Snyder v. Goble

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: February 13, 2025
• Docket: 24-4009
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-4009 Document: 82-1 Date Filed: 02/13/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 13, 2025 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court RAYMOND MAX SNYDER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 24-4009 (D.C. No. 4:23-CV-00056-DN) JUDGE ALEX GOBLE, individually (D. Utah) and in his official capacity as a Justice of the Sixth Judicial District Court of Sevier County, Utah; AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE; STEWART HARMAN, American Family Insurance's attorney; LAUARA ANN LISK; SHAWN B. MEADOR; WOODBURN & WEDGE; BRANDT DEATON, Detective, Sevier County Sheriff's Office; CASEY JEWKES, Sevier County attorney,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-10,

Defendants. –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

RAYMOND MAX SNYDER,

v. No. 24-4010 (D.C. No. 4:23-CV-00008-DN) SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF (D. Utah) Appellate Case: 24-4009 Document: 82-1 Date Filed: 02/13/2025 Page: 2

UTAH; JUDGE ROBERT P. FAUST, individually and in his official capacity as Justice of the Sixth Judicial District Court of Sevier County; MATTHEW HOWELL,

Defendants - Appellees. –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

v. No. 24-4011 (D.C. No. 4:23-CV-00007-DN) JUDGE MARVIN BAGLEY, (D. Utah) individually and in his official capacity as Justice of the Sixth Judicial District Court of Sevier County; AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE; LAUARA ANN LISK; NATHAN CURTIS, Sevier County Sheriff; MARK CRANE, Sergeant; SEVIER COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE,

v. No. 24-4013 (D.C. No. 4:24-CV-00002-DN) FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF (D. Utah) UTAH; STATE OF UTAH; JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN; THOMAS R. McCOSH; GARY GUELKER; LAUARA ANN LISK; HEIDEMAN & ASSOCIATES; RESNICK AND

2 Appellate Case: 24-4009 Document: 82-1 Date Filed: 02/13/2025 Page: 3

LOUIS, P.C.,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before PHILLIPS, CARSON, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

These appeals stem from continuing and voluminous state-court

litigation between Raymond Max Snyder and his ex-wife. Dissatisfied with

the rulings and other aspects of their legal proceedings, Snyder filed four

federal lawsuits against his ex-wife and the numerous government and

private individuals and entities involved in the state-court proceedings. The

district court dismissed his complaints for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, concluding his claims are barred by the Younger 1 and/or

Rooker-Feldman 2 doctrines. The court also determined that Snyder is a

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

2 D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid.

Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 3 Appellate Case: 24-4009 Document: 82-1 Date Filed: 02/13/2025 Page: 4

vexatious litigant and imposed filing restrictions. Snyder appeals and,

exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I

These consolidated appeals involve a plethora of courts, cases, and

legal claims. We endeavor to briefly summarize them as background to

these appeals.

Snyder’s numerous state-court cases included his divorce proceedings

in Nevada, a lawsuit against the insurance company that insured property

that is the subject of his divorce proceedings in Utah, lawsuits against his

ex-wife in North Carolina, cases related to the domestication of foreign

judgments from Nevada and North Carolina litigation, lawsuits against his

ex-wife’s divorce attorneys and his own divorce attorneys, and a pending

criminal case against him in Utah.

The numerous cases Snyder has filed are accompanied by a variety of

legal claims. In the first three federal cases (on appeal before this court as

case numbers 24-4009, 24-4010, and 24-4011), Snyder asserted claims

alleging, inter alia, that various state-court judges violated his civil rights;

a state court, a judge, and an attorney colluded to allow an insurance

company to breach its contract with Snyder; his ex-wife and her attorney

knowingly filed false documents during the couple’s divorce-related

litigation; police officers and a county attorney covered up the fact that

4 Appellate Case: 24-4009 Document: 82-1 Date Filed: 02/13/2025 Page: 5

Snyder was poisoned with Viagra; and a police department set him up for

arrest for criminal charges. In the fourth suit (case number 24-4013), he

alleged that the Utah state court’s rulings against him in his lawsuit

against his former divorce attorneys (including its finding that he is a

vexatious litigant) were improper, that his former attorneys exploited him

during the divorce proceedings, and that his ex-wife assisted them in

exploiting him and obtaining improper judgments against him. The facts

underlying his claims in the four federal suits are the same as those

involved in the state-court actions, and many of his federal claims are based

on arguments that have been considered and rejected in the state courts.

Before the district court, the defendants in the first three federal suits

filed motions to dismiss on various jurisdictional grounds under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for relief. The district court referred the

motions to a magistrate judge.

The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (R&R)

concluding that Snyder’s claims in the first three suits involved the same

subject matter as state-court actions and recommending that the claims

involving ongoing state-court actions be dismissed under the Younger

doctrine. The magistrate judge further recommended that the claims

involving any resolved state-court proceedings be dismissed under the

5 Appellate Case: 24-4009 Document: 82-1 Date Filed: 02/13/2025 Page: 6

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The magistrate judge also found Snyder is a

vexatious litigant and recommended that the court impose filing

restrictions on him in any cases in which he is proceeding pro se. Snyder

timely objected to the R&R.

After considering and rejecting Snyder’s objections, the district court

adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations, dismissed the first three

cases under Younger and Rooker-Feldman, imposed filing restrictions, and

entered judgment for the defendants. In a separate order, the court sua

sponte dismissed the complaint in the fourth case on the same grounds and

entered judgment for the defendants.

Snyder appeals each district court judgment. He challenges both the

dismissal orders and the imposition of filing restrictions. We procedurally

consolidated the appeals for briefing and decisional purposes. 3

II

As an initial matter, we note that contrary to Snyder’s contention, the

district court did not dismiss his complaints based on “improper vexatious

3 After judgment entered in the first three district court cases, Snyder’s ex-wife and her divorce attorney moved for attorney fees and costs. The district court granted the motions and entered an award for the ex-wife; it has not yet determined the amount of fees to be awarded to her attorney. Snyder’s appeals of the order awarding fees to his ex-wife (Case Nos. 24- 4102 and 24-4103) are not presently before us. Accordingly, we do not address the arguments in his brief about the attorney fees issue. 6 Appellate Case: 24-4009 Document: 82-1 Date Filed: 02/13/2025 Page: 7

litigant designations by the state courts.” Aplt. Combined Opening Br.

at 10. Rather, the district court dismissed his complaints under the Younger

and Rooker-Feldman doctrines. 4 We review de novo the dismissal of a

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Guttman v. Khalsa, 446

F.3d 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2006).

Younger and Rooker-Feldman both bar federal interference with state

court decision-making. As pertinent here, the difference between them is

the procedural stage at which the bar applies. Younger prevents federal

district courts from interfering in an ongoing state proceeding. Weitzel v.

Div. of Occupational & Pro. Licensing of the Dep’t of Com. of Utah, 240 F.3d

871, 875 (10th Cir. 2001). Rooker-Feldman prevents lower federal courts

from reviewing final decisions of state courts. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi

Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).

To the extent Snyder’s state-court proceedings are ongoing, the

district court correctly applied Younger, which requires a federal court to

abstain from hearing a case where “(1) state judicial proceedings are

ongoing; (2) state proceedings implicate an important state interest; and (3)

4 Given that the district court dismissed the complaints under these doctrines for lack of jurisdiction, it did not address the merits of his claim. We thus reject his argument that the court violated his right to due process by not considering the exhibits attached to his complaint and by not docketing his motion for summary judgment. 7 Appellate Case: 24-4009 Document: 82-1 Date Filed: 02/13/2025 Page: 8

the state proceedings offer an adequate opportunity to litigate federal

constitutional issues.” Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Stovall, 341 F.3d 1202,

1204 (10th Cir. 2003). The state proceedings at issue here implicate

important state interests. See Hunt v. Lamb, 427 F.3d 725, 727 (10th Cir.

2005) (“It is well-established that federal courts lack jurisdiction over the

whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, and parent and

child.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); Thompson v.

Romeo, 728 F. App’x 796, 798 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (affirming

Younger dismissal of claims arising from allegedly unconstitutional orders

entered in ongoing state-court divorce proceeding); 5 Winn v. Cook, 945 F.3d

1253,1258 (10th Cir. 2019) (“For the purposes of Younger, state criminal

proceedings are viewed as a traditional area of state concern.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

Snyder has not shown that the state proceedings did not provide an

adequate opportunity to litigate federal constitutional issues – his

disagreement with the state courts’ rulings does not mean those courts are

an inadequate forum. See Winn, 945 F.3d at 1258 (“Younger requires only

the availability of an adequate state-court forum, not a favorable result in

the state forum.”). And he has not met his “heavy burden” to overcome the

5 We cite unpublished decisions for their persuasive value only and do

not treat them as binding precedent. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 8 Appellate Case: 24-4009 Document: 82-1 Date Filed: 02/13/2025 Page: 9

bar of Younger abstention by establishing that an exception applies. Phelps

v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1066-68 (10th Cir. 1995); see Younger, 401 U.S.

at 54 (creating exception on “showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other

unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief”).

To the extent Snyder’s state-court proceedings have concluded, the

district court correctly applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which

prohibits a lower federal court from considering claims actually decided by

a state court and claims, whether raised in state court or not, that are

“inextricably intertwined” with a prior state-court judgment such that the

federal court “is in essence being called upon to review the state court

decision.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16. Snyder does not dispute that his

federal constitutional claims depend on the alleged invalidity of the state-

court proceedings and that they ask the federal district court to do what

Rooker-Feldman prohibits – revisit and invalidate state-court decisions.

III

“Federal courts have the inherent power to regulate the activities of

abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions under

appropriate circumstances.” Ysais v. Richardson, 603 F.3d 1175, 1180 (10th

Cir. 2010). Filing restrictions “are appropriate where (1) the litigant’s

lengthy and abusive history is set forth; (2) the court provides guidelines as

to what the litigant must do to obtain permission to file an action; and (3)

9 Appellate Case: 24-4009 Document: 82-1 Date Filed: 02/13/2025 Page: 10

the litigant received notice and an opportunity to oppose the court’s order

[imposing filing restrictions] before it [was] instituted.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). A court’s discretion in imposing filing

restrictions and fashioning appropriate filing requirements is “extremely

broad,” and we will affirm its decision to do so absent an abuse of that

discretion. Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 354 (10th Cir. 1989) (per

curiam).

Snyder first argues that the district court lost its authority to impose

filing restrictions after concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over

his claims. But “a federal court may consider collateral issues after an

action” has been “dismissed for want of jurisdiction.” Cooter & Gell v.

Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990).

That is exactly what happened here. The district court’s order

imposing filing restrictions did not pass judgment on the merits of his

claims, so it did not implicate jurisdiction. Rather, it involved only collateral

matters related to whether he had abused the judicial process and, finding

that he did, what sanction would be appropriate. See Judd v. Univ. of N.M.,

204 F.3d 1041, 1044 (10th Cir. 2000) (imposing filing restrictions after

dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction).

Next, Snyder argues that the district court abused its discretion in

imposing filing restrictions because it did so based on state-court

10 Appellate Case: 24-4009 Document: 82-1 Date Filed: 02/13/2025 Page: 11

determinations that he is a vexatious litigant, which he claims are wrong.

We do not have jurisdiction to review his challenges to the state courts’

decisions, and we see no abuse of discretion here.

In the R&R, the magistrate judge recommended that the court

designate Snyder a vexatious litigant and impose filing restrictions, then

listed the proposed restrictions. Snyder thus had notice of the restrictions,

and he opposed them in his objections to the R&R. In its order, the district

court explained that its vexatious litigant designation and finding that

“reasonable procedures are necessary to restrict future abuses” were based

on Snyder’s “conduct in these cases and in other courts.” R. (Case No. 24-

4009), vol. VIII at 299. In support of its finding that he has “a lengthy

history of abusive litigation,” the court detailed his numerous state and

federal court lawsuits and noted that he had “been the subject of sanctions”

and had “been found to be a vexatious litigant by at least two different Utah

state courts.” Id. at 296. And the court observed that by filing multiple

federal cases, he had “flood[ed] the docket with filings.” Id.

Thus, contrary to Snyder’s contention, the court based its imposition

of filing restrictions not on the state-court vexatious-litigant

determinations, but on its own findings about his abusive litigation conduct

in both state and federal courts.

11 Appellate Case: 24-4009 Document: 82-1 Date Filed: 02/13/2025 Page: 12

The record supports the district court’s conclusion that his litigation

history establishes a sufficiently abusive pattern to merit filing restrictions.

The restrictions imposed are sufficiently tailored and are not excessively

burdensome, because they allow Snyder to file suit if he is represented by a

licensed attorney and explain the steps he must take if he were to again

proceed pro se. See Ketchum v. Cruz, 961 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992).

IV

Snyder also filed numerous motions in this court, several of which

remain pending: (1) “Appellant Brief Confirming the U.S. District Court,

District of Utah’s Ongoing Deception, Bad Faith, and Fraud, and Motion to

Allow Pleadings” (filed Mar. 8, 2024); (2) “Consolidated Request for

Directions,” which seeks to reverse the vexatious litigant designations

against him; (3) “Consolidated Request to Submit” (filed Sept. 9, 2024); and

(4) “Consolidated Motion to Find Defendants Obstructed Justice in the

States of Utah and Nevada” (filed Sept. 23, 2024).

Having considered all the pending motions, and noting that some are

now moot, we determine that none of the motions warrant further

discussion and all of them are denied.

V

We AFFIRM the district court’s judgments dismissing Snyder’s

complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the district court’s

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order designating him a vexatious litigant and imposing filing restrictions.

We DENY all of Snyder’s pending motions.

Entered for the Court

Richard E.N. Federico Circuit Judge