SNEE v. United States

CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedJanuary 23, 2026
Docket24-199
StatusPublished

This text of SNEE v. United States (SNEE v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
SNEE v. United States, (uscfc 2026).

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims No. 24-199 Filed: January 23, 2026

PATRICK SNEE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

Steven M. Wald, with Michael J. Smith, Thomas S. Stewart, and Reed W. Ripley, Stewart, Wald & Smith, LLC, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiffs.

Emily A. Davis, Environment and Natural Resources Division, Natural Resources Section, with Adam R.F. Gustafson, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 1

TAPP, Judge

Plaintiffs seek just compensation for the United States’ uncompensated taking related to their New York properties. They now move for partial summary judgment as to liability. (Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 43). 2 Plaintiffs ask this Court to find that the: (1) source conveyances granted easements to the railroad under New York law; (2) recreational trail use exceeds the scope of those easements; (3) Plaintiffs regained fee simple ownership of the land underlying the railroad corridor based on their adjacency to the rail line; and (4) the issuance of the Notice of Interim Trail Use (“NITU”) effected a taking. (Id.). The United States objects in part and cross-moves for partial summary judgment. (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 45). The United States argues that the Plaintiffs cannot show: (1) that they have an ownership interest in the rail corridor; (2) causation or just compensation for several Plaintiffs, due to the existence of the Maybrook Trail; and (3) that the Railroad would have abandoned the rail line absent the NITU. (Id.).

1 This Opinion is substantively identical to the Court’s analysis in an indirectly related action, Zanzarella v. United States, ___ Fed. Cl. ___, 2025 WL 3628241, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 15, 2025) (“Zanzarella”). 2 This Motion is filed on behalf of 93 landowners who own 104 parcels of land as a collective. (Pls.’ Mot. at 1, ECF No. 43). The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ source documents conveyed easements to the railroad. The Court also finds that while the pre-existing recreational trail does not affect causation, it may nevertheless impact just compensation—an issue overlooked by the Plaintiffs. To that end, the United States has taken a portion of Plaintiffs’ property for public use, but several claims have failed to demonstrate an interest in the land underlying the rail corridor. Therefore, summary judgment is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART.

I. Background

This rails-to-trails case concerns a 41.1-mile section of rail line running from the Connecticut/New York State Line (Milepost 71.2) to Beacon, New York (Milepost 0.0) across Dutchess and Putnam Counties (the “Line”). (Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 1; Pls.’ Mot. at 1).

(Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 2 at 7, ECF No. 43-2). The Line was previously owned by the Maybrook Railroad Company, which in 1992 acquired 157 miles of railroad that included this segment. (See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 9 (“Danbury Terminal R.R. Co. and Maybrook Properties, Inc.-Acquisition and Operation Exemption-Consolidated Rail Corp., ICC Docket No. FD 32180 (Sub-No. 1) (served Dec. 29, 1992), available at 1992 WL 383337”), ECF No. 43-9). In 1995, ownership of the Line transferred to the Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (“MNR”). (Pls.’ Mot. at 5 (citing Pls.’ Ex. 11, ECF No. 43-11)).

2 Under the Trails Act, a railroad may initiate abandonment proceedings of a rail line before the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”). 49 U.S.C. § 10903; see 16 U.S.C. § 10502. It is not uncommon for a railroad to abandon all or some portion of its line. The Trails Act permits intervention by qualified private organizations or public agencies to railbank the corridor before abandonment is consummated by agreeing to serve as a trail operator in the interim. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). The railbanking intervention process enables a railroad to negotiate with the intervening entity, which then assumes financial and managerial responsibility for the corridor by operating it as a recreational trail. 28 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6 (citing Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 6–7, (1990) (“Preseault I”)). To allow for this process, the STB may issue a NITU. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29. If the railroad and trail sponsor agree, then the parties notify the STB, the corridor is railbanked, the STB retains jurisdiction, and “interim trail use is thereby authorized.” Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 7 n.5 (1990); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(h). If an agreement is not reached, the railroad may exercise its STB-granted authority to abandon the line. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d)(1), (e)(2); see Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails v. STB, 267 F.3d 1144, 1150–53 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

In December 2023, MNR filed a Verified Notice of Exemption of Abandonment (“Abandonment Application”) with the STB. (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 22, ECF No. 43-22). MNR also formally requested a NITU with MNR as the trail sponsor, (id., Ex. 2), which the STB issued on February 8, 2024, (id., Ex. 3, ECF No. 43-3). Per the NITU, MNR was required to notify the STB of a trail use agreement prior to its expiration on February 8, 2025. (Id., Ex. 3 at 3). MNR filed for and was granted an Extension of the Interim Trail Use Negotiation period, which is now set to expire on February 8, 2026. (Id., Ex. 190, ECF No. 43-190).

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Each party moves for summary judgment. The Court may “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” RCFC 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Facts are material if they “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine factual dispute exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

While “inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion[,]” United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962), summary judgment may still be granted when the party opposing the motion submits evidence that “is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (internal citations omitted). However, the moving party “need not produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact but rather may discharge its burden by showing . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Dairyland Power Co-op. v.

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SNEE v. United States, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/snee-v-united-states-uscfc-2026.