Opinion
DiPENTEMA, J.
The plaintiff John Sobczak1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court, following a jury trial, in favor of the defendants, the board of education of the city of Meriden (board) and Elizabeth Ruocco.2 Although the plaintiff raises multiple claims of instructional and evidentiary error, the dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff failed to exhaust the grievance procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement (agreement) between the board and the Meriden federation of municipal employees. We conclude that he did, thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. We therefore reverse the [101]*101judgment of the trial court and remand the case with direction to render judgment dismissing the action.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. For twenty-seven years, the plaintiff was employed as a custodian by the board. In December, 1997, he grew increasingly concerned about the allegedly inequitable use of overtime by his supervisor, Ed Boganski. While cleaning the office of a secretary to the principal of Washington Middle School, the plaintiff discovered custodian payroll records in a file cabinet. He then made copies of those documents. On December 17, 1997, the plaintiff and three other custodians filed a grievance with their union and the school principal, accusing Boganski of “[h]arassment,” “[a]buse of power,” “[deceiving and misleading overtime record keeping,” and “[t]otal disregard for [their] contract . . . .” The plaintiff also informed union president Ricky Allen that he had obtained copies of the payroll records. Two days later, John Cordani, head of the buildings and ground department for the city of Meri-den, met with the plaintiff. After Cordani cautioned the plaintiff that his activities in obtaining the records potentially were criminal, the plaintiff signed a resignation letter. At that time, he was fifty-nine years old.
Thereafter, this action commenced.3 The plaintiff filed a six count complaint that included a count alleging age discrimination pursuant to both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. The defendants filed a motion to strike that count on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not filing a complaint with the commission on human rights and opportunities. On October 6,2000, the court granted [102]*102the motion. The plaintiff then filed a four count amended complaint alleging constructive termination, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful termination and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In response, the defendants filed an answer and four special defenses.4 The matter was tried to the jury. Following the close of the plaintiffs case, the defendants moved for a directed verdict, contending that, as the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court reserved its decision on that motion. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants on all counts, and this appeal followed.5
I
The defendants claim that, because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.6 “A determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question [103]*103of law. When . . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kobyluck v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 84 Conn. App. 160, 165, 852 A.2d 826, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 923, 859 A.2d 579 (2004).
“It is well settled under both federal and state law that, before resort to the courts is allowed, an employee must at least attempt to exhaust exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures, such as those contained in the collective bargaining agreement between the defendant and the plaintiffs’ union.” Daley v. Hartford, 215 Conn. 14, 23, 574 A.2d 194, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982, 111 S. Ct. 513, 112 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1990). Failure to exhaust the grievance procedures deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Id., 22-23; see also Nieman v. Yale University, 270 Conn. 244, 253, 851 A.2d 1165 (2004). “The puipose of the exhaustion requirement is to encourage the use of grievance procedures, rather than the courts, for settling disputes. A contrary rule which would permit an individual employee to completely sidestep available grievance procedures in favor of a lawsuit has little to commend it. . . . [I]t would deprive employer and union of the ability to establish a uniform and exclusive method for orderly settlement of employee grievances. If a grievance procedure cannot be made exclusive, it loses much of its desirability as a method of settlement. A rule creating such a situation would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Labbe v. Pension Commission, 229 Conn. 801, 811-12, 643 A.2d 1268 (1994).
Notwithstanding the important public policy considerations underlying the exhaustion requirement, our Supreme Court has “grudgingly carved several exceptions” from the exhaustion doctrine; Harwinlon Dril[104]*104ling & Engineering Co. v. Public Utilities Control Authority, 188 Conn. 90, 94, 448 A.2d 210 (1982); although “only infrequently and only for narrowly defined purposes.” LaCroix v. Board of Education, 199 Conn. 70, 79, 505 A.2d 1233 (1986); see also Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, 227 Conn. 545, 561, 630 A.2d 1304 (1993). One of the limited exceptions to the exhaustion rule arises when recourse to the administrative remedy would be demonstrably futile. O & G Industries, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 232 Conn. 419, 429, 655 A.2d 1121 (1995); Labbe v. Pension Commission, supra, 229 Conn. 814.
The plaintiff contends that the futility exception applies, thus excusing his failure to exhaust the remedies available to him under the agreement. We disagree.
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Opinion
DiPENTEMA, J.
The plaintiff John Sobczak1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court, following a jury trial, in favor of the defendants, the board of education of the city of Meriden (board) and Elizabeth Ruocco.2 Although the plaintiff raises multiple claims of instructional and evidentiary error, the dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff failed to exhaust the grievance procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement (agreement) between the board and the Meriden federation of municipal employees. We conclude that he did, thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. We therefore reverse the [101]*101judgment of the trial court and remand the case with direction to render judgment dismissing the action.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. For twenty-seven years, the plaintiff was employed as a custodian by the board. In December, 1997, he grew increasingly concerned about the allegedly inequitable use of overtime by his supervisor, Ed Boganski. While cleaning the office of a secretary to the principal of Washington Middle School, the plaintiff discovered custodian payroll records in a file cabinet. He then made copies of those documents. On December 17, 1997, the plaintiff and three other custodians filed a grievance with their union and the school principal, accusing Boganski of “[h]arassment,” “[a]buse of power,” “[deceiving and misleading overtime record keeping,” and “[t]otal disregard for [their] contract . . . .” The plaintiff also informed union president Ricky Allen that he had obtained copies of the payroll records. Two days later, John Cordani, head of the buildings and ground department for the city of Meri-den, met with the plaintiff. After Cordani cautioned the plaintiff that his activities in obtaining the records potentially were criminal, the plaintiff signed a resignation letter. At that time, he was fifty-nine years old.
Thereafter, this action commenced.3 The plaintiff filed a six count complaint that included a count alleging age discrimination pursuant to both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. The defendants filed a motion to strike that count on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not filing a complaint with the commission on human rights and opportunities. On October 6,2000, the court granted [102]*102the motion. The plaintiff then filed a four count amended complaint alleging constructive termination, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful termination and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In response, the defendants filed an answer and four special defenses.4 The matter was tried to the jury. Following the close of the plaintiffs case, the defendants moved for a directed verdict, contending that, as the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court reserved its decision on that motion. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants on all counts, and this appeal followed.5
I
The defendants claim that, because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.6 “A determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question [103]*103of law. When . . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kobyluck v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 84 Conn. App. 160, 165, 852 A.2d 826, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 923, 859 A.2d 579 (2004).
“It is well settled under both federal and state law that, before resort to the courts is allowed, an employee must at least attempt to exhaust exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures, such as those contained in the collective bargaining agreement between the defendant and the plaintiffs’ union.” Daley v. Hartford, 215 Conn. 14, 23, 574 A.2d 194, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982, 111 S. Ct. 513, 112 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1990). Failure to exhaust the grievance procedures deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Id., 22-23; see also Nieman v. Yale University, 270 Conn. 244, 253, 851 A.2d 1165 (2004). “The puipose of the exhaustion requirement is to encourage the use of grievance procedures, rather than the courts, for settling disputes. A contrary rule which would permit an individual employee to completely sidestep available grievance procedures in favor of a lawsuit has little to commend it. . . . [I]t would deprive employer and union of the ability to establish a uniform and exclusive method for orderly settlement of employee grievances. If a grievance procedure cannot be made exclusive, it loses much of its desirability as a method of settlement. A rule creating such a situation would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Labbe v. Pension Commission, 229 Conn. 801, 811-12, 643 A.2d 1268 (1994).
Notwithstanding the important public policy considerations underlying the exhaustion requirement, our Supreme Court has “grudgingly carved several exceptions” from the exhaustion doctrine; Harwinlon Dril[104]*104ling & Engineering Co. v. Public Utilities Control Authority, 188 Conn. 90, 94, 448 A.2d 210 (1982); although “only infrequently and only for narrowly defined purposes.” LaCroix v. Board of Education, 199 Conn. 70, 79, 505 A.2d 1233 (1986); see also Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, 227 Conn. 545, 561, 630 A.2d 1304 (1993). One of the limited exceptions to the exhaustion rule arises when recourse to the administrative remedy would be demonstrably futile. O & G Industries, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 232 Conn. 419, 429, 655 A.2d 1121 (1995); Labbe v. Pension Commission, supra, 229 Conn. 814.
The plaintiff contends that the futility exception applies, thus excusing his failure to exhaust the remedies available to him under the agreement. We disagree.
“Unions and their employers have broad contractual authority to provide administrative remedies for disputes arising out of the employment relationship. That authority encompasses issues of law as well as of fact. . . . Before pursuing even alleged violations of state statutory procedures and of constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, parties to a collective bargaining agreement must attempt to exhaust the exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures established in their agreement before resorting to court.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Trigila v. Hartford, 217 Conn. 490, 494-95, 586 A.2d 605 (1991).
Article III of the agreement sets forth a grievance procedure designed to “equitably resolve any alleged breaches of this Agreement or problems incident to job descriptions, classifications, duties, and working conditions . . . .” The grievance procedure contains both an informal procedure and a five step formal procedure.7 [106]*106Level one allows8 the grievant to file a written grievance with the immediate supervisor, and requires the supervisor to meet with the grievant and to furnish a written decision to the grievant. If the grievant is unsatisfied with that disposition, level two permits the grievant to file the grievance with the director of personnel, who likewise must meet with the grievant and supply the grievant a written decision. Further recourse is provided at level three, at which a grievant is entitled to file the grievance with the school superintendent. At that point, either the superintendent or a designee must [107]*107meet with the grievant and provide a written decision to the grievant.
In his reply brief, the plaintiff argues that he asked Allen, the union president, to file a grievance on his behalf. Because Allen refused to do so, the plaintiff concludes, the grievance procedure was futile and inadequate. We do not agree. Even if we presume that Allen refused to file the grievance, the plaintiff remained free to pursue his grievance. The grievance procedure provides that “[a] grievant may be represented by any representative at Levels One, Two and Three of the grievance procedure, provided, however, that exclusive organizational representation shall be provided by the Federation. When a grievant is not represented by the Federation, the Federation shall have the right to be present and state its views at Levels One, Two and Three of the grievance procedure.” (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff, therefore, was expressly permitted to initiate a grievance either on his own or with the assistance of a representative other than the union at levels one through three of the grievance procedure. It is undisputed that he failed to do so.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs contention that it necessarily would be unavailing to file a grievance pursuant to levels one through three is purely speculative. “The mere possibility, or even likelihood, of an adverse decision does not render a remedy futile.” Neiman v. Yale University, supra, 270 Conn. 260. “It is futile to seek a remedy only when such action could not result in a favorable decision and invariably would result in further judicial proceedings.” O & G Industries, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 232 Conn. 429. On the basis of the undisputed facts in the record, we can only speculate as to whether the filing of a grievance with the superintendent, for example, would have resulted in a decision unfavorable to the plaintiff. We [108]*108certainly cannot say that he could not obtain a favorable decision.
In Housing Authority v. Papandrea, 222 Conn. 414, 432, 610 A.2d 637 (1992), our Supreme Court rejected the claim of futility by the plaintiff because the grievance procedures were capable of providing the plaintiff with relief even though the commissioner of the department of housing had, in an advisory letter, already taken a position that was adverse to the plaintiff. The Papan-drea court stated that “[t]he fact that the commissioner [had taken the adverse position in a letter] did not relieve the [plaintiff] of its obligation to pursue its administrative remedies in an effort to persuade the commissioner that his position was legally incorrect.” Id. Likewise, the plaintiff in the present case has failed to demonstrate that resort to the grievance procedure would necessarily have been futile or inadequate.
The agreement mandated that “[ejmployees shall utilize this grievance procedure before seeking other legal or administrative remedies to resolve their grievances.” (Emphasis added.) By not complying with that requirement, the plaintiff failed to exhaust the available grievance procedure. That failure deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
II
The plaintiff nevertheless argues that a claim sounding in negligent infliction of emotional distress9 is exempt from the exhaustion requirement. Relying on Mendillo v. Board of Education, 246 Conn. 456, 717 A.2d 1177 (1998), he asserts that “[w]here there is an underlying claim of constructive discharge, notwithstanding the existence of a collective bargaining griev-[109]*109anee procedure, a plaintiff is not required to exhaust statutory or contractual administrative remedies.” That is an inaccurate statement of Connecticut law.
In Mendillo, the plaintiff raised an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Mendillo v. Board of Education, supra, 246 Conn. 461. Noting that a “complaint sounding in tort will not in itself prevent [resort to contractual grievance procedures] if the underlying contract embraces the disputed matter”; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 475; our Supreme Court explained that whether a dispute is grievable under a collective bargaining agreement depends on the proper interpretation of the agreement. Id., 476. Because the alleged tortious conduct did not fall within the definition of grievance as provided in the collective bargaining agreement, the court in Mendillo held that the plaintiffs claim was not subject to the agreement’s grievance procedures. Id.
In determining whether a tort claim is subject to the grievance procedures of a collective bargaining agreement, the critical inquiry, therefore, is whether the tortious conduct is encompassed by the terms of the agreement. In the present case, the plaintiff predicates his claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress on a hostile work environment. Article III, § 3.2 (a), of the agreement defines grievance as “a violation of a specific term or terms of this Agreement or a problem incident to job descriptions, classifications, duties, and working conditions to the detriment of an employee or group of employees.” That a hostile work environment is a problem incident to working conditions cannot be debated. We accordingly conclude that the plaintiffs claim was subject to the grievance procedure set forth in the agreement. Because he failed to exhaust the available grievance procedure, his claim must fail.
[110]*110The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment dismissing the action.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.