Socarras v. City of Philadelphia

552 A.2d 1171, 123 Pa. Commw. 197, 1989 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 55

• Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: January 27, 1989
• Docket: Appeal 2603 C.D. 1987
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion by

Judge McGinley,

Jorge Armando Socarras (Socarras) appeals from an order of the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia (trial court) granting the City of Philadelphia’s (City) motion for summary judgment thereby dismissing Socarras’s complaint against the City. We reverse.

The facts in this matter are not contested. On December 5, 1980, Socarras sustained severe injuries when a small Volkswagen automobile he was driving struck the rear of a pick-up truck which had broken down and had come to a stop in one of the middle lanes of northbound Interstate Route 95 in Philadelphia. The record indicates that just before the accident, the driver of the pick-up attempted to flag down a passing Philadelphia police officer who failed to stop. Socarras subsequently filed a complaint against the City among other defendants, alleging negligence on the part of the police officer for failing to stop and assist the disabled pick-up truck. After discovery was completed the City filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the police officer owed no duty to stop and assist the disabled truck. The trial court granted the City’s motion and dismissed the complaint as to the City. Socarras appeals.

Our scope of review when considering a grant of summary judgment is clearly defined. A summary judgment can only be sustained where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Melendez v. City of Philadelphia, 320 Pa. Superior Ct. 59, 466 A.2d 1060 (1983).

Socarras presents two issues for our review. First, Socarras contends that when a police officer has actual knowledge that a motorist is stranded in a dangerous position on a roadway a special relationship arises creating a duty to render necessary assistance. Second, Socarras contends the public duty doctrine, which states officers owe a general duty to the public, but not to specific individuals should be overruled as contrary to public policy as it shields municipalities from the negligent acts of their police officers. We need only address the first issue.

Socarras argues that in his situation a special relationship was created when the police officer observed specific individuals, namely Jo Anne Coleman Kollmer and Michelle Marnell, the occupants of the disabled pick-up truck, signaling for police assistance. Socarras argues that once the police officer observed the occupants of the truck signaling for assistance he had a duty to.reñder assistance in order to protect the occupants and also passing motorists who were unaware of this dangerous condition. We agree. In Mindala v. American Motors Corporation, 518 Pa. 350, 543 A.2d 520 (1988) our Supreme Court examined a situation wherein a township police chief had personal knowledge that a stop sign was missing from a dangerous intersection within his department’s area and failed to replace the stop sign or install warning devices to alert motorists, the failure allegedly resulted in a fatal accident. In, Mindala the Court reasoned:

Since the township police possessed statutory authority to regulate traffic, had knowledge of a dangerous situation, and the capability to rectify the problem, a duty was created to reasonably exercise that authority and the failure to do so violated that duty. Therefore, for purposes of determining a motion for summary judgment, the Appellants have alleged sufficient facts to support their contention that the township owed a duty to the Mindalas and breached that duty.[¹] Id. at 363, 543 A.2d at 527.

In this case, both parties stipulated for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, which is the subject of this appeal, that a City police officer passed the disabled pick-up truck on Interstate 95, looked in the direction of the disabled vehicle and failed to stop to render assistance. Further, Directive 92 of the Philadelphia Police Department, issued July 3, 1974, regarding vehicle investigations directs police officers to render assistance to motorists when circumstances indicate that an operator or vehicle is in need of police assistance.² It is not contested that Interstate 95, within the limits of the City of Philadelphia, is clearly within the jurisdiction of the City police and that the City police have authority therein to regulate traffic. Accordingly, since the passing City police officer possessed statutory authority to regulate traffic on Interstate 95,³ drove past, and directly confronted the dangerous situation presented by the presence of the disabled vehicle in one of the middle lanes, and had the capability to rectify the situation, a duty was created for that officer to reasonably exercise his authority. As in Mindala, failure of the officer to take the appropriate action results in a violation of that duty owed not only to the occupants of the disabled vehicle, but also to approaching motorists who would foreseeably come into contact with the disabled vehicle.

Having determined that there are sufficient facts alleged to support the contention that the City owed a duty and breached that duty, the order of the trial court is reversed.

Order

NOW, January 27, 1989, the order of the trial court is reversed and this matter is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

1 Mindala at 527.

2 Directive 92, Philadelphia Police Department, Section I.C. and II. C. Reproduced Record at 46a-47a.

3 Section 6109 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C. S. §6109, Philadelphia Home Rule Charter §5.5-200 (May 1980).