Smull v. Commissioner
This text of 17 T.C. 1393 (Smull v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
OPINION.
The sole issue presented concerns the taxability of certain cash dividends received by the petitioner in the taxable year 1946. As indicated in our findings of fact, the J. H. Winchester & Co. Inc., in which petitioner is a principal shareholder, qualified as a personal service corporation for World War II excess profits tax purposes and elected not to be subject to excess profits tax for the years 1940 to 1945, inclusive.1 Accordingly, each year Winchester’s shareholders were required to include in their gross income as dividends any yearly earnings which Winchester retained in the business.2 The Code contains certain adjustments to be made with respect to the retained earnings of a personal service corporation in arriving at the amount which the shareholders are required to report as gross income in their returns, and this adjusted amount is defined in the Code as “undistributed Supplement S net income.” 3
’ The Code contains other provisions which are pertinent to the income tax treatment of undistributed Supplement S net income.4 The first of these, section 394 (d), provides that an amount equal to the undistributed Supplement S net income of a personal service corporation for its taxable year “shall be considered as paid in as of the close of such taxable year as paid-in surplus or as a contribution to capital, and the accumulated earnings and profits as of the close of such taxable year shall be correspondingly reduced, if such amount or any portion thereof is required to be included as a dividend in the gross income of the shareholders.” The other pertinent provision of the Code, section 394 (e), states that the portion of the undistributed Supplement S net income which each shareholder is required to include in his gross income “shall, for the purpose of adjusting the basis of his stock with respect to which the distribution would have been made (if it had been made), be treated as having been reinvested by the shareholder as a contribution to the capital of the corporation; * * *.”
Petitioner’s principal contention appears to be that the cash dividends distributed in 1946 by Winchester constituted distributions of the latter’s 1945 undistributed Supplement S net income, and that since he, as a stockholder, included in his 1945 gross income his share of such undistributed Supplement S net income ($20,554.04), he should not be taxed a second time in 1946 when the corporation distributed such income.
Petitioner’s brief contains two other arguments why he should not be taxed on his share of the 1946 corporate distributions. The substance of one of these appears to be that Winchester “could not” distribute its 1945 earnings to its shareholders as dividends because of the War Shipping Administration’s requirement that a minimum net worth of $250,000 be maintained (Winchester’s net worth as of December 31,1945, was $295,712.39), and that, in view of this fact, to require the shareholders to include the dividends in their 1946 income would be inequitable and would constitute an unwarranted penalty. The other argument advanced was that there was a “constructive payment” of dividends in 1945 in the amount of 1945 undistributed Supplement S net income, the amount the shareholders were required to report as gross income for that year.
The petitioner’s principal contention is supported by certain of the stipulated facts which indicate that (1) it was the expressed intent of Winchester’s board of directors that the retained earnings were the source of the 1946 dividends, and (2) the total amount of these dividends ($97,696.45) equaled Winchester’s 1945 undistributed Supplement S net income of $97,876.45, reduced by unallowable deductions and adjustments of $180.
The stipulation also indicates, however, that Winchester’s 1946 earnings, after taxes and unallowable deductions and adjustments, amounted to $153,202.94, an amount far in excess of the dividends distributed in 1946. The existence of such 1946 earnings requires our consideration of section 115 (b) of the Code, which reads as follows:
SEC. 115. DISTRIBUTIONS BY CORPORATIONS.
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(b) Sohece or Distbibutions. — For the purposes of tbis chapter every distribution is made out of earnings or profits to the extent thereof, and from the most recently accumulated earnings or profits. Any earnings or profits aeeumu-lated, or increase in value of property accrued, before March 1, 1913, may be distributed exempt from tax, after the earnings and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, have been distributed, but any such tax-free distribution shall be applied against and reduce the adjusted basis of the stock provided in section 113. The preceding sentence shall not apply to a distribution which is a dividend within the meaning of the last sentence of subsection (a).
The above reference in section 115 (b) to “most recently accumulated earnings or profits” includes the earnings of the year in which the distributions were made.5 Furthermore, the requirement that for income tax purposes every distribution is made out of such most recently accumulated earnings or profits is a conclusive statutory presumption. Leland v. Commissioner, 50 F. 2d 523, affirming Albert J. Gifford, 18 B. T. A. 795; Lawrence v. Commissioner, 143 F. 2d 456.
We have given careful consideration to the provisions of section 115 (b) set out above, as compared with the provisions of the Code which are pertinent to the treatment of undistributed Supplement S net income for income tax purposes (section 394 (d) and (e) of the Code discussed above), and we believe that these provisions of the Code are consistent with one another, that they are correlative, and that nowhere in any of these sections which we have discussed above, nor elsewhere in the Code, does there exist any provision excepting from the operation of section 115 (b) any distributions alleged by a personal service corporation to be out of undistributed Supplement S net income. Accordingly, we believe that the issue presented herein is reduced to that presented whenever a corporation which has such earnings available for dividends as would render a distribution taxable under section 115 expressly declares that the source of its dividends is paid-in or capital surplus. In such cases it has been consistently held that in view of the language contained in section 115 (b), and similar provisions of preceding revenue laws, the expression of the directors as to the source of corporate dividends must be disregarded and the dividends have been held to be taxable. Leland v. Commissioner, supra; Stanley M. Bolster, 23 B. T. A. 347; R. M. Walker, 26 B. T. A. 494, appeal dismissed 74 F. 2d 1022; Lawrence v. Commissioner, supra.
Since we believe that in accordance with the sections of the Code discussed above the 1946 distributions in question are taxable, we deem it unnecessary to consider petitioner’s alternative arguments and we hold that the respondent did not err in including in petitioner’s income the dividends he received from Winchester in the year 1946.
Decision wül be entered, for the respondent.
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17 T.C. 1393, 1952 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 266, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smull-v-commissioner-tax-1952.