Snell v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Snell v. State

845 So. 2d 323, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 7392, 28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 1276

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMay 20, 2003

DocketNo. 1D02-1799

StatusPublished

This text of 845 So. 2d 323 (Snell v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Snell v. State, 845 So. 2d 323, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 7392, 28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 1276 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Cary Snell, challenges the sentence imposed when the trial court revoked his probation, and the State has properly conceded error. Snell’s original sentence — 24 months in prison, suspended, and 30 months of probation — was a “true split sentence.” See Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161, 164 (Fla.1988); Evans v. State, 730 So.2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). “[T]he imposition of a true split sentence ... precludes the trial court from placing a defendant on probation for a period of time that exceeds the unserved portion of a suspended sentence.” Evans, 730 So.2d at 769. Accordingly, the maximum sentence available upon appellant’s violation of probation was “the maximum term of the suspended jail sentence.” Id.

We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. As in Evans, defendant need not be present for resentencing.

KAHN, VAN NORTWICK, and BROWNING, JJ., CONCUR.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Cary Snell, challenges the sentence imposed when the trial court revoked his probation, and the State has properly conceded error. Snell’s original sentence — 24 months in prison, suspended, and 30 months of probation — was a “true split sentence.” See Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161, 164 (Fla.1988); Evans v. State, 730 So.2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). “[T]he imposition of a true split sentence ... precludes the trial court from placing a defendant on probation for a period of time that exceeds the unserved portion of a suspended sentence.” Evans, 730 So.2d at 769. Accordingly, the maximum sentence available upon appellant’s violation of probation was “the maximum term of the suspended jail sentence.” Id.

We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. As in Evans, defendant need not be present for resentencing.

KAHN, VAN NORTWICK, and BROWNING, JJ., CONCUR.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

845 So. 2d 323, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 7392, 28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 1276, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/snell-v-state-fladistctapp-2003.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack