsch’s permission to put the buyer in touch with Deutsch’s counsel for zoning information on the property. It was therefore not against the weight of the evidence for the trial court to conclude that the broker was the procuring cause of the purchase, or, even if he was unable to prove that he was the procuring cause of Marks’s purchase, that defendants terminated his activities “in bad faith and as a mere device to escape the payment of the commission” (SPRE Realty, Ltd. v Dienst, 119 AD3d 93, 100 [1st Dept 2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Even if there was a compromise, and the parties substituted the amount of $150,000 as the new commission, as contended by the defendants (see Wyckoff v Searle Holdings Inc., 111 AD3d 546, 546-547 [1st Dept 2013]), the trial court correctly found that defendants negated that agreement when they failed to make payment. Thus, the trial court’s credibility findings that the parties reached an agreement for a 4% commission, which itself was less than the customary rate in the area, should not be disturbed (see Matter of Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 86 AD3d 314, 320 [1st Dept 2011]).

Concur—Tom, J.P., Friedman, Saxe and Richter, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles E. Ramos, J.), entered November 24, 2014, after a nonjury trial, in favor of plaintiff in the total sum of $1,657,319.45, unanimously affirmed, with costs. Appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered October 23, 2014, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the judgment.

In this action for damages arising from a claimed breach of contract relating to the sale of two of defendants’ properties in East Hampton, New York, we find no basis to disturb the trial court’s findings, based largely on credibility determinations, that there was an express agreement or at least an implied agreement to pay plaintiff a commission of 4% (see Joseph P. Day Realty Corp. v Chera, 308 AD2d 148, 149, 153 [1st Dept 2003]).

Plaintiff’s broker (1) told defendant Deutsch that the buyer was interested in the property; (2) personally showed the buyer, *641 his wife, and his decorator the property; (3) discussed the potential purchase price with the buyer at the property; (4) continued to keep Deutsch abreast of the buyer’s interest; (5) sent the buyer, at his and Deutsch’s request, information on comparable properties; and (6) sought Deutsch’s permission to put the buyer in touch with Deutsch’s counsel for zoning information on the property. It was therefore not against the weight of the evidence for the trial court to conclude that the broker was the procuring cause of the purchase, or, even if he was unable to prove that he was the procuring cause of Marks’s purchase, that defendants terminated his activities “in bad faith and as a mere device to escape the payment of the commission” (SPRE Realty, Ltd. v Dienst, 119 AD3d 93, 100 [1st Dept 2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Even if there was a compromise, and the parties substituted the amount of $150,000 as the new commission, as contended by the defendants (see Wyckoff v Searle Holdings Inc., 111 AD3d 546, 546-547 [1st Dept 2013]), the trial court correctly found that defendants negated that agreement when they failed to make payment. Thus, the trial court’s credibility findings that the parties reached an agreement for a 4% commission, which itself was less than the customary rate in the area, should not be disturbed (see Matter of Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 86 AD3d 314, 320 [1st Dept 2011]).

Concur—Tom, J.P., Friedman, Saxe and Richter, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

137 A.D.3d 640, 28 N.Y.S.3d 364, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sothebys-international-realty-inc-v-deutsch-nyappdiv-2016.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack