Sonya Leclair v. Donovan Spring Co., Inc.

2018 DNH 238

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: November 30, 2018
• Docket: 18-cv-669-JD
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Sonya Leclair

v. Civil No. 18-cv-669-JD Opinion NO. 2018 DNH 238 Donovan Spring Co., Inc.

O R D E R

Sonya Leclair brought suit against her former employer,

Donovan Spring Co., alleging federal and state claims of sex

discrimination and retaliation. Donovan Spring moved to dismiss

her claims as untimely and for failure to state a claim. In her

objection to the motion to dismiss, Leclair explained that she

was pursuing the same state law claims of sex discrimination and

retaliation in state court and appended a copy of an order

issued in that case, Sonya Leclair v. Donovan Spring Co., 218-

2018-CV-00314, which denied Donovan Spring’s motion to dismiss

those claims.

Because of the parallel state court proceeding, the court

ordered Leclair to show cause why this court should not abstain

in favor of the state court proceeding pursuant to Colo. River

Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817

(1976). Leclair has filed her memorandum and opposes

abstention. Donovan Spring filed its response, favoring

abstention, and provided a copy of a subsequent order by the state court in which the court reconsidered part of the prior

order and partially granted the motion to dismiss.

Donovan Spring moved in state court, as it does here, to

dismiss Leclair’s state law sex discrimination claim as

untimely. Specifically, Donovan Spring contended there and here

that the alleged incidents of harassment discrimination occurred

more than 180 days before Leclair filed her charges with the New

Hampshire Commission on Human Rights on April 16, 2015. Donovan

Spring asserted that the last incident of harassment occurred on

October 6, 2014, based on criminal complaints filed against the

coworker/perpetrator. As a result, Donovan Springs argued, the

claims were untimely under RSA 354-A:21, III.

Leclair objected there, and here, on the grounds that the

date of the last incident was uncertain and that time for filing

the charge did not start on the date of the incident. She

argued that the criminal complaints could not be considered for

purposes of a motion to dismiss and that the date in the

complaints might not be accurate. She also argued that the time

for filing the charge did not start until she knew that Donovan

Spring would not take remedial action.

The state court agreed with Leclair and denied the motion

to dismiss. The court concluded that the criminal complaint did

not establish the date of the incident and that the filing

deadline was tolled because Leclair could not file a charge

2 against Donovan Spring until it investigated the incident and

failed to remedy it.

On reconsideration, however, the court changed course. The

court accepted the criminal complaints as proof of the date of

the harassment incident. In addition, the court reconsidered

the meaning of RSA 354-A:21, III in light of New Hampshire cases

and concluded that harassment committed by a co-worker is the

actionable discrimination, not the response or lack of response

by the employer. For that reason, the court decided that the

180-day time limit was not tolled while Leclair waited for

Donovan Spring to investigate the incident. As a result, the

court agreed with Donovan Spring that Leclair’s claim of sex

discrimination under RSA 354-A:7 was time barred. Donovan

Spring represents that Leclair has now moved for reconsideration

of that order.

Leclair brought her action in this court based on federal

question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, arising from her

federal claims of sex discrimination and retaliation under Title

VII, 41 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and § 2000e-3(a). Leclair’s

federal and state claims arise from the same incidents and

circumstances. As provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the court

has supplemental jurisdiction over Leclair’s state law claims.

Even when jurisdiction exists, a federal court may decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on the grounds provided by

3 § 1376(c), including if “in exceptional circumstances, there are

other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.”

§ 1367(c)(4). In deciding whether the circumstances are

exceptional, the court considers judicial economy, comity, and

convenience and fairness to the parties. Estate of Amergi ex

rel. Amergi v. Palestinian Authority, 611 F.3d 1350, 1366 (11th

Cir. 2010); Lindsay v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 416, 425

(D.C. Cir. 2006).

This case presents the exceptional circumstance that the

same parties are simultaneously litigating the same claims under

RSA chapter 354-A in state court and in this court. As the

state court’s orders demonstrate, those claims have already

raised a complex issue of state law and statutory

interpretation. These parallel proceedings are duplicative and

raise the issues associated with piecemeal litigation.

The parties disagree about whether abstention would be

appropriate in this case, and the issue is far from clear. On

the other hand, however, the exceptional circumstance of

parallel proceedings, which is presented here, supports an

exercise of the court’s discretion to decline supplemental

jurisdiction over the state law claims. § 1367(c)(4).

4 Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the claims in this case that are

brought under RSA chapter 354-A. Therefore, Counts III and IV

are dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. The case will proceed on Counts I and II.

SO ORDERED.

______________________________ Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. United States District Judge

November 30, 2018

cc: Iryna N. Dore, Esq. Michael J. Iacopino, Esq. H. Jonathan Meyer, Esq.