Sophie Rider v. Jeannie Fuller
This text of Sophie Rider v. Jeannie Fuller (Sophie Rider v. Jeannie Fuller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 16 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
SOPHIE RIDER, No. 22-56075
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-02913-SB-AFM
v. MEMORANDUM* JEANNIE FULLER; JENNIFER FULLER; BERNARD ANDERSON; ERIN BARDALES, AKA Erin Sooper, AKA Erin Valarde; DOES, 1 to 5, inclusive,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 16, 2024**
Before: BENNETT, BADE, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Sophie Rider appeals from the district court’s dismissal
of her complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo, see United States ex rel.
Hartpence v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 792 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2015) (en
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). banc), we affirm.
Rider’s operative second amended complaint asserts claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, slander, “false allegations” (alleging, in substance,
trespass and theft), and false imprisonment. Named as Defendants, in one or more
of these claims, are Rider’s next-door neighbor, Jeannie Fuller (who the complaint
alleges is now a retired officer with the Torrance Police Department), as well as
Fuller’s daughter and two other Torrance police officers. Rider’s sole asserted
basis for invoking federal court jurisdiction is that one or more of these claims
states a cause of action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In dismissing Rider’s previous complaints with leave to amend, the district
court explained that § 1983 does not provide a remedy for state law torts and that
Rider would have to adequately plead sufficient facts to support a non-frivolous
claim under § 1983. In particular, the court noted that the complaint failed to plead
sufficient facts establishing either the state-action element of a § 1983 claim or any
basis for concluding that Rider’s claims based on long-ago conduct were not
barred by the statute of limitations. After affording Rider two opportunities to cure
these deficiencies, the district court held that Rider’s effort to assert a § 1983 claim
was so wholly insubstantial and frivolous that it did not even suffice to give rise to
federal jurisdiction. See Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 45–46 (2015) (citing
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946)).
2 We agree with the district court that Rider’s effort to invoke § 1983 is
“wholly insubstantial and frivolous” and therefore fails to provide any basis for
federal question jurisdiction. See Bell, 327 U.S. at 682–83. Nearly all of the
conduct alleged in the complaint involves private disputes between Rider and
Fuller, including disputes in state court concerning a restraining order that Fuller
obtained, and sought to have extended, against Rider. The complaint fails to plead
any facts that would support a non-frivolous claim that Fuller took the alleged
actions under color of state law, as required to state a § 1983 claim. See Schucker
v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Invoking state legal
procedures does not constitute ‘joint participation’ or ‘conspiracy’ with state
officials sufficient to satisfy section 1983’s state action requirement.”). Although
the complaint also alleges that Fuller conspired with the Defendant police officers
to have Rider taken into civil custody on false pretenses, that alleged conduct
occurred in 2014 and there is no non-frivolous basis for concluding that Rider’s
reliance on such a theory raises a valid § 1983 claim. See Maldonado v. Harris,
370 F.3d 945, 954–55 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that § 1983 claims are governed by
“the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the forum state,” which in
California is two years (citing CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 335.1)). Finally, although the
complaint alleges that, at some unspecified time, Fuller called the police, who then
drove by Rider’s house “slowly with intimidating stares,” any contention that such
3 conduct, without more, is actionable under § 1983 is wholly frivolous.
Because Rider’s effort to shoehorn her state law claims into the framework
of § 1983 was wholly insubstantial and frivolous, the district court properly
concluded that her complaint failed to invoke the district court’s federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. And because Rider and her next-door
neighbor were obviously not of diverse citizenship, there was no basis for diversity
jurisdiction. The court therefore properly dismissed this action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Sophie Rider v. Jeannie Fuller, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sophie-rider-v-jeannie-fuller-ca9-2024.