Solomon v. Liberty County

Eleventh Circuit

Solomon v. Liberty County

899 F.2d 1012

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

DecidedApril 5, 1990

DocketNo. 87-3406

StatusPublished

Cited by42 cases

This text of 899 F.2d 1012 (Solomon v. Liberty County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Solomon v. Liberty County, 899 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1990).

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PER CURIAM:

We unanimously vacate the district court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). We hold, as a matter of law, that the appellants have satisfied the three Gingles factors, see post at 1037 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring), 1017 (Kravitch, J., specially concurring), but we are divided on the legal effect of proving those factors. Because we are divided in our interpretation of Gingles and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982), we do not specifically direct the district court on how to proceed on remand. Rather, we instruct the district court to proceed in accordance with Gingles, giving due consideration to the views expressed in Chief Judge Tjoflat’s and Judge Kravitch’s specially concurring opinions. This case is VACATED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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PER CURIAM:

We unanimously vacate the district court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). We hold, as a matter of law, that the appellants have satisfied the three Gingles factors, see post at 1037 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring), 1017 (Kravitch, J., specially concurring), but we are divided on the legal effect of proving those factors. Because we are divided in our interpretation of Gingles and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982), we do not specifically direct the district court on how to proceed on remand. Rather, we instruct the district court to proceed in accordance with Gingles, giving due consideration to the views expressed in Chief Judge Tjoflat’s and Judge Kravitch’s specially concurring opinions. This case is VACATED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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805 F. Supp. 967 (S.D. Florida, 1992)

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899 F.2d 1012, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/solomon-v-liberty-county-ca11-1990.

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