Snell v. State

845 So. 2d 323, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 7392, 28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 1276
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Snell v. State. Read the opinion of the Court — 890 So. 2d 1292
District Court of Appeal of Florida·Decided May 20, 2003·No. No. 1D02-1799·Published

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Cary Snell, challenges the sentence imposed when the trial court revoked his probation, and the State has properly conceded error. Snell’s original sentence — 24 months in prison, suspended, and 30 months of probation — was a “true split sentence.” See Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161, 164 (Fla.1988); Evans v. State, 730 So.2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). “[T]he imposition of a true split sentence ... precludes the trial court from placing a defendant on probation for a period of time that exceeds the unserved portion of a suspended sentence.” Evans, 730 So.2d at 769. Accordingly, the maximum sentence available upon appellant’s violation of probation was “the maximum term of the suspended jail sentence.” Id.

We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. As in Evans, defendant need not be present for resentencing.

KAHN, VAN NORTWICK, and BROWNING, JJ., CONCUR.

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Snell v. State, 845 So. 2d 323, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 7392, 28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 1276 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003).

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Related

Poore v. State
531 So. 2d 161 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1988)
Evans v. State
730 So. 2d 768 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1999)