Sosa Segura v. United States

• Court: District Court, E.D. Washington
• Decided: November 22, 2019
• Docket: 2:19-cv-00219
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 FILED IN THE 2 U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 3 Nov 22, 2019 4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 9 ANDRES SOSA SEGURA, No. 2:19-cv-00219-SAB 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER DENYING 12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 13 Defendant. DISMISS 14 15 16 Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 5. A hearing 17 on the motion was held on November 20, 2019, in Yakima, Washington. 18 Defendant was represented by Assistant United States Attorney John T. Drake and 19 Vanessa R. Waldref. Plaintiff was represented by Jennifer Chung, Kenneth E. 20 Payson, Aaron Korthuis, and Lisa Nowlin. 21 Plaintiff Andres Sosa Segura is suing the United States for the alleged 22 conduct of two United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers who 23 approached him at the bus station in Spokane and detained him without probable 24 cause because he was Latino. 25 Plaintiff is bringing claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 26 alleging state law claims of (1) False Arrest; (2) False Imprisonment; and 27 (3)violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). The United 28 States asserts the WLAD claim must be dismissed because (1) the United States 1 has not waived sovereign immunity for state civil rights torts under the FTCA and 2 (2) Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under the WLAD because the United 3 States does not own, operate, or exercise control over the Spokane Intermodal 4 Center where the alleged encounter took place. Thus, the United States cannot be 5 liable as a matter of law. 6 Background Facts 7 The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint: 8 Plaintiff was traveling by bus from Portland, Oregon to Montana to go home 9 to his family and had to transfer buses at the Spokane Intermodal Center, in 10 Spokane, Washington. When he exited his bus to make the transfer, two CBP 11 agents singled him out and pulled him aside. He believes it was because he is 12 Latino. They began questioning him about his immigration status. Because 13 Plaintiff had an immigration lawyer, he pulled out a card that he handed to the 14 CBP officers. In sum, the card indicated that Plaintiff was invoking his 15 Constitutional rights and that he wanted an attorney present before he answered 16 questions. 17 The CBP officers ignored this and ordered Plaintiff to follow them outside to 18 the parking lot where they continued to interrogate him. He told the agents he was 19 from Mexico but had been released from a detention center and that he had a 20 lawyer, and he showed him the ankle bracelet from the Immigration court. 21 Undeterred, the officers took Plaintiff to a detention facility an hour away, 22 put him in a cell and took his phone away. After four hours passed, the CBP 23 officers allowed Plaintiff to call his wife and drove him back to the Spokane 24 Intermodal Center but by that time he had missed his connection. As there were no 25 other buses, his wife had to drive 5 hours to pick him up. 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 Motion Standard 2 1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) 3 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a district court must dismiss 4 a complaint if the court does not have jurisdiction over it. In reviewing a “facial” 5 jurisdictional attack, the jurisdictional challenge is confined to the allegations pled 6 in the complaint. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). The 7 challenger asserts that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient “on their 8 face” to invoke federal jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 9 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). To resolve this challenge, the court assumes that the 10 allegations in the complaint are true and draws all reasonable inference in favor of 11 the party opposing dismissal. Wolfe, 392 F.3d at 362. 12 2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 13 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss 14 a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive 15 a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a 16 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 17 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires the plaintiff to allege 18 facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 19 unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While courts do not 20 require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts 21 sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 22 at 555. 23 In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be 24 granted, the court must assume that the plaintiff’s allegations are true and must 25 draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 26 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the court is not required to accept as 27 true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 28 1 unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Sci. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th 2 Cir. 2008). 3 Federal Sovereign Immunity / Federal Tort Claim Act 4 Before the enactment of the Federal Tort Claim Act (FTCA), the immunity 5 of the Government for negligent acts of its employees was absolute. The FTCA 6 was passed in 1946, after nearly thirty years of consideration. Dalehite v. United 7 States, 346 U.S. 15, 16 (1953). “It was the offspring of a feeling that the 8 Government should assume the obligation to pay damages for the misfeasance of 9 employees in carrying out its work.” Id. at 24. While the FTCA sought to waive 10 sovereign immunity for certain specified torts of federal employees, “[i]t did not 11 assure injured persons damages for all injuries caused by such employees.” Id. at 12 16. 13 The FTCA gives federal district courts subject matter jurisdiction over civil 14 actions against the United States for money damages for injury or loss or property, 15 or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of 16 any employee of the government while acting within the scope of his office or 17 employment under circumstances in the United States, if a private person would be 18 liable to the plaintiff in accordance with the law of the place where the challenged 19 act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) A further condition provides that the 20 United States is liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private 21 individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. 22 “The broad and just purpose which the statute was designed to effect was to 23 compensate the victims of negligence in the conduct of governmental activities in 24 circumstances like unto those in which a private person would be liable and not to 25 leave just treatment to the caprice and legislative burden of individual private 26 laws.” Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1955). 27 No action can lie “against the United States unless the legislature has 28 authorized it” Dalehite, 345 U.S. at 30. Thus, before a court may exercise 1 jurisdiction over any suit against the government, it must have “a clear statement 2 from the United States waiving sovereign immunity, together with a claim falling 3 within the terms of the waiver.” United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 4 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Park Place 5 Assocs., Ltd., 563 F.3d 907, 923–24 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing the relationship 6 between sovereign immunity and subject matter jurisdiction). The government’s 7 waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied, but “must be unequivocally 8 expressed in statutory text.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996). 9 Here, if the WLAD imposes tort liability upon a private person for the 10 wrongful conduct alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint, the FTCA waives the United 11 States’ sovereign immunity. Schwarder v. United States, 974 F.2d 1118, 1122 (9th 12 Cir. 1992) (“[T]he FTCA directs us to look to the law of the state in which the 13 government official committed the tort to determine the scope of sovereign 14 immunity. If the law of that state makes private parties liable. . . then the United 15 States is liable for the same.”). The effect of the FTCA is to waive immunity from 16 “recognized causes of action and was not to visit the Government with novel and 17 unprecedented liabilities.” Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-42 (1950). 18 “The words “like circumstances” [in § 2674] do not restrict a court’s inquiry 19 to the same circumstances, but require it to look further afield.” United States v. 20 Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 46 (2005) (emphasis in original). 21 Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that his “action falls within an 22 unequivocally expressed waiver of sovereign immunity by Congress.” Dunn & 23 Black, P.S. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 2007). 24 Analysis 25 1. Sovereign Immunity 26 The first step in determining whether the WLAD imposes tort liability upon 27 a private person for the wrongful conduct alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint is to 28 identify a reasonable private party analogy to the CBP’s action. Dugard v. United 1 States, 835 F.3d 915, 919 (2006). This is somewhat difficult given the CBP 2 officers were performing a “uniquely governmental function.” See Olson, 546 U.S. 3 at 46. However, it is not impossible. Courts need “to look to the state-law liability 4 of private entities, not to that of public entities, when assessing the Government’s 5 liability under the FTCA ‘in the performance of activities which private persons do 6 not perform.’” Id. (citing Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 64). Although the federal 7 government “could never be exactly like a private actor, a court’s job in applying 8 the standard is to find the most reasonable analogy.” Dugard, 835 F.3d at 919 9 (quotation omitted). 10 As illustrative, in Dugard, the plaintiff, Jaycee Dugard, sued the United 11 States alleging that it had negligently performed numerous mandatory duties when 12 supervising the person who had kidnapped and raped her over a period of 18 years, 13 including its duty to report parole violations in the years prior to her kidnapping. 14 Id. at 918. She argued that but for the United States’ negligence, her capturer’s 15 parole would have been revoked and he would not have been able to kidnap her in 16 1991. Id. In concluding that the FTCA foreclosed federal liability in that case, the 17 Circuit reasoned the most analogous case to the alleged situation involved the 18 liability of private criminal rehabilitation facilities. Id. at 919. It then noted that 19 under California law, private companies that operate rehabilitation programs do not 20 owe a duty of care to the public at large for the conduct of inmates or parolees 21 under their supervision. Id. Ultimately, it concluded that because a private 22 individual in like circumstances would not be liable under California law, the 23 United States cannot be held liable under the FTCA for the conduct of the parole 24 officer. Id. at 921. 25 The United States urges this Court to skip the analogous conduct analysis 26 and instead accept a blanket rule that the United States has not waived its 27 sovereign immunity for state civil rights torts. It maintains that Delta Savings Bank 28 1 v. United States, 265 F.3d 1017 (2001) is directly on point. The Court does not 2 read Delta Savings Bank so expansively. 3 In that case, an individual sued the United States and alleged that agents of 4 the United States discriminated against him because of his Asian descent when 5 they appointed a conservator/receiver of a bank that was owned by mostly persons 6 of Asian descent. Id. at 1019. He alleged a conspiracy among Office of Thrift 7 Supervision (“OTS”) employees that was motivated by their racial bias against the 8 Asian ancestry of the bank’s management. Id. at 1020. Despite an administrative 9 review that was favorable to the plaintiff the OTS issued a Prohibition Order that 10 forever banned the plaintiff from working in the American banking industry. Id. at 11 1020. That decision was appealed, and the prohibition order was vacated. Id. 12 The plaintiff then filed suit in federal court alleging causes of action for 13 violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1986, and 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) 14 based on the failure of the OTS to prevent the race-based conspiracy of its 15 employees. Id. The claims under § 1985(3) and § 1986 were dismissed because the 16 United States had not waived its sovereign immunity. Id. The remaining FTCA 17 was later dismissed. Id. at 1021. 18 Notably, in that case, the plaintiff attempted to incorporate 42 U.S.C. §§ 19 1985 and 1986 as state law causes of action. Id. at 1024. In doing so, the plaintiff 20 argued that an FTCA claim can be brought for violations of federal statutes that 21 provide private federal causes of actions, even if there is no analogous state law. 22 Id. The Ninth Circuit rejected that attempt. Id. The plaintiff then attempted to argue 23 that the conduct of the OTS officers violated some state law, relying on the general 24 California civil rights law, the California Unruh Act and the Fair Employment and 25 Housing Act. Id. at 1025. 26 The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments, noting that the Unruh 27 Act has been limited to cases “where the plaintiff was in a relationship with the 28 offending organization similar to that of the customer in the customer-proprietor 1 relationship.” Id. Notably, the Act specifically prohibits discrimination in the full 2 and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all 3 business establishments of every kind whatsoever. Id. (emphasis added). The 4 United States has not pointed to any case that specifically limits the WLAD to only 5 those situations where the plaintiff was in a relationship with the offending 6 organization. 7 Also, in that case the Ninth Circuit did not impose a blanket rule that the 8 United States cannot be held liable for state law discrimination statutes under the 9 Federal Tort Claim Act. Rather, it concluded that the cited California laws could 10 not grant a party a cause of action against a private defendant who committed acts 11 like those allegedly committed by the United States in this case.” Id. (emphasis 12 added). Rather than support a blanket rule, Delta Savings Bank is consistent with 13 Ninth Circuit precedent that requires courts to find analogous private-party 14 conduct. 15 For his part, Plaintiff relies on Xue Lu v. Powell, 621 F.3d 944 (2010) and 16 Anderson v. United States, 127 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1997). In Xue Lu, an asylum 17 officer sexually assaulted and demanded bribes from two female Chinese asylum 18 seekers. 621 F.3d at 946. The plaintiffs in that case relied on the Federal Tort 19 Claim Act to bring claims against the United States, relying on the theory of 20 respondeat superior to ask for compensation for the asylum officer’s infliction of 21 emotional distress and interference with their civil rights. Id. at 949. The California 22 statutes analyzed by the Ninth Circuit was Cal. Civ. Code 52.1, or the Tom Bane 23 Civil Rights Act. Id. at 950. The Circuit noted that the California courts recognize 24 a suit against a private employer under this statute. Id. (citing Stamps v. Superior 25 Court, 136 Cal. App. 4th 1441 (2006)). Therefore, the plaintiff’s claim based on 26 respondeat superior could proceed under the FTCA. Id. 27 The Anderson case is a published case dealing with the question of attorney 28 fees under the FTCA. 127 F.3d at 1191. In that case, the plaintiffs filed an action 1 against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2 2671–2680 (1994), alleging the government was liable for negligent supervision 3 and sexual harassment based on the WLAD. Id. The district court held a bench trial 4 and awarded compensatory damages, attorneys fees and expenses to the plaintiffs. 5 Id. The Circuit held that Congress has not waived the United States’ sovereign 6 immunity for attorneys’ fees and expenses under the FTCA and vacated the 7 judgment on fees and costs. Id. Notably, the district court’s award of compensatory 8 damages, which was not the subject to the appeal, was left undisturbed. Id. 9 Although it is true it appears both the district court and the Ninth Circuit 10 accepted without question that the United States waived its sovereign immunity for 11 the WLAD sexual harassment claim, that fact deserves more import than the 12 United States is prepared to give. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 13 (2010) (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)) (“Courts have 14 an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, 15 even when no party challenges it.”); Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 16 1116 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that not only is the Circuit obligated to consider sua 17 sponte whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, but it must also satisfy itself that 18 the lower court had jurisdiction in the case it is reviewing). It certainly is a 19 reasonable inference that the Ninth Circuit, the district court, and even the United 20 States, since it did not appeal the damages award, all believed that the United 21 States waived its sovereign immunity with respect to WLAD discrimination 22 claims. 23 On that same note, in the cases relied on by the United States, including the 24 case from the Eastern District of Washington, no analysis or reasoning was 25 provided by the court as to whether a private entity engaged in the same conduct 26 would be held be liable under the WLAD. Many of these were being brought by 27 pro se plaintiffs and it appears the United States’ sovereign immunity claims were 28 unchallenged in most cases. 1 If the Court had to pick whether the Anderson case or the district court cases 2 answer the question as to whether the FTCA waives the United States’ sovereign 3 immunity for WLAD claims, the Court chooses Anderson. And this is supported 4 by case law that recognizes that law enforcement and security guards can be liable 5 under the WLAD for alleged discriminatory conduct in public places. See 6 Taylor v. City of Seattle, 2018 WL 5024029 (W.D. Wash. 2018); A.J. v. City of 7 Bellingham, 2018 WL 3390485 (W.D. Wash. 2018); Turner v. City of Port 8 Angeles, 2010 WL 4286239 (W.D. Wash. 2010); Demelash v. Ross Stores, Inc., 9 105 Wash. App. 508 (2001); McKinney v. City of Tukwila, 103 Wash. App 391 10 (2000). 11 More recently, the Washington Supreme Court held that an employer can be 12 held liable for the discriminatory conduct of its employees. See Floeting v. Grp. 13 Health Cooperative, 192 Wash.2d 848, 856 (2019). In Floeting, the plaintiff 14 alleged that he was repeatedly sexually harassed by a Group Health employee 15 during his regularly scheduled medical appointments. Id. at 851. The Washington 16 Supreme Court held that under the plain language of WLAD, employers are 17 directly liable for the sexual harassment of members of the public by their 18 employees, just as they would be if their employees turned customers away 19 because of their race, religion, or sexual orientation. Id. at 856. 20 Moreover, the Washington legislature has directed courts to liberally 21 construe WLAD to eradicate discrimination, including discrimination in places of 22 public accommodation. RCW § 49.60.010, .020; see also Jin Zhu v. N. Cent. Educ. 23 Serv. Dist.-ESD 171, 189 Wash.2d 607 (2017) (quoting Marquis v. City of 24 Spokane, 130 Wash.2d 97, 108 (1996)). 25 Under this reasoning, it is clear Washington courts would hold a security 26 guard company liable for the discriminatory conduct of its security guards. For 27 reasonable analogous private party conduct, the Court finds that a private security 28 officer is the best fit to analyze whether the United States waived its sovereign 1 immunity for Count 3 of the Complaint. Because the WLAD imposes tort liability 2 upon a private person for the wrongful conduct alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint, the 3 FTCA waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for Count 3. 4 2. Failure to State a Claim 5 The United States asks the Court to dismiss Count 3 for failure to state a 6 claim, asserting that before a private entity can be liable under the WLAD public 7 accommodation provision, the discrimination must be attributed to the place of 8 public accommodation, that is, “a claim for discrimination in a place of 9 accommodation can only be asserted against the place of public accommodation.” 10 ECF No. 5. (emphasis in original). The United States asserts that Plaintiff is asking 11 the Court to find that all individuals who enter a place of public accommodation to 12 be subject to the WLAD. Instead, it urges the Court to dismiss Claim 3 because the 13 CBP agents who engaged in the alleged discrimination were not employees or 14 agents of the Spokane Intermodal Center and the United States does not own, 15 operate, or exercise control over the Spokane Intermodal Center. 16 The Court declines to read the WLAD as narrowly as the United States 17 suggest. The facts alleged in the Complaint establish that the CBP officers did not 18 just happen to show up at the Spokane Intermodal Center. Again, the security 19 guard analogy is apt to show that the WLAD covers situations where federal 20 officers enter places of accommodation and wield their power over individuals at 21 places of accommodation. Under the plain language of the WLAD, the United 22 States may be liable because the alleged CBP acts “directly or indirectly” caused 23 Plaintiff “to be treated as not welcome, accepted, desired, or solicited” at the 24 Spokane Intermodal Center based on his race, Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040(14), 25 .030(1)(b), and/or “directly or indirectly result[ed] in . . . discrimination” against 26 him at the Center based on his race. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.215. 27 At this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff has stated a valid claim that can 28 proceed beyond the pleading stage and into discovery. 1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 2 1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 5, is DENIED. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter this Order and forward copies to counsel. 5 DATED this 22nd day of November 2019. Ce... Shruukeyld Ec har 10 Stanley A. Bastian United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22) 23 24 25 26 27 28

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 12