Snow v. Portland Hous. Auth.

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: November 9, 2006
• Docket: CUMcv-06-71
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE CUMBERLAND, ss. J SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION ~?~KE~~9', ~Y~O~-?l .. VIRGINIA E. SNOW

Plaintiff v. ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION PORTLAND HOUSING RECEIVED FOR SUMMARY AUTHORITY, et a1. JUDGMENT ,J()I\lALD L. GARBRECHT Defendants 'r:.w I'~RARY

AUG 20 ZU01 Before the Court is Defendants Portland Housing Authority ("PHA"),

Bruce R. Loring ("Loring"), Linda Herbert ("Herbert") and Janice Bosse's

("Bosse") motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff Virginia Snow's

("Plaintiff") amended complaint.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff owns a condominium that she rents. PHA is a governmental

entity with the mission of helping provide affordable housing to those in need.

Owners of participating properties contract with PHA for assistance arranging

the rental of their property to "Section 8" tenants who receive housing assistance

payments from PHA. Plaintiff agreed to rent her condominium to James Lowry

("Lowry") who received such assistance from PHA. The lease was signed on

February I, 2002. Unknown to Plaintiff, Lowry had been convicted of multiple

crimes prior to that date.

Herbert is a PHA Housing Officer responsible for determining eligibility

of prospective tenants to receive rental assistance from PHA. Herbert also has

continuing responsibility over the eligibility of program participants once rental

assistance is provided. Plaintiff alleges that Herbert made representations to her

1 that Lowry had not been convicted of any crimes even though Plaintiff expressly

stated that she would not rent to an individual with a criminal background.

Plaintiff also alleges that after she began to have problems with Lowry as a

tenant, she asked Herbert on multiple occasions to verify that Lowry's record

was clean and that Herbert: confirmed that it was. Herbert denies that she ever

represented to Plaintiff that Lowry had a clean criminal record.

Following an eviction proceeding against Lowry, Plaintiff gained access to

her rental unit on September 27, 2005, at which time Plaintiff became aware of

significant damage done by Lowry. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff initiated a

criminal background check on Lowry. On October 7, 2005 Plaintiff received

records reflecting Lowry's criminal background.

Plaintiff initiated the present suit against PHA and Loring on December

22, 2005. In her two count complaint, Plaintiff alleged fraudulent

misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation. Both counts of the original

complaint were pursued against Loring in his individual and representative

capacities as well as against PHA as a governmental entity.

On May 10, 2006, PHA and Loring filed a motion for summary judgment.

In her opposition to summary judgment, filed on May 30, 2006, Plaintiff

expressly abandoned her negligent misrepresentation cause of action, leaving

onIy her claim of fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of PHA and Loring.

Along with her memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, Plaintiff filed

a motion to amend her complaint in order to add one count alleging violation of

Maine's Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("UDTPA"), 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1211

- 1216, against PHA as a governmental entity as well as against Loring, Herbert

and Housing Services Director Bosse in their individual and representative

2 capacities. Plaintiff also moved to amend her complaint to add Herbert and

Bosse as defendants under the existing fraudulent misrepresentation count. On

June 19, 2006, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to amend and on June 23,2006

Plaintiff filed her amended complaint. In an order dated November 8, 2006 the

Court granted summary judgment in favor of PHA and Loring on all counts

alleged in Plaintiff's original complaint.

On January 10, 2007, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on

all counts of Plaintiff's amended complaint. In her memorandum in opposition to

summary judgment, Plainliff does not argue in opposition to Defendants'

contention that summary judgment is appropriate with respect to her UDTPA

claim. She also does not oppose summary judgment in Bosse's favor on the

fraudulent misrepresentation count. In addition, in the prior summary judgment

order, this Court entered judgment in favor of Loring and PHA on Plaintiff's

fraudulent misrepresentation count. As a result, the only issue remaining for

decision on the present motion is whether summary judgment is appropriate in

favor of Herbert on Plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentation cause of action.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper where there are no genuine issues of

material fact. Rogers v. Jackson, 200211£ 140, ']I 5,804 A.2d 379, 380. Prompt

disposition of cases through summary judgment is appropriate when lithe

dispute is solely dependent on an issue of law. Cook v. Lisbon Sch. Comm., 682

A.2d 672,675 (Me. 1996) (quoting Tisei v. Town of Ogunquit, 491 A.2d 564, 569

(Me. 1985) (internal quotations omitted)).

In response to a defendant's motion for a summary judgment, a plaintiff

having the burden of proof must produce evidence that, if produced at trial,

3 would be sufficient to resist: a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Ne. Coating

Technologies, Inc. v. Vacuum Metallurgical Co., 684 A.2d 1322, 1324 (Me. 1996). This

requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case for each element of the cause

of action. Id. /I A party opposing a motion for a summary judgment must come

forward with competent and admissible evidence in response to the motion./1

First Citizens Bank v. M.R. Doody, Inc., 669 A.2d 743, 744 (Me. 1995).

DISCUSSION

1. Timeliness of Notice and Claim

Under the Maine Tort Claims Act (/IMTCA/I), 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 8101- 8118, a

plaintiff suing a governmental entity is required to give that entity notice of the

suit within 180 days of accrual of her cause of action. 14 M.R.S.A. § 8107(1). In

addition, the statute of limitations is two years from accrual. 14 M.R.S.A. § 8110.

As an initial matter, Plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentation cause of

action is based on her allegation that Herbert's misrepresentations induced her to

rent to Lowry. Therefore, any alleged misrepresentations by Herbert regarding

Lowry's criminal background occurring after Plaintiff agreed to rent to Lowry

are immaterial as Plaintiff could not have relied on these misrepresentations in

coming to that agreement. As a result, the only question affecting whether

Plaintiff's notice was timely as well as whether her case was brought within the

statute of limitations is whether Plaintiff's cause of action "accrued" when

Herbert allegedly told Plaintiff in 2002 that Lowry had no criminal history, or

when Plaintiff discovered in 2005 that Lowry had a criminal history. If it accrued

in 2002, Plaintiff's notice of claim and complaint were both untimely.

One instructive case on the issue at bar is Cottle Enterprises, Inc. v. Town of

Farmington. 1997 ME 78, 693 A.2d 330. In Cottle Enterprises, Inc., the Law Court, in

4 holding that a Plaintiff was time barred from asserting a tortious

misrepresentation claim, stated that 14 M.R.S.A. § 8107(1) "requires the filing of a

notice of claim within 180 days of the wrongful act alleged to produce a judicially

cognizable injury." Id.

tortious misrepresentation accrues is in line with the general rule for accrual of

causes of action in Maine. See e.g. Dunelaw Owners' Assoc. v. Gendreu, 2000 ME 94,

action accrues when the plaintiff suffers harm to a protected interest"). Thus,

under the general rule, Plaintiff's cause of action would be time barred.

Although Cottle Enterprises, Inc. seems at first to be dispositive of the

present issue, the court in that case left the door open to the possibility that, in a

fraudulent misrepresentation case, a cause of action might not accrue until a

plaintiff "understood that [the defendant's] representations had been, at the very

least, inaccurate." See Cottle Enterprises, Inc., 1997 ME 79, n. 5, 693 A.2d at 335.

In further support of the timeliness of Plaintiff's cause of action is a First

Circuit case interpreting Massachusetts law in which the court recognized that

"[a] claim for fraudulent misrepresentation does not begin to accrue until 'a

plaintiff learns or reasonably should have learned of the misrepresentation.'"

Rodi v. S. New England School of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Kent v.

Dupress, 429 N.E.2d 1041, 1043 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). While this case applied the

law from a different jurisdiclion, it is nevertheless persuasive. Together with the

Law Court's recognition in Cottle Enterprises, Inc. that the relevant date for

accrual of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim could involve an analysis of

when a plaintiff should halve discovered the misrepresentation, and in the

absence of any authority to the contrary, there is no reason to hold that the rule

5 in Maine is different from that in Massachusetts. 1 As a result, Plaintiff's cause of

action accrued at the time she learned of Lowry's criminal record, rendering both

her notice of claim and complaint timely.

II. Bad Faith

Under the MTCA Plaintiff can only hold Herbert liable for an intentional

tort if she demonstrates that Herbert's actions were in "bad faith" as the MTCA

provides a government employee with immunity from suit for "[a]ny intentional

act or omission within the course and scope of employment; provided that such

immunity does not exist in any case in which an employee's actions are found to

have been in bad faith." 14 lv1.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(E).

Although it is a close call, Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of

bad faith. Herbert was not personally responsible for carrying out the

background check on Lowry, but this does not nullify her subsequent actions as

alleged by Plaintiff. Specifically, Plaintiff states that Herbert repeatedly assured

her that a background check had been conducted and had come back showing

that Lowry had no criminal background at times when Herbert had no

knowledge of the results of any background check. Herbert testified at her

deposition that the intake department would normally conduct such background

checks to determine whether a party had been convicted of crimes sufficient to

render him ineligible to receive PHA assistance. Even if Herbert could

reasonably have relied on the fact that the intake department had approved

Lowry for the proposition that a background check had been conducted,

I This result is further reinforced by 14 M.R.S.A. § 859, which permits a plaintiff to file suit within 6 years after discovery of the existence of a cause of action when a defendant fraudulently conceals that cause of action from a plaintiff.

6 however, that would not warrant Herbert telling Plaintiff that Lowry had no

criminal history. Although certain crimes may render a party ineligible for PHA

assistance, it is possible for a party who has a criminal history to nonetheless

qualify for PHA assistance. Plaintiff's allegation that she told Herbert that she

did not want to rent to anyone with a criminal history, together with Herbert's

alleged actions in initially misrepresenting and then continuing to misrepresent

her knowledge of Herbert's lack of a criminal background could lead a

reasonable jury to conclude that Herbert acted in bad faith.

III. Discretionary Function Immunity

Even if Herbert might otherwise be liable under the bad faith exception to

14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(E), she could be immune from suit under a provision of the

MTCA that recognizes absolute immunity for governmental employees

"[p]erforming or failing to perform any discretionary function duty, whether or

not the discretion is abused." 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C).

The absolute immunity provided by paragraph C shall be applicable whenever a discretionary act is reasonably encompassed by the duties of the governmental employee in question, regardless of whether the exercise of discretion is specifically authorized by statute ... and shall be available to all governmental employees ... who are required to exercise judgment or discretion in performing their official duties.

14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1). Discretionary function immunity can apply where a

complained of act was intentional so long as the act did not exceed the scope of

the discretion a defendant possessed in her official capacity. Polley v. Atwell, 581

A.2d 410, 413 (Me. 1990). In deciding whether an act is "discretionary," the

following factors must be considered:

(1) Does the challenged act, omISSIOn, or decision necessarily involve a basic governmental policy, program[,] or objective?

7 (2) Is the questioned act, omISSIOn, or decision essential to the realization or accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective[,] as opposed to one which would not change the course or direction of the policy, program[,] or objective?

(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental agency involved?

(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the challenged act, omission, or decision?

Grossman v. Richards, 1999 ME 9, <]I 7, 722 A.2d 371, 374 (quoting Berard v.

McKinnis, 1997 NIB 186, <]I 9,699 A.2d 1148, 1151).

One instructive case on the issue at hand involved a foster child who

made unsubstantiated sexual abuse allegations against her former foster parents.

Polley, 581 A.2d at 411. In placing the child with new foster parents, a caseworker

declined to mention the previous incident because of the uncertainty involved.

Id. The foster parents eventually learned of these allegations and subsequently

were accused of sexual abuse by the foster child. Id. at 411-12. The foster parents

sued the caseworker for breach of contract, negligence and fraud. Id. at 412.

In determining that the caseworker was immune from suit under 14

M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C), the court found persuasive that there was a strong

statutorily expressed policy that caseworkers should have wide discretion in

determining what information to keep confidential in pursuing the goal of

placing foster children in suitable foster homes. Id. at 413.

Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is evident that

Herbert cannot invoke discretionary immunity. Plaintiff asserts that Herbert

stated that a background check had been conducted and come up clean at a time

when she had no actual knowledge of Lowry's criminal background. This

8 representation was made even though Herbert knew or should have known that

the mere fact that the intake department had approved Lowry did not mean that

he had no criminal background. Misrepresenting a potential tenant's criminal

background to a landlord who asks about that background cannot be said to

have been within Herbert's discretion as a housing officer. 2

IV. Waiver of Liability in Housing Assistance Payments Contract

In order to participate in PHA's housing assistance payment program,

Plaintiff signed a standard Housing Assistance Payments Contract ("HAP

Contract") on April 5, 2002.. Under the terms of this contract, an owner agrees

that she is responsible for screening a tenant's behavior for suitability for

tenancy, that PHA is not responsible for that screening, and that PHA has no

liability or responsibility to the owner for a tenant's behavior or conduct during

his tenancy. Thus, under the plain language of the contract, it would appear that

Plaintiff has waived her right to bring the present lawsuit.

Plaintiff raises two issues that she contends demonstrate that the waiver

provision of the HAP contract does not bar her suit. First, she argues that there

was fraud in the inducement. Fraud in the inducement is a defense to a contract

that renders it voidable. Cote v. Dep't of Human Services, 2003 ME 146, n. I, 837

A.2d 140, 142. This doctrine, however, is only applicable where "a party's

manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a material

misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is justified in

2 This is unlike in Polley where the caseworker, in not revealing the child's allegations against her former foster parents to the new foster parents, made a discretionary decision based on the uncertainty surrounding the truth of those allegations. In the present case, Herbert had access to information necessary to determine whether or not a criminal background check had in fact been conducted and the results from such a background check.

9 relying." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1981) (emphasis

added).

The undisputed timeline of events in this case negates Plaintiff's claim of

fraud in the inducement. Specifically, the lease agreement between Plaintiff and

Lowry is dated February I, 2002. It was not until March 7, 2002 that Plaintiff

filled out a Request for Tenancy Approval in the housing choice voucher

program. Plaintiff did not meet Herbert until she went to sign this initial

program paperwork. Finally, Plaintiff did not sign the HAP Contract until April

5, 2002. Quite simply, it is impossible for any alleged fraud on the part of Herbert

to have induced her to rent to Lowry when she had already signed a lease with

Lowry prior to meeting Herbert?

Equally unavailing is Plaintiff's argument that applicable federal

regulations and PHA's own Administrative Plan ("Plan") trump the waiver

provision of the HAP Contract. Plaintiff correctly notes that PHA receives

funding from the United States Department of Housing and Development

("HUD") and is therefore subject to HUD regulations regarding the provision of

public housing. HUD regulations provide the following:

In selection of families for admission to its public housing program . . . the PHA is responsible for screening family behavior and suitability for tenancy. The PHA may consider all relevant information, which may include, but is not limited to . . . [aJ criminal background involving crimes of physical violence to persons or property and other criminal acts which would adversely affect the health and safety or welfare of other tenants.

3For similar reasons, Plaintiff would be unable to prevail on her substantive fraudulent misrepresentation cause of action as one of the elements necessary for establishing a prima facie case of fraudulent misrepresentation is that a defendant's false representation was made for the purpose of inducing a plaintiff to act in reliance on that representation. Francis v. Stinson, 2000 ME 173, ,-r 38, 760 A.2d 209,217. Such reliance is absent in this case.

10 24 c.P.R. § 960.203. Similarly, the Plan stated that I/[a]pplicants will be denied

admission to the program if they have been convicted of any criminal act of

violence or illegal drug activity within 3 years prior to the date of the certification

interview.I/

Although the HUD regulation and the Plan demonstrate that PHA did

have a responsibility to screen potential participants for a criminal history and

other factors that might make them unsuitable tenants, this screening was for

purposes of determining whether the potential tenant was a good candidate to

participate in PHA's rental assistance program. There is nothing in the federal

regulation or the Plan that demonstrates an intention to relieve a landlord of her

traditional responsibility to screen her own tenants to ensure that they satisfy the

landlord's requirements. Therefore, the federal regulations and the Plan do not

trump the express waiver language of the HAP Contract and Plaintiff is barred

from recovery in the present suit.

The entry is:

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Judgment for Defendants on all counts of Plaintiff's amended complaint.

The clerk shall incorporate this Order into the docket by reference pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).

Dated at Portland, Maine this .2 ;J2 day o,/JL.\-----"'"'79-~"O

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