Sorak v. Cisneros

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: December 4, 2024
• Docket: 24-1170
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-1170 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2024 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 4, 2024 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court KENNETH SORAK,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 24-1170 (D.C. No. 1:23-CV-02391-CNS-NRN) THERESA CISNEROS in her official (D. Colo.) capacity as Senior Judge; AMANDA BRADLEY, in her official capacity as Magistrate; COLORADO JUDICIAL BRANCH,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________

Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Kenneth Sorak, a Colorado resident proceeding pro se,1 appeals the district

court’s order dismissing his complaint against two Colorado state-court judges under

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 “Because [Mr. Sorak] appear[s] pro se, we liberally construe his pleadings. Nevertheless, he . . . must comply with the same rules of procedure as other litigants.” Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir. 2018) (citations Appellate Case: 24-1170 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2024 Page: 2

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).2 We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2019, Mr. Sorak’s then-wife, nonparty Amy Sorak, filed a state-court

petition for legal separation from Mr. Sorak in Douglas County, Colorado. The

ensuing domestic relations case proceeded to a conclusion that left Mr. Sorak

dissatisfied, so he sued the magistrate, the senior judge, and the Colorado Judicial

Branch in federal court. He specified in his complaint that he was suing each judge

only “in her official capacity.” R. at 5. As relief, he requested compensatory

damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. He also requested “a judgment for

removal of the [state-court] Protection Order [in the domestic relations case], a

parenting and child support order hearing . . . a judgment for a change of venue for

[the domestic relations case] to the Federal District Court, [and] an immediate trial to

address the contempt issues before the state court.” R. at 17.

omitted). And in the course of our review, “[w]e will not act as his counsel, searching the record for arguments he could have, but did not, make.” Id. 2 Mr. Sorak’s lawsuit named three defendants: Senior Judge Theresa Cisneros in her official capacity, Magistrate Amanda Bradley in her official capacity, and the Colorado Judicial Branch. In his notice of appeal and opening brief, however, he indicates he no longer wishes to proceed against the Colorado Judicial Branch. But whether the Colorado Judicial Branch is a party to the appeal is academic, because “[o]fficial-capacity suits . . . generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 166 (“[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”).

2 Appellate Case: 24-1170 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2024 Page: 3

The defendants moved to dismiss. Their motion asserted that the district

court lacked jurisdiction based on (1) the Eleventh Amendment and (2) the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923);

D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). A magistrate judge

recommended granting the motion. Mr. Sorak objected, but the district court

overruled the objections, granted the motion, and dismissed the case.

DISCUSSION

“We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) . . . .” Stuart v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co.,

271 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001). Where, as here, the party seeking dismissal

made a facial attack on the complaint’s allegations of subject-matter jurisdiction, the

district court “must accept the allegations in the complaint as true.” Id.

Both the Eleventh Amendment and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine limit the

jurisdiction of federal courts. The Eleventh Amendment “deprives federal courts of

any jurisdiction to entertain” claims for money damages brought by a private citizen

against a State without the State’s consent. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–99 & n.8 (1984). And a claim against a state official in

her official capacity, as here, is in essence a claim against the State. See Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985).

As for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it “is a jurisdictional prohibition on lower

federal courts exercising appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments.” Campbell

v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2012). On appeal Mr. Sorak argues

3 Appellate Case: 24-1170 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2024 Page: 4

his injuries came not from the state-court judgment itself but from the allegedly

unconstitutional processes that produced it. But all his claims would evaporate if

there were no state-court judgment against him. In other words, every claim for relief

in the complaint is predicated on the effect of the state-court judgment. And a claim

is barred by Rooker-Feldman if “an element of the claim [is] that the state court

wrongfully entered its judgment.” Id. at 1283.

Mr. Sorak also argues that the doctrine of judicial immunity does not shield

the state-court actions in this case because, he asserts, the adverse judgments resulted

from nonjudicial acts. But we do not need to decide whether judicial immunity

applies because we agree with the district court that Rooker-Feldman and the

Eleventh Amendment stand as jurisdictional bars to the complaint.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

Entered for the Court

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge